1. Facts and figures

**Political system:** According to the Constitution of the Russian Federation (2020), Russia is a democratic federal constitutional state with a republican form of government. However, Freedom House's 2022 report* states that Russia has recently shifted to an authoritarian presidential political system.

**Official language(s):** Russian

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2021</th>
<th>2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population on 1 January</td>
<td>145.8 million</td>
<td>146.6 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP in million EUR</td>
<td>1 503.28</td>
<td>1 154.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita in PPS Index (EU27_2020 = 100)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General government expenditure (in % of GDP)</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public cultural expenditure</td>
<td>EUR 7.48 billion</td>
<td>EUR 5.70 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public cultural expenditure as % of GDP</td>
<td>0.50%</td>
<td>0.49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public cultural expenditure per capita</td>
<td>EUR 11.49</td>
<td>EUR 8.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of cultural employment of total employment</td>
<td>1.96%</td>
<td>1.67%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** * For more information, see [https://freedomhouse.org/country/russia/freedom-world/2022](https://freedomhouse.org/country/russia/freedom-world/2022)

**Sources:**
RUB to EUR conversion: EUR 1 = RUB 74.1446 (average for the period 1 Jan 2016 to 31 Dec 2016)
RUB to EUR conversion: EUR 1 = RUB 87.1527 (average for the period 1 Jan 2021 to 31 Dec 2021)

General government expenditure (in % of GDP), latest data available / https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.CON.GOV.T.ZS?locations=RU

2. Cultural policy system

2.1 Objectives

The current cultural policy framework draws on several key legislative acts, which were adopted under two distinct political regimes – a democratic (1991–2011) and an authoritarian one (since circa 2012). In particular, the federal law ‘Fundamentals of Russian Legislation on Culture’ (1992) and the Presidential Decree approving the ‘Basics of State Cultural Policy’ (2014)¹ are the two central normative acts that simultaneously regulate the cultural sector and arts.

The 1992 federal law defines the following range of tasks, which include but are not limited to:

- the ensuring and protection of the constitutional right of citizens of the Russian Federation to cultural activities;
- the creation of legal guarantees for the free cultural activities of associations of citizens, peoples and cultural communities in the Russian Federation;
- the establishment of state cultural policy, legal norms for state support for culture and guarantees for state non-interference in creative processes.

The 2014 Presidential Decree establishes a new model of state cultural policy. Its strategic objectives are reduced to ‘the formation of a harmoniously developed personality and the strengthening of the unity of Russian society’ (Decree 2014: 2). At the same time, the secondary goals of state cultural policy are focused on:

- the strengthening of civic identity;
- the creation of conditions for the upbringing of citizens;

The preservation of historical and cultural heritage and its use for education;
the transmission from generation to generation of values and norms, traditions, customs and patterns of behaviour traditional for Russian civilisation;
the creation of conditions for each person to realise their creative potential;
the provision of citizens with access to knowledge, information and cultural values.

The political authority of the 2014 presidential decree overrides the previous priorities and principles of cultural policy but does not repeal the 1992 Federal Law on Culture.

2.2 **Main features**

For the last thirty years, cultural policy in the Russian Federation has been shaped by contradictions and different regimes of power, as well as by internal problems and geopolitical conflicts. It continues to be influenced by elements of the Soviet past, the post-communist transition to capitalism in the 1990s and, finally, the authoritarian tendencies associated with the post-2012 regime.

Between 1991 and 2011, there was a general trend towards the liberation of the cultural sphere from the ideological and administrative control of the Communist Party government. It was supported by the first federal law ‘Fundamentals of Russian Legislation on Culture’ (1992), which established an initial normative framework for cultural policy. The law prescribed the common reciprocal relationships between the state and other actors of the cultural sphere based on the principles of cultural and economic freedom. It also aimed to ensure and protect Russian citizens’ constitutional right to cultural activities and to preserve cultural heritage, including the public network of cultural and educational institutions. Combined with liberal political ambitions and economic reforms, this led to a relative decentralisation of the bureaucracy and the commercialisation of the cultural sector in the mid-1990s. Administrative fragmentation and the absence of an ideological doctrine made it possible, on the one hand, to localise the processes of policy formation and adjust their logic to regional needs, and on the other hand, to globalise the priorities of national cultural policy. In general, post-Soviet cultural policy was characterised by an emphasis on the socio-economic impact of culture in relation to social inclusion, a pluralist attitude to culture concerning the normative
space of culture and UNESCO’s stress on cultural diversity with respect to human rights and freedoms.

