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INTRODUCTION: DIVERSITY CHALLENGES IN EUROPE. AIMS AND OVERVIEW OF THE BOOK

Anna Triandafyllidou and Ricard Zapata-Barrero
INTRODUCTION
DIVERSITY CHALLENGES IN EUROPE. AIMS AND OVERVIEW OF THE BOOK

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In 2001, violent conflicts between native British and Asian Muslim youth took place in northern England. In 2005, the civil unrest amongst France’s Muslim Maghreb communities expanded all over the country. In 2006, the publication of pictures of the prophet Muhammad in Denmark generated the so-called ‘cartoon crisis’. Muslim communities have come under intense scrutiny in the wake of the terrorist events in the United States (2001), Spain (2004) and Britain (2005). Extreme right-wing politicians such as Geert Wilders in the Netherlands and parties such as the Northern League in Italy gained votes playing on the electorate’s fears of the ‘Muslim’ or the ‘immigrant’. The current economic crisis provides further fruitful ground for racist and discriminatory behaviour towards minorities: the massive expulsions of Roma populations from Italy in 2008 and from France in 2010 have been sad examples of rising xenophobia and racism.

During the first decade of the 21st century, politicians and academics have been intensively debating the reasons underlying such tensions and what should be done to enhance societal cohesion in European societies. The question that is being posed, some times in more and others in less politically correct terms, is what kind of ethnic, cultural or religious diversity can be accommodated within liberal and secular democracies and in what ways (see also Vertovec and Wesserdorf eds. 2010; Triandafyllidou, Modood and Meer, eds. 2011; Zapata-Barrero and Ewijk, eds. 2011). A number of thinkers and politicians have advanced the claim that it is almost impossible to accommodate certain minority groups, notably Muslims, in European countries because their cultural traditions and religious faith are incompatible with secular democratic governance. Others have argued that Muslims can be accommodated in the socio-political order of European societies provided they adhere to a set of civic values that lie at the heart of European democratic traditions and that reflect the secular nature of society and politics in Europe. Others still have questioned the kind of secularism that underpins state institutions in Europe. Some writers have also argued that citizen attitudes towards religion in Europe are not secular but rather tend towards individualised forms of religiosity. Hence the tension with Muslims lies at the level of public or private expression of religious feelings rather than on religiosity as such.
The debate has been intensive in the media, in political forums as well as in scholarly circles. In policy terms, the main conclusion drawn from such debates has been that multicultural policies have failed and that a return to an assimilationist approach (emphasising national culture and values) is desirable. The Netherlands for instance that had been a forerunner in multicultural policies since the 1980s has shifted, at least at the symbolic level, towards such a view establishing integration courses for newcomers to the Netherlands and a civic integration test to be undertaken by prospective migrants before departure from their country of origin (Ter Wal, 2007; Vasta, 2007).

In the face of mounting civil unrest and social exclusion of second-generation immigrant youth, the French government has reasserted its Republican civic integration model banning religious symbols from schools in 2004 (Kastoryano, 2006; Guiraudon, 2006) and the wearing of the integral veil (burqa or niqab) in 2010. Germany, home to one of the largest Muslim communities in Europe, is a somewhat ambivalent case. On the one hand, politicians officially acknowledged that Germany is an immigration country and a multicultural society making integration the new buzzword during the last decade; on the other, the restrictive implementation of the liberal citizenship law of 2000 led to a decrease in naturalisations (Schiffauer, 2006; Green, 2004). Britain and Sweden are perhaps the only European countries that have maintained in practice (even if they changed the terminology used) a political multiculturalism approach. Concerns for cohesion, however, and an underlying need to retrieve an inclusive understanding of Britishness - particularly in the aftermath of the July 2005 London bombings – have led recent governments to introduce a ‘Life in the United Kingdom test’ (a civic integration test) and civic ceremonies (Meer and Modood, 2008).

While traditional immigration countries in central and western Europe experience an identity crisis confronted with jihadist terrorism and social unrest among immigrant communities, the so-called ‘new hosts’ like Spain, Italy, Greece or Portugal are left to their own devices. The multiculturalism crisis comes at a time when these countries just started acknowledging their de facto multicultural and multiethnic composition. The perceived failure however of the cultural diversity approach adopted by the ‘old hosts’ discourages multicultural integration policies in southern Europe, reinforcing the view that immigration may be economically a good thing provided that immigrants become assimilated into the dominant national culture (Zapata-Barrero, 2006; Triandafyllidou, 2002; Calavita 2005).

The question of ethnic minority integration becomes more complicated, perhaps paradoxically, due to the European integration process. Old and recent member states strive to accept diversity within Europe as well as to define their geopolitical and cultural position within the continuously enlarging European Union. National identities are under pressure by the Europeanisation process – especially as regards the former Communist countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 (Kuus, 2004; Triandafyllidou and Spohn, 2003, dell’Olio, 2005; De Bardeleben, 2005). The question of Turkey’s accession into the EU has given rise to fervent debates about: the Christian roots of European values; the compatibility between a predominantly Muslim country with a secular constitution and an Islamic governing party and the rest of the EU; and the borders of Europe – the question of where does Europe essentially end? (Zapata-Barrero, ed. 2010)
The process of European integration has been coupled with identity negotiation and geopolitical re-organisation within the member states. In this context, the question of immigrant minorities comes as an additional layer of diversity and complexity, which, if anything, is less desirable and more alien than intra-European diversity. Although the EU indirectly and sometimes even directly supports minority protection and combats discrimination, the overall Europeanisation process has certainly not made the integration of immigrant minorities, and especially Muslims, in specific member states any simpler. On the contrary, long-term migrant residents socially integrated in their country of settlement discover they are sometimes at a disadvantage compared to citizens of other EU member states who may be newcomers but who enjoy the advantages of European citizenship. Moreover, whilst most EU citizens are being encouraged to think of themselves less in national terms, migrants are encouraged to assimilate to the dominant national majority.

In this context, the case of Central and Eastern European countries that have joined the European Union in 2004 and 2007 is also particularly challenging. These countries have had to adopt, among other measures, specific policies protecting native minority rights in order to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria for accession. At the same time, they have had to adopt migration policies that are geared towards securing the external EU borders disregarding regional specificities of cross-border trade and labour mobility. The 2004 member states do not face a serious challenge of incoming migration; hence migrant integration is not a prominent issue in their agendas. Rather, their concern is with emigration of their nationals towards other member states. However, the EU migration policy emphasis on border control contributes to making these countries reluctant to address cultural and religious diversity issues. Thus, while the rights of native minorities are guaranteed, there are no provisions for integrating newcomers under similar conditions of tolerance and/or respect. There is a clear division thus between diversity that is considered to belong to these countries in historic terms and ‘alien’/foreign diversity.

In Southeastern Europe, in the Balkan peninsula and in Turkey, the issue of ethnic and cultural diversity is further complicated. While these countries aspire to become members of the European Union, they are still struggling with issues of internal cohesion, accommodation of ethnic or religious diversity in their institutional make-up and respect of human rights, not to mention collective minority rights. In most cases, democratic consolidation is still incomplete and overcoming the recent violent conflicts that broke up Yugoslavia and that still torment Turkey with regard to its Kurdish minority is not an easy task. Nonetheless, it should not be forgotten that these regions have an important (albeit neglected today) heritage of respect, tolerance and recognition of cultural and religious diversity which is part of their imperial legacy.

The Ottoman Empire to which most of these countries belonged, recognised and tolerated – as this concept was defined and understood in that particular historical context - religious and cultural diversity, elevating religious communities to political self-governing entities, the well known millet system. Thus, it is relevant to consider whether and to what extent this heritage may not be lost, since it appears to have been overshadowed by the ideological hegemony of the nation state and its presumption of cultural and ethnic homogeneity within a state. In other words, there
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are probably important lessons to be learnt from the history of the wider Southeastern Europe region even if the present situation appears quite bleak in terms of tolerance and respect for diversity.

It is in this socio-economic and political context that this book approaches the question of diversity in 16 European countries: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden, the UK, and one associated country: Turkey. The book surveys immigrant and native minority groups in these countries and concentrates on the specific diversity challenges that have a currency in each of them. It discusses the ways in which different states have dealt with similar diversity dilemmas and analyses the relevant discourses.

The book is equally concerned with native and immigrant minorities depending on their relevance for each country. A distinction between ethnic minorities and migrant populations is in order here as usually these two different types of minorities enjoy different sets of rights and different levels of public recognition. Native minorities are defined as populations that have been historically established in a given territory and which took part in the formation of the (national or multi-national) state in which they live (such as a Catalan population within Spain or Flemish in Belgium). In many cases their participation in state-building is recognized in the Constitution and they are guaranteed special rights regarding the preservation of their cultural, religious, or linguistic heritage. In some countries, there are special provisions regarding the political representation of a native minority in cases where that minority is so numerically small that it risks being left out of the political system.

This book’s theoretical focus is not only on diversity but also on whether we reject, tolerate or accept/respect specific diversity claims. We question tolerance as a concept, discuss its meaning in different contexts, and look at the practices of tolerance in different countries and towards different minority groups. We propose tolerance as a middle class concept and practice that stands between intolerance (the non acceptance of individuals, groups or practices) and acceptance, respect and public recognition of minority individuals, groups or practices. We distinguish thus both empirically and normatively between:

i) **Non-toleration**: Individuals, groups and practices who seek or for whom/which claims of toleration are being made but to whom/which toleration is not granted, and the reasons given in favour of or against toleration;

ii) **Toleration**: Individuals, groups and practices who seek or for whom/which claims of toleration are being made and to whom/which toleration is granted, and the reasons given in favour of or against toleration;

iii) **Recognition, respect as equal and admission as normal**: Individuals, groups and practices who seek or for whom/which it is claimed that toleration is not enough and other normative concepts, namely those that focus on majority-minority relations and the reform of institutions and citizenship, are or should be more relevant. They also include claims and processes towards the reconsideration of difference as a ‘normal’ feature of social life. Such concepts include equality, respect, recognition, accommodation and so on, and the reasons given in favour of or against these propositions.
It is important to clarify that the relationship between tolerance and respect or recognition of difference is not necessarily a hierarchical one. Respect is not necessarily nor always a better institutional or practical solution for accommodating difference. While tolerance may be appropriate for some diversity claims and may satisfy some requests of minority groups or individuals, respect and public recognition may be a better ‘fit’ for other types of diversity claims. It is our aim in this book to highlight some of the contexts in which tolerance is a better ‘fit’ than respect (or vice versa).

The book is structured in three parts according to discussions being held in old host countries, new host countries, and countries in transition.

**Part I** discusses six ‘old host’ countries in northern and western Europe: France, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom. These are countries that have had small historical minorities but have large migration-related minority populations that have arrived in the post-war and post-1989 period.

Despite the predominantly civic definitions of the nation in five out of the six old hosts examined here and their long experience in receiving migrants, the recent decade has seen if not a retreat at least a repositioning of cultural diversity policies and discourses with a view to emphasising a common civic sense of citizenship as the basis on which newcomers should integrate. Indeed, the Netherlands, a country that has been a forerunner in multicultural policies since the 1980s has now imposed not only integration courses for newcomers but also a civic integration test to be undertaken by prospective migrants before departure from their country of origin. In the face of mounting civil unrest and social exclusion of second-generation immigrant youth, the French government has reasserted its Republican civic integration model banning ostentatious religious symbols from schools. Britain and Sweden have upheld in practice (even if they changed the terminology used) a political multiculturalism approach. However, concerns for cohesion have been strong in Britain have led recent governments to introduce a ‘Life in the United Kingdom test’ (a civic integration test) and civic ceremonies for citizenship acquisition. The concerns are however not fully acquiesced as the recent statements by the UK Prime Minister David Cameron show.

Nonetheless it is worth noting that Britain, the Netherlands, France and Sweden have upheld rather generous naturalisation policies, seeing citizenship as a tool for migrant integration. The German naturalisation policy has become more liberal during the last decade but its implementation remains relatively restrictive. Denmark also has a restrictive naturalisation policy although it has a very open civic integration policy at the local level (migrants can participate in local elections after two years of residence).

In these six ‘old host’ countries of northern and western Europe, Christianity and its traditions (including also monuments and the fine arts) are part of the national heritage (Catholic religion in France and to a certain extent in Germany and the Netherlands; Protestant religion in Sweden, Denmark, Britain and also to a certain extent in Germany). Catholic and Protestant denominations are also recognised institutionally and given certain privileges as regards taxation or education. However, religion is not necessarily part of national identity in these countries. The link between a specific religion and the nation is quite loose, and rather what is distinctive of these countries is the moderate secularism that allows for different religions and their institutions to flourish with some support from the state.
Part II introduce the new host countries, notably Greece, Italy, Spain, Ireland and Cyprus have experienced immigration during the last two decades. Among them, the Spanish and the Italian nation are mostly civically defined while the Irish and the Greek are mostly ethnically conceived. Spain and Italy have strong centrifugal tendencies due to the regional nationalisms in Spain and the regional identities in Italy. In either country the nation is defined predominantly in territorial and political terms and is also largely contested by minority nationalisms in Spain and by regional nationalism in Italy. Interestingly in either country there is a close link between national identity and the Catholic religion even though such link has been losing its importance in recent decades.

Overall new host countries are more ethnically oriented in their national identity definition compared to the old hosts, have more restrictive naturalisation policies and see citizenship as a prize rather than as a tool for integration. Their integration policies towards migrants have been underdeveloped and mainly actually guided through grassroots initiatives of civil society actors rather than framed as a state policy. The new host countries in southern Europe and Ireland have not yet re-considered their national identity in any way that would actively embrace cultural, ethnic or religious diversity like some of the old host countries did (notably Britain, Sweden, the Netherlands and to a lesser extent France). By contrast all the new host countries have had to face the cultural and ethnic diversity challenges of Roma and Traveller minorities and have done so with very little success. Indeed Roma populations in Spain, Italy and Greece and Travellers in Ireland are among the most harshly discriminated and socio-economically disadvantaged minority populations in Europe.

Part III deals with the countries in transition. These countries are new EU member states that are mainly affected by emigration towards the old member states and to a lesser extent by immigration from East Eastern Europe. These countries have a long history of native minority integration (or assimilation) and share their recent past under Communism. Thus all the countries in this group (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Romania) are relatively young democracies that have experienced a revival of national and religious identities in the post-1989 period.

The 2004 member states do not face a serious challenge of incoming migration; hence migrant integration is not a prominent issue in their agendas. Rather, their concern is with emigration of their nationals towards other member states. However, the EU migration policy emphasis on border control contributes to making these countries reluctant to address cultural diversity issues. Thus, while the rights of native minorities are guaranteed, there are no provisions for integrating newcomers under similar conditions of tolerance and/or respect. There is a clear division thus between cultural diversity that is considered to belong to these countries in historic terms and ‘alien’/foreign cultural diversity.

Modern Turkey is worth a special mention here as the country is characterised not only by important emigration (Turks being among the largest immigrant groups in Germany, France, the Netherlands, and Denmark, among the countries studied) but also by significant immigration from neighbouring Balkan and Asian countries as well as by the historical presence of large native minorities. Indeed Turkey is by definition a multi-ethnic and multi-religious country that bears with it both the multicultural tolerance tradition of the Ottoman Empire and
the *millet* arrangements as well as the modern nationalist intolerance towards minorities. Minorities in Turkey (the smaller historical minorities of Armenians, Greeks, Assyrians and Jews but most importantly the large minorities of Alevis, Sunni Arab Muslims, Circassians, Georgians, Lazans and Kurds) are integrated socio-economically but are treated politically as second-class citizens because they do not belong to the dominant Turkish—Sunni-Muslim majority. However, starting from the Helsinki Summit of the European Union in 1999 December, Turkey has become exposed to the celebration of ethno-cultural and religious identity claims in the public space. This process has been going on with certain ups and downs putting to the test the consolidation of Turkish democracy.

To summarise, this book seeks to offer a European view of diversity challenges and the ways in which they are dealt with. It highlights important similarities and differences and identifies the groups that are worse off in the countries studied. Future research needs however to dig deeper and consider whether there can be a common European approach to migrant and native minority integration that respects the specificities of each country but also allows for a bird’s eye view of the situation across Europe and identifies the challenges that are common and that can be best dealt with through EU legislation and EU consultations, exchanges of best practices and cooperation. Indeed the question of both the Roma and the Muslim populations is of particular interest here. While it may be difficult to devise policy approaches that are responsive to the needs of all the 16 European countries studied here (let alone the 27 EU member states), it is however possible to develop policies that address a number of European countries that share common or parallel migration and ethnic minority experiences.

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The Book is intrinsically comparative in nature and interdisciplinary. This is the outcome of a research European team of political scientists, sociologists, social anthropologists and political theorists, with expertise in different fields (minorities, migration, Islam, European integration, media, governance, etc.), working together under a European research project called Accept-Pluralism. The purpose of this joint-research action is twofold: to create a new theoretical and normative framework of different types of (in)tolerance to diversity; to explore policy responses with a view to providing key messages for policy makers. Adequate policies seek meeting points between the realities and expectations of European and national policy makers, civil society, and minority groups. Fifteen countries are represented in the consortium – 14 EU members: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Romania, Poland, Spain, Sweden, the UK, and one accession country: Turkey. These countries produce a mosaic of diverse experiences and traditions regarding ethnic, cultural and religious diversity: western European states with a long experience in receiving and incorporating immigrant minorities; ‘new’ migrant host countries essentially southern-European, central European states that have recently joined the EU and an associated state, all of them mostly concerned by emigration rather than immigration but also characterised by a significant variety of native minority populations.
The ACCEPT PLURALISM project is distinctively European in that it offers a wide European coverage, bringing together countries in the West, North and South of the continent with different experiences of migrant reception and accommodation of cultural diversity. In an expanded EU, member-states can learn from each other’s traditions in dealing with ethnic, cultural and religious diversity. Turkey, a country with a fragile balance between religion and secularism but with a significant pluri-religious past from the Ottoman times, is relevant for comparative purposes.

A broader cross-section of the European public will benefit from the ACCEPT PLURALISM research. The target audience include: Policy makers at the European and national level; Local and regional authorities (planning and implementing policies for immigrant and minority social and cultural integration), Non Governmental Organisations (minority and immigrant associations), Journalists – Media professionals; Education policy officers - High school teachers and students; Academics and graduate students.

The ACCEPT PLURALISM project is hosted by the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, in the European Institute of Florence, and co-ordinated by Prof. Anna Triandafyllidou. For more information see website: www.accept-pluralism.eu

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Chapter Outline

Part I: Old host countries

Chapter 1: France
Riva Kastoryano, Angéline Escafré-Dublet, CERI - Sciences Po

The chapter presents the challenge of diversity in France. It describes the formation of a diverse population, resulting from successive waves of immigration and shows how the formation of the French State is connected to the idea of national identity in a manner that emphasizes the notion of individuals over groups. Formally, it does not allocate space for the acknowledgement of diversity. With this challenge in mind, the authors explore the kinds of identities that are perceived as different and/or challenging, and the way diversity has been accommodated in France. They look at the French version of secularism, laïcité, as a way to deal with religious diversity and argue that the perception of an increased religious diversity led to the reassessment of the notion since the beginning of the 2000s. They discuss whether the notion of laïcité pertains to tolerance or acceptance of others as equals.

Chapter 2: Denmark
Kristian Jensen, Johanne Helboe Nielsen, Morten Brænder, Per Mouritsen and Tore Vincents Olsen, Department of Political Science, Aarhus University

This chapter analyses the cultural diversity challenges in Denmark and how they have been met with intolerance, tolerance, respect and recognition respectively. It starts by analysing the main traits of national identity and state formation, then moves on to Danish immigration history and the various ethnic and religious minorities resulting from immigration and from the changing of territorial borders, before it finally addresses how Denmark generally has handled cultural diversity challenges of the last 40 years.

The overshadowing concern with cultural and religious differences in Denmark today pertains to minorities of immigrants and descendants from non-western countries, most of whom are (identified as) Muslims. Since the mid-1990s, Denmark has seen a long period of politicization of integration and refugee issues, particularly focusing on Muslims. The main diversity challenges that politicians consider important can be summed up in three core themes: 1) Unemployment: non-Western immigrants as a burden on social security, 2) Parallel societies (ghettoisation): non-Western immigrants living in their own secluded communities, 3) Radicalisation/extremism: the growing concern with radicalisation within Muslim communities.

In the discourse and law on integration a comprehensive notion of citizenship is established, drawing on central elements in the Danish national identity, namely: Christianity, Danish language, Denmark as a small and culturally homogeneous country, smallness and homogeneity connected to values of egalitarianism and pride in the welfare society. In the last two decades the discourse of integration is explicitly set against the notion of multiculturalism. In the discussion of the hazards of multiculturalism and parallel societies, tolerance has in part been framed as overindulgence or indifference to problematic beliefs and practices among minorities.
Chapter 3: Germany

Nina Mühe and Werner Schiffauer, Europe-University Viadrina, Frankfurt (Oder)

The years after 2000, and especially after 9/11/2001, witnessed a heightened debate about Muslims and the question, if they could be integrated into German society. Other groups, like the Roma, are not as openly debated in public discussion, or are even, like certain Vietnamese immigrants, partially portrayed as ‘positively integrating’, but they often have to face rather restrictive immigration policies nonetheless.

While tolerance is generally understood as the opposite of discrimination and racism, it can be observed in current public discourses that the concept of tolerance is also increasingly used to draw borders between those who are to be tolerated and those who are not, while the non-tolerance towards a specific group or individual is often legitimised with its own (perceived) intolerance towards others. The slogan “no tolerance for intolerance” is widely used in political rhetoric today, often concerning religious Muslim groups. By portraying certain groups as intolerant, they are labelled as foreigners with incompatible values and beliefs to whom too much tolerance would be a detrimental attitude.

Looking at tolerance not only as a normative value but also as a political discourse that marks insiders and outsiders of the society, allows us to recognise parts of the debate as an attempt to keep up perceived cultural homogeneity in a time of fundamental changes in German understandings of nationality.

Chapter 4: The Netherlands

Marcel Maussen and Thijs Bogers, University of Amsterdam

In contrast to dominant notions, debates concerning cultural diversity and minority acceptance in the Netherlands do not exclusively focus on the position of Muslims and the role of Islam in society. There is also an ongoing discussion on the position of native religious minorities. Orthodox Calvinist groups, Catholic institutions and Muslims are publicly challenged with respect to their beliefs and practices, which are often perceived as crossing the boundaries of the ‘intolerable’. A recurring topic in the national elections throughout the last decade has been the call to severely curb flows of immigration to the Netherlands. Overall, the notion of the Netherlands as an immigrant nation has become supplanted by the notion of the Netherlands as a nation rooted in a distinct European Judeo-Christian tradition: a tradition that needs to be ‘defended’ from external influences stemming from immigration. Overall, it appears that the Netherlands is still trying to strike a balance in accommodating various forms of pluralism in a depillarised society of immigration.

Throughout this chapter we constantly aim to analyse the ways in which ideas of acceptance, respect, recognition and tolerance, developed in tandem with institutional arrangements and practices. We begin with a review of the major elements of Dutch nation state formation and then proceed to discuss the main diversity challenges and how they relate to different minority groups. Then we discuss five conceptualisations of tolerance that, so we argue, structure the discursive space in which ideas about toleration and acceptance are being articulated in the Netherlands. Finally, we extract some conclusions and major issues that require further examination and empirical research.
Chapter 5: Sweden
Hans-Ingvar Roth and Fredrik Hertzberg, Department of Education, Stockholm University

This chapter presents a historical and current picture of Sweden as a country of migration. Sweden has for a long time had cultural encounters with neighboring countries but it is only in the post war period that the stream of migrants became large and justified the statement that Sweden is a multicultural society in a descriptive sense. The chapter contains an account of the main tenets in Swedish nationalism, and how Swedish national identity is constructed today. It also contains a description of Sweden’s modern immigration history, from the World War II and onwards, with a focus on the two last decades, and how the migrant legislation has changed during that period. We also give a short account of four minority groups in present day Sweden; Sámi, Roma, Muslims and sub-Saharan Africans, whose claims for acceptance, tolerance and recognition sometimes is met with indecision, opposition or – at least at the informal level of everyday life – with outright aversion. In the section preceding the conclusions, we discuss how questions of tolerance, acceptance and recognition has been articulated and formulated in migration- and minority policy during the last decades, with a focus on the ten previous years.