However, since the mid-2010s, Russian cultural policy has changed course and gradually introduced conservative priorities in the face of a growing trend of national securitisation. In December 2014, President Vladimir Putin signed a decree to approve the ‘Basics of State Cultural Policy’ (BRSCP). The document is the first of its kind, a white paper of sorts, in which the establishment lays out its vision of a complex cultural issue. Firstly, it affirms the highest value of Russian culture, placing it among the national priorities. Secondly, the adopted piece of legislation has become part of the National Security Strategy and has gained supreme political power. Its preamble states that the BRSCP is the basic document for establishing any legislative or other normative legal acts that regulate the processes of cultural development in the country. Thirdly, it outlines a new problem for the government with respect to the strategic objectives and principles of state cultural policy.

The BRSCP is essentially concerned with a humanitarian crisis that threatens the future of Russia. This crisis is portrayed as a destabilisation of the social order and other internal and external symptoms of cultural and political changes associated with liberal capitalist formations. To tackle this problem, urgent measures are required from all levels of state authorities. Thus, to reinforce stability and order, the BRSCP (2014: 2) intends to establish the identity of the Russian people through a ‘social mission of culture’ that ‘transmits to new generations a set of moral, ethical and aesthetic values that constitute the core of national identity’. By doing so, this state policy aims to strengthen Russia’s cultural sovereignty and protect Russian civilisation from the destructive patterns of Western hegemony – primarily individualism, liberalism and consumerism. The objective of state cultural policy is to reinforce and extend Russian ‘spirituality’ incarnated in culture as a national and international strategic resource. In this way, spirituality is optimised to enable the nation to restore the great power of Russia. To fulfil the social mission of culture, cultural policy must apply an intersectoral approach and cover all areas of cultural activity, including the media, family, youth, national and educational policies, issues of art education, as well as the spiritual and patriotic education of Russian citizens.
In fact, this rationale reveals strong aspects of state paternalism over the common cultural space and national identity, with elements of censorship on individual cultural rights and freedoms. The shift to the conservative agenda in cultural policy was conditioned by a rapid centralisation of decision-making processes in the Presidential Administration, as well as by structural changes in scientific and expert institutions that occurred around 2012–2015. To implement the new model of state cultural policy, its philosophy and logic were distributed as a set of administrative practices through the apparatus of national strategic planning. In particular, the ‘Strategy of State Cultural Policy until 2030’ (2016) and its supplementary measures – the National Project ‘Culture’ and its action plan ‘Passport for 2019–2024’ – outline the characteristics of the governmental technologies used to execute the proposed political objectives and allocate funds coming from the Foundation of Presidential Grants, as well as the federal, regional and local budgets.

As mentioned above, the new cultural policy model is a political priority for public authorities at all levels but does not repeal the federal law ‘Fundamentals of Russian Legislation on Culture’, which has been shaping the normative framework for the sphere of culture since 1992. In 2017, however, the President of Russia instructed his administration to draft a new federal law on culture, compatible with the ‘Basics of State Cultural Policy’ (2014), to replace the 1992 law. This draft, ‘Concept of the New Federal Law on Culture’ (2018), has undergone numerous expert discussions but has not yet been officially adopted.

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2 For more information, see the National Project ‘Culture’, the Russian Ministry of Culture, available / https://culture.gov.ru/about/national-project/about-project/
2.3 **Governance system: Organisational Organigram**

*The relatively independent consultative public, scientific and expert policy-making actors are in italics.*
2.4 Historical background for the past 70 years

Right after the October Revolution in 1917, Vladimir Lenin proposed a ‘cultural revolution’ so that Russia could quickly overcome its backwardness. The idea was to raise the cultural level of the Russian population by eliminating illiteracy and teaching people basic hygiene standards. Culture was the instrument for transforming the peasantry into a civilised and disciplined proletariat – the Soviet people – an integral part of the socialist utopia.

1930–1950: Under Stalin’s leadership, socialism turned into a representational project, which bridged the ideas of industrialisation, avant-garde utopias and the cult of Stalin’s personality through the aestheticisation of labour and production.

1950–1980: During the period of ‘Khrushchev’s thaw’ (1953–64) and ‘Brezhnev’s stagnation’ (1964–82), cultural policy moved significantly away from the ideological priorities of the Communist Party and became the subject of state administration. The Ministry of Culture was established in 1953. It centralised the administration of all areas of cultural creativity (i.e., fine arts, performing arts and cultural heritage), mass education and various branches of arts education. A few specialised state committees were responsible for publishing, cinematography, and television and radio broadcasting.

1985–1990: The years of ‘perestroika’ and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union (1991) brought about noticeable changes in all spheres of social and cultural life. In the official rhetoric, the communist worldview was replaced by the prospect of civil society, in which people do not exist for the state, but the state exists for the people.

1990–2000: Yeltsin’s radical reforms in the 1990s initially envisioned a rapid political and economic transition to a capitalist state. In the early 1990s, within the general tendencies of decentralisation and economisation, cultural policy became the subject of liberal discussions and legislative modifications. The 1992 federal law set a flexible framework for the formation of cultural policy. It prescribed the common principles and norms that actors should follow. It also guaranteed freedom of speech, and cultural, ethnic and religious self-determination.
2000–2010: During the years of economic prosperity and a loose state governance framework, cultural policy actors tended to interact with programmes and structures developed in the European Union and the United Kingdom. As a rule, this international collaboration was backed by the European Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) programme or Cross-Border Cooperation, the European Council, the British Council and the Western third sector, i.e., the Open Society Institute, the Ford Foundation, the Goethe Institute, the Carnegie Institute, etc.

2010–2020: After 2012, a conservative turn took place in cultural policy following the general transformation of state administration and the emergence of authoritarian aspects in the Russian regime. In 2014, cultural policy became part of the National Security Strategy. Anti-Western and anti-European sentiments gave rise to a restrictive set of laws that eliminated human rights and freedoms in Russia. Culture became a tool of the conservative political project to create Russia’s national identity and serve other purposes of memory politics.

2020–2022: The current model of state cultural policy is in line with Russia’s authoritarian regime and conservative government. On 21 February 2022, President Putin announced his decision to launch a ‘special military operation’ in Ukraine. Putin\(^3\) justified Russia’s invasion of Ukraine by referring to the ‘Russian world’, the principles and subjects (i.e., Russian-speaking people) of which must be protected from Western ‘will and pseudo-values’. Russian cultural policy has yet to experience the changes associated with this decision and the consequences of the militarisation of the country and the totalisation of its regime.

\(^3\) Address by the President of the Russian Federation. Moscow: Kremlin, 21 September 2022, available / http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69390
3. **Current cultural affairs**

3.1 **Key developments**

The 2004 administrative reform reorganised the Russian government system and centralised political power and spending decisions in Moscow. Amid the global financial crisis of 2007 and 2008, the Russian expert community announced the inability of the Russian Government to provide state guarantees in the field of culture. The argument was that the 2004 administrative reform and the austerity policies imposed by the federal government significantly undermined the 1992 federal law on culture, which by that time had more than 200 amendments.

In response to the criticism of the expert community, the Ministry of Culture initiated the engineering of a brand-new federal law on culture in 2009. The original idea was that it would meet the social and economic trends in cultural development, corresponding to the main documents of UNESCO, and take international best practices as a starting point in relation to the constitutional rights and freedoms of individuals, for example. According to the initial concept of the future law, the then Russian Federation tended to embrace the notion of ‘knowledge economy’ by stressing the role of fostering ‘human capital’. In 2011, the proposed law was positively received by the majority of the Russian Parliament. However, ultimately the law was not passed due to the new composition of the Russian Parliament and Putin’s newly appointed Government in 2012.

In May 2012, Putin signed eleven decrees in which he, as president, promised to solve problems of and obstacles to Russia’s development, concerning the cultural, educational and social spheres in particular, through a pay rise and improvement of working conditions. To satisfy the stated political ambitions, the Russian Government initiated a policy of ‘optimization’, in which cultural and educational institutions were subjected to staff and structure reductions. It was in this way that two central research think tanks for cultural policy, the Likhachev University and the Russian Institute of Cultural Studies, were merged by an order of the Ministry of Culture in 2014. As a result, only the Likhachev Russian Research Institute for Cultural and Natural Heritage survived the optimisation process.