Chapter 6: Great Britain
Tariq Modood, Jan Dobbernack, University of Bristol and Nasar Meer, Northumbria University

In the United Kingdom, a significant set of ‘diversity challenges’ can be traced to post-war labour migration from the Caribbean and South Asia. The 20th century is characterized by the struggle of members of these and other minority groups for equality. Non-discrimination, respect and recognition in relation to various dimensions of ‘difference’ have been turned, albeit slowly and not unequivocally, into political commitments. Recent years saw such commitments coincide with new attempts to conceptualize an idea of ‘Britishness’ that identifies a set of shared values and promotes ‘social cohesion’. We argue that political responses that are required for making Britain a tolerant, pluralistic and accommodating society need to take account of a moving picture. Recent responses, such as the Equality Act of 2010, go some way towards addressing new situations of discrimination. Public perceptions of cultural difference, in particular of Islam, represent considerable obstacles in the way towards a more complete situation of fairness and equality.

Part II: New host countries

Chapter 7: Greece
Anna Triandafyllidou and Ifigeneia Kokkali, European University Institute. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies

Until 20 years ago, Greece was considered largely a mono-ethnic, mono-cultural and mono-religious country, a true ‘nation-state’ where the dominant nation, notably people of ethnic Greek descent and Christian Orthodox religion accounted for approx. 98% of the total population. During the last two decades Greece has become the host of more than a million returning co-ethnics, co-ethnic immigrants and foreigners – these groups
accounting now for more than 10% of the total resident population. At the face of a 10% immigrant population Greece is slowly and to a certain extent reluctantly adapting its education and citizenship policies. There is however as yet no re-consideration of what it means to be Greek in the 21st century. The still dominant definition of national identity does not embrace minority and immigrant groups, who are largely considered to be (and at a certain extend remain indeed) outside the Greek society. The recent citizenship law reform is actually seen with suspicion by many majority Greeks who disagree with the opening up of citizenship to people of non Greek descent. The main concept and perspective adopted in Greece to deal with ethnic and religious diversity is that of integration, while notions such as tolerance, acceptance, respect or recognition are more or less absent from the relevant debates. Yet, integration is used rather loosely to refer more often than not to assimilation and much more rarely to a mutual engagement of the different groups to form a cohesive society. Interestingly, the long-existing native minorities of the country are not seen as relevant to this debate as if the two types of diversity – the native and the immigrant – cannot be addressed with the same type of policies.

Chapter 8: Italy
Maurizio Ambrosini and Elena Caneva, Department of social and political studies, University of Milan

Italy took several decades to build up a united nation because of the previous political fragmentation, but now the widely accepted representation is that of a relatively homogeneous ethnic, linguistic and religious population, despite some regional socio-economic diversities, especially between the North and the South of Italy. The main cultural diversity challenges that Italy had to deal with in the last 30 years were from linguistic, religious and immigrant minorities. The first two posed linguistic (by native minorities) and cultural (by religious minorities) challenges to the majority, but without destabilizing the common representation of Italy as a relatively homogeneous population. These minorities were gradually being integrated into the Italian society, including institutional recognition. By contrast, the difficulties in accepting immigrants are linked to their cultural and religious diversity. In contrast with the labour market, where immigrants are accepted and economically integrated – albeit in "subordinate integration -" cultural and religious integration is a theme that is rarely discussed and is never considered in political terms. Migrants are accepted as silent workers but the opposition to them increases when they demand public and institutional recognition. The opposition to and the refusal of immigrants are justified by public and political discourses on the necessity to defend social order, the citizens’ security and the Italian cultural identity. This climax, spread by some political forces, has favoured the development of an intolerant attitude towards migrants. So, in Italy the current pattern seems to be characterized by a decrease in tolerance, by non-acceptance of religious and cultural pluralism, in contrast with an increase in the diversity which is transforming Italian society.

Chapter 9: Spain
Ricard Zapata-Barrero and Blanca Garcés-Mascareñas, GRITIM – Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona

In this chapter, we first examine the main factors that have determined the development of the predominant conception of Spanish identity and
its impact on the accommodation of diversity. Second, we outline the immigrant minority groups and briefly identify the main diversity challenges. These diversity challenges are analysed in terms of categories rather than groups as this allows us to: a) establish a clear link between national identity and diversity challenges; b) focus on the conflict itself and particularly on those issues/practices under discussion; and c) consider diversity in a broader sense, including debates on national cultural and linguistic diversity. Third, we consider how tolerance has been thematised in the Spanish case. We aim to understand which diversity-related conflicts have been understood in terms of ‘tolerance’ and which ones as issues of equality, respect, recognition or accommodation. Finally, we highlight the main distinctive features of the Spanish case from a comparative European perspective in the conclusions.

Chapter 10: Ireland
Nathalie Rougier and Iseult Honohan, School of Politics and International Relations, University College of Dublin

Irish identity was historically shaped by contrast to England as homogeneously Catholic and Gaelic. The main indigenous minorities are Protestants, Jews and Travellers. While religious minorities are now generally accommodated, significant toleration challenges concern Travellers’ ethnic group status, halting sites and access to education. Ireland’s late and rapid immigration, coinciding with economic prosperity from the 1990s, along with its history of emigration, and lack of a colonial history distinguish it from many EU member states. The focus is still on ‘newcomers’ rather than later generations; most migrants have come from the European Union, and are of working age, highly educated and skilled.

No significant right wing anti-immigrant party or campaign has yet arisen, although sub-Saharan Africans particularly experience discrimination in work and other areas. Toleration issues concerning Muslims, who in Ireland are more varied in origin and social composition than in many EU countries, have been limited; Muslims have engaged in dialogue with government, and their religious practices receive some accommodation. Rather than ‘mere’ tolerance, the official response to the new diversity has been framed as ‘interculturalism’. Yet the establishment of secure institutional, practical and attitudinal toleration has been mixed. Many issues have yet to arise and to be addressed.

Chapter 11: Cyprus
Nicos Trimikliniotis and Corina Demetriou, Centre for the Study of Migration, University of Nicosia

The chapter aims at exploring the frames and themes of intolerance in the Cypriot context, using the desk top method to study the diversity challenges of the new millennium, against the backdrop of ethnic conflict that historically torn the country since the 1960s. The ‘Cyprus problem’, underlying the politics of citizenship, impacts all aspects of social, economic and political life. One of its most significant consequence was the post-war model of rapid economic development which structured the economy in such a way that Cyprus had to reluctantly open its doors to migrant workers for what was thought to be a limited period, imposing restrictions and characterised by a rigidity that survived in the new millennium. The
various ideologies of ethnic hatred and the rise of the far right, with an emerging racist lobby active in the periphery of mainstream institutions, have led to the intensification of racism and intolerance and to policy reactions rendering immigration control even more rigid. The chapter explores the vacuum created by the “states of exception” and the prospects for a widely termed reconciliation emerging from how the Cyprus problem has evolved in the new millennium.

Part III: Countries in transition

Chapter 12: Bulgaria
Antonina Zhelyazkova, Maya Kosseva and Marko Hajdinjak, International Center for Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations (IMIR)

The following chapter examines issues of tolerance, acceptance and diversity challenges in Bulgaria. After briefly presenting the processes of state- and nation-building since establishment of the modern Bulgarian state in 1878, the chapter investigates the majority-minority relations in the country from the 1980s to today.

The main cultural diversity challenge Bulgaria faced during the last 30 years (the last decade of Communist rule and two decades of democracy) was the integration of the three largest minority groups: Turks, Roma and Pomaks. Each of these three communities has its own and unique set of problems in their relations with the majority population. Turks are well integrated, politically organised and with a very clear and well-expressed self-awareness, but are faced with the increasingly intolerant attitude of the majority population. Roma are almost completely excluded from the society. They are rejected not just by the majority population but other minorities as well. Pomaks are tolerated as a religious minority, but any attempt to assert their different ethnic or national identity is met by a furiously intolerant rejection of such claims. The chapter analyses the challenges, difficulties and successes that have marked these processes.

In the concluding part, it is discussed and explained how tolerance and acceptance are understood and conceptualised in Bulgaria. Perceptions of the general society, government and state institutions, political parties, and media are analysed. The chapter challenges the self-ascribed image Bulgarians have about themselves as one of the most tolerant nations in Europe.

Chapter 13: Hungary
Anikó Horváth, Zsuzsanna Vidra and Jon Fox, Center for Policy Studies (CPS) - Central European University, Budapest

The chapter presents an overview of questions related to the most pressing issues of (in)tolerance in today’s Hungary by focusing on the development of the concept of the nation as well as the history of minority groups and their political, social and cultural accommodation in the country. Social scientific research shows that the Roma are the primary target of the most intense prejudice and racism in Hungary. Hungarians from the neighbouring countries constitute an important part of the national ‘self’, however, they have been pictured, somewhat ironically, a national ‘other’. Other immigrant groups in contrast have been less visible simply due to their small numbers. Other minorities in Hungary are not viewed as a challenge
to the hegemony of the Hungarian nation. In contrast, anti-Semitism has been (and continues to be) an essential and formative element of Hungarian national self-understandings, with ‘the Jew’ having filled the role of ‘internal other’ for centuries. The chapter also accounts for the recent resurgence in Hungarian nationalism on discourses and practices of tolerance and explains how the question of Hungary’s internal minorities (and the Roma in particular) has taken a backseat to the question of the trans-border Hungarians. The policies devised for Hungary’s minorities and the Roma in particular did not always correspond to the needs or demands of these minorities. Legislative changes in education, the welfare system, and economic structures have often had the effect of further marginalizing the Roma. This continued socio-economic marginalization of the Roma has been further exacerbated by racialized understandings of difference (particularly evident vis-à-vis the Roma) that preclude possibilities for sociocultural integration and/or accommodation.

Chapter 14: Poland
Michał Buchowski, Katarzyna Chlewińska, Adam Mickiewicz University of Poznań

Polish understanding of multiculturalism differs significantly from that in other European countries, as it is mainly based on historical memory. Actions supporting cultural diversity in society which is recognised as one of the most ethnically homogeneous in the world, are based mainly on the popularisation of folk performances and celebration of the exotic cultural attractions, with virtually no discussion on changes in the ethnic composition of the Polish society and the marginalisation of ethnic/cultural minorities’ presence in public space and social awareness. The growing standard of living and Polish membership in the EU makes Poland more attractive for immigrants which does not affect real situation of immigrants’ functioning within the Polish state, even though there are many efforts made by various authorities towards legislative changes in the spirit of the guidelines imposed on Poland by the European Union.

The level of respect for the rights of minorities is improving; legal standards are increasingly congruent with both the social reality and international instruments for equality and anti-discrimination. Despite these improvements, data on insufficient state action in many areas concerning support granted to culturally distinct groups appear repeatedly, particularly in relation to immigrants. Public opinion polls indicate that the reluctance of Poles towards people of different nationalities and ethnic backgrounds residing in Poland is slowly decreasing, which can be treated as one of the premises indicating that the tolerance of cultural diversity in Poland is growing.

Chapter 15: Romania
Alina Mungiu-Pippidi and Sinziana-Elena Poiana, Romanian Academic Society

By looking at what exactly Romanian national identity claims to be and how it got there, the present chapter reviews the main challenges posed by ethnic diversity in Romania and the consequent public discourse on tolerance towards it. Romania’s institutional history stands as undeniable proof of the Balkan, non-Western and Orthodox national identity. The firm definition of national identity as equivalent to Orthodoxy sets the
stage for what was going to be the discourse on ethnic tolerance in post-1989 Romania. The interwar national discourse of intellectual elite, which the first part of the chapter discusses, was bound to resurface after the fall of communism. But in what context? And who were its subjects?

While the 1990s were dedicated to the battle for rights of the Hungarian minority, it is argued that in the past decade the challenges posed by the Roma minority are stealing the show. The European and transnational dimensions of the challenges posed by the ethnically Roma Romanian citizens seem to be much stronger than the ones of the Hungarian minority. The Roma minority is confronted with a number of outstanding problems – low occupation rates, poor access to services, segregation, extreme poverty and the highest discrimination rates out of all marginalized groups in Romania. However, as deeply rooted as they might be, they are far from homogeneous across local communities. Judging the situation of the Romanian Roma, to what extent can we expect a consociationist “happy-end” as that of the Hungarian minority? Is it reasonable to expect that the public discourse is tolerant enough to allow for a policy approach to collective Roma rights that would lead to an improvement of the situation of this minority in the foreseeable future? Even though definite answers cannot be given yet, the second part of the chapter makes an account of the problems faced by Hungarian and Roma minorities in Romania and the evolution of the tolerance discourse towards them.

Chapter 16: Turkey

Ayhan Kaya and Ece Harmanyeri, Istanbul Bilgi University

The chapter is designed to portray the ways in which ethno-cultural and religious diversity has been so far managed by modern Turkish state with regard to the usage of the discourse of tolerance. Explicating the construction of the Turkish national identity and the modern Turkish state, the chapter primarily delineates the constitutive elements of the state machinery as well as the technologies of citizenship. Turkey’s process of Europeanization is also scrutinized in order to pave the way to a throughout analysis of the transformation of the Turkish polity from the Cold War years to the Post-Cold War years. In doing so, major challenges against the traditional Kemalist nation-state building process such as political Islam, Alevi revival, Kurdish revival and Europeanization are discussed. The chapter claims that there is no problem of tolerance in Turkey as long as those non-Sunni, non-Muslim, and/or non-Turkish minorities accept to be second-class citizens. On the other hand, those non-Turks and non-Sunnis, who claim to be the constitutive elements of the modern nation in Turkey, are not in search of tolerance from the majority nation.

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CHAPTER 1. FRANCE

Riva Kastoryano and Angéline Escafré-Dublet

CERI - Sciences Po

Introduction

France is a country of immigration and diversity is an important component of the society. Immigration waves from 1900 to the Second World War included flows from Northern Europe (Belgium), Eastern Europe (Poland) and Southern Europe (Italy and Spain). After the Second World War, while a significant number of immigrants came from Southern Europe (Spain and Portugal), the post-colonial component of immigration increased (Algeria, Morocco and other African countries). The demographic fact of diversity in contemporary France is a product of both labour and post-colonial migration. In the post-war period, France signed bilateral agreements with Southern European countries to attract European immigrants whom the French authorities regarded as more likely to adapt to French society than post-colonial workers. However, the dismantling of the colonial empire and the treaties that France signed with the newly independent countries included articles that favour the circulation of former colonial subjects to the Métropole. As a result, the post-colonial input represents an important part of French cultural diversity today.

The State’s response to the diversity of the French population has been to make difference invisible, or more precisely to leave ethnicity and religious expressions in the private sphere. It is based on the French conception of citizenship, inherited from the 1789 Revolution, which is civic and not ethnic, and it is anchored in the Republican values that structure the national discourse on diversity. Moreover, since the 1905 law separating Church and State, it has been argued that by keeping official differences in the private sphere everyone will be considered the same and will, therefore, enjoy equality. Religious affiliations are kept private, and laïcité (the French version of secularism) is a central principle of the modern State. It maintains a strict separation between religious matters and public life. As a consequence, discourses on cultural and religious diversity are hard to pin down in the French public space and are usually understood as conflicting with Republican values.

This chapter describes the diversity of the French population and explores the institutions that try to accommodate diversity in France.

1. The French colonial empire consisted of colonies, protectorates and mandates in Africa, the Middle East and South-East Asia. Migrants of former colonial countries came mainly from Algeria, Morocco and other African countries.


3. The term Métropole refers to French territory in Europe (continental France and the adjacent islands such as Corsica) as opposed to French territories that are located outside Europe (‘Overseas Territories’).
It also shows how the notion of cultural diversity has emerged in national debates and when. First, we will outline the main historical events in the formation of the State and national identity to understand the challenge of cultural diversity in the French context. It will be seen that the formation of the French State is connected to the idea of national identity in a manner that emphasizes the notion of the individual over the group and, formally, does not allocate space for the acknowledgement of diversity in the public arena. Secondly, we will explore how issues have emerged which were perceived as resulting from the diversity of the population and how they have been approached and dealt with. This will lead us to identify what kinds of identities are perceived as different and/or challenging in the French context. Thirdly, we will explore the concept of tolerance in France. We will look at the concept of *laïcité* and see how it has been used to accommodate religious diversity in France. Does it foster tolerance towards religious expression? We will see that *laïcité* has been used to deal with tensions resulting from the purportedly religious character of post-colonial migrants and we will discuss its reassessment in response to the concern about Islam.

**State formation and national identity**

**Historical elements on the formation of the French Nation-State**

The formation of the French nation dates back to the French Revolution of 1789. It is based on the idea of a nation composed of citizens as opposed to the addition of groups that characterised the *Ancien Régime*: the nobility, the clergy and the Third Estate. As argued by Gerard Noiriel: ‘[the] context of anti-aristocratic and anti-clerical mobilisation explains, far beyond the philosophy of the Enlightenment, the essential aspects of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizens. Behind the haunting theme of equality is found a violent rejection of all privileges (and all stigmatisations) based on origin’ (Noiriel, 1999: 46). The French conception of citizenship is civic and implies a vertical relation between the citizens and the State. It does not recognise the intermediate level of a group or a specific community based on origin. The State should consider each individual regardless of his/her origin, race or religion. Even though the events took place two centuries ago, this universalist principle is considered as guiding the understanding of the relationship between each citizen and the State (cf. article 1 of the Constitution of 1958: ‘All citizens shall be equal before the law, regardless of their origin, race or religion’). The myth of the French Revolution that embodied the victory of the people over the nobility laid the emphasis on the universalist principles that linked citizens with one another, rather than their original membership of a group.

The 19th century was marked by an effort to unify French territory and French culture (mainly through the teaching of French as the first language for all French people) and suppress regional identities. Transforming ‘peasants into Frenchmen’ (Weber, 1976) was the goal of the Third Republic from 1870 to 1940. It anchored the conception of a French population as a product of a *fusion* of people into one common language and identity. Ethnic specificities – understood as regional identities – were to be subsumed in the larger French national identity through
the practice of the French language. From this founding period of French society there has remained until today the conviction that additional forms of identity such as regional, religious or immigrants’ origin are to be kept in the private sphere. As a result, little room is left for the articulation of minority claims in the public sphere.

However, throughout the 19th and the 20th centuries, the creation of the colonial empire induced a breach in the universalist principle of French equality. The French State allocated differential status to indigenous populations and European expatriates. Nowhere was this differentiation stronger than in Algeria, where European settlers from Italy, Spain or France were granted French nationality and citizenship whereas the indigenous populations were kept in a specific status with different political and legal rights. In the colonies, indigenous populations were nationals but not citizens. Ethnicity, then, worked as a ‘juridical category’ to distinguish the ‘Metropolitan’ from the ‘Indigenous’ (Kastoryano, 2003: 67). After the Second World War, the French Empire was renamed the French Union and colonial subjects became citizens of the French Union. They only enjoyed a truncated version of citizenship, however, and they did not have any political rights in the colonies (Weil, 2008).

The case of differential status in the French colonies offers an example of a breach in the continuity of the universalist principle. It demonstrates that, in the colonial context, the Republic made distinctions between individuals on the basis of their belonging to a specific group considered as ethnically different. Furthermore, post-colonial immigrants who came to France in the second half of the 20th century carried this complex system of status with them. Being born in a French colony gave them special access to French nationality. The story of the various colonial statuses established during the French Empire is still important today to understand the post-colonial migrants’ complex relationship with French nationality and identity.

France and the European Union

France was a founder member of the European Economic Community and signed the 1957 Treaty of Rome. It was an active member of the Community until 1993, when it became the European Union. Since 2000, France has been the target of many criticisms regarding issues of diversity and pluralism. In the first case, when confronted with the imperative to open civic rights to European citizens, France was one of the slowest countries to adapt article 8 of the Maastricht Treaty (Strudel, 2007). The French authorities argued that the link between nationality and citizenship was primordial and prevented the granting of civic rights to non-nationals. Furthermore, France was also slow to implement anti-discrimination legislation even though some of its architects were French politicians (Guiraudon and Geddes, 2004).

Finally, France is proud to see itself as a country of Human Rights. The number of refugees who are granted political asylum each year is high and, in 2008, France was in third place after the US and Canada. However, it has been criticised for its actual application of Human Rights. For instance, in 2010, the French government was admonished by the members of the European Parliament for its treatment of the Roma
people coming in from Eastern Europe (Le Monde, 7 September 2010). Voices of protest are also emerging in French civil society that criticise policies seen as contrary to the European Declaration of Human Rights. The European Union serves as a constitutional recourse in cases of Human Rights violations related to discrimination.

The main cultural diversity challenges that France has faced in the last 30 years

The formation of a diverse population

A diverse population is one that encompasses groups with various origins from a geographical and cultural point of view. In the case of France, its long experience in receiving and incorporating immigrant populations makes it a diverse country. Limited population growth and a shortage of labour have made it a migration destination – and not a country of departure – since 1880. For instance, when the United States imposed quotas to limit entries (1924), the flow of immigrants from Southern Europe was ‘diverted’ towards France, and by 1931 the increase in foreigners in France was greater than in the United States (Noiriel, 2006: 21).

Moreover, like most of its neighbours in Western Europe (Belgium, Germany, Great Britain), France experienced massive post-war immigration flows during the period of reconstruction, coming, in her case, from Southern Europe (mainly Spain and Portugal) and North Africa (mainly Algeria, but also Morocco). 5

In 1974, in line with other industrial countries, the French government brought economic migration to a halt and the authorities ceased to deliver work permits to immigrants. After this ‘closing’ of economic migration, family members of immigrants could still come to France under the family reunification regime. However, immigrants who had no family ties in France started coming illegally or, if coming from countries in conflict, they tried to enter under the refugee regime. Despite the official ‘closure of immigration doors’, the migration influx has continued over the past decades, with a diversification of immigrants’ origin. In addition to constant flows of immigrants from Europe, the arrival of immigrants from North Africa has continued to be significant and there has been a slight increase in immigrants coming from other African countries.

Successive waves of immigrants have settled in the country and increased the diversity of the French population. However, official statistics only record nationality, and the progressive integration of immigrants into French nationality results in statistically concealing people’s origin. There are, therefore, few means to reflect the diversity of the French population that results from decades of immigration. Official statistics only identify immigrants who still hold foreign nationality. Figure 3 shows the development of the immigrant population according to country of origin from 1962 to 1999. Countries of origin, however, are grouped together for clarity: Spain and Italy; Portugal; Maghreb (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia); other African countries; Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam; Turkey; and other countries.

5. From 1954 to 1968, Spanish people went from 289,000 to 607,000; Portuguese, from 20,000 to 296,000; Algerian, from 212,000 to 474,000 and Moroccan, 11,000 to 94,000 (Source: National Census, National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies, INSEE).
Figure 1. Breakdown of immigrant population from 1962 to 1999 (in thousands)

Since 1999, the proportion of sub-Saharan immigrants in total inflows rose from 10% to 17% (Beauchemin and Lessault, 2009). The migration of sub-Saharan Africans is, however, still vastly outnumbered by immigrants from Europe and North Africa. The numbers of immigrants coming from Mali and Senegal are far behind immigrants from Algeria, Morocco and Portugal.

Finally, the latest estimation by EUROSTAT reckoned that, in 2009, foreigners made up 5.8% (i.e. some 3,675,000) of the French population and that 2% came from the EU27 countries and 3.8% from outside EU27 (Eurostat Press Release, 16 December 2009).

The understanding of cultural diversity through the lens of nationality

The French naturalisation process tends to conceal cultural diversity

In France, the official census classifies the resident population under three categories:

- French-born;
- Naturalised French;
- Foreigners.

In 2007, 89.9% of the population were born with French nationality, 4.3% were naturalised French and 5.8% were foreigners (INSEE, 2007). The Nationality Code establishes statistical categories that exclude ‘origin’ once French nationality is obtained. Thus, once foreigners are naturalised, they are no longer referred to according to their origin; they have become French by naturalisation. As for their children, they become French automatically when they reach the age of 18 (provided that they have lived in France for five years by that age).
france

6. Noiriel argues that the interpretation of immigration through the national lens started in the late 19th century (Noiriel, 1988). Here we would point to the novelty of the discourse in the 1980s in contrast with the 1960s and 1970s. However, a longue durée perspective does reveal earlier manifestation of such a nationalist reaction against immigration issues.

Therefore, ethnicity is invisible in French official statistics (Kastoryano, 2007: 69) and the very idea of recording ethnicity is usually deprecated with the argument that this would go against the universalist principle guaranteeing the equal treatment of individuals regardless of their religion, origin or race. However, the census of 1999 did introduce a distinction of origin in the sense that the ‘previous’ nationality of immigrants who had acquired French nationality started to be recorded in the system. In French statistics, nationality matters: officials draw lines between French nationals, naturalised French, and French with foreign ancestry. Instead of ethnicity, French official statistics make nationality, and to a certain extent national origin, visible.

The statistical device chosen by the State authorities to render the features of the French population reflects the framing of French discourse on immigration in the sense that it focuses on the question of nationality. According to the French model of integration, becoming a French national remains the pivot of the integration process (Guiraudon, 2005: 163). France keeps an open code of nationality allowing for a sizable number of foreigners to become French nationals according to several criteria (essentially five years’ residence, legal status and knowledge of the French language).

From the possibility of becoming a French national given to foreigners, the official discourse on immigration in France has shifted to the necessity for immigrants to become French. Adrian Favell has demonstrated how a ‘philosophy of integration’ spread out in French national discourse on immigration during the 1980s (Favell, 1998). He also points to the novelty of such a framing: ‘previously [before the mid-1980s], there was no connection of immigration with the idea of republican citizenship’ (Favell, 1998: 46). This can be explained by the fact that, before the 1980s, immigrants were essentially perceived from a socio-economic point of view and their incorporation in society was mainly an issue from an economic perspective (they were unskilled and more likely to be unemployed). Moreover, their stay in France was considered temporary.

Having said that, it is necessary to distinguish, on the one hand, immigrants from southern Europe, such as Portugal and Spain, whom the French authorities regarded as an important input for the population of the country at the beginning of the century and between the two wars; and, on the other hand, post-colonial migrants who were considered temporary workers and were not expected to assimilate easily, such as Algerians. In the early 1980s, when it became clear that post-colonial migrants would stay in France, their presence started to be perceived as problematic. The fact that their children automatically became French when they turned 18 became a focus of political discussion. Issues related to nationality and the process of nationality acquisition started to represent an important dimension of immigration issues.

Immigration and the ‘national question’

The topic of immigration publicly emerged in connection with the ‘national question’ in the late 1980s. Subsequent events testify to a reading of immigration issues that focuses on the process of nationality acquisition. In 1986, the government of Jacques Chirac (right-wing) introduced a new bill that would stop the automatic naturalisation of
Although the declaration was easy to make, studies have shown that children of immigrants born in France did not always do so, for lack of adequate information on the issue (Weil, 2008: 272). Indeed, the belief that being born in France is sufficient to make one French (jus soli) is widespread among French people and second generation immigrants (Simon 2010).

These developments regarding nationality laws on the part of right-wing and then left-wing governments also demonstrate how the issue became politicised: on the one hand, the right-wing parties who advocate a more selective approach to nationality acquisition and on the other hand, the left-wing parties who stress the need to preserve open access to French nationality for the children of immigrants born in France.

The questions of citizenship and the naturalisation process have been at the core of the debates on diversity and integration for 30 years now. After the necessity for second generation immigrants to ‘declare’ their desire to be French, the French government tackled the possibility for all foreigners who have been living legally in France for a minimum of five years to acquire French nationality. With an open code of nationality, France does not grant nationality automatically to those requesting it: the average rate of acceptance from 2000 to 2004 was 77.4% and in 2004, for instance, 64,695 requests were granted out of 81,680, i.e. 79% (Ministère de l’Emploi, 2006: 81). The administration expects applicants to fulfil ‘assimilation criteria’ such as knowledge of the French language, stable financial resources and current residence in France, and also loyalty to and sharing of Republican values.

A 2003 law reinforced these conditions and added the requirement of proving sufficient knowledge about the rights and responsibilities of French citizenship. These rules leave major discretion to officials, and applicants can be subject to judgement as to whether their application is ‘suitable’ or not (Spire, 2005).

Regarding the possibility of adding new requirements to demonstrate the applicant’s commitment to French nationality, one should note that this is in constant discussion. Following a European trend, the French government considered the possibility of introducing civic tests when implementing the New Reception and Integration Contract (Nouveau contrat d’accueil et d’intégration). The tests were not introduced but, since 2007, the integration of immigrants has been supervised by the National Office for Immigration and Integration (Office français de l’immigration et de l’intégration). Newly arrived immigrants – with a legal status – are encouraged through this ‘contract’ to learn French and acquire knowledge of French laws. While naturalisation is not obligatory the compulsory steps that each foreigner should take make it clear that it is a desirable outcome.

In 2007, the newly elected President Sarkozy created a Ministry of Immigration and National Identity, clearly articulating the link between the issue of immigration and that of nationality. However, the Ministry oversaw activities pertaining to immigration regulation and social aid that had previously been dealt with by existing administrative units. In 2009, the Minister launched a series of debates to take place in all regions of
10. ‘It should be possible to withdraw French nationality from any person of foreign origin who has deliberately harmed the life of a police officer or gendarme or any other person with authority to enforce public order (…) We are going to reassess the criteria under which a person might be stripped of his or her nationality’, speech by President Sarkozy in Grenoble on 30 July 2010 (Libération, 30 July 2010).

Finally, in a speech delivered in response to violence which occurred during the summer of 2010 in Grenoble (south-east France), President Nicolas Sarkozy announced the possibility of stripping offenders of their French nationality provided that they had been naturalised in the previous ten years. This last attempt not only to limit access to nationality but to threaten to withdraw it shows how the process of nationality acquisition is again and again called into question in response to what is perceived as a challenge related to the diversity of the society.

**The understanding of religious diversity through laïcité**

*The enforcement of laïcité aims at organising the co-existence of various religious faiths*

There are no official statistics that record religious affiliation in the French population. However, it is fair to say that the French population is mainly Catholic. Jews, Protestants and Muslims are ‘religious minorities’ in France. As a matter of fact, according to D. Lochak while the official discourse rejects the notion of minorities, the term ‘minority’ has appeared in legal texts in reference to ‘religious minorities’ since the 1789 Revolution (Lochak, 1989).

*Laïcité*, defined as the separation of Church and State in all things pertaining to public life, seems to be the principle that provides for the co-existence of various religious faiths in French society. It is embodied in the 1905 law separating Church and State and rules out any official representation of religion in public places. It also implies that religious affiliations are not considered a legitimate basis for the identification of groups.

In other words, there is no official recognition of religious affiliation. This is understood as a way to guarantee the neutrality of the State and the equal treatment of individuals on the basis of citizenship.

**The reassessment of laïcité to tackle the challenge of Islam**

In a context where the acknowledgement of various religious affiliations is little articulated in the public sphere, the formation of a Muslim minority is mainly tackled through the scope of *laïcité*. As such, although *laïcité* as a principle emerged from the Enlightenment and was designed to diminish the power of the Catholic Church over French society, the notion has been increasingly discussed in connection with Islam in the past two decades. It is given a narrow interpretation in the public debate: although it is a tool to deal with religious diversity in general, it is mainly used as a mean to target Islam. This focus on Islam when *laïcité* is discussed is an important feature to understand how religious diversity is perceived in French society.
The approach to issues pertaining to Islam in terms of laïcité can be traced back to the first headscarf affair that took place in 1989 in Creil, an outer suburb of Paris, when the principal of a secondary school took the decision to exclude three girls because he considered that their Muslim headscarves were religious symbols and undermined the principle of laïcité. The State Council, however, ruled that the wearing of the headscarf was ‘not contradictory to the values of the secular and republican school’ and left it to the teachers and school heads to decide whether or not pupils were using this as an instrument of proselytism and disturbance of school activities. The 1989 interpretation of laïcité by the State Council was later challenged and given a more restrictive twist with the establishment of the Stasi Commission in 2003 and the passing of the 2004 law forbidding the wearing of ‘ostentatious’ religious signs such as Muslim headscarves in schools.

The restrictive interpretation of laïcité was confirmed in 2010 with the debate and the passing of a law banning the wearing of the full Islamic veil in public. Despite the limited number of women reported as wearing the full Islamic veil, the phenomenon was widely constructed as an issue by the media and politicians. In contrast with the headscarf affair and the sequels that first arose from the practice of teachers in school and then reached the political agenda, the ‘burqa affair’ was brought about by members of parliament (on the initiative of André Guérin, Communist deputy from the Lyon region of south-east France), in connection with a declaration in 2009 by President Sarkozy, who was reported saying that ‘the burqa was not welcome in the Republic’. That the media played an important role in spreading the image of a threatening Islam in the previous headscarf affairs has already been demonstrated (Deltombe, 2005; Lorcerie, 2005; Tevenian, 2005). However, in the case of the ‘burqa affair’, the role of the media and politicians is even stronger in the sense that the number of women wearing the full Islamic veil is limited.

Moreover, it is important to note that the wearing of the full Islamic veil is advocated mainly by Salafist groups. These are Islamic groups who advocate a strict observance of Islam developed in the past ten years and come from Saudi Arabia. Their practice of Islam has little to do with the more traditional forms of Islam practised by North African immigrants (Roy, 2010). The presence of women wearing the full Islamic veil in France is thus related to the internationalisation of fundamentalist forms of Islam rather than with the successive waves of immigrants who came from North Africa. Yet the presentation of the ‘burqa ban’ in connection with immigration and the question of national identity point at the Muslim population in France and contribute to their construction as foreign to French identity.

The difficulties in accommodating Muslims in France stem from this construction of Islam as foreign to French identity. Even though the French State has found ways to accommodate Jews and Protestants in the past, it is making it harder for Muslims. It has been integrating Islam in a ‘pragmatic handling of differences’ that consisted of ‘gradually introducing the minimal dose of institutionalisation needed for a concrete resolution of the practical problems created by the existence of “minority groups”’ (Lochak, 1989). As such, the Council of Moslems of France was recognised by Interior Minister Charles Pasqua in 1994 and, in 2003, the French Council for the Muslim Religion (Conseil Français du Culte Musulman) was created.
Although the principle of _laïcité_ emerged in 1789 as a way to exclude the power of the Catholic Church from the French State and has been associated with a strong anti-Catholic stance in France, it is now increasingly discussed in connection with Islam. The reassessment of _laïcité_ in public policies and public debate is an important feature of the understanding of religious diversity in France. It also shows how Islam is perceived as a challenging dimension of French religious diversity.

**Challenging identities in the French context**

In this part, we list the different groups that contribute to the diversity of the French population in order to bring out the types of identities that can be considered as challenging. In the French republican context, there is no recognition of the existence of sub-groups and the only difference recorded in official statistics is that of nationality (cf. supra). Thus, with these constraints in mind, we will detail the various groups of immigrants according to their nationality, but we will also go beyond this juridical view and discuss the existence of ‘visible minorities’ in French society that are not recorded by the census. We will discuss Islam and skin colour as essential features of the construction of the Other in France. Lastly, we will detail the specific case of the Roma community in France.

**Immigrants**

Immigrants are individuals who were born abroad to non-French parents and are currently residing in France. Immigrants may hold French nationality that they acquired after immigrating to France (in 2004-05, 2 million immigrants held French nationality). There were 4.9 million foreign-born in 2004 (INSEE, 2006), i.e. 8.1% of the population. Of those foreign-born, 1.7 million are from Europe (40%), 1.5 million from the Maghreb (31%) and 1.4 million from the rest of the world. 570,000 are from sub-Saharan Africa (of which 70% come from a former colonial country); 48% are Asian and 16% are from Turkey. (See Figure 1 supra.)

Immigrants from the EU are the largest category but fall into a variety of nationalities. Moreover, considering the construction of the Other in the French context, immigrants coming from outside Europe are the most likely to be seen as different and as tending to challenge the perception of diversity in French society. The largest groups are therefore: North-African immigrants, Sub-Saharan Africans, Asians and immigrants from Turkey.

1. **North-African immigrants (1,500,000 in 2004)**

North-African immigrants are mainly composed of nationals from Morocco and Algeria and, in smaller numbers, nationals from Tunisia. During the colonial time, Algerians, but also Moroccans, were identified as the indigenous population and were recruited to work in low-skill jobs (construction, mines, agriculture) starting in the interwar period. The end of colonial rule, in 1956 for Tunisia and Morocco and in 1962 for Algeria, did not stop the influx of immigrants to France, because of difficult economic conditions in the newly independent countries and the fact that former colonial subjects enjoyed a specific status in France (especially Algerians). Despite common representations of immigrant populations as essentially composed of male workers, families settled, starting in the 1960s. The end of economic
migration in 1974 only intensified immigrants' recourse to family reunification but did not start the process of settlement per se. Despite the restrictions on immigration into France, the number of Algerians and Moroccans is still growing: +100,000 since 1999, for each nationality. The family members that nationals from Algeria and Moroccans may have in France allow them to come to France under the family reunification regime. This can account for their growing number, along with the strong links that the countries still have in the economic and educational fields.  

2. Sub-Saharan African immigrants (570,000 in 2004)  

Seven out of 10 immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa come from countries formerly ruled by the French State (Mali, Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire and Cameroon). In the 1960s, France signed bilateral agreements with the newly independent countries that secured French economic interests in those countries, while, in exchange, it guaranteed the free circulation of their nationals (Viet, 1998: 219). This favoured the migration of African immigrants to France, although in small numbers. In 1962, there were 22,000 immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa against 570,000 in 2004. Today, Senegalese and Malian nationals account for the larger groups of immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa (57,000 and 48,000 in 2005 respectively).  

Sub-Saharan African immigrants have been present in small number in the past decades. Their number has however been increasing since the last census of 1999 (+45%) and they have attracted much media and political attention, with the common figure of the clandestine immigrant who embarks on a long and dangerous journey to reach France, often illegally. However, it is important to note that contrary to the common image circulated by the media, sub-Saharan African immigrants only accounted for 30% of the illegal immigrants who applied for a regularisation procedure between 1999 and 2006; 30% were from North Africa, 16% from Asia and 12.3% from America (Beauchemin and Lessault, 2009).  

3. Asian immigrants (258,000 in 2004)  

The number of immigrants from Asia has been increasing since the last national census of 1999. While the number of immigrants from Vietnam is stable, the Chinese community is growing (from 27,826 in 1999 to 61,000 in 2005). Immigrants coming from South East Asia and political refugees fleeing the conflict in Sri Lanka also account for a growing number of Asian immigrants in France (mainly concentrated in the Paris region).  

4. Immigrants from Turkey (222,000 in 2004)  

Immigrants from Turkey account for 4% of the immigrant population as a whole. Since France signed a bilateral agreement in 1966, there has been a constant and growing community of immigrants in France (see Figure 2).  

Visible minorities: French of North African and African descent, French of Caribbean ancestry  

As French nationals, descendants of immigrants and people from the overseas departments are not recorded in official statistics. Yet, surveys on portions of this population show that they can be the target of  

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20. Although Algerians born before 1962 (Algerian Independence) held French nationality at the time of their birth, if they chose to take the nationality of the independent country in 1962, they no longer had French nationality.  
21. African countries that were not under French rule during the colonial period but that are represented in the immigrant population in France are Democratic Republic of Congo and Mauritius.  
discriminatory practices (Beauchemin et al., 2010). We argue that they belong to ‘visible minorities’ and for this reason should be analysed as carrying challenging identities. What are their main features? Why are they perceived as different from the rest of the society? We argue here that skin colour and a construction of Muslims as ethnically different from French identity have created visible minorities in France that are perceived as challenging identities.

The example of a recent survey on discrimination in France is an interesting case in point to outline the main features that are regarded as challenging for the rest of French society.23 According to this survey, children of French persons born in the overseas departments and also sub-Saharan African immigrants mention skin colour well ahead of ethnic origin or nationality (73% and 88% respectively) (Beauchemin et al., 2010: 4). This shows that when French people are black they are perceived as different from the rest of the society and that this might expose them to discriminatory practices. It confirms that being ‘black’ in France is perceived as a challenging identity (Ndiaye, 2008). Furthermore, second generation immigrants who are not black declare that ethnicity – phrased in terms of origin or nationality in the survey – is the main reason why they suffer discrimination. Among these second generations, the majority were born of North African parents.

Can we speak of a North-African minority in France, and what is the role of Islam as a distinctive feature for this minority? Can we speak of a Muslim minority in France?

In France, North Africans are perceived as different because of a process of differentiation that dates back to the colonial period and the decolonisation wars (Stora, 1998). Islam played an important role and was used more as an ethnic marker than in reference to a religious practice in constructing North Africans as essentially different (Weil, 2008). Ethnicity and religious affiliation have been used to differentiate North Africans from the French population in a manner that parallels a process of racial construction. The category ‘race’ is seldom used in the French context. However, considering that race is a social construct that has a close connection to ‘racism’ as an ideology or an attitude, one may argue that North Africans have been ‘racialised’ because of their ethnicity and religion in France. Moreover, in current political and media discourses the category ‘Muslim’ operates as a ‘neo-ethnic’ rather than a religious category to refer to immigrants with an African or Asian background (Roy, 2010).

However, we would point out that the category ‘Muslim’ belongs largely to the English-speaking world.24 Only 59% of French people with North African, African and Turkish descent identify themselves as Muslim (Tiberj and Brouard, 2006). This stems from the fact that there is a low level of assertion of religious affiliation as a form of political identity in France and respondents mainly link Islam to a religious practice. When they do not consider themselves practising Muslims they tend not to identify themselves as Muslims (Tiberj and Brouard, 2006). This should lead us to take the figure ‘6 million Muslims living in France’ with caution.25 This number derives from the number of immigrants and their descendants who come from a country where Islam is the predominant religion (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey and to a certain extent Senegal). It does not, however, entail that 6 million people in France identify themselves as Muslim, or as belonging to a Muslim community. It is therefore difficult to speak of a Muslim minority in France and it seems more accurate, historically, to speak of a North African minority.

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23. TeO - Survey on the impact of origins: life histories of immigrants, immigrants’ descendants and native French people. Launched in 2005, the TeO survey covered a large sample of 24,000 individuals composed of immigrants, descendants of immigrants, French citizens from the overseas departments and members of the majority population. For more information, see: http://www.ined.fr/en/current_researchs/research_projects/majors_projects/bdd/projet/P0835/ [last access: 15/12/2011]

24. ‘Whereas studies published in French talk of “people of immigrant origin”, those carried out by English-speaking institutes routinely speak of “young Muslims”, or of “Muslim riots”.’ (Roy, 2010: 83)

Finally, regarding Blacks, African immigrants may be Muslims or Christians, and so, as a visible minority, they overlap with the Muslim minority. Despite attempts to identify a ‘Muslim effect’ among Africans in France (Adida et al., 2010), skin colour might be a stronger marker than their religion.

Therefore, it is appropriate to talk about a North African minority (immigrants from North Africa and French people of North African descent) on the one hand, and a ‘black’ minority (immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa, French people of African descent and French people from the overseas départements) on the other hand. Furthermore, the emergence of a recent discourse on diversity in France has been connected to the affirmation of a black identity.

**The Roma community**

The Roma community in France is composed of French nationals who are usually referred to as ‘travellers’ (gens du voyage) in administrative documents so as to avoid the derogatory term ‘gypsies’ (gitans). It also refers to one of their specific traits, which is to be nomadic and to have no permanent residence – although this is changing and 85% of them are settled. While they may be referred to as the ‘Roma community’ of France, the ‘travellers’ encompass various minorities (Rom, Gitan and Manouche). They trace their roots to the nomadic people who came originally from India and speak a language different from French.

There are no official statistics that record the number of people from the Roma community in France and estimations vary. A 1969 law defines a specific status for ‘travellers’, who can hold a ‘travel pass’ (titre de circulation). In 2002, 156,282 people held this document. However, pass holders have to be older than 16 and some settled families do not have passes. The number of 156,282 is therefore an underestimation of the Roma community in France. Estimates for the total Roma community vary from 250,000 to 400,000 people, that is 0.5% of the population (Robert, 2006: 11).

The Roma community of France is not homogenous but composed of different minorities; they are, however, all exposed to discrimination and suffer from socioeconomic disadvantages (Robert, 2006: 9). The expulsion of Roma people of Romania by the French government has introduced some confusion regarding the different Roma communities and there has been an increase in the stigmatisation of the community in general (Le Monde, 20 October 2010).

**How are tolerance and equality understood in France?**

**Notions of equality and tolerance towards diversity**

In France, it is usually assumed that the best way to achieve equality is to ignore cultural and religious differences. There should be no recognition of differences. This is linked to the belief that all matters pertaining to public life should be considered outside of the articulation of group identities, in a vertical relationship between the individual and the State.
The French strategy to reach equality: making difference ‘invisible’

The Republican creed is that equality will be achieved by making difference invisible. This is generally done by excluding any means of recording differences among individuals in their interaction with public authorities (social security, local office for social housing, education, employment). By rendering difference invisible, the official discourse bypasses the acknowledgement of differences.

One may point out to an exception to this prevailing view: in 1981, the Socialist Party won the presidential election with a programme that advocated the ‘Right to be Different’. This discourse did not directly designate immigrant groups. It was used to implement various types of policy (for instance, giving more power to regional governments in a perspective that valued the ‘regional differences’ of the country). Yet it had implications for the acknowledgement of the diversity of the population resulting from immigration to France. At the level of political discourse, the recognition of the multicultural character of the society emerged, especially when the demand for equal treatment of second generation immigrants made itself heard (Leveau and Wihtol de Wenden, 2001; Escafre-Dublet, 2010).

At the level of public policies, one may observe a higher level of concern for minority issues. The expression of regional cultures, for instance was favoured by the Ministry of Culture (Giordan, 1982). A report to establish the cultural needs of immigrants in school was commissioned by the Ministry of Education (Berque, 1985). Claims for the representation of minority interests were able to be articulated and this resulted in the emergence of a prolific anti-racist movement with organisations such as SOS-racism and France plus. The experience was short-lived, however. The extreme right parties turned the discourse on the Right to be Different against anti-racist groups and claimed the ‘Right to be Different, yes, but at home’, calling for the exclusion of immigrants and their return to their country of origin.

The short-lived experience of the promotion of the Right to Difference in France had a long lasting effect. It was marked by the success of the extremist party, the National Front (Front national), whenever difference is acknowledged. Today, it remains an important dynamic to bear in mind when considering discourses on difference in France: the racist discourse articulated by the Front national is still seen as the reverse side of the recognition of cultural differences. This is, for instance, exemplified in the distrust towards communitarianism (communautarisme), i.e. a form of cultural separatism considered as the inevitable outcome of group recognition and the promotion of cultural differences.