In December 2014, President Putin signed the decree on the ‘Basics of State Cultural Policy’. By this decree, a new model of cultural policy has been introduced,
in which the state is both the main actor and the patron. The decree tends to exercise power over further federal laws on culture and any other normative acts in this sphere.

To translate the political ideas and ambitions of the ‘Basics of State Cultural Policy’ into the state mechanism, the Russian Government adopted the ‘Strategy of State Cultural Policy until 2030’ in 2016. To implement this strategy, the National Project ‘Culture’ and its ‘Passport for 2019–2024’ (i.e., a financial and organisational action plan) were prepared in 2018 and launched in 2019.

The National Project ‘Culture’ (2019–2024) outlines the main directions of the infrastructural, institutional and cyberspace support for the policy priorities through three federal projects. These are:

- ‘Cultural sphere’: ensuring a qualitatively new level of cultural infrastructure development.
- ‘Creative people’: the creation of conditions for the realisation of the creative potential of the nation.
- ‘Digital culture’: the digitisation of services and the creation of an information space in the field of culture.

The implementation of the strategy and its associated national projects is supervised by the State Council and its special Commission ‘Culture’, which report directly to the president. These policy measures are executed in parallel with the old cultural policy mechanisms such as the state programmes ‘Development of Culture’, ‘Development of Culture and Tourism’ and others. However, in 2017, Putin instructed the Presidential Administration together with the Presidential Council for Culture and Arts to develop a new federal law on culture to replace the 1992 federal law.

In 2020, the Constitution of the Russian Federation was amended, with two implications for cultural policy. First, the Constitution has enhanced the symbolic status of the Russian language and the ‘traditional family’. Second, it has enshrined state patronage of culture with an emphasis on the ‘all-Russian civic identity’, and the spiritual and territorial integrity of the country (Constitution 2020: Article 69.3).

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The National Security Strategy is another significant document that defines the contours of cultural legislation. As stated, cultural policy became part of the National Security Strategy in 2014. After that, all normative acts on culture have been established in accordance with the updated versions of the National Security Strategy. For example, the current National Security Strategy (2021) has directly reinforced the conservative trends in the cultural sphere. After its adoption, President Putin initiated the so-called federal law on ‘traditional values’, and its draft was published by the Ministry of Culture at the end of 2021. Following harsh criticism from several art industry unions in January–February 2022, the Ministry of Culture has postponed public discussion of the traditional values draft law and announced that more work needs to be done on it. Otherwise, changes in cultural legislation that correspond to the National Security Strategy have typically been enacted through state-driven negotiations in the Civic Chamber, in the State Duma Committee on Culture and on various ‘expert’ platforms.

3.2 Key themes

The mainstream cultural policy debates are characterised by topics such as the antagonism between Russia and the West, the cultural sovereignty of Russia and its securitisation. In 2015–2020, the Likhachev Institute became responsible for providing a scientific alibi for the central ideologemes of Russian state cultural policy, including ‘traditional values’, ‘spiritual patriotism’ and ‘Russian civilisationism’. These concepts are an integral part of the current model of cultural policy that has been developed since 2014.

If the ‘Basics of State Cultural Policy’ is a kind of political declaration, the ‘Strategy of State Cultural Policy until 2030’ (2016) is a practical guide for authorities at all levels. The latter is informed by the former and strengthens the definition of the civilisational nature of Russian culture through an antagonism to ‘mass culture that fosters the consumer’ and apparently originates from Western capitalism. Unfolding this narrative, the document specifies ‘the most dangerous symptoms of the humanitarian crisis’ that threatens ‘Russia’s future’. These include:

- a decrease in the intellectual and cultural level of society;
- a devaluation of universally recognised values and the misrepresentation of value-based guidelines;
- the rise of aggression, intolerance and asocial behaviour;
• the distortion of historical memory, a negative assessment of significant periods of Russian history and the spreading of disinformation about the historical backwardness of the Russian Federation;
• the fragmentation of the society, the growth of individualism and a disregard for the rights of others.

According to the Strategy until 2030, these symptoms entail ‘threats to the national security in the sphere of culture’, and specifically the ‘erosion of traditional Russian spiritual and moral values and the weakening of the unity of the multi-ethnic people of the Russian Federation by means of the external cultural and information expansion’. The task of Russian state cultural policy is therefore to eliminate these threats.