The French understanding of tolerance towards religious diversity: laïcité

The notion of tolerance is linked to religious tolerance. The Edict of Nantes (1598), for instance, was labelled an Edict of Tolerance and it recognised freedom of religious belief for Protestants in France. Subsequently, the concept of laïcité has been the main notion through which to understand tolerance for religious diversity in France. It is not a passive acceptance of the practice of the Other, but an active principle that keeps all religious expressions in the private sphere (Kintzler, 1998).
The concept of laïcité emerged from the thinking of the Enlightenment and the need to expel the power of the Church from all matters pertaining to public life. Throughout the 19th and the 20th centuries, advocates of the implementation of laïcité in France have also been anti-religion militants. They have conveyed the idea that by making religion invisible in French public life, the State could ensure that individuals could be treated equally. Because of the power that the Catholic Church used to represent in French society, they have contended that religious expressions are a threat to the good functioning of democracy. As such, laïcité provides for the right to belief and disbelief of all individuals, so that no member of a religious group can be favoured over individuals who do not profess any religious faith. It is also a way to protect individuals from the intolerance of religions. The state of tolerance in France is seen as best achieved through the invisibility of religious expressions in public debates and political life. This guarantees the neutrality of the State and makes the equal treatment of individuals, regardless of their religious affiliation, possible.

Laïcité and equality in practice

Despite a well-articulated discourse on equality in France, instances of discrimination are reported (Meurs et al., 2006). Moreover, strategies to implement positive actions towards specific groups have been deployed, although they have targeted individuals identified mainly on socio-economic criteria. The analysis of policy results and attitudes towards difference demonstrates the downside of making difference invisible: a low level of articulation of ethnic and cultural difference lead to situations of double standards and ethnic ascriptions.

The policies to promote equality and combat discrimination

In practice, a long history of racist incidents and the recent exposure of discrimination on the labour market through statistical surveys have pointed to the difficulty of guaranteeing equal treatment of individuals in French society (Meurs, Pailhé and Simon, 2006). Already in 1998, the left-wing government of Lionel Jospin had acknowledged the failure of the strategy of integration (Haut Conseil à l’Intégration, 1998) and a critique had emerged (Belorgey, 1999). Following the impetus of the EU, the French government established a High Authority to fight discrimination and promote equality (Haute autorité de lutte contre les discriminations et pour l’égalité, HALDE) in 2004. Despite a change in framing (from integration to anti-discrimination), the High Authority remains reluctant to adopt a strategy to acknowledge differences among individuals (Lépinard and Simon, 2008).

Moreover, the EU directive advocates the monitoring of discrimination practices, which is difficult given the lack of ethnic data in France. The debate that emerged in 2008 on the collection of ethnic statistics is another example of the challenge to address issues resulting from the diversity of the population (Simon, 2008). In a country where colour blindness is the rule, the difficulty of identifying individuals according to their ethnic traits prevents the measurement of the scale of discrimination practices. The difficulty of collecting ethnic data stems from the fact that the racial construction of visible minorities is little acknowledged

26. Despite the 1973 law condemning racist speech and acts, anti-racist movements have denounced the consistency of racist crimes over the past decades, regularly pointing at specific cases that did not receive the adequate penalty (for instance the UCRA, la Ligue contre le racisme et l’anti-sémitisme, www.ucra.org).

27. In May 2011, the HALDE disappeared and the fight against discrimination is now included in the remit of the new Defender of Human Rights.
because the category of race is banned from scientific discourse on differences (Badinter and Lebras, eds: 2010).

Finally, in the implementation of policy to enforce equality, France has designed positive actions targeting specific groups, but policy makers have relied exclusively on social criteria. This is the case for Priority Education Zones (ZEP), which were created in 1984 to bring more educational resources to specific areas that were identified as disadvantaged (Glasman, 2000). It was in keeping with the official discourse on republican integration and the refusal of any specific treatment according to ethnic or cultural difference. The policy consisted mainly in a redistribution of resources (concretely, schools that fell into the ZEP category had extra budgets) and did not entail tackling difference from a cultural or even a religious point of view. However, sociological studies have shown that educational practitioners resort to powerful categorisation in terms of ethnicity, cultural traits and religious affiliation (Lorcerie, 2003). One may therefore argue that the official silence on migration-related diversity has favoured the unofficial development of ethnic and cultural categorisations in educational practices.

Laïcité in practice

In practice, laïcité means that there are no religious signs in public places. Civil servants, also, should not wear religious signs because the exercise of public service should be done regardless of any political or religious affiliation. Laïcité does not only apply to the expression of religious faith, it is a law that is linked to the notion of freedom of expression and therefore also applies to the expression of political opinion. As such, the application of laïcité in French state schools prevents teachers from expressing religious and political opinions in class.

However, laïcité has been put into practice in a mainly Catholic country. This means that since its inclusion in the Ferry law of 1882 and its institutionalisation in the 1905 law, the Catholic Church has fought to maintain some of its positions (for the preservation of its patrimony and its network of parishes). Protestants, Jews and Muslims were not as numerous and as powerful. This explains why Catholicism is more present in French society. For instance, while religious education cannot take place in state schools, it has been the practice to establish chaplaincies for Catholics where pupils can discuss religion and have prayer groups as long as they do not proselytise or disrupt the normal functioning of the school.

Moreover, although the application of laïcité is incumbent on all citizens in France, exceptions were made in the colonies. For instance, laïcité was not applied as such in Algeria. The State had a say on the organisation of Islam because the colonial administration wanted to keep its control over the administration of the Muslim religion (Achi, 2004). Thus, from a historical perspective, the enforcement of laïcité has had slightly different applications depending on the religion (Weil, 2007).

The fact that the application of laïcité is currently mainly targeting Islam in France is therefore a manifestation of the different treatment that each religion receives and shows that the state is not neutral towards all religions (Laborde, 2008). Some argue that it is problematic because the debate on laïcité has fostered a sharp return of assimilationism and
has formed part of a growing ‘Islamophobia’ (Geisser, 2003). One can observe that laïcité has been mentioned several times by government officials to address the question of Islam in France. This was the case with the President’s advocacy of a ‘positive laïcité’ (laïcité positive), arguing that laïcité was not enough. Philosophers and political theorists, however, have answered that the concept of laïcité is in itself positive, in the sense that it is substantial and protects the right of belief and unbelief (Kintzler, 1998).

Furthermore, public opinion surveys show a change in the understanding of laïcité in the French population. Whereas laïcité used to be linked to leftist political orientations and mainly associated with people who were in opposition to the Catholic Church, in recent years, people who recognise laïcité as an important value for them are also people who declare anti-immigrant feelings and position themselves on the right of the political spectrum (Barthélemy and Michelat, 2007).

**Concluding remarks**

France’s response to the formation of a diverse population has been to leave particular identities outside the public sphere and promote the neutrality of the State towards any kind of religious and ethnic affiliations. This has been seen as the best way to guarantee the equal treatment of individuals, in a vertical relationship between them and the State. In practice it has prevented the expression of religious and ethnic affiliation in many instances of public life, such as education and politics. The promotion of equality through invisibility has had some shortcomings, however, and the exposure of discrimination or the identification of racial bias against Muslim populations in France shows how processes of ethnic ascription and racial construction are in play.

In this report we have listed the different groups that contribute to the diversity of the French population and put in historical perspective the various features that make the identities of these groups challenging (from a religious or ethnic point of view). We have identified the elements of French discourse that pertain to the question of diversity and tolerance. In particular, the notions of national identity and laïcité have been put forward in recent years to deal with issues that are related to the diversity of the French population.

The analysis of the discourse and of historical developments regarding national identity and laïcité makes it possible to identify the main elements that structure toleration and the logic of recognition in France.

- **Toleration** in France is not so much about passively accepting that others may have practices that the majority population disapproves of. Rather, the practice of tolerance, toleration, is an active principle that excludes the expression of religious and/or ethnic affiliation from the public space in order to guarantee its neutrality. This is, for instance, conveyed through the notion of laïcité.

- The exclusion of religious practices from the public sphere should not be mistaken for the disapproval of religious affiliation in general. The goal is first and foremost to guarantee the equal treatment of all individuals in the public sphere; in the private sphere one is free to express any kind of religious or ethnic affiliation. However, due to the special
position of the Catholic Church in the implementation of laïcité, one may identify a difference of treatment towards minority religions in France (Islam, Protestantism and Judaism). This may lead to claims of non-toleration of certain religious practices in specific cases.

- The promotion of equality through invisibility represents a challenge in analysing the question of recognition in the French context. There is no such thing as the identification of groups, and the recognition of groups’ affiliations or the acknowledgement of their specific needs is not relevant for how the society operates. To develop the discussion beyond the notion of toleration therefore requires extending the concept of recognition to the notion of respect as equal and admission as normal. The challenges then lies in the acknowledgement that the diversity of the population is represented in the national community and is seen as normal. The value discourse on national identity, for instance, is deeply connected to that logic: by pointing to differences that are not compatible with the national identity, actors are drawing invisible boundaries. Islam does not make up the whole challenge of diversity in France. Cultural diversity encompasses broader challenges such as the recognition of immigration as a valuable input to the French national narrative.

Bibliography


CHAPTER 2. DENMARK

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Introduction

Danes perceive Denmark as situated on the fringes of Europe, and not only geographically. At face value, this perception is a peculiarity, since Denmark has always been surrounded by and interacting with key players in the struggle for European dominion. Today, Denmark’s closest neighbors in cultural, political and economic terms, Sweden and Germany, also constitute its main trading partners (Danmarks Statistik, 2008).

As Denmark’s role in the great European power struggles was gradually but inevitably reduced at the brink of the modern age, Danish national identity was more and more defined in accordance with its role as a minor European state. A national awakening in the 19th century fitted the political reality of the losses of Norway (in 1814, to Sweden) and Schleswig-Holstein (in 1864, to Germany) as well as the ideal of romanticism. The separation from its former lands created a Danish state without noticeable differences in nationality and language. The Danish nation and the Danish state eventually became so closely knit together that it to this day is difficult to think of the nation without the state.

In the early 20th century Denmark gradually became a social democratic Scandinavian welfare state formed by the non-revolutionary Social Democratic Party. Their struggle to reform the state was linked to a perception of the political elite as out of touch with the backbone of the nation: the working class (Hansen, 2002: 60-61).

After the Second World War welfare programs expanded significantly, and growth and equality were successfully united. Although this positive development came to a halt in the 1970’s, the fundamental social democratic vision of the welfare state has been largely accepted by Liberal and Conservative parties (except one minor party: Liberal Alliance).

This widespread solidarity has come under pressure in recent decades as the share of immigrants and descendants has steadily risen. The overshadowing concern with cultural and religious differences in Denmark
today pertains to post-immigration minorities with backgrounds in non-western countries, most of whom are (identified as) Muslims. Immigration from non-western countries is very controversial because of (what is perceived to be) their low ability or willingness to integrate into the ‘modern’ Danish society and democracy.

In the last two decades, the predominant discourse in Denmark with regard to religious and cultural differences has been one of integration, rather than of tolerance or of respect and recognition of ethnic and religious identities. This discourse of integration is explicitly set against notion of multiculturalism. The latter is seen as synonymous with parallel societies and a moral, social and political failure to demand and further the integration of all residents into society.

The strong focus on integration has changed the perception of Denmark as a country tolerant towards alternative lifestyles (first to legalize pornography and recognize gay marriages). The comparably liberal immigration laws of 1983 have been replaced through gradual reform with one of the toughest immigration regimes in Europe. The developments above set the scene for studying the recent cultural, ethnic and religious diversity challenges in Denmark and the ways in which they have been addressed. Section 2 will expand on the current dimensions of Danish identity and the selective reading of historical events and figures related to this discursive construction. Section 3 will broadly describe Danish immigration history and the challenges that the most relevant minority groups of Danish society face today. Finally, before the concluding remarks, section 4 will expand on the dominant interpretation of tolerance in Denmark and on the values and arrangements of the Danish integration regime.

In this report we use the following working definitions. National identity refers to the identity that Danes see themselves as sharing as members of the national community. National heritage concerns the historical bases of this identity. Multiculturalism relates both to the fact that there are distinct socially salient groups in society that differ with regard to their cultural and religious backgrounds, and to the broadly conceived normative position which holds that these groups should be given positive symbolic recognition of their contribution to society through specific polices and rights. Cultural, ethnic and religious diversity refers to the notion that there are non-trivial differences along cultural, ethnic and religious dimensions between different groups. Citizenship is both understood as legal nationality, and as a social and political ideal that implies that the citizen participates democratically in political institutions and the civil society. Integration means the equal participation of immigrants in all spheres of society and in Denmark is based on the adoption by immigrants of the practices and values of ‘active citizenship.’ It is hence not equal to a complete cultural assimilation and the demand that immigrants become like Danes on all cultural and identity dimensions.

The doctrine of civic integrationism refers to the belief that integration of immigrants should be based on ‘active citizenship’ and includes elements of both republicanism (citizenship as democratic participation) and perfectionist liberalism (the state promotes individual autonomy). The concept of toleration implies not forbidding beliefs and practices that one finds wrong, because the reasons for not forbidding them are
found weightier that the reasons for objecting them. In the report, the terms of tolerance and toleration are used interchangeably. In Denmark there is a particular conception of tolerance that is called ‘free mindedness’ or ‘liberality’. Liberality entails fighting for the values ‘you hold dearly’ while insisting on the same right for all others. Tolerance here is taken to mean indifference, relativism and the failure to form moral judgements.

**National identity and State formation**

**State formation**

Through time Danish national identity has been influenced by the parallel and interwoven development of state formation and conceptions of the nation, each of which is connected to a series of key historical events.

The Lutheran reformation (1536), whereby church land was expropriated and church influence on state policy was diminished, coincided with the often heavy-handed creation by the state of a (protestant) Christian people. This proto-nationalist people-building emphasised individual loyalty to the Christian king, knowledge of the scripture and catechism, and to this end extended the use of national language in churches and schools. Only later, with the liberal 1849 constitution, religious and worship freedoms in independent religious societies were established; in conjunction with the creation of a state church, the so called ‘People’s Church’ [Folkekirken], with locally self-governing parishes under government administration. Culturally Folkekirken retains a privileged position today (Mouritsen, 2009: 7-8).

The 1750s saw a large debate on how to define the nation and citizenship. Enlightenment ideas in the modernising monarchy produced – for a brief period of time – a form of cosmopolitanism where a person’s motherland was the territory where he chose to live in loyalty and allegiance to the king. This civic-patriotic conception of the nation and citizenship was soon challenged by a growing national bourgeoisie that was hostile towards granting citizenship and state employment to foreigners. Criticism grew after an episode in 1770s, where J. F. Struense, a German-born physician to mentally ill King Christian VII, had seized power to initiate reforms before he was outmanoeuvred. This perceived German coup d’etat provoked the Law of Indigenous Rights of 1776, whereby only citizens born in the King’s dominions (but still also German speakers) could assume office.

From the mid-19th century Danish politics changed significantly when the last stage of nation building coincided with the country’s relatively early democratisation in a way that still shapes contemporary delineation of national membership. When the king resigned in 1848 and the first free constitution was signed in 1849, all major political forces favoured comprehensive constitutional rights and (male) democracy. However, an internal conflict erupted between national liberals on the one hand and cosmopolitans and left-liberals on the other, who disagreed on the identity, in terms of language and territory (but not religion), of the new democratic people. This blow produced an
inward-looking, nationalist re-awakening inspired by romanticism and based on the rural society and peasant virtues. The loss of one-third of the country, including the most developed cities and regions, was counterbalanced by cultivating the Jutlandic moor, development of cooperative farm movements, and the establishment of popular folk high school education for peasant youth.

Danish nationalism, emerging as a literary phenomenon in the early 19th century, evolved into political nationalism from the 1830s (Korsgaard, 2004: 298), with N. F. S. Grundtvig (1783-1872) playing a prominent part in both movements. Today, the dominant conception of the nation and national identity reflects a selective reading of Danish national identity history. In it five semantic and narrative elements can be identified (Mouritsen, 2009: 23-25; Mouritsen, 2010: 8-9).

First, even though traditional religiosity is declining, cultural Christianity remains significant. The idea of a special Danish brand of Lutheranism, tied to this narrative, presupposes the separation of religion from politics and the practice of religion in a worldly fashion. Thereby it tends to place Islam in an unfavourable light.

Second, Danish language has constituted an important element in national belonging. Today, immigrants are expected to master and use Danish at a level well beyond what is required to function in the labour market and ordinary communication.

Third, Denmark is often described as a small and culturally homogeneous country with a characteristic social ideal of tight knit ‘cosiness’. Present debates on cohesion in Denmark, the valuation of sameness, and mistrust of cultural pluralism per se draw on these themes.

Fourth, smallness and homogeneity are connected to values of egalitarianism and a special way of understanding and organising democracy. The influence from Grundtvigianism created a tradition of anti-authoritarianism, social liberalism and appreciation of social levelling that have become linked to the comprehensive welfare state and its focus on social and cultural equality, (Koch, 1945).

Fifth, the pride in the welfare society evident in government discourse translates to a requirement of reciprocity and solidarity, concretely manifested as an obligation to work and pay taxes.

Today, cultural diversity is often associated with the existence of inferior cultures (un-western, un-modern, un-civilised) in Danish society (Mouritsen, 2009: 27). ‘Danish’ values of democracy, gender equality, and freedom of speech become presented, here, as universalistic concepts but with culturalist spins (Ibid: 19), producing a ‘particular universalism.’ To a large extent, Muslims have become the defining ‘other’ of these peculiarly culturalised civic-liberal self-understandings. They are who the Danes are not (Mouritsen, 2006: 88).

Citizenship in Denmark

The term ‘citizenship’ bears different meanings in a Danish context. The concept of indfødsret was the first coinage of citizenship and literally
means ‘the right to be native born’. (Ersbøll 2010). The purpose was not to reserve positions for ethnic Danes and, hence, *indfødsret* was originally understood in terms of a *ius soli* interpretation. The interpretation of the law, however, soon changed such that only children born of native-born parents acquired *indfødsret* at birth (Ibid.).

The concept of *statsborgerskab* denotes legal nationality, and in terms of citizenship it signifies the citizen’s status as subject of a particular (national) state. Today *indfødsret* and *statsborgerskab* are used interchangeably as they denote the same status and rights.

The concept of *medborgerskab* (*medborger* literally means ‘fellow citizen’) signifies a horizontal interpretation of what belonging to the same society entails – a form of compatriotism. In its contemporary use it is closely associated with the comprehensive Danish welfare state and the notion of Denmark as a social space inhabited by a population of active citizens who share the same public values.

Due to the development from a multi-national to a national state it became increasingly less meaningful to differentiate between the above meanings of citizenship. From the early 20th century onwards, the different terms were perceived as inseparable and both *indfødsret* and *medborgerskab* gradually fell out of use (Ibid.).

However, citizenship as *medborgerskab* gradually re-entered the public discourse during the 1990s in the wake of the Muslim immigration and has been a central concept in the public discourse since the liberal-conservative government took office in 2001. The current distinction between *statsborgerskab*/*indfødsret* and *medborgerskab* denotes how access to legal citizenship is now perceived as a prize at the end of the road of successful integration. One has to be committed to the virtues of being a ‘fellow citizen’ (*medborger*) before one can gain recognition as a full-fledged member of the community.

Danish citizenship is generally understood in terms of *ius sanguinis*. Accordingly, Danes today tend to perceive Denmark as a community rather than a society. For more than 200 years after 1776 immigrant descendants were entitled to Danish citizenship either automatically or since 1950 through declaration (though from 1976 conditioned on residence and from 1999 also on conduct). This general entitlement was repealed in 2004 with immigrant descendants now being required to apply for Danish citizenship by naturalization (Ibid: 26).

Since 2001 there has been a tightening on all fronts concerning permanent residence and naturalization. Both objective criteria such as years of residence (for naturalization: from seven to nine years) and self-support (for naturalization: no more than 6 months on public benefits in the last 5 years plus no debt to the state) as well as what can be defined as a subjective criterion of belonging has been tightened. The last aspect is probably the most central. Initiatives like the signing of an Integration Contract and a Declaration on Integration and Active Citizenship, a harsh language proficiency test and a citizenship test examining knowledge of “Danish culture, history and social conditions” signals a turn towards a more subjective element of belonging where being Danish is not only a matter of submitting to Danish legislation or even to Danish norms, but of identifying with those norms.
Denmark and Europe

The opposition between being Nordic and being European was emphasized in the debate in the 19th century among romanticists and adherents of enlightenment ideology. Being Nordic meant defining one’s identity in terms of being Danish or Scandinavian, while being European meant defining one’s identity in more abstract terms, as committed to more general ideas of the liberty and equality of man.

The consequence of the tight conceptual coupling of nation and state in the 19th century has been that encroachments on political sovereignty have been perceived as threats to the nation. Since the early 1990’s Denmark’s relationship to the EU has been marked with skepticism expressed in the consistent high level of no-support in referenda from 1992 and onwards. This inability to distinguish between nation and state has locked the debate in such a way that the pro-Europeans primarily have focused on the economic prospects and argued that the EU does not exceed normal inter-state cooperation while the euro-skeptics have claimed that the EU is a new superstate that threatens national independence (Hansen, 2002).

When the Maastricht Treaty was turned down in 1992, the solution was that Denmark would ratify the treaty but it would be allowed to opt out of the integration process on four issues (Krunke, 2005: 341-42): Union Citizenship, the Common Defence and Security Policy, the Economic and Monetary Union and the new initiatives in the area of Justice and Home Affairs. The last of the four opt-outs was from the very beginning framed as a means of securing national sovereignty regarding questions of immigration and integration.

Cultural diversity challenges

Immigration history of Denmark

Before the immigration wave of Turkish and Yugoslav foreign labour in the late 1960s the question of cultural homogeneity in Denmark was, with a few notable exceptions, hardly ever raised. Denmark has been – and probably still is - one of the most ethnically homogenous countries in the world. Danes have always been reluctant to perceive the nation and Danish history in relation to and as a result of immigration, which reflects itself in the fierce opposition the last 20 years to label Danish society as multicultural. Today 9.8 percent of Denmark’s 5.5 million residents are immigrants and descendants of immigrants, and 6.6 percent of the population is from non-Western countries (Ministry of Refugees, Immigrants and Integration, 2010: 17).

Following the Reformation, Denmark was a Lutheran Protestant country where the principle of ‘cuius regius eius religio’ was strictly pursued for decades: in the multicultural ‘Composite State’ there was strict church discipline, and Catholics, Calvinists and Jews were not allowed to settle here. However, due to economic needs a more tolerant view on religious differences began to show during the 17th century. The Danish Law of 1683 removed several of the strict regulations concerning non-Lutheran immigration from the time of the Reformation and allowed all but monks...
and Jesuits access to the kingdom. As a result, Jews settled in many provincial cities (Østergaard, 2007: 264-65). Full religious freedom was not instituted until the ratification of the constitution in 1849. In the 18th century the ideas of the Enlightenment slowly began to affect theological thinking and the relationship between the state and religious minorities. This led to greater tolerance among the different Christian confessions; however, the extension of tolerance to Jews was more difficult. When Bishops and other people of authority spoke of or decided on religious matters (e.g. the building of a synagogue) they often referred to the possible resentment of the general public. (Ibid: 145). Within 30 years (1784-1814) the government started to ignore the views of the clergy when deciding on religious matters relating to minorities. The guilds were opened in 1788 and in 1814 Jews were given equal access to all occupations, educational opportunities, right to buy land and to be added to the military enrollment (Ibid.). At the same time, however, the special rights Jews had within the areas of family and religion were reduced. At the end of the 19th century, approximately 3500 Jews lived in Denmark.