In the same vein, a special working group of the Presidential Administration issued a draft entitled ‘Concept of the New Federal Law on Culture’ (2018)5. This draft was published on the website of the Ministry of Culture for public discussion. The authors of the draft proposed to replace the emphasis on cultural diversity and autonomy established by the 1992 federal law with a notion of culture ‘as that which shapes and transmits a special civilisational code of the nation’. Its purpose was to establish new legislation based ‘on an understanding of this special mission of culture, which is not reduced to market mechanisms, nor to the sphere of consumption, nor to public services’.2 The Concept affirms the agency and specificity of Russian culture against other notions of culture understood as threatening it, in particular the commercial or entertainment sector, because these do not support its essential ‘spiritual’ mission. Consistent with this mission, the draft proposes a legally enforceable distinction between spiritual and consumer culture to prevent what is seen as the cultural degradation of Russia caused by a free market economy in which ‘the customer is always right’.

During 2019 and 2020, the Concept passed public discussions and expert debates on various government platforms. So far, this legislative initiative has not been officially approved. Nevertheless, in 2021, representatives of the Presidential

Council for Culture and Arts confirmed that all policy-making parties have reviewed the Concept positively and that the law is currently being drafted.

Throughout 2021 and 2022, the dominant discussion themes in the State Duma, the Civic Chamber and the Likhachev Russian Research Institute for Cultural and Natural Heritage included ‘traditional values of the Russian civilisation’, ‘true patriotism’ and the ‘conviction that Russian national interests, history and values must be protected’ from Western aggression.

### 3.3 International Cultural Cooperation

In 1996, the Russian Ministry of Culture supported the Council of Europe's initiatives in the field of rights and freedoms, cultural diversity and sustainable development. The process of decentralisation and regionalisation of post-Soviet cultural policy was mainly associated with the democratic project of the Russian Institute for Cultural Research. Under the leadership of Kirill Razlogov, this think tank was a kind of pioneer in building mutual relationships between legislative authorities and non-governmental actors in society, including international actors.

In the early 2000s, quite a few independent agencies and research centres interacted with European actors. During 2000–2007, numerous autonomous domestic cultural policy players emerged at the regional and local level. Cultural agencies attempted to establish a politically active community and bring together various representatives of cultural business, local self-government, and the private and professional sectors. Moscow-based NGOs such as the Institute of Cultural Policy (http://eng.cpolicy.ru/) and the Creative Industries Agency (www.creativeindustries.ru) were among them. This trend continued throughout the 2010s. In cultural politics, there was therefore active interaction between:

- Federal and regional government structures (Russian Ministry of Culture and regional Ministries of Culture, Committees of Culture and local authorities);
- Russian and European governmental structures (Russian Ministry of Culture and UNESCO, EU Council, EU Commission on Culture, etc.);
- Foreign foundations and EU structures, local public authorities, autonomous cultural agencies, domestic academic communities and individual scholars.
The institutional transformation of international cultural policy cooperation began in 2013. That year, Vladimir Medinsky, the newly appointed Minister of Culture, rejected a national report on culture, which had been prepared by a team of experts in cooperation with several regional ministries and already endorsed by the Council of Europe. In relation to this issue, Kirill Razlogov⁶, one of the editors of this volume, noted that officials wanted him to ‘improve’ the final version of the text in line with Putin’s quotations from the 2012 Valdai Club. Kirill Razlogov refused to comply with these instructions.

In response, the bureaucratic apparatus of the Ministry of Culture and the Russian Government were appointed to prepare and approve the national report on culture. Later, in 2014, the Russian Institute for Cultural Research was dissolved, and cooperation with the Council of Europe ended shortly after.

4. Cultural Institutions

4.1 Overview

The Russian Federation inherited an extensive network of cultural and art institutions from the Soviet Union. This post-Soviet system of state-run organisations and institutions of culture, art and cinematography (film production) is financially supported and managed by the Ministry of Culture of the Russian Federation and regional authorities. However, the Russian cultural sector, its creative practices and arts activities are not limited to the state-run infrastructure alone. For instance, the Association of Private Museums\(^7\) unites more than 500 independent museums operating throughout Russia, and about 700 more museums are awaiting registration for membership. It is important to note that the data from national statistical offices or the Ministry of Culture do not cover the private museum sector, and therefore these figures are not included in official reports. In other words, not enough data and analytical research are available on private institutions in Russia.