In 1904-1917, following the violent pogroms in Russia this number doubled. The newly arrived Russian-Polish Jews were poor, had other customs, language, names and were often more orthodox believers than the semi-assimilated Danish Jews. This led the latter to fear that the newcomers might provoke anti-Semitism among the majority population.

In the last part of the 19th century, the industrial revolution took place in Denmark and increased the demand for foreign labor. By 1885 8.1 percent of the population in Copenhagen was foreign born (Ibid: 284). The majority of foreign workers came from Sweden and took on the hardest and worst-paid jobs. In 1891 the Poor Law (“Fattigdomsloven”) established that only Danish citizens were entitled to support from the state. At the same time, however, access to Danish citizenship was made easier, especially for Swedes and Norwegians. In combination with mixed marriages, a similar language and culture, this led to quick assimilation.

The demand for labor created by the cultivation of sugar beets that began in the 1870s and 1880s was met by Polish seasonal workers (14.000 by 1914). However, the First World War led to a drastic decline, and after 1929 the flow of workers practically stopped. The Catholic Church in Denmark supported the Poles and helped them adjust. It strived to assimilate them in order to avoid a Polish minority church and because it feared that the poor and alien Poles would diminish the Church’s reputation in Denmark. (Ibid: 304).

After the Second World War less than 1000 of the approximately 30,000 non-German refugees from the war stayed in Denmark and did not noticeably stand out (Ibid: 332). Up until 1983 approximately 10,000 refugees arrived from Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Uganda, Chile and Vietnam. They were perceived as unproblematic and largely welcomed with kindness and understanding.

The period after the Second World War was one of economic prosperity, with industrial expansion in Denmark in the 1950s and 1960s increasing the demand for labor. The first groups of guest workers came in 1967. Liberal immigration rules made it possible for them to come without work or residence permits. A spontaneous immigration of mostly Turks and Yugoslavs – and later on Pakistanis – took place.
after Sweden and West Germany tightened their rules. Immigration was first regulated with quotas for work permits in 1973. However after the oil crisis hit the country later the same year, all further labour immigration was suspended. In 1973, 12,000 guest workers resided in Denmark; family reunifications brought that number to 35,000 by 1978 (Ibid: 362). The realization that many guest workers planned to stay prompted the Social Democratic government in 1980 to make integration the explicit principle behind its immigrant policies: the goal was to make immigrants self-supporting and to strike a reasonable balance between assimilation to Danish language and culture and the preservation of the identity-carrying elements of the immigrant communities.

From 1984 the attention shifted to the flow of refugees coming from the Middle East and Sri Lanka, with 2,827 asylum seekers arriving in September 1986. This number drastically dropped to 137 in the following month after the law was tightened (Togeby, 2002: 37). In 1992 it was decided to give Yugoslavian war refugees (approximately 9,000, mostly Bosnians) temporary residence in expectation of a rapid return to their home country. In 1995 when this turned out not to be possible, their residence was normalized. The good will of their surroundings contributed to a relatively smooth inclusion into society. In the mid-90’s a large group of Somalis sought refuge in Denmark. They were met with an often intrusive attention from the public and much more attention than had ever been directed at comparable groups of Iraqi and Afghan refugees who had arrived throughout a longer time period.

Since the mid-1990s Denmark has seen a long period of politicization of integration and refugee issues particularly focusing on Muslims. At first the issues mainly revolved around welfare-state dependency, family reunification and the concentration of immigrants in ghettos. After 9/11 the focus was also directed at the (un-)democratic mind-set of Muslims, their loyalty to the Danish state and the lack of gender equality in many households. From the mid-90s the centre-left government came under increasing pressure to address immigration. This resulted in a number of revisions to the immigration and integration rules. It culminated in 1998 in a major revision that restricted the possibilities for permanent residence and family reunification and introduced a reduced ‘introduction benefit’ for immigrants. The discourse also toughened and deep cultural differences were targeted as a problem for the coherence of the national state – especially with appointment of the social democratic hawk Karen Jespersen as Minister of the Interior in 2000. It was often emphasized that Denmark should not become a multicultural country. Multiculturalism took on a negative connotation referring to parallel societies.

As this politicization of Muslims progressed, the right-wing Danish People’s Party (DPP) also became increasingly influential. In 2001 the new liberal-conservative government became dependent on the DPP for their parliamentarian majority. The new government made a wide range of changes aimed at reducing the number of immigrants, refugees and family reunifications, and at making it harder to get access to permanent residence and citizenship. Most recently, the government proposed making family reunification dependent on the work experience, educational level and mastery of specific languages of both parties seeking reunification. But perhaps most notably, a host of initiatives have been undertaken to change the mind-set of immigrants – particularly Muslims – with the aim of modernizing their outlook on society (cf. section 3.2.4).
In brief, until the inflow of guest workers in the late 1960s immigration to Denmark was limited and often resulted in assimilation. Increasing cultural pluralism from the 1960s on, however, eventually led to politicization of the issues surrounding integration from the mid-1990s and resulted in more and more restrictive rules and a tough political discourse aimed primarily at Muslims. The table above sums up the composition of immigrants and their descendants in Denmark as of January 1st 2010.

### Table 1. Immigrants and descendants in Denmark, 1 January 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Immigrants</th>
<th>Descendants</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percentage of all foreigners in Denmark</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>32,255</td>
<td>26,961</td>
<td>59,216</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>28,234</td>
<td>2,678</td>
<td>30,912</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>21,306</td>
<td>7,958</td>
<td>29,264</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>25,443</td>
<td>2,958</td>
<td>28,401</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>12,012</td>
<td>11,763</td>
<td>23,775</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td>17,911</td>
<td>4,310</td>
<td>22,221</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other African countries</td>
<td>17,054</td>
<td>4,586</td>
<td>21,640</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>11,169</td>
<td>9,223</td>
<td>20,392</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>11,021</td>
<td>5,938</td>
<td>16,959</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>10,127</td>
<td>6,704</td>
<td>16,831</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>14,663</td>
<td>1,404</td>
<td>16,067</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Asian countries</td>
<td>11,907</td>
<td>3,509</td>
<td>15,416</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>12,098</td>
<td>3,111</td>
<td>15,209</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>13,233</td>
<td>1,921</td>
<td>15,154</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>8,919</td>
<td>4,959</td>
<td>13,878</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>11,832</td>
<td>1,221</td>
<td>13,053</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>9,966</td>
<td>2,664</td>
<td>12,630</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>6,715</td>
<td>4,088</td>
<td>10,803</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>9,352</td>
<td>870</td>
<td>10,222</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>5,140</td>
<td>4,691</td>
<td>9,831</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>8,506</td>
<td>1,182</td>
<td>9,688</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>8,773</td>
<td>908</td>
<td>9,681</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>8,849</td>
<td>562</td>
<td>9,411</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phillipines</td>
<td>8,377</td>
<td>930</td>
<td>9,307</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>7,876</td>
<td>1,090</td>
<td>8,966</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Countries</td>
<td>81,684</td>
<td>12,126</td>
<td>93,810</td>
<td>17.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Countries</td>
<td>414,422</td>
<td>128,316</td>
<td>542,738</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The next section outlines the challenges that the main minority and immigrants groups have faced in and posed to Denmark. As an introduction table 2 below broadly describes the different minority and immigrants groups in Denmark and how they differ along six dimensions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions of difference</th>
<th>Racial</th>
<th>Ethnic</th>
<th>Religious</th>
<th>Cultural</th>
<th>Linguistic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Native minorities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greenlanders</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants (non-Muslims)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scandinavians (Norwegians, Swedes, Icelanders)</td>
<td>(X)*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poles</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iranians (Christian)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asians (Sri Lankans, Vietnamese, Filipino, Thai)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants (Muslims)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iranians (Muslim)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabs (Iraqis, Lebanese, Moroccans)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ex-Yugoslavs (Serbs, Bosnians)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asians (Pakistanis, Afghans)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalis</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* In general Norwegian, Swedish and Danish are very similar. Icelandic however is not understandable for Danes.
Source: Own elaboration

**Toleration of differences**

**The Greenlandic minority in Denmark**

Greenland, part of the Danish Kingdom since the 18th century, was a colony until 1953, when the (theoretically) equal status between Danes and Greenlanders was formally declared. Following growing Inuit political and national awareness in the 1970s that emphasized a distinct Greenlandic culture in contrast with Danish culture, Home Rule was established in 1979 (Togeby, 2002: 120). In 2009 Greenland’s status was further enhanced with a declaration of the area’s political autonomy, also entailing the recognition of Greenlanders as a people under international law and of Greenlandic as the principal language in Greenland.
Characteristics of Greenlanders living in Denmark and their demands and relation to Danish society closely reflect the political connection between Denmark and Greenland. In the 1950s Greenlandic pupils were sent to Denmark for higher education as part of a sustained modernization policy. Later younger children (12-14 years old) also came. However, the idea to create a Danish-minded elite which could take on a leading role in Greenland upon returning was a complete failure (Ice News, 2009).

In the 1970s and 80s Greenlanders in Denmark were primarily young students, as well as a relatively small group of women married to Danish men (Togeby, 2002: 45).

Whether born in Denmark or Greenland, Greenlanders have Danish citizenship and the same political, civil and social rights as Danes. That is, Greenlanders in Denmark are not recognized as a national minority, which has been criticized by the Council of Europe (2000; 2004).

Compared to ethnic Danes, Greenlanders in Denmark have lower levels of education and employment (Togeby, 2002: 38). Approximately 40 percent depend on transfer incomes, compared to 20-25 percent of Danes. Greenlanders also have less political capital and participate less in electoral channels of democracy, whereas their participation in everyday civil society is equal to that of Danes (Ibid: 151). Compared to immigrants, they tend to be more integrated on several dimensions (e.g. having Danish friends, being married to Danes, residential segregation, no identity problems (Ibid: 33-35, 121, 129, 153).

Despite common attachment to Greenland, Greenlanders living in Denmark hardly constitute a single group. Togeby (2002) distinguishes between five groups, which differ in their national belonging. One of these, the marginalized, had a Greenlandic childhood and has lived in Denmark several years but is not self-supporting or married to a Dane. Even though the group of marginalised only make up a small percentage (5-10 percent) of all Greenlanders in Denmark, they are the stereotype because of their visibility in the streets (Ministry for Social Affairs 2003: 7; Togeby 2002: 45, 154). The grievance most often mentioned among Greenlanders in Denmark concerns discrimination, racism and general prejudices (Togeby, 2002: 112-126). However, compared to Turks, Greenlanders report few incidents of discrimination.

The German national minority in Southern Jutland

The only recognized national minority in Denmark are the Germans in Southern Jutland who are Danish citizens but identify with German culture. A corresponding Danish minority exists south of the Danish-German border.

The two minority groups have been recognized in both Denmark and Germany, which have agreed on practical solutions to problems concerning family separations and broken trading and cultural relations, though the Danish government refused to make a bilateral agreement with Germany concerning the two minorities despite pressure from Germany and the German minority (Kühle, 2003: 129-130). Hence, national policies for minority protection were passed to facilitate a significant degree of cultural autonomy for the minorities.

1. The other four groups: 1) the Danish: children from mixed marriages which have spent the most of their childhood in Denmark, 2) the integrated: a Greenlandic childhood but have lived and established a life in Denmark for several years 3) the partial integrated: same characteristics as the former but is dependent on social security benefits, 4) the newcomer: have only lived in Denmark for few years and are influenced by the attitude in Greenland in contrast to Danish.
When Danes in Germany were given minority rights in 1949, the German minority initiated negotiations with the Danish government aiming to obtain a corresponding official declaration. The Danish government made it clear that the German minority already possessed the civic rights announced in Germany through existing practice, and that the minority could freely negotiate on equal terms with authorities. Following the West German NATO membership, the Danish-German minority issue emerged on the international agenda, resulting in governments’ declarations: the 1955 Copenhagen-Bonn Declaration. It contained recognition of school examinations, the written declaration of German-minority rights in agreement with Danish-minority rights, acknowledgement for spiritual and material support of the minorities, and finally a free-choice basis of affiliation with German nationality and German culture, hereby maintaining the principle of ‘disposition’ \( \text{[sindelagsprincippet]} \): those who wish to be part of the minority are part of it (Ibid: 99-100, 135-136; Klatt, 2006: 74-76).

The reciprocal declaration had great political and sociological impact and is often described as the turning point from national tensions to increasing mutual recognition and co-operation (Kühle, 2003: 136).

Since 1953 a German minority-Danish government dialogue has been facilitated through a regular elected representative in the parliament in the periods 1920-43; 1953-1964; 1973-79 and through the Contact Committee established in 1965\(^2\) (Ibid.: 137). Inclusion of the German minority has been also facilitated through significant local and regional political participation. German-minority issues do not take up much attention in the Danish media or public anymore. To a large extent the German minority is recognised as a well integrated group, and the cooperation between it and Danish authorities is almost without friction. (Kühle, 2003: 133)

However, dislike of Germans still occasionally surfaces (Ibid: 143). Two recent events have emerged. First, the creation of a Euro-region between the county of Southern Jutland and the German part of Schleswig in 1997 ignited an emotional debate with anti-German hostility (Ibid: 143-144). Second, the Danish ratification of the \textit{European Treaty of Regional or Minority Languages} in 2000 initiated intense debate concerning the use of German language in Danish public institutions (Ibid: 145-148). This led to the recognition of as a minority language in Southern Jutland.

\textit{Roma}

For nearly 200 years, from 1554 to 1736, the Roma were outlawed in Denmark; if caught by the authorities they were either deported or put into forced labor. By the mid-1700s reports on the Roma had gradually disappeared, and for the next 100 years very little was heard of them (Østergaard, 2007: 200). Not until the latter half of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century did the Roma (immigrating from Hungary and Romania) re-appear in noticeable numbers. A new law, stating that it was illegal to take up residence in Denmark if one sought work by travelling, was put into force to form a legal basis for deporting the traveling Roma; this law remained in force until 1952.

Today the Roma residents in Denmark have settled more permanently. In 2006 there were between 5.000 to 10.000 Roma in Denmark (Ibid: 204). Most are ‘guest workers’ from Yugoslavia who arrived in the late
1960s, and their descendants. A smaller number came as refugees from the wars in Yugoslavia and Kosovo.

A large part of the Roma is concentrated in the city Elsinore. The municipality has gained a certain media attention with their special initiatives aimed at relieving the group’s social problems, especially concerning low rates of school attendance among Roma children. From 1982 to 2004 the municipality maintained special all-Roma school classes for children deemed problematic. After the policy had been criticized internationally as racial segregation, however, the Ministry of Teaching declared that the school classes violated the primary school law. Another practice eventually found illegal started in 2000 and consisted in an economic incentive structure set up to make parents bring their children to school. A recent expulsion from Denmark of 23 Roma with citizenship in other EU countries, justified on the grounds of their threat to public order, created some debate on the discrimination and prejudices experienced by the Roma in Denmark. The European Roma Rights Center (ERRC) in Budapest is currently preparing a court case against the Danish state, claiming that the expulsion violates EU law (EU citizens’ right to free movement) and is discriminatory.

The stereotype of the Roma as stealing, cheating, lying, poor, uneducated, lazy and unwilling to integrate is well alive in Denmark and felt by the Roma, inducing many to hide their background (Schmidt, 2003). This stigmatization may have influenced the lack of organizational representation to carry forth group demands to public institutions.

Jews

Following a spread of anti-Semitic sentiment in Poland in 1969 more than 3,000 Poles migrated to Denmark, contributing significantly to the number of Jews in Denmark. The Jewish minority today consists of somewhere between 5,000 and 7,000 members. The Danish Jews are especially of interest due to the status which the rescue of the Danish Jews during World War II still carries in Danish, Israeli and American national mythologies.

The general impression is that anti-Semitism is practically unknown in Denmark except for conflicts between some Muslim immigrants and Danish Jews. Most noticeably the media reported on 20 documented incidents where Jews were harassed by Muslims during the three weeks of the Gaza War in 2008/09. However, the former head rabbi of the Jewish Community in Denmark, Bent Melchior, was quick to emphasize that he did not see the incidents as reflecting general anti-Semitism and that their significance was blown out of proportion (as opposed to the DPP, who called for a national action plan to fight anti-Semitism)(Melchior, 2009).

Unconcern about the level of anti-Semitism is in part contradicted by a recent study that demonstrates a significantly higher level of apprehension towards Jews among Turks, Pakistanis, Somalis, Palestinians and Ex-Yugoslavians than among ethnic Danes. Between 60 and 70 percent of the former five groups confirmed that ‘you can’t be too careful around Jews’ compared to 18 percent of ethnic Danes (Nannestad 2009); which points to a tacit, rather than explicit, anti-Semitism.
Muslims

Since the 1990s a tendency has been identified across Europe to label immigrants in religious terms rather than in light of their ethno-cultural background or social roles in society (Allievi, 2006: 37). This tendency, whereby Muslims in particular are seldom categorized as Turks, Iranians or Somalis (or as students or workers) also exists in Denmark, where debates over integration and toleration of differences invariably centre on Muslims and where religion is often associated with potential conflict (Mouritsen, 2006: 75-76).

Whereas controversy over integration is discussed as related to issues of culture, culture is almost always linked to religious beliefs and associated value conflicts. Since the end of the 1990s immigration and integration policies have been important issues among the electorate and a main theme in electoral campaigns (Mikkelsen, 2008: 185). Public discussions tend to take place in an ‘us-them’ framework which, on the one hand, is concerned about the social and residential segregation of an out-group of Muslims in vulnerable suburb districts (Social Democrats & Socialist Peoples Party, 2010; Government, 2010). On the other hand, the ‘us-them’ polarity is reinforced as Islam is increasingly constructed in opposition to Danish values of democracy and equality (Mouritsen, 2009: 19; Lindekilde, 2009: 4).

In Denmark, as noted, the constitution gives a privileged position to the Lutheran Folkekirke as the state church, while also guaranteeing freedom of religion to other religious communities (however, without the same privileges). Approved religious communities may be granted authorization to officiate marriages, subject to individual evaluation of congregations (Ministry of Justice, 2010). In contrast to the state church, other religious communities finance their activities, buildings and cemeteries themselves.

A mosque built in accordance with traditional Islamic rules does not yet exist. Financial difficulties and obstacles to obtaining planning permits have long delayed the process despite strong desires among Muslims, who have set up advocacy groups in favour of a mosque. Groups opposing the building of mosques in Denmark have also been established, and the political salience of the issue remains high. Particularly controversial is the question of whether to allow calls to prayer from mosque minarets, which is currently prohibited. In 2009 the Ahlul Bait association was granted permission to build the Imam Ali Mosque in Copenhagen. The building will have a traditional look with a dome and minarets, the latter only having symbolic function. For now, Muslims in Denmark use previously existing buildings not built for the purpose of worship.

The first Muslim cemetery not attached to a Christian cemetery was established in 2006 near the city of Brøndby outside Copenhagen. Until then Muslims were either buried in their country of origin or in special areas of cemeteries reserved for Muslims. The negotiations and preparation preceding the opening of the Muslim cemetery date from the early 1990s, when different Muslim associations joined together to advance their claim. Negotiations to establish Muslim cemeteries in Herning (Jutland) and Roskilde (Zealand) are also now taking place, meeting Muslims’ wishes to be able to bury family members nearer to their homes (Ritzau, 2008; Jørgensen, 2008).
An official education for imams (corresponding to the official Lutheran priest educations) does not exist, but the possibility has been discussed for a number of years (Kristeligt and Dagblad, 2005; Pedersen, 2007; Borking, 2010). It has been argued that a Danish education would stem the influx of radical imams without any background in Denmark. Currently, imams from abroad who are affiliated with an approved religious society in Denmark can obtain a residence permit (Law of Foreigners §9f subsection 1).

The Danish version of the head scarf debate began as a controversy about whether cashiers in supermarket had a right to wear headscarves on the job, or whether it was a legitimate interest of the employer to ensure that no customer was ‘inconvenienced’ by the headscarves. The controversy was settled with the right of the employer to dictate a job uniform. In most cases practical solutions have been found, with a large majority of employers accepting the headscarf (Bræmer, 2008).

Debates over headscarves in schools have not been as politicised as in France or Germany, in part because of a relatively decentralised system of school administration, which has facilitated local solutions. Debates over headscarves have, however, spread to other areas, from politicians wearing headscarves at the speaking podium in Parliament to whether or not judges may wear headscarves (the latter a purely hypothetical debate that prompted an amendment in 2008 of the Law of Justice Administration (Retsplejeloven) (Klarskov, 2008).

In the latter case the Danish court agency (Domstolsstyrelsen) announced that Muslim female judges could in fact wear headscarves in court, but the government disregarded the statement and banned the wearing of any kind of religious or political symbols in court (Law of Justice Administration: §56 subsection 1; Boddum 2008). The headscarf is in general involved in the larger debate about integration and Islam’s compatibility with the fundamental values of Danish society, especially gender equality (Mouritsen, 2009: 20).

Owing to existing Danish legislation on private schools, Muslims are allowed to run Muslim schools on the condition that the curricula meet basic Danish standards. No official statistics on the number of Muslim schools exist.

A more general change of the Danish official school ideology may also be identified, in line with a growing focus on national identity, diversity and integration in society. The preamble of the Danish Law for primary and secondary school (Folkeskoleloven) was changed in 1993 (and adjusted in 2006) to emphasise that pupils must become ‘familiar’ with Danish culture (and history from 2006) while giving them an ‘understanding’ of other countries and cultures (Jensen, 2010).

Certain subjects referred to as ‘identity carrying subjects’, such as history and Christian studies (kristendomskundskab), were strengthened. In particular, a discussion has taken place between politicians and teachers as to whether ‘religious studies’, as a broader information subject, could be taught instead of ‘Christian studies’ as a cultural and identity-oriented subject. The government made it clear that Christian Studies is a compulsory subject (Mouritsen & Olsen, forthcoming).
In the intense public debates on integration problems, Danish media have tended to confront non-Western ethnic minorities, particularly Muslims, to get their reactions regarding the issue at hand. Hence, immigrants are often presented in the role of a self-defending reactor to a political agenda that has been defined by others (Lindekilde, 2009: 26-27). This media focus may partly explain why ethnic minorities in Denmark raise more claims regarding issues of integration, as compared to claims regarding issues of immigration, asylum, citizenship and homeland affairs. However, better opportunities for immigrant participation in the local policy-making of integration (e.g. integration councils or a favourable local electoral system to immigrant groups), when compared with other countries, could be an explanation for this tendency too (Ibid: 22-23). Before the Muhammad caricatures in 2005, Danish Muslims had not mobilized and engaged in continued claims-making or been prominent actors in national debates, but this is now changing (Ibid: 26).

Often in debates of Muslims vis-à-vis the Danish society all Muslims have been portrayed as a monolithic group. However, in some cases internal splits among Muslims have become evident, even in public media. This has been the case, for instance, with the issue of whether sunni Muslims could identify with the Mosque project in Copenhagen, which was led by a shia community. One way of distinguishing between Muslim groups is to describe Muslim claimants as exponents of different ways of practicing Islam in a Danish context (Lindekilde, 2008: 78-79). Three basic types of this diverse ‘diasporic’ Islamic religiosity have been distinguished by Werner Schiffauer – see the table below (Schiffauer, 2007). The different dispositions should be viewed as positions on a continuum.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3. Types of Islamic Religiosity</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cultural Muslims</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emphasis on non-discrimination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normative pluralism</td>
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<tr>
<td>Islam should be practiced in private</td>
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<tr>
<td>scepticism towards strong/</td>
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<td>influential Islamic organisations</td>
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<td>sharia is not an issue</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mobilisation is difficult</td>
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<tr>
<td>Secularism: rejection of ostentatious</td>
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<tr>
<td>religious symbols in public</td>
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<tr>
<td>Religion integrated in everyday life</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assimilation</td>
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<td>Acceptate of cultural modernity</td>
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Source: reproduced from Lindekilde, 2008, applied from Schiffauer, 2007: 80-90
Cultural Muslims are the most assimilated group and believe that Islam can be practised in the same secularised way that Danes typically practice Christianity. The organisation Democratic Muslims is the clearest exponent of this group. It was established during the Muhammad caricatures controversy, attempting to mobilise the ‘silent majority’ of Danish Muslims (Lindekilde, 2008: 79).