In the 2000s and 2010s, there was a significant rise in cultural industries, contemporary art initiatives and independent cultural research due to the growth of domestic consumer potential and financial support from abroad. Creative business and non-for-profit projects were equally regulated by the 1992 federal law on culture, which provided for various tax incentives and ways to obtain support from public and private funding. The situation for autonomous artistic initiatives and creative projects has changed since 2012.

After the mass anti-Putin and anti-government protests of 2011 and 2012, the Putin regime adopted an increasingly reactionary approach to the cultural sphere and increased state censorship as part of the subsequent authoritarian turn in Russia. The punishment received by members of Pussy Riot for their 2012 performance protests at the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in Moscow is perhaps the most well-known example. During 2012–2015, the Russian Government hastily passed a series of restrictive laws on ‘foreign agents’ and information security, as well as amendments to the administrative and criminal codes regarding the ‘feel-

\(^7\) A catalogue of the Association of Private Museums, available / [https://www.частныемузеи.рф/en/about/]
ings of believers’, ‘gay propaganda’ and other forms of ‘extremism’, and the disruption of ‘social stability’ in the country. According to the federal law on foreign agents (2012), non-governmental and non-profit organisations, as well as religious and civic communities, are not permitted to receive funding from abroad. Considering the poor economic conditions inside the country, national legislation has put the third sector along with private citizens into a position of complete dependence on the state bureaucratic apparatus, thus constraining the autonomy of civil society. Therefore, as one implication of the post-2012 legal system, self-employed artists, state-run organisations and independent socio-cultural projects have lost the opportunity to cooperate with international partners, as well as to receive profits, or financial or organisational assistance from abroad.

Since 2018, several attempts have been made by Russian officials to establish a legal distinction between spiritual/patriotic/consistent with Russian traditional values and consumerist/not patriotic enough/consistent with Western or European culture to strengthen state support for the former and limit access to state funds for the latter. For example, such an approach was originally proposed in the draft Concept of the New Federal Law on Culture (2018), which was discussed in 2019 and 2020 but has not yet been officially adopted. Similar initiatives to draw a line between Russian civilisational culture and Western decadent culture have been introduced by the Likhachev Institute and its current Director Vladimir Aristarkhov, former vice-Minister of Culture. During 2020–2022, Aristarkhov has been particularly active in promoting the legislation on traditional values and conservative amendments to the ‘Basics of State Cultural Policy’ (2014) in line with the recently updated National Security Strategy (2021). In addition to economic restrictions, the adoption of this package of laws may lead to the normalisation of state censorship on any form of dissent and insufficiently patriotic cultural activities.
### Data on selected public and private cultural institutions

#### Table 1: Cultural institutions, by sector and domain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>Cultural Institution (Subdomain)</th>
<th>Public Sector</th>
<th>Private Sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cultural Heritage</strong></td>
<td>Cultural heritage sites (recognised)</td>
<td>39 812</td>
<td>168 095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Archaeological sites</td>
<td>55 300</td>
<td>69 841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Museums</strong></td>
<td>Museum institutions</td>
<td>2 981</td>
<td>2 742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Archives</strong></td>
<td>Archive institutions</td>
<td>2 103</td>
<td>1 747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Visual arts</strong></td>
<td>Public art galleries / exhibition halls</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Performing arts</strong></td>
<td>Scenic and stable spaces for theatre</td>
<td>679</td>
<td>651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Concert houses</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Theatre companies</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dance and ballet companies</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Symphonic orchestras</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Libraries</strong></td>
<td>Libraries</td>
<td>41 356</td>
<td>38 228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Audio visual</strong></td>
<td>Cinemas</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Broadcasting organisations</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interdisciplinary</strong></td>
<td>Children's art schools</td>
<td>5 008</td>
<td>5 007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cultural houses</td>
<td>42 546</td>
<td>41 350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Others</strong></td>
<td>Circuses</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public parks</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zoos</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:**