The Neo-orthodox Muslims maintain their Islamic traditions but in a way that is adjusted to the Danish context. Sometimes demands for certain privileges are made by groups belonging to this category. An exponent of this group is The Community of Islamic Faith (Islamisk Trossamfund), who was very active in the public debate in the caricature controversy and demanded an official apology (ibid: 86; see Lindekilde 2008).

The Ultra-orthodox Muslims consider the other two groups as not being real Muslims or as ‘selling out’ on Islamic values. These segments often come together in loose networks and live isolated from society. They reject democracy by being passive and often they support violent groups in their lands of origin which are condemned by the West. Danish authorities are worried about the development of these groups because radicalised Muslims, including individuals actually convicted of terrorism, have come from here.

Muslim organisations cutting across national origin but with Islamic religiosity at their cores have gained ground in recent years, especially among the second and third generations of Muslim immigrants (Mikkelsen, 2008: 144-145). For this group religiosity is becoming an increasingly important part of their identity, and they spend more and more time and energy, compared with their parents, familiarizing themselves with Islam. At the same time they clearly seek recognition from Danish society, signalling that simultaneously being a second-generation immigrant, a Dane and a Muslim is perfectly possible.

Definitions of toleration and respect in Denmark

Historically, tolerance has in a widely received interpretation been dismissed as a form of indifference and relativism with regard to the beliefs and actions of others. As such it connotes the idea that all beliefs, values, and practices are of equal value and therefore also of no value. Tolerance, in this sense, means the inability to make judgements, or to differentiate properly between right and wrong, good and bad, true and false (Bredsdorff & Kjældgaard 2008: ch. 15). While this idea is based on a biased (or misunderstood) reading of Enlightenment philosophy, many have wished to employ an alternative term, a favourite being frisind, meaning ‘liberality’ or ‘free mindedness’.

This term, originating from the influential populist leader, author and priest N.F.S. Grundtvig, originally refers to the idea that the state should stay out of matters of religion and let the exponents of different views of religion use all verbal powers at their disposal to promote their own views and criticise those of others. Yet with the state as the guarantor of equal civic freedoms – securing, as Danes have put it since Grundtvig, freedom to Loke as well as to Thor – liberality means that one is able to speak truth against a lie without holding back in dull indifference or 5. In Nordic mythology Thor denotes uprightness and truth, whereas Loke stands for falsehood and devi-ousness.
adoption of social conformism in order to ensure social and political peace (ibid.). The notorious Danish cartoon crisis referred to this understanding of liberality: by those who argued for the right to criticise and ridicule the beliefs of others, as well as by those who were concerned that all the relevant parties did not in fact have equal civic standing in Danish society (Ibid.; Meer & Mouritsen 2009).

The preference for liberality over tolerance is particularly conspicuous among right-of-centre politicians in Denmark today. A competing conception of tolerance developed in connection with the split up of the Liberal party (Venstre, literally ‘Left’) in two parties in 1905: the one represented by the Venstre, mainly consisting of farmers and members of the liberal professions, and the other one represented by the Radikale Venstre (literally ‘Radical left’) made up by small peasants and intellectuals. Due to this ideological difference not only two distinct liberal parties but two distinct liberal ideologies developed, and these two different interpretations of liberalism caused the reception of tolerance to follow two separate courses throughout the 20th century. In very general terms: in contrast to the right-wing liberals who, by and large, stuck to Grundtvig’s distinction between tolerance and liberality, left-wing liberals accentuated the importance of a universal concept of tolerance.

Recent times have seen a change in the subjects and objects of toleration in Danish discourse. While it never acquired an unequivocally positive meaning, the main concern with tolerance has shifted: from the intolerance of the majority against immigrants in the 1970s and the 1980s, to a concern, in the 1990s and the 2000s, that too many immigrants reluctant to integrate would have a corrosive effect on the otherwise well-established, traditional tolerance of the majority. There has never been any celebration of multiculturalism in Denmark, beyond seeing cultural diversity as giving interesting spice of life (foods, folklore, etc).

From the 1990s onwards, multiculturalism has represented ‘parallel societies’, disintegration, and a moral, social and political failure to demand and promote the full inclusion of all groups into society: into its labour market, education, civil society organisations and, eventually, politics. This inclusion is seen to be endangered by too much tolerance or overindulgence towards groups who abuse the rights and privileges they enjoy in Denmark and who may not eventually reciprocate the tolerance of the majority (or who may themselves in the future become an intolerant majority).

The form of inclusion available for immigrants is based on a comprehensive concept of equal citizenship that pertains to all fields of life, including family and private life. The only form of recognition given to immigrants is that of becoming a full and equal citizen; a form of recognition nonetheless withheld for a considerable number of years, until immigrants have proved their determination and ability to become full members of society through economic self-sufficiency, Danish language literacy and knowledge of Danish history, culture and fundamental political values. Some symbolic (and legal) recognition is also given to working immigrants who bring special professional skills to the country and contribute to its economic growth. However, their positive contribution is seen as almost purely economic, not cultural (skills, not identity) (Mouritsen & Olsen 2011).
Acceptance and integration in Denmark

The values of the Danish integration regime

The inclusion of post-immigration minorities in Denmark is based on the values of equal and active citizenship. The fundamental idea is that this status is accessible to all who want it, and that it is not prima facie a particularly Danish, ‘national’ form of citizenship. As a normative and identity- or practice-oriented ideal, ‘good’ citizenship is relatively comprehensive (Mouritsen and Olsen, 2011; Mouritsen, 2011) and is conceived to have a progressive and emancipatory potential for the dominated in different ways, i.e., patriarchal norms, gender equality and child education, and even sexual practices. Capacity to practice critical self-reflection in private lives as well as politics and democracy is crucial.

Right of the political centre, these values are often seen as anchored in a broader Danish cultural-Christian tradition influenced in particular by the Grundtvigian movement which emphasises popular consent, anti-authoritarianism and liberality. Groups on the left, while generally subscribing to the same comprehensive understanding of these values, are more reluctant to agree to this particular cultural heritage argument (Mouritsen, 2006). Liberality is thus broadly considered a central virtue when dealing with others in a democratic system such as the Danish, i.e. where democratic decision making is often understood (and celebrated) as a ‘form of life’ characterised by informality, deliberation, equal voice and consensualism.

Democracy and democratic debate do not here connote politeness and civility, let alone ‘recognition’, so much as blunt and open exchanges are combined with having ‘thick skin’. In this view, one has to be able to handle rudeness and even ridicule as a part of democracy. This all entails that Danish tolerance in a paradoxical way is not seeing society and exchanges between groups in society as being based on ‘co-existence’ or a modus vivendi. Tolerance is wrong, or even a vice to the extent that it implies permissiveness or ‘letting people be’.

Policies and institutional arrangements

Danish efforts to reduce discrimination and create equal treatment for all to a large extent have been driven by the need to transform international obligations into national law (Justesten 2003, Nielsen 2010). However, the early 1990s saw the creation of a Board for Ethnic Equality (BEE) with the purpose of ‘fighting difference of treatment in all its aspects as well as supporting that all ethnic groups in society,’ (Law on the BEE 1993). Behind the BEE, which was based on a Social Democratic proposal, was a general concern with racism and pressure from immigrant organisations who had fought for recognition as ethnic minorities rather than as immigrants and who pointed to discrimination as a main cause of minority exclusion (Nævnet for Etnisk Ligestilling, 2002: 7-12).

The BEE defined ethnic equality as ‘more than just formal rights. Ethnic equality entails equality before the law, equal access to the institutions of society and equal right to realize one’s distinctive character (særpræg) within the limits of the law’ (Ibid: 15). Ethnic equality meant more than
formal equal treatment; it might imply certain types of positive action, as well as recognition that the different needs of different groups might have to be met in different ways. The BEE could not process individual complaints about discrimination. Danish legislation against discrimination and racism was based on criminal law until 1996 where a new law on discrimination in the labour market opened up possibilities for civil law suits. This law was replaced in 2003/4 by the implementation of two EU directives on anti-discrimination which extended civil law prohibition against discrimination on the basis of race and ethnicity beyond the labour market. This extension also introduced administrative complaint procedures, which were strengthened in 2009 with the creation of a new Equality Board which will process complaints on all relevant grounds.

Nonetheless, public campaigns against discrimination and racism suffered a blow with the change of government in 2001, which closed the BEE and ‘restructured’ the Danish Centre of Human Rights into a new Danish Institute for Human Rights. The present governing coalition of Liberals, Conservatives and Danish People’s Party had found the two former institutions too vocal in the general immigration and integration debate. The new government prioritised restrictions in immigration policies and access to citizenship and pursued a tough integration policy already initiated in the late 1990s by its Social Democratic predecessor.

Integration policies, over the last decade, have aimed to render the immigrant able to participate ‘on an equal footing’ in Danish society, to a large degree placing the responsibility for this to happen on the individual immigrant/minority member, rather than the receiving society (The 1999 Integration Law, par. 1).

This integration policy has been deepened and extended in consecutive stages, moving from an initial emphasis on labour market functionality and language into a wider realm – particularly after 9/11 – of civic competences and liberal values, cultural and historical orientation, and loyalty. It has pushed sensitivity towards cultural identities and notions of a society based on pluralism, mutual respect and tolerance of diversity into the background (Hvenegaard-Lassen, 2002: 251; Mouritsen and Olsen, 2011).

However, government policy has not been without focus on tolerance and equal respect. In 2003, the government developed an action plan, ‘For the Promotion of Equal Treatment and Diversity and The Fight against Racism’ (based on the 2001 Durban Declaration). This plan again refers to the old Nordic ‘freedom for Loke as well as for Thor’ as a principle of equal treatment that implies that ‘we are not identical and we should not be made uniform’ and stipulates that ‘difference is the precondition for all democratic dialogue’ (p. 1). But consonant with the new perception of subjects and objects of toleration, the plan eagerly underlines that ‘tolerance should go in all directions’, and points to problems of intolerance between groups of ethnic minorities as well as ‘intolerant attitudes among ethnic minorities towards the majority population’ (p. 14). The remedy is again the creation (through integration policy) of a set of shared fundamental democratic values: Freedom, equal worth (ligeværdighed), responsibility, duties and active participation. (p. 15)

The plan was mainly premised on state support for initiatives formed by other actors, primarily from civil society. In 2010 it was replaced by a new
action plan on ‘Ethnic Equal Treatment and Respect for the Individual’. The new plan is based on the same ideas of spreading the fundamental principles of democracy. It does, however, reflect an increased concern with intolerance both against minorities and within minorities (anti-Semitism in particular) and underlines the need to map and counteract discrimination in different areas of life such as work, spare time activities, and education. As something relatively new, it refers to diversity management in workplaces and conceives of diversity as an asset for companies and for the economy more generally.

The shift in emphasis that this plan entails can reasonably be explained by a desire to attract highly skilled workers to the booming (until 2008) Danish economy on the one hand, and on the other a concern with domestic cases of planned (but not executed) terror actions (and the Cartoon Affair). In this plan the fight against intolerance and discrimination is regarded as an important part of avoiding extremism and generally connects this goal with increased efforts to instil democratic values in all new members of society, in particular through education and civil society participation. Hence tolerance and equal respect are back on the agenda, this time not only in order to ensure the rights and security of minorities, but especially with a view to enhance the security of the majority.

Acceptance and accommodation as a social practice

Danes exhibit a relatively high level of comfort with the idea of having neighbours who have a different ethnic background or another religion than themselves, compared to the European average. Danes are also more likely than the EU average to have friends and acquaintances that have another ethnic background (62 percent) and religion (66 percent) than themselves. Younger people mix more with people of different backgrounds than do older people, and the more education you have, the more you mix with people of other ethnic backgrounds (Eurobarometer 317/2009, factsheet on Denmark, p. 1).

Paradoxically, Danes at the same time perceive their country to be quite discriminatory in relation to people with different ethnic or religious backgrounds. 77 percent and 55 percent find discrimination on the basis of these respective grounds widespread (Ibid.). Between 63 and 68 percent also suspect that skin colour, ethnic background and the expression of a religious belief make a negative difference for job candidates when employers choose between people of equal skills and qualifications (Ibid: 2).

This indicates that while people themselves in general are appreciative, indifferent, or perhaps tolerant towards ethnic and religious differences in their daily lives, they perceive others to be rather intolerant of such differences. Eurobarometer surveys generally show a high level of comfort, among Danes, with the idea of having people with different ethnic background elected for the highest political office in the country while the comfort level with regard to people with a different religious background is at the European average (Eurobarometer 317: 69, table QE6.5).

Studies of political tolerance carried out in Denmark (but thought to apply generally) demonstrate, however, that tolerance is conditional on the perception of whether the groups in question respect democratic norms and hence live up to a norm of reciprocity (Petersen et al., 2010).
Low tolerance, on the other hand, is found with regard to groups who have been previously associated with an ‘extremist stance in terms of violent and non-democratic behaviour’ (Ibid: 10, 13). The partial exception here is the group of ‘ordinary Muslims’ (as opposed to ‘Islamic fundamentalists’) who are not tolerated among those who dislike them the most, despite the fact that they have not been directly connected with extremist stances. This is likely to be explained by the ‘perception that the social practices of even ordinary Muslims are in conflict with liberal ideals’ (Ibid: 14).

The findings of the above studies suggest that Danes personally have a somewhat high tolerance level in their daily practices when it comes to people with different ethnic or religious backgrounds than their own, and that there is a relatively high level of contact between people of different cultural and religious backgrounds, especially among the young and the well-educated. Indeed, Danes may be indifferent towards or appreciative of such cultural and religious differences. However, their perception is paradoxically that the tolerance of other fellow citizens is low. Moreover, political tolerance is largely conditional on the perception of others’ respecting fundamental democratic values and subscribing to a norm of reciprocity: no toleration for the intolerant.

**Concluding Remarks**

Over the last two decades, the predominant discourse in Denmark with regard to religious and cultural differences has been one of integration, rather than of tolerance or of respect and recognition of ethnic and religious identities. The discourse of integration is explicitly set against the notion of multiculturalism. The latter is synonymous with parallel societies and a moral, social and political failure to demand and further the integration of all residents into society. In general, cultural and religious differences are seen as illegitimate to the extent that they stand in the way of integration, understood as the ability to live up to one’s duty as an economically self-sufficient and taxpaying individual and as a participating citizen at all levels of civil society and political institutions.

The idea that we need to be mutually reassured at the symbolic level that we all belong to the same community (in that we affirm the same fundamental democratic values) is now a central part of a self-conscious discourse on the necessity of ensuring the ‘cohesion’ of Danish society in order to sustain the support for the Danish welfare community and its social and moral achievements. While these achievements include equality and self-reflective moral and political autonomy for the individual citizen, the idea of social integration through values is closer to the idea of a *Gemeinschaft* built on mechanic solidarity (Durkheim), than to that of a *Gesellschaft* premised on abstract norms of interaction, individualism and division of labour (organic solidarity).

This ‘civic integrationism,’ with its comprehensive notion of citizenship, draws on central elements in national identity history that place a value on the society’s smallness, popular participation, consensus and the ability and duty to communicate in the same language across social and political cleavages. For the right-of-centre, it is rooted in a broader national and Christian culture. The centre-left also subscribe to the citizen ideal, but tends to reject the right wing’s somewhat nationalist
interpretation of its basis. It is generally believed that status as an equal citizen with identical rights and duties provides sufficient support for the realisation of cultural and religious identities and that it is accessible to all with the right motivation. Danish citizenship as a social and legal status is not biased towards a specific nationality, culture or religion. Nonetheless, immigrants are thoroughly vetted through integration and language tests to qualify for citizenship: the formal legal status is a prize and the end of a long trial period that is supposed to ensure and demonstrate the commitment by the new-comer to the fundamental democratic values of Danish society.

The overshadowing concern with cultural and religious differences in Denmark today pertains to post-immigration minorities who arrived from non-western countries in the last 40 to 50 years, most of whom are (identified as) Muslims. National and older religious minorities of Greenlanders, Germans, Poles and Jews are today uncontroversial and rarely raise claims themselves about special or equal rights, symbolic respect and recognition. Immigrants from non-western countries, on the other hand, are very controversial because of (what is perceived to be) their low ability to integrate into the ‘modern’ and ‘liberal’ Danish society and democracy.

The turn towards integration has pushed the question of toleration aside. In the discussion of the hazards of multiculturalism and parallel societies, tolerance has in part been framed as overindulgence or indifference to problematic beliefs and practices among minorities. This criticism of tolerance as indifference or naïveté relies on a historical preference in some parts of society for ‘liberality’ over ‘tolerance’. Tolerance is seen as form of moral failure: it implies giving up the forming of judgements over what is right and wrong. Liberality, on the other hand, entails fighting for the values one holds dear while insisting on the same right for all others. The basis of this Danish interpretation of tolerance is, first, a strong commitment to equal citizen rights by all and their protection by the state. Liberality, secondly, implies criticising and even ridiculing all that you find wrong. While this leaves some space for legal tolerance, understood as the right to think and act in ways that are considered wrong, it leaves little space for social tolerance, understood as abstention from criticism of, among other things, cultural and religious sensibilities. Liberality is a ‘republican’ virtue that enables you to participate in blunt public exchanges with a ‘thick skin’ so that you can reach negotiated, consensual democratic agreements with your opponents at all levels of society.

In the last 4-5 years, concern with radicalisation and extremism may have led policy makers to re-consider whether the swing towards civic integrationism, also fuelled by post 9/11 fears of radical Islamism, has been too one-sided. Slightly more emphasis is given to concepts like tolerance and equal respect in order to prevent minorities from being alienated and turning against society: these concepts are thus back on the agenda, not only to ensure the rights and security of minorities, but also improve the safety of the majority.

In conclusion, the main diversity challenges that politicians consider important relate almost exclusively to non-Western immigrants. As described above, the concerns driving them can be summed up in three themes:
1. Unemployment: It is often emphasized that the percentage of non-Western immigrants on social security is out of proportion with the rest of the population. This is seen as a problem for the sustainability of the Danish welfare model.

2. Parallel societies (ghettoisation): It is often noted that we need to avoid a situation where Muslims are living in their own secluded communities impervious to the rules and institutions of the rest of society and that we are heading towards such a situation if something is not done now. The fear is one of parallel societies hostile and indifferent to one another, of Sharia law being de facto implemented outside Danish law, and generally of the erosion of society's social cohesion.

3. Radicalisation/extremism: There has been a growing concern with radicalisation within Muslim communities. In the discussion of the hazards of multiculturalism and parallel societies, tolerance has in part been framed as overindulgence or indifference to problematic beliefs and practices of minorities that in a worst-case scenario could lead to acts of terrorism. Concern for the democratic mind-set of Muslims is often expressed. However, both in order to counterbalance the symbolic exclusion of immigrant youth and thereby avoid radicalisation and in order to counteract anti-Semitism in larger urban areas the concept of toleration is being brought back onto the political agenda.

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**Law**


CHAPTER 3. GERMANY

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Introduction

This article gives a broad overview of the major German debates concerning cultural diversity challenges that have taken place during the last thirty years, and of the most relevant groups and their different labels within these discussions. After summing up historical developments with respect to German national identity, and the politics of naturalisation and citizenship, we present the major debates on issues of immigration and diversity and how they were framed in the different decades, starting with the 1980s, the 1990s, and into the first decade after 2000.

The public debates and political ideas around issues of immigration have long been discussed in the atmosphere of a general rejection of the fact, that Germany has been a de facto country of immigration since the beginning of labour immigration after World War II. The perception, that immigrants would one day return home made it possible to ignore important issues of diversity, the necessity to politically address the social participation of immigrants and their children, as well as the changing demographic structure and national identity of Germany becoming an immigration country.

It was only in the year 2000, when the reform of citizenship laws gradually enabled non-ethnic Germans to become citizens, that politics officially declared Germany as a country of immigration and, at the same time, pointed out the necessity to urgently design integration policies.

Though ‘integration’ has become the key political term within a wide variety of diversity issues, immigrant groups often perceive the real concept behind the label as rather assimilatory.

Integration, as it is widely used in political rhetoric, is regarded as an attempt by the majority to ‘integrate’ minorities into the already existing society and ‘culture,’ also labelled ‘Leitkultur’ (leading culture) by mainly conservative politicians. The possibility that the majority culture and society would undergo change through this integration is hardly ever addressed.
The idea of cultural diversity – describing an immigration society that is made up of citizens with different cultural heritages and religions, and is thus also changed and formed by these differences – is hardly used at all in the political sphere. Because of its link to the idea of multiculturalism, diversity has likewise been rejected by politicians throughout the last decade, long before the famous statement of the Federal Chancellor Merkel in October 2010, when she declared that the concept of multiculturalism had absolutely failed (sueddeutsche.de, 2010).

The primary object of public debates about multiculturalism and related issues has been labour migrants from Turkey and descendants. After the terror attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001, the debate began to turn on Muslims, who were to a large extent replacing ‘Turks’ in the public imaginary. One could say that, more or less, the same group of immigrants was perceived not only as ‘culturally’ determined, but also religiously so. Public discourse both culturalised and essentialised this group of (former) immigrants as ‘Turks’ and ‘Muslims,’ widely portraying them as fixed entities, whose members are hardly differentiated and substantially determined by their cultural/religious belonging. At the same time the debate about asylum seekers grew very strong and incited strong negative feelings in German society, leading even to violent outbreaks and murder in the 1990s.

This article chooses to discuss immigrant groups mainly in the way they are and were labelled within public discourse. Therefore the immigrants from Turkey and their descendants are discussed as ‘labour migrants’, ‘refugees’, ‘asylum seekers’, ‘Turks’ or ‘Muslims’, depending on the respective time and issue.

Apart from Turkey, asylum seekers arrived in Germany in the 1990s from very different countries, many of them escaping violent conflicts in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan or the Palestinian territories. Some groups, such as Jews, the Roma, or Vietnamese were discussed in different ways throughout the decades and in relation to different diversity challenges, whereas the labels hardly changed. In the 1990s, however, Jews were often discussed in the frame of ‘quota refugees’ (Kontingentflüchtlinge), a label they shared with ethnic German immigrants from Russia and other countries, but not with the Roma, who until today demand this status in light of the genocide committed against them during the Nazi regime.

After pointing out the different debates and political measures concerning immigration and diversity in Germany over the past thirty years, this article sheds light on the ways in which tolerance is used in public discourse in Germany today and as a normative concept in relation to different groups and issues. It explains the use of a variety of other concepts, like integration or acceptance, which are relevant in this context of dealing with difference.

**Germany: State formation, national identity and citizenship**

Citizenship outlines the borders of national belonging, of who is allowed to be an integral part of the society and who is not. The rules and regulations of citizenship thus reveal a lot about a country’s understanding of its national identity. The German citizenship law has until 1999 been dominated by *ius sanguinis*, that deems ethnic descent the major factor for national belonging. According to the political scientist and historian Werner Ruf, a
specifically ethnic understanding of the nation has been an important factor of German development of national identity since the very beginning of the nation-building process. An understanding of the German nation as ethnically determined has thus supported border-drawing and exclusionary processes, that culminated in extreme degradation of ‘non-ethnic Germans,’ and finally in the unprecedented genocide of the Holocaust by the National Socialists.