Performing arts: Public sector, latest data available / https://stat.mkrf.ru/upload/iblock/659/6590181f42427ce0e3e755217733e708.pdf
Performing arts: Private sector, latest data available / https://www.thefuturelab.ru/census
Museum institutions and Zoos: Public sector, latest data available / https://stat.mkrf.ru/upload/iblock/720/7204d9bec113d0e4044a6eb009e226b.pdf
Archive institutions: Public sector, latest data available / statistika.archives.ru/reporting/archives.shtml
Cinemas: Private sector, latest data available / https://research.nevafilm.ru/research/research-news/view/cinemamarket-0106202/
Cultural houses: Public sector, latest data available / https://stat.mkrf.ru/upload/iblock/d2f/d2f78843b86f662d2cfc2c588fae56c9b.pdf
Circuses: Public sector, latest data available / https://stat.mkrf.ru/indicators/
Public parks: Public sector, latest data available / https://stat.mkrf.ru/upload/iblock/d2f/d2f78843b86f662d2cfc2c588fae56c9b.pdf

5. Cultural Funding

5.1 Overview

Russian public spending on culture includes federal, regional and municipal levels. Federal funds are distributed through the central Ministry of Culture, while regional and local funds are administered by the regional ministries of culture, city budgets and municipalities.

In 2021, the federal budget was divided into four sections: 1) culture (RUB 132 323 055 067.40); 2) cinematography (RUB 8 192 386 757.85); 3) applied scientific research in these areas (RUB 525 413 500.00) and 4) other issues in culture and cinematography (RUB 5 302 704 534.10). The Ministry of Culture oversees the allocation of these funds to its subordinated organisations via subsidies. In addition to these subsidies, the Ministry of Culture's other main funding mechanism is the federal programme for the development of culture, established for 3- to 5-year periods.

After the introduction of the new model of state cultural policy in 2014, other forms of state support to culture were added to the existing system. These include the funding coming through the National Project ‘Culture’ (2019–2024) and grants.
The National Project ‘Culture’ is administered by the State Council’s Commission on ‘Culture’. The grants come from the Presidential Fund for Cultural Initiatives, which was created in 2021.

According to the latest reports from the Ministry of Culture (2016; 2019)^8, there has been a steady growth in public cultural expenditure since 2012. Indeed, as can be seen from the latest official statistics (2016 and 2021), the expenditures of the consolidated budget of the Russian Federation and state off-budget funds on culture and cinema increased by 1.78 billion euros (31.23%) in absolute values. However, the share of cultural spending as a percentage of Russia's GDP has remained virtually unchanged, increasing by only 0.01% from 2016 to 2021.

In general, the official statistics cover the figures related to the state funding and income of the state-driven organisations in the cultural sector. However, there is a lack of comprehensive research and analysis of private funding for culture that comes from philanthropy, sponsorships, fundraising campaigns and personal investments.

5.2 Public cultural expenditure by level of government

Table 2: Public cultural expenditure by level of government, in RUB and in EUR, 2021 and 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of government</th>
<th>Total cultural expenditure in 2021</th>
<th>Total cultural expenditure in 2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>in billion RUB^*</td>
<td>in billion EUR^*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal</td>
<td>146.3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consolidated Regional (including municipal)</td>
<td>531.9</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL**</td>
<td>678.2</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources:


**Note:**
* On the date of expenditure.

** The total of the actual expenditure figures of the federal and the consolidated regional budget exceeds the figures of the consolidated budget for culture of the Russian Federation by 3.9% (RUB 651.9 billion) in 2021 and by 1.1% (RUB 422.8 billion) in 2016. This difference between the actual spending and the allocated budget might be explained by interregional transfers and funds coming from the state budget for social development and education or the Presidential Fund for Cultural Initiatives.
5.3 Public cultural expenditure per sector

Table 3: Public cultural expenditure*: by sector, in RUB and EUR, in 2021 and 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field / Domain</th>
<th>Total cultural expenditure 2021</th>
<th>Total cultural expenditure 2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>in billion RUB</td>
<td>in billion EUR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Heritage</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Museums</td>
<td>73.4</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archives</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performing Arts, concert companies</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theatres</td>
<td>90.3</td>
<td>1.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children art schools</td>
<td>110.95</td>
<td>1.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural houses</td>
<td>174.6</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libraries</td>
<td>85.3</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zoos</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL*</td>
<td>678.2</td>
<td>7.78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources:
All the 2016 figures for the public sector were derived from the State Report on Culture. Ministry of Culture, available /https://culture.gov.ru/activities/reports/years/report2016/
All the 2021 figures for the public sector were derived from ‘Key performance indicators of the industry: Statistical data on types of cultural, art and educational institutions’. AIS ‘Statistics’, Ministry of Culture, available /https://stat.mkrf.ru/indicators/.
Note:
* The total of the actual expenditure figures of the federal and the consolidated regional budget exceeds the figures of the consolidated budget for culture of the Russian Federation by 3.9% (RUB 651.9 billion) in 2021 and by 1.1% (RUB 422.8 billion) in 2016. For consistency with the previous table, the total figures show the sum of the federal and the consolidated regional budget for culture of the Russian Federation.

6. Legislation on culture

6.1 Overview of national cultural legislation

Russian cultural policy is implemented through law. The introduction of restrictive laws and amendments after 2012 has created the conditions for the political and economic dependence of the arts and cultural sphere on the state. These legal actions have reversed and erased the previous developments at the level of the state which had recognised a ‘cosmopolitan’ idea of culture as well as its market-centric economic dimension, in particular in the framework of the 1992 federal law.

Since 2012, Russian cultural policy goals have been transformed through the implementation of the presidential May decrees. In 2013, the original May decrees were changed into 218 presidential assignments given to the Russian Government. To deliver them, the Government introduced the mechanism of national strategic planning\(^9\), which established a new management structure aimed at setting goals for, forecasting and planning the social and economic development of the country\(^10\).

The national strategic planning mechanism consists of policy formation elements that are new to the Russian system, including concepts, strategies, projects and implementation plans. The concepts are not federal laws under the Russian Constitution, but they are placed above all relevant previously adopted federal laws. In terms of legislative procedure, a concept is an initial element of a policy framework, usually followed by a policy implementation ‘strategy’ and other supplementary ‘plans’ and ‘projects’. A concept also serves as a starting point for further

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policy legislation. Technically, this policy framework runs in parallel with the existing legal foundations and previously adopted state development programmes but integrates the policy development processes in the Presidential Administration, the State Council and the Presidential Councils.

The current Russian state cultural policy is composed of:

1. Basics of State Cultural Policy (2014)\(^{11}\)
2. State Cultural Policy Strategy until 2030 (2016)\(^{12}\)

The key pieces of legislation related to the cultural sector in general:

- The Constitution of the Russian Federation (2020)\(^{14}\)
- National Security Strategy (2021)\(^{15}\)
- Federal law ‘Fundamentals of Russian Legislation on Culture’ (1992)\(^{16}\)

6.2 Overview of international cultural legislation

In early September 2022, President Putin signed a decree approving the concept of Russia's humanitarian policy abroad (Decree 2022 № 611)\(^{17}\). This document was drafted behind the closed doors of the Presidential Security Council. It was never made public for preliminary parliamentary hearings and was approved by the sovereign decision of the president. It describes the philosophy of the Russian political establishment on the issue of Russia's international image and proposes solutions to problematic issues of power.

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\(^{13}\) Documents of the National project ‘Culture’, Ministry of Culture of the Russian Federation, available / [https://culture.gov.ru/about/national-project/about-project/](https://culture.gov.ru/about/national-project/about-project/)


The 2022 decree begins with the affirmation of Russia as a sovereign country with a ‘special path of development’ and its own understanding of democracy (ibid., p. 3). However, Russia’s current international status is threatened by the accelerating processes of globalisation and intense competition for cultural dominance in the world. In fact, the country is facing an increasing number of ‘attempts to belittle the significance of Russian culture and its humanitarian projects, to disseminate and impose a distorted interpretation of the true goals of Russia ... and to discredit the Russian world, its traditions and ideals’ (ibid., p. 3). Consequently, Russia’s true ambitions to protect the cultural sovereignty and traditional values of the Russian world abroad are misunderstood. This delusion damages Russia’s national interests and its international image. To tackle this issue and strengthen Russia’s position in the world, the decree proposes to take urgent measures in the field of international relations with non-Western countries by means of ‘soft power’, that is, through culture, science, sports, education, tourism and humanitarian cooperation.

At the moment, it is not clear how the Russian Government will realise these ideas. Nevertheless, the decree makes it clear that the Russian Government nowadays seeks to create a strong coalition with exclusively illiberal and non-Western countries, without even mentioning the latter in the document. Another significant implication of the adoption of the decree is that the notion of the ‘Russian world’ has appeared for the first time in legislation backed by presidential authority. It is expected that the decree will be followed by an implementation strategy and further changes in federal legislation.