### Historical development of the German national identity

The Peace of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years War in 1648, plays an important part in the German historical memory. On the one hand, it ended decades of violent conflict that centred on issues of religious freedom between the Catholic Church and other Christian denominations by laying the constitutional basis for mutual tolerance. On the other hand, it strengthened the power of the individual principalities vis-à-vis the German emperor (Kaiser), thus laying the foundation for the strong position of the German federal states in relation to the national government, an arrangement that persists until today. The regional identities have long been more important than a common German identity. Still, a strong national identity developed perhaps precisely because of these strong local ties; there was a necessity to construct and support a strong common, unifying identity for the fragmented territory, which was supposed to comprise one nation since the foundation of the Deutsche Kaiserreich in 1871. This, together with the developments to create a common German identity against those of other nations, like France, which were gradually all constructed as inferior in relation to the German one, led to the idea of the Volk, a specific concept of community, which developed in close relation to the concept of ethnicity, gaining prominence in relation to the national project until very recently. The concept of the Volk especially stressed the factor of a common bloodline of all the members of the nation, which – like one big family – were all perceived as of a common descent, of which the common language is an important constituting factor. Germany thus developed an idea of ethnic origin and common identity, which was far more ideological than the concept of ethnicity and that strongly linked ideology and – perceived – biological factors. This concept was directly related to the devaluation of other nations and ethnic groups, which eventually generated the National Socialists’ idea of a superior German ‘race’, which had to govern all other ‘races’ and even extinguish other groups and nations.

Among the individual states that were members of the Deutsche Bund (German Federation) from 1815 to 1866, the questions of a common German nation and national identity were heavily debated. After the unification of all German-speaking territories (großdeutsche Lösung) was found to be unrealisable, the member states of the Deutsche Bund united under the Prussian king and without the Austrian territories, which was called the kleindeutsche Lösung. A common identity, however, was not yet established, and the question of the unification of all territories in which German was the national language would come up again in between the two world wars, and in the National Socialist regime.

The time of the Weimarer Republik is another important landmark in German collective memory, as the young republic, which had a short zenith in the 1920s before the world economic crisis in 1929, in the end was the precursor for the National Socialist dictatorship. The republic,
which had already been under the pressure of reparations for World War I and was extremely weakened by the economic crisis, was finally gradually taken over by right-wing extremist political powers.

The important factor of the downfall of the Weimarer Republik, until today is the perception that it had been too open for all political powers – even the enemies of the republic and its constitution – which eventually led to the National Socialists coming into power. The lesson learnt from these historical developments is the enduring conviction that the republic and the constitution may under no circumstances admit its own enemies into power, that no ‘tolerance’ may be shown to the ‘intolerant’, as explained in more detail in chapter 4.

From the very beginning, Hitler’s two major goals were the war of aggression and extermination for creating new ‘living space in the East’ (‘Lebensraum im Osten’) and the persecution and extermination of the Jews. This racist worldview of the Nazis and the attempt to create a ‘pure’ and ‘healthy’ common and superior ‘race’, the embodiment of intolerance in its most cruel form, targeted (apart from the Jews) two other minorities considered a ‘foreign race’ (Fremdrasse): the Roma, and members of Slavic ethnic groups, like Poles, Russians or Ukrainians. Other persecuted groups that were not considered a ‘foreign race’ but as a danger to the ‘health and purity of the population’ were homosexuals, disabled people and many other weak or minority groups, who were also victims of persecution, violence and murder. In the year 1941, the Nazis began with a systematic murder of Jews in specially constructed extermination camps. In the camp of Auschwitz-Birkenau alone, about one million people died in gas chambers. The unconditional capitulation on the 8th of May, 1945, was circumvented by Hitler and other major responsible politicians and members of the military through suicide. Those major responsible persons that survived were convicted in the Nuremberg Trials (Nürnberger Prozesse).

After the allied forces occupied in 1949, the Federal Republic of Germany was founded in the three Western zones and the German Democratic Republic in the Soviet zone. The Cold War and the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961 completely separated the Eastern and Western parts of the German population from each other. It was only in 1991 that Germany was completely reunified and regained its state sovereignty.

An important historical heritage is the collective memory that Germany incited and lost two World Wars. Although considerable parts of the population have long been deeply sceptical towards the militarism that was once the backbone of the state, recent developments seem to bear evidence to a certain change in perspective in this regard. Not only is German military engagement gaining international importance and intensity, but so are very recent debates about German (cultural) identity, especially in contrast to (mainly Muslim) immigrants. The influential book by Thilo Sarrazin (Sarrazin, 2010) – former member of the board of the Federal Bank, about ‘Germany doing away with itself’ through the demographic rise of certain immigrant groups (namely Muslims), who are qua culture and/or religion less intelligent and economically effective than others – has marked a new German self-perception of superiority. This feeling of superiority is marked not so much biologically but more culturally and first of all economically. It is nevertheless a nationally and culturally determined perception of superiority, where the understanding
of culture is very essentialising, defining cultures as fixed and inflexible entities, and thus to a certain extent takes the place that was formerly inhabited by a similarly fixed and essentialising understanding of ‘race’.

Citizenship and access to citizenship

The latest reform of the citizenship law of 1999/2000 adds aspects of *ius soli*, but does not completely abolish the *ius sanguinis*. It is however an important step towards complete equality before the law, which enables the integration of immigrants without the assimilatory demand to give up cultural characteristics. Equality before the law would mean that the acceptance of and respect for the constitution would be the only necessary prerequisites for naturalisation. Significantly, the branch of the German intelligence service concerned with internal security is called the agency for the ‘protection of the constitution’ (*Verfassungsschutz*), as the constitution and the acceptance of it or even a certain ‘patriotism towards the constitution’ are perceived as lying at the core of the constitutional state.

However this process has not yet been completed; the citizenship law still contains many aspects of the *ius sanguinis*, and the understanding of national identity based on ethnic origin is still strong within society and politics. Since the reform children of non-German citizens born in Germany have access to German citizenship, subject to fulfilling certain requirements. In part, this signifies recognition of the importance of citizenship for integration, and is partly based on major changes in the national self-understanding. For those born before 2000, however, access to citizenship remains more difficult. In particular, this is because new rules and regulations increasingly stress the economic potential of those aspiring to immigration and naturalisation. For example, the latest change to the naturalisation law of 2004 (enacted in 2007) requires young immigrants less than 23 years of age (mostly children of immigrant parents) to show proof of income sufficient for their own sustenance. This requirement is, however, waived where applicants are able to prove that their missing income is due to the lack of employment trainee and apprenticeship positions.

At first, the introduction of the law led to the naturalisation of large numbers of people (Stahl, 2002). Recent statistics, however, suggest a steady decline in rates of naturalisation, which may originate from a combination of factors. These include: a corollary to the time it has taken to provide access to citizenship; the reluctance of immigrants to apply for citizenship due to the stigma of betraying one’s national background; the perception of growing hostility towards Muslims in Germany – who make up the largest part of the immigrant population - and frequent and far-reaching feelings of discrimination.

Apart from the positive changes in the law, especially the shift from an ethnic understanding of the nation towards one based on place of birth, the new citizenship legislation also explicitly forbids dual citizenship. Naturalisation dropped considerably after a number of cases demonstrated that Turks who retook their Turkish citizenship after having received a German passport would lose their German citizenship once and for all. This is one of the major reasons why, despite supportive attitudes from Turkish consulates and legal arrangements that allow former Turkish
passport holders to keep most of their citizenship rights, many Turks in Germany think twice before giving up their Turkish passports (Mühle, 2010). Another legal change that creates difficulties for those young people who hold dual citizenship is the requirement to choose one of the two passports when they reach the age of 18. Under the citizenship law of 2000, children born in Germany whose parents have lived there for at least eight years receive a German passport, even if they possess another nationality. From the age of 18, however, they have to decide between the two citizenships. In 2008, this regulation affected 3,300 Turkish-Germans. Kerim Arpad, chairman of the European Assembly of Turkish Academics is among those who have criticised the double standards, noting that EU nationals with two passports are not required to make this kind of choice (am Orde, 2008).

Additionally to those regulations, since September 2008 the naturalisation process requires the passing of a national naturalisation test, which demands detailed knowledge about Germany’s culture, history and society. The test, which will be applied throughout all of the federal states, is an improvement in comparison to certain tests in Baden-Württemberg and other federal states, which specifically target Muslim immigrants and ask questions about private attitudes in a discriminatory manner. (For a detailed critique of the naturalisation test, see Joppke, 2007.) Some of these are, however, still in use, even after the introduction of the national test. Germany has also introduced language proficiency tests for spouses wishing to join their partners in Germany. The difficulty of obtaining the necessary language skills in rural areas of Turkey, combined with the fact that such requirements were not applicable to citizens from, for example, the USA or Japan, increased perceptions that this was targeted at especially preventing immigration from Turkey. The president of the federal parliament, Norbert Lammert, has recognised lately, that the fact that Germany is home to the highest number of third-country nationals in Europe, yet has one of the lowest naturalisation rates, represents a major barrier to civic participation. “Our problem in Germany is not too high an immigration rate, but rather too little naturalisation,” he said (Welt online, 2010a).

**Cultural diversity challenges during the last 30 years**

Germany has been a de facto country of immigration since it started signing labour recruitment contracts with Italy (1955), Greece and Spain (1960), Turkey (1961), Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964) and Tunisia (1965). Until only a few years ago, however, official national politics denied the fact that Germany had since then been an immigration country. Instead, the idea that the former labour migrants, having come to the country for a limited period of time, would finally go back to their countries of origin – even if they had been in Germany for two and three generations – was held up together with an avoidance of working on real integration programmes foocusing on the participation of immigrants and former immigrants in the society. The reform of the citizenship law however marked also a major shift in political rhetoric. Whereas the long-time resistance of the political elites to regard Germany as a country of immigration also included a reluctance to implement or even debate integration measures, the reform of the citizenship laws changed the social reality, and a debate about the necessity to ‘integrate’ immigrant groups and their descendants gained importance.
Table 1. Most important immigrant groups. People with migration background according to origin, migration experience and gender, micro census 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Region of origin</th>
<th>With own migration experience</th>
<th>Without own migration experience</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percentage of women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>absolute</td>
<td>in%</td>
<td>absolute</td>
<td>in%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-27</td>
<td>2,545</td>
<td>69.0</td>
<td>1,141</td>
<td>31.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not included: Greece</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>43.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>529</td>
<td>82.9</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumania</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>86.3</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Europe</td>
<td>3,327</td>
<td>69.1</td>
<td>1,486</td>
<td>30.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not included: Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>76.7</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>32.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>90.9</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>73.4</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>26.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1,511</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>1,016</td>
<td>40.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainia</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>89.3</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe in total</td>
<td>5,872</td>
<td>69.1</td>
<td>2,627</td>
<td>30.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>71.3</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>28.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>America</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>32.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia, Australia and Oceania</td>
<td>1,183</td>
<td>78.8</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>21.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not included: Near und Middle East</td>
<td>584</td>
<td>82.5</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>94.4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South- and Southeast Asia</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>74.0</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Late-)Resettlers</td>
<td>2,756</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,756</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from Poland</td>
<td>518</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>518</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from the Russian Federation</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from Kazakhstan</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from Romania</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from the former Soviet Union</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without Information</td>
<td>2,904</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>1,682</td>
<td>36.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People with migration background altogether</td>
<td>10,534</td>
<td>68.4</td>
<td>4,877</td>
<td>31.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source. Statistisches Bundesamt (Federal Agency for Statistics)

The numerically largest immigrant group have always been Turks and/or their children and grandchildren. The public perception of this group has changed throughout the decades in relation to political developments and issues that gained prominence in public discourse. This report traces these different debates since 1980, and the concomitant adjustments to the labels that were given to Turkish immigrants (‘guest workers,’ ‘Turks’ or ‘Muslims’), as well as to other groups. As the different immigrant and national minorities were labelled very differently depending on the time period and the character of the public discourse – German Roma have for example not always been accepted as a national minority – the article discusses the respective groups in relation to the label they were given at the specific moment and in the specific debate.

Apart from labour migration, refugees from different war torn countries make up another set of important immigrant groups. The Afghan diaspora in Germany is the largest in Europe. There are also significant numbers of Pakistanis and Indonesians in Germany, as well as refugees from the Balkans. The German-Arab population numbered approximately 290,000 in 2002 (Blaschke, 2004). Many Palestinians enter the country...
as official refugees from other countries, making it difficult to obtain precise numbers for this immigrant population.

After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the opening of the borders, the number of ethnic German resettlers increased considerably. (For the different types of immigrant legal statuses, including refugees and asylum seekers, see also Ohliger and Raiser, 2005). The immigration consisted of both inhabitants of the Eastern German territories (Übersiedler) and of immigrants of ethnic German origin from the territories of the former Soviet Union (Aussiedler), who received the German nationality.

Another minority group is the German Sinti and Roma, who have not immigrated recently, but have in fact resided in Germany for several hundred years. The National Socialists had defined Romani and Sinti as an ‘inferior foreign race’ (mindenwertige Fremdrasse) and murdered hundreds of thousands of them systematically with the aim of a complete genocide. The persecution of Roma and Sinti is therefore included in the term Holocaust or named the Roma Holocaust.

About 70,000 German Sinti and Roma are living in the country today. Additionally large numbers of Roma are refugees from Kosovo. Since the end of that war, they are no longer accepted as legal refugees, and many are deported each year, or are in danger of being deported.

Jews have been living on the territory of contemporary Germany for about 1700 years. In 1933, about 515,000 Jews were living in the country. After the Holocaust, which killed around 6 million Jews, only 20,000 to 30,000 remained in Western Germany. In the German Democratic Republic, only a few Jews remained, and their communities gradually disappeared. Since 1991, Germany admits Jews and their relatives from the former Soviet Union as so-called Kontingentflüchtlinge (quota refugees), which has led to considerable growth of the Jewish community, mainly due to immigration from Russia. As of 2005, the population of Jews in Germany numbered around 105,000, most of whom are immigrants from the former Soviet Union and their descendants. Life in the communities reflects a growing diversity – from orthodox to liberal – of Jewish life in Germany. However, anti-Semitism has been growing again to a threatening extent. In addition, anti-Semitism within certain immigrant communities, especially the Muslim community, has been increasingly discussed in recent years.

The 1980s: End of the Cold War

Since the labour recruitment in the 1960s and early 1970s, the growing amount of immigrants from rural areas of Turkey and other countries has been one of the major sources of cultural and/or religious diversity. In the early years of labour migration the immigrants were mainly seen as workers, who were to remain for a limited time, but who had similar interests with the rest of the working class in Germany and often joined the same worker's unions. At the same time, although in a fragile situation in general, the immigrants were important for the German economy and thus had a certain power to have their basic needs met.

The debate about multiculturalism has to some extent been imported from Anglophone discussions, but never gained the same importance. In 1989, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, member of the Green party, initiated with
the support of his party the Amt für multikulturelle Angelegenheiten (Agency for Multicultural Affairs) in Frankfurt/Main, that aimed to mediate between immigrants and the broader German society and mark the beginning of a change in immigrant politics. Supporters of the concept of multiculturalism at this time criticised the Federal Government for its negation of the actual reality of Germany having become an immigration country through the recruitment of labour migrants. With the memory of World War II and the racist ideology of the National Socialists having led to mass killings of Jews and Roma and other ethnic, religious and political groups, the supporters of the multicultural idea wanted to prevent any form of hostility or even pressure to assimilate directed towards immigrants.

During the late-1970s and 1980s, however, the economic boom in Germany ended and with growing refugee-immigration from war-torn countries and inner-German migration from East to West the attitude towards the immigrants changed and political measures were taken to encourage immigrants to return to their home countries.

**Labour migrants**

The official end of labour recruitment in 1973, however, restricted the former labour migrants from travelling freely back and forth. Many responded by having their families – most of them from rural areas in Turkey – join them in Germany. Even if both German politicians and the labour immigrants expected the situation to be temporary, only half of the four million migrants actually left Germany. The labour migrants were usually concentrated in certain districts with low rent prices. This phenomenon was encouraged by official policies and supported by public opinion at the time; however today it is widely criticised in public debate as a manifestation of ‘parallel societies’ (Parallelgesellschaften). Due to the change in the character of migration, the so-called ‘guest-workers’ moved out of the workers’ accommodations and rented their own apartments, usually in run-down, inner-city areas (Schiffauer, 2005).

In East Germany, the recruitment of foreign workers (from then-socialist states such as Algeria, Hungary or Vietnam) was on a far smaller scale than in West Germany. This might explain why few people with an Italian, Greek or Turkish immigration history live in the eastern parts of the country today (Ohliger and Raiser, 2005: 12).

**Refugees**

Another wave of immigration from Turkey was initiated by the second coup d’ état in 1980 and the civil war in South East Turkey (Schiffauer, 2005). Around 125,000 Turks and Kurds – mainly critics of the regime – came to Germany as asylum seekers. One major group were the Yezidis, a religious group in its own right, whose members are Kurdish-speaking and originate from Turkey, as well as from Iraq and Syria, with small numbers also from Iran. The Yezidis were granted collective asylum on grounds of religious persecution. Kurdish asylum seekers also arrived from the Kurdish areas in Iraq, Iran and Syria. Compared to other Western countries, Germany has the highest share of Kurds amongst its immigrant population.
About 35,000 Assyrians, a Christian minority in Turkey and other countries, fled from Turkey and from Iraq to Germany, where today they have communities mainly in Berlin and Wiesbaden/Mainz (Kleff, 1984).

Another religious minority that has been persecuted in Turkey are Alevis, some of whom regard themselves as Muslims while others, like the secretary-general of the Alevi Community in Germany (Alevitische Gemeinde Deutschland) Ali Ertan Toprak, claim acceptance in Germany as a religious community in its own right instead of being regarded as merely a liberal branch of Islam (Facius, 2007).

Apart from the large Turkish community, there is a considerable Afghan diaspora in Germany, constituting the largest in Europe. While between the 1950s and the 1970s Afghan immigrants were mainly students and business people, the second wave of immigration consisted of asylum seekers fleeing the Soviet invasion and communist regime after 1979.

At the same time, Vietnamese came to East Germany as labour migrants, having been recruited to substitute for the large numbers of emigrating Germans, and came to make up about two-thirds of its immigrants. They arrived in West Germany mainly as so-called ‘boat people’ – refugees who had reached Germany by boat. By 1985, they made up the biggest part of the 30,000 quota refugees1 (Kontingentflüchtlinge) who lived in Germany.

However, up to 1989, refugees were not very large in number and caused no major public debate in Germany.

Roma and Sinti

Apart from Roma labour migrants, who arrived when labour recruitment was at its peak, about 60,000 to 70,000 Roma have been living in German territories for several hundred years. According to the Documentation and Cultural Centre of German Sinti and Roma in Heidelberg, ‘Sinti’ names that part of the minority that has been living in Western Europe since the late Middle Ages, while ‘Roma’ refers to those of south European descent. This distinction is only made in the German-speaking countries.

The Documentation Centre together with nine federal state and local associations form the Central Council of German Sinti and Roma, which was founded in 1982 and played an important role in generating recognition of the minority as victims of the Holocaust, in which around 500,000 Sinti and Roma were killed in concentration camps, aiming at their complete extermination. They also advocate for compensation and antidiscrimination.

Jews

During the Holocaust the Hitler regime killed between 5.6 (Pohl, 2003:109) and 6.3 (Benz, 1996) million people from many different countries, all of whom the National Socialist regime defined as Jews. This historically unique genocide aimed at exterminating all European Jews.

In the 1950s and 1960s, about 20,000 to 30,000 Jews lived in the Federal Republic of Germany, most of them old and sick people, unable to emigrate to the US or Palestine.

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1. A quota refugee is someone who has already been granted a form of refugee status by the destination country before leaving the country of origin.
Those who stayed in Germany or came back after the war were under considerable pressure from within the community to justify their decision to stay in the country of the perpetrators after surviving the Holocaust (Schoeps 1991). Especially in Eastern Germany the small number of Jews constantly diminished from 3,500 in 1945 to 350 at the end of the GDR. The Jewish community was also quite elderly. After the fall of the Eastern regimes and the German border since 1989, and after the reunification in 1989, about 28,000 Jews were members of the state-recognized Jewish communities, and another 20,000 to 30,000 Jews were non-members.

An open debate about anti-Semitism, the so-called historians’ dispute (Historikerstreit), was initiated by the historian Ernst Nolte in 1986 with his assumption that the German concentration camps had been a reaction to the mass destructive Gulags of Stalin. The philosopher Jürgen Habermas countered these assumptions, which he called “apologetic tendencies within German historiography” (Habermas, 1986). Habermas concluded from this debate that, “the only patriotism that does not alienate us from the Western world is a constitutional patriotism (Verfassungspatriotismus)” (Habermas, 1987).

**Eastern Germans and ethnic German resettlers**

Even if emigration to Western Germany was not easy and the application for it could take 10 years and deteriorate the social situation of the person willing to leave the GDR, between 1961 and 1988 around 383,000 people managed to migrate to the Western parts of Germany, most of them through the exchange of prisoners – mostly for financial contribution from the FRG – or through the refusal to return from a legal visit to the FRG. In 1989, the year of the German reunification, around the same number of people – 344,000 – left the GDR for West Germany (Schroeder, 1988).

Also, descendants of ethnic Germans who lived in Eastern European countries – most of them through migration and displacement during the course of World War II – have had the right since 1950 to immigrate to Germany as members of the German nation (Volkszugehörige) and are directly given German citizenship. Between 1950 and the mid-1980s about 1.5 million resettlers came to Western Germany, mainly from the former Soviet Union. At the end of the 1980s the numbers of resettlers, together with inner-German migrants and asylum seekers, grew strongly (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2005). This process of large immigration, and the quite successful integration of large numbers of resettlers, could be perceived as a positive example for dealing with challenges of diversity. The growing economy after the war probably contributed to this positive integration to a large extent.

**The 1990s: German reunification process, anti-immigrant rhetoric and violence**

With the opening of the borders between Eastern and Western Germany, as well as the countries of the former Soviet Union, much immigration into the former Western parts of Germany happened in a very short time and challenged the quite unprepared society and its political leaders. Between 1950 and 1999 the population of the former Western parts of Germany grew by
13.5 million inhabitants, while the former Eastern parts lost almost 5 million inhabitants (Münz, Seifert & Ulrich, 1999). As this new immigration was no longer accompanied by a growing economy in Western Germany, the integration of the new immigrants became more challenging then in the years before. Both 1990 and 1991 witnessed the immigration of 1 million people each, most of them inner-German migrants and ethnic German resettlers. The immigration of the latter has however been reduced by administrative restrictions (Andersen & Woyke, 2003).

In light of this large immigration from the former Soviet Union and Eastern Germany as well as refugees and asylum seekers from different war-torn countries, the supporters of multiculturalism became weaker and anti-immigrant rhetoric became stronger in public discourse. The perception of the former ‘guest-workers’ (Gastarbeiter) turned into a ‘foreigner’ problem, most of these foreigners being Turks. Even the German resettlers – mainly called ‘Russian Germans’ (Russlanddeutsche), many of whom did not speak German – were less welcomed by the existing population than some years before, and were perceived as strangers, too.

The public debate thus focussed mainly around Turks who remained in the country and whose ‘foreign culture’ became more and more problematised, as well as around asylum seekers from different countries, who were often portrayed as an uncontrollable flood overwhelming Germany. In 1991, the weekly magazine der Spiegel presented a cover that showed Germany as a full boat about to drown in the sea of immigrants and refugees (der Spiegel, 1991) - the ‘full boat’ became a trope of increasing prominence, invariably reproduced within public discourse at this time.

Asylum seekers

Applications for asylum peaked in 1991 with more than 430,000. Due to the wars and conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and the Balkans, many refugees arrived in Germany during the 1990s from Albania, Kosovo, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and predominantly from Bosnia and Herzegovina, most of them Muslims. There were also many refugees from Afghanistan, who fled the civil war and the take over of the Taliban in the mid-1990s. Other refugees from Asia – with different rights and statuses – were Tamils from Sri Lanka, Ahmadiyas from Pakistan and Sikhs from India.

Additionally - beyond the group of labour migrants from Morocco and Tunisia - most of the Arab immigrants to Germany had arrived as refugees and asylum seekers (Schmidt-Fink 2001). The rhetoric and violence wielded against immigrants in the early 1990s did not focus especially on Muslims or Turks, but concentrated on asylum seekers and repeatedly challenged their right to asylum by questioning the real necessity of their asylum and supposing mere economic reasons for seeking refuge in Germany.

Probably as a result of this anti-immigrant and especially anti-asylum atmosphere, the early 1990s witnesses several violent attacks and even murders of asylum seekers and other immigrants. A year after the first attacks on foreign workers and asylum seekers in 1991 in Hoyerswerda, the city of Rostock witnessed the worst attacks against foreigners in Germany since the war, when several hundred right-wing extremists attacked the homes of asylum seekers under the eyes and with the
applause of around 2,000 citizens altogether. Most of the people living there were Vietnamese, but also Roma and other asylum seekers from different countries. At the end of 1992, the houses of Turkish citizens were attacked by neo-Nazis, and two girls and their grandmother were killed. Another attack in 1993 against the homes of people of Turkish origin in Solingen killed five people.

Not long after these outbreaks of violence, the Federal Government tightened the immigration laws and restricted the right to asylum in 1993, which led to a substantial reduction of asylum seekers and other immigrants. In 1997/98 net immigration rates were approaching zero because of the return of the refugees from war-torn Bosnia.

At the same time that Germany saw the abolishment of the right to asylum in 1993, however, the reform of immigration law also recognised a right to naturalisation for the first time (Hagedorn, 2001).

**Roma and Sinti**

Apart from the Sinti, who have been living in Germany for several hundred years, and those who immigrated during labour recruitment, a third group of 15,000 to 20,000 people came in the 1990s as refugees from war-torn Yugoslavia. In 1995, the German Sinti and Roma gained legal recognition as a national minority, the Charta of the European Council recognized German *Romanes* as a minority language. Their status as a national minority guarantees the continuous support of the Central Council as well as the Documentation and Cultural Centre of German Sinti and Roma.

This protection as a national minority, however, only includes Roma with German citizenship and of German descent. German Roma with origins from South Eastern Europe or Spain are thus not included in the status of national minority and its protective function.

Other national minorities that have been recognised in Germany since the late 1990s are Danes, Friesians, and Sorbs.

**Jews**

In 1991 the law mandating a refugee quota (*Kontingentflüchtlingsgesetz*) was passed, which, among other rights, guaranteed certain groups of immigrants the status as refugees, among them Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union. Within a span of 20 years, around 220,000 people came into Germany through Jewish immigration. Only about half of these were seen as Jews in the religious sense by the German Jewish community, while the others were people with Jewish families, but without a Jewish mother. Still, the latter had often been victims of anti-Semitism in the former Soviet Union, mainly because of their Jewish names. Their non-acceptance as parts of the Jewish community in Germany led to some inner conflicts (Bodemann & Bagno, 2010). Through this immigration of Jews and their families from Russia, the German Jewish community has grown to four time its 1989 size, numbering around 120,000 members today. In many cities new communities have been founded and new synagogues have been built.
Apart from the deterioration of public opinion about ‘foreigners’ in the face of massive immigration in the early 1990s, anti-immigrant rhetoric and violent attacks, Turks and other labour migrants, some of whom had been living in the country for around 10 years at the time of German reunification, mainly suffered from a setback in rights and social participation through the systematic preference for ethnic Germans. Although the resettlers from the former Soviet Union came into Germany as new immigrants and to a large extent spoke no German, they were treated as part of the German ‘Staatvolk’ – the people who were ethnically assigned to the German nation – and preferred in rights and status to the labour migrants, who were seen as foreigners, even if they had been living and working in the country for many years. Unlike refugees and former labour migrants, the resettlers, often called Russian Germans (Russlanddeutsche), were granted integrative support, German citizenship and language courses.

This ethnic understanding of nationality and ethnic determination of belonging formed a great barrier to integration and participation for large segments of those immigrants who had come into the country as labour migrants or refugees and could not claim any ethnic German descent.

**EU-foreigners**

Immigrants from EU countries – like the Poles, who, after people of Turkish origin, make up the second largest group of immigrants in Germany today – practically disappeared from the public debate and consciousness as soon as their countries joined the European Union, like Poland did in 2004. One might conclude that a corollary of disappearing from the lists of illegal immigrants is vanishing from public attention. This leads to the interesting question, if a future joining of Turkey to the EU could have a similar affect on Turks in European countries, especially Germany.

**Since 2000: Reform of citizenship laws, anti-Islamic rhetoric after 9/11**

The citizenship reform of 2000 had far-reaching implications in terms of the self-perception of German society. Even if many regulations still created barriers to naturalisation for many immigrants - among them the non-acceptance of dual citizenship – the change in perception from ius sanguinis to ius soli, which went along with the Federal Government finally calling Germany an immigration country, marked an important turning point for society and politics.

It was against this backdrop that a public and to a certain degree populist debate about a common German ‘leading culture’ (Leitkultur) was initiated at the end of 2000 by the conservative politician Friedrich Merz, who demanded an adaptation of immigrants to the German culture, if they wanted to stay in Germany for good. This debate – which discredited any debate about multiculturalism and tried to replace it – can be perceived as an expression of a certain fear of losing cultural hegemony within the newly declared immigration country and an attempt to sustain a vanishing homogeneity.
The other turning point for public perception of immigrants was – as in many other countries - the 2001 terror attack on the World Trade Center. The public perception of the former labour migrants – earlier referred to mainly as ‘Turks’ – transformed into ‘muslims’ and the two markers of difference – often deployed in an exclusionary way – became interchangeable and also partially reinforced one another. With the concentration on the religious background of the former immigrants, the problems became more and more culturalised and essentialised. The factor of class – which plays an important role in the analysis, as the former labour migrants were almost exclusively recruited from working classes – was almost completely blended out in the public discourse after 9/11.

As this culturalising of social problems went on with every new issue attributed to the Muslim community – arranged/forced marriages, homophobia, anti-Semitism, and others – the stigmatisation and exclusion of this group became less and less socially vexed. The concept of multiculturalism – although never really strongly influencing German politics – was harshly criticised as too tolerant towards cultural groups, equating this tolerance with naïve indifference.

At the same time, a major shift in the use of ‘tolerance’ regarding Muslim groups and individuals can be observed: intolerance towards Muslims and other immigrant groups – especially in light of the early nineties’ violent attacks and murders of immigrants – had always been stigmatised and easily connected to right-wing extremism and National Socialism, with Muslims and other immigrants as their potential victim. However, after 9/11, Muslims were increasingly perceived as the perpetrators instead of the victims of intolerance. While in the 1990s mainly right-wing extremists represented the intolerable in society, in the years after 2001 Muslims came to occupy this position more and more.

This positioning of Muslims as the intolerant other can be seen as fulfilling diverse functions in German society, among them a certain relief for ethnic Germans of a kind of post-war burden. Muslims became the locus of different negative aspects in society, which had been attributed to certain non-Muslim Germans before. This disburdening capacity even went so far as to equate Muslims with fascism, as the word-construction Islamo-Fascism indicates, which is widely used by anti-Islamic populism and even within mainstream media. With the widely held conviction that Muslims represent intolerance, issues of their exclusion and discrimination got blurred and the acceptance of their individual and group rights became a point of major debate. Also, essentialising discourses blurred the real reasons for social problems, while tolerance towards the Muslim minority generally diminished.

**Jews**

Although Jewish immigration was encouraged after World War II, most of the immigration advantages for Jews were abolished with the EU-membership of the Baltic countries from the 1st of January 2005. The new regulations practically stopped Jewish immigration. In 2009, only 1,088 immigrants came to Germany, again 24 percent less than the year before.

Like in other European countries, anti-Semitic violence in Germany grew after 2001. Anti-Semitism debates have centred on the one hand around
the demand to put an end to the debate about the past and German guilt (Kollektivschulddebatte)
, and on the other around the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Also, anti-Semitism of the immigrant – in particular the Muslim – community has been strongly debated in recent years, and various conferences have been organised on this issue.

The two minorities have on the one hand problematic relations towards each other, because of mutual prejudices and conflicting views about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. On the other hand, they share certain interests and issues as two non-Christian minority religious communities, especially as far as religious freedom and religious group rights are concerned.

Especially Muslim representatives increasingly point towards similarities in the manner of discrimination of the two minorities, partially to give their demands for minority rights and anti-discrimination more weight and attention. This new solidarity is taken up by Jewish representatives in different ways. Even if certain parts of the Jewish community reject this approach of Muslim representatives as instrumentalising, others try to establish new bonds of solidarity. (see also Yurdakul, 2010).

The heightened debate about Muslim anti-Semitism – which has to a certain degree been more prominent than the debates on the anti-Semitism of ethnic Germans - can be regarded as part of the transformation of Muslims from victims of discrimination to perpetrators and thus from the ones to be tolerated to the intolerant ones, almost unable to claim tolerance for themselves.

Roma and Sinti

The law about the Federal Budget (Bundesaushalt) states that since the year 2002, the law about the protection of national minorities and the European Charta for regional and minority languages ensures protection and support for the German Sinti and Roma. The declared aim is to provide for their equal participation in the political and cultural life of Germany, which is in part ensured by governmental support for the Central Council and the Documentation and Cultural Centre of the German Sinti and Roma.

Parts of the Roma population in Germany are thus under specific protection as a national minority. Although even this group has to struggle with discrimination in society and difficulties with equal participation in the labour market, the Roma are hardly ever openly problematised in public discourse as certain other groups are. The history of mass murder and genocide of Sinti and Roma by the National Socialists might prevent strongly negative portrayal of this minority group in the media and the open and public repatriation and mistreatment that the Roma are currently suffering in France is also unthinkable in Germany.

However, only one part of the Roma community in Germany is protected by its status as a national minority. Those not included in this status are the refugees from Kosovo, who fled the wars in the early 1990s and in 1998/99 and a third group of migrants from the EU-member states Bulgaria and Romania.

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2. Critics of Daniel Goldhagen’s book “Hitler’s Willing Executioners” (Hitlers willige Vollstrecker) said that the author pleaded for a collective German guilt for the crimes of the Nazi regime, which the author denied.
While the latter have freedom of movement within the EU, the former refugees have never had an unlimited right to stay and have always lived in danger of repatriation.

In April 2010 the Federal Government signed an agreement with the government of Kosovo, regulating the repatriation of refugees from Kosovo, about 12,000 of whom are Roma and Ashkali- and Kosovo-Egyptians. Based on a UNICEF survey, the families in danger of repatriation have been living in Germany for an average of 14 years, and although almost half of the 12,000 people are children, the well-being of the children played no role in the agreement.

Critics of this agreement, including politicians like the senator of the interior of Berlin, argue, that the Roma refugees were well-integrated, working, and that their children were socialised in Germany. It would be a great hardship for them to be repatriated to Kosovo, where they could not speak the language and were still highly stigmatised and discriminated against. The UNICEF survey also stated that about 75% of the repatriated Roma children abandoned their school education in Kosovo.

One day after the public commemoration of the Holocaust on the 29th of January 2010, the NGO Gesellschaft für bedrohte Völker (Association for Endangered Peoples) pointed to the difficult situation of Roma from Kosovo and their children (many of them raised in Germany) who had only been granted exceptional permission to remain in Germany for a limited time and were now in danger of being repatriated to Kosovo. The organisation asked for a residence permit quota for the 10,000 persons concerned, which had also been given to immigrated Jews in light of the crimes committed against them during the Holocaust.

The German government is however determined to repatriate around 2,500 Roma each year, thereby avoiding the public attention that a mass repatriation like the one in France could attract, but nevertheless gradually carrying out the planned repatriation of Roma families, long resident in Germany.

Vietnamese

The reality of Vietnamese in Germany is mainly that of two classes: those who arrived in the former GDR and who often had higher educational degrees, many of whom managed to make a living in Germany in spite of difficult conditions, and those who have been coming as asylum seekers since the fall of the communist regimes and who are often living as non-accepted asylum seekers or undocumented migrants.

While the former are portrayed as hard-working, education-oriented and well-integrated immigrants – thus positioning them on the opposite side of Turkish migrants on a scale of successful integration and educational achievement and through this contradicting the criticism against failures of German integration policies – the latter are portrayed as cigarette smugglers and petty criminals, misusing the asylum laws, who are rightly deported. There are only very few Vietnamese asylum seekers whose reasons for applying for asylum are accepted by federal agencies, and so the large majority of them are repatriated again. (Gräßler, 2009) In 2008, almost 1,300 Vietnamese applied for asylum, while the quota of acceptance was 0.1 percent, which means that 99.9 percent must anticipate
repatriation, although amnesty international reports that torture, political imprisonment and capital punishment are widely practiced in Vietnam. In June 2009, more than 100 Vietnamese from 12 federal states and Poland were deported to Hanoi, which, according to the federal police, was the first mass repatriation since the mid-1990s.

Inner-German migration

The inner-German migration from the five new federal states to the old federal states in the former West also produced debates and tensions. The pejorative naming of Germans from the former Eastern parts as ‘Ossis,’ along with a certain negative stereotyping, can be seen as indications of a culturalisation of the German reunification process. Shortly after the reunification of Germany, socio-economic differences between the former Western and Eastern parts were perceived more and more in socio-cultural terms and mutual stereotyping took place. This culturalisation process remains salient: a German woman who had been denied a job with the (unintentionally uncovered) remark on her application that she was an ‘Ossi,’ sued for discriminatory hiring practices. In order to be regarded before the law as ‘discrimination,’ she had to appeal to the court to accept the category ‘Ossi’ as an ethnicity – a claim that the court ultimately rejected. Thus, socio-economic differences and difficulties are in some cases portrayed and perceived as fundamentally cultural or – in the case of Muslims – religious. This so-called culturalisation of social relations and challenges can be frequently observed in German public discourses, not only concerning immigrants from other ethnic backgrounds, but even so-called ethnic Germans who have historically belonged to different nations and political systems.

Ethnic German resettlers

The total numbers of immigrants, that balance immigration with emigration, were only 176,000 in the year 2000 and 275,000 in 2001 and ethnic Germans made up the biggest part, being 85,000 in 2001.

In spite of their many legal advantages in comparison to other immigrants, the resettlers were also confronted with high rates of unemployment – especially in the field of unskilled work – and with the non-acceptance of many of their professional and academic certificates.

A 2007 analysis from the Institute for Research about the Labour Market and Professions of the Federal Agency for Employment (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung der Bundesagentur für Arbeit) showed that the integration of resettlers into the labour market had to a certain degree been even less successful than that of other immigrants, especially among people with higher education.

Even if for a long time the public discussion about resettlers has been one of successful integration, in recent years the so-called ‘Russian Germans’ have repeatedly been debated as problematic, and as overrepresented in unemployment and criminality.

In some debates it can be observed that ‘German resettlers’ turn into ‘Russian Germans’ as soon as problematic aspects are being discussed. One example of this identity labelling in media coverage could be observed in
2009 after the murder of the young Egyptian woman in a courtroom, killed by a young German resettler with right-wing extremist political views. Not only was the Islamophobic motivation of the murderer not mentioned in the media until about a week after the killing, but also, the perpetrator was very quickly named a ‘Russian German.’ In the aftermath of the murder, the criminality and right-wing views of Russian Germans were heavily discussed in the media, while the growing Islamophobia in mainstream society was – in an evidently dis-burdening manner – almost entirely blended out.

**Tolerance discourses in Germany**

The concept of tolerance is increasingly used in German public discourse about immigrants and integration. By far, the most heavily discussed issues concerning diversity challenges in contemporary German society concern Muslims and Muslim religious practices. The most widely used concept within this discourse is the concept of integration. Government figures mainly talk about integration as the key concept to solving problems in society, which are portrayed as the result of cultural and/or religious pluralism, mainly that of Muslims. Indeed, most issues surrounding the Muslim community in Germany are discursively connected to their cultural and/or religious difference, even if socio-economic and other factors would in many cases be the most relevant frames of reference.

As was made evident when the Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel recently declared that attempts at multiculturalism had failed, and at the same time demanded that immigrants expend more effort towards education and integration, minorities are often portrayed as most responsible for their own integration. The slogan ‘supporting and demanding’ (‘Fördern und Fordern’) is at the core of integration politics of Merkel’s party, the CDU, but in practice the demanding part seems to be more emphasised. Against this backdrop, we observe increased use of the concept of tolerance in the discourse on Muslims and/or integration.

There is generally a wide variety of interpretations and ways to use the concept of tolerance. It can, for example, be seen as the opposite of discrimination. Recent discourse and politics show, however, that it is more and more concerned with the limits of tolerance and with drawing lines within society between those who are to be tolerated, and those who should not be tolerated.

The slogan ‘no tolerance for intolerance’ is widely used in public debates around Muslims. One striking example is an extensive dossier by Ulrich Greiner in the prestigious weekly *Die Zeit* in January 2010. Under the heading “Islamismus: Toleranz für die Intoleranz?” (Islamism: Tolerance for Intolerance?) the author reminds us of a recent controversial media debate about Islam, Islamism and Islamophobia, where different journalists had issued conflicting views on how to frame the debate on Muslims and Islam in the media. The author also takes a stand within this debate, arguing for a deep cultural conflict between Islam and the West and cautioning the reader against too much tolerance in the face of violent Islamist threats (Greiner, 2010). This emphasis on the limits of tolerance is intended to call for a vigilant awareness of the dangers for society, dangers that could be overlooked by too much tolerance. Even the defenders of the concept of multiculturalism, like Daniel Cohn-Bendit, the founder of the *Amt für multikulturelle Angelegenheiten* in Frankfurt, caution against
“naïve” forms of multiculturalism that could lower human rights standards in society. Heiko Henkel explains how Cohn-Bendit and also Habermas draw a line of tolerance against what they call ‘fundamentalism’ or ‘fundamentalist immigrant cultures’ (Henkel, 2008). This association of a society putting itself in danger by tolerating the intolerant is a strong image within German discourse, because it recalls an important part of national history; it was precisely the Weimar Republic’s tolerance even towards its own enemies that boosted the rise of the Nazi regime. For this reason too much tolerance is seen as a danger to democracy. The Weimar Republic was perceived as too weak because of its openness, and the lesson learnt from this is often summed up in the slogan “no tolerance for intolerance”.

For analysing the political function of the use of tolerance, Wendy Brown has provided a very useful concept, which regards tolerance as a “political discourse and practice of governmentality”, rather than a “transcendent or universal concept, principle, doctrine or virtue.” (Brown, 2006:4) In the German context, the increased use of the concept of tolerance works hand-in-hand with the general political approach towards the inclusion of others, framed as integration. Rather than discussing structural inequalities and discrimination against certain immigrant groups as a major barrier to participation and inclusion, the integration debate positions the minorities vis-à-vis the majority and the state in a situation of ‘the others’, who are to be supported, and also challenged, but who are not framed as an integral part of the society. The otherness of non-ethnic Germans, mainly Muslims, is thus reproduced and reaffirmed through the discourse on integration. The concept of tolerance supports this process of othering, at the same time that it positions the tolerating side above those who are to be tolerated or not tolerated – constructing both borders and hierarchies between in- and out-groups.

How are claims of toleration made and by whom? Under which conditions is toleration granted or withheld? In which cases is something more than tolerance – namely, respect or recognition -- demanded for specific groups? Most of the debates turn on a variety of claims by Muslim groups for recognition and acceptance of specific religious practices.

The demands made by Muslim individuals and groups themselves are generally not framed in terms of toleration, but in terms of granting equal rights, especially the right of freedom of religious expression, which is perceived as both a fundamental right of the German constitution, the Grundgesetz, as well as a fundamental human right. The claims are thus not made as demanding tolerance towards something alien to German society and culture but as the granting of basic rights, which is perceived as an integral part of Europe’s basic values. Muslim groups often especially refer to the German Grundgesetz, which they perceive as a guarantor of their freedom of religious expression. When Aygül Özkan was nominated Minister of Social and Integration Issues of the federal state Lower Saxony in April 2010 by the conservative party CDU, it was widely presented as the first nomination of a Muslim as Minister of a German federal state, and in this context as an act of tolerance. One of the major Muslim organisations, however, spoke about the nomination as “a sign of increasing normality and acceptance that all offices and positions of this country are also open for Muslims, just as for all other religious communities (…)” (Koordnierungsrat der Muslim in Deutschland - KRM, April 2010, translation by author).
But even if the minorities themselves are not arguing from outside but from inside the society and its legal institutions, public figures and media perennially refer to these claims as issues of toleration or non-toleration. After Özkan incited a controversy within her own party and beyond by stating in an interview with the weekly Focus that, herself following a secular rather than a religious view, she would prefer public schools to be free of all religious symbols, including headscarves but also crucifixes, a local newspaper printed a story titled “Aygül Özkan – Der schwierige Start einer Muslime” (Aygül Özkan – The difficult start of a Muslim woman). The paper argued that the nomination of Özkan, which had been intended as a sign of tolerance and cosmopolitanism, was quickly putting these same values to the test.

This can be seen as a clear example of what Wendy Brown calls a discourse of depoliticization, in which “tolerance can function as a substitute for or as a supplement to formal liberal equality or liberty; it can also overtly block the pursuit of substantive equality and freedom” (Brown, 2006:9). By using the concept of tolerance in the context of Muslim individuals or groups being granted rights, that are anyway guaranteed to them by the constitution, the issue is taken out of the realm of liberal equality or liberty and into the area of what Rainer Forst calls “allowance tolerance”, which – in contrast to his perception of “respect tolerance” - marks the relation between a powerful entity, in this case the political and social majority, and a less powerful minority, which is granted tolerance, but can also lose it by the will of the tolerant group (Forst, 2003:42). The precondition for the granted tolerance in this conception is generally the fact that the tolerated group does not challenge the given distribution of power.

In this sense it can be suggested that tolerance talk undermines the ‘pursuit of equality and freedom’ that Muslim groups and activists aim for, and reaffirms unequal distributions of power between different (ethno-religious) groups in society.

The discourses on tolerance and integration help not only to draw borders between an ethnic German in-group and out-groups with immigrant backgrounds, but also to differentiate between those parts of the perceived immigrant population that are more easily tolerated, and those towards whom tolerance has to be limited. The effect of border drawing of tolerance talk is thus both differentiating between in- and out-groups, but also within out-groups between those who are (more) easily tolerated and those who are grudgingly tolerated, or who should not be tolerated at all.

As the granting or denial of tolerance, and with it the granting or denial of certain legal rights, is within the discourse often linked to the (in-)tolerance of the respective group, the perception of a group as (in-)tolerant has substantive effects. Within this discourse, a certain tendency can be observed to regard secular Muslims and immigrants as more tolerant than religious ones, and at the same time to favour individuals over groups. This is quite symbolically reflected within the German Islam Conference, where the Minister of the Interior invites certain religious Muslim organisations, but limits their weight within the discussions through an even higher amount of participants, who are not organised and many of whom are not religious or are even outspoken critics of Islam.
However, not all religious groups are perceived as equally tolerant or intolerant. While the major Sunni organisations are portrayed with criticism and often viewed as backward and patriarchal, other communities, such as the Alevi organisations, are often perceived as tolerant and liberal. The Alevi claims for specific religious instruction at public schools have thus caused far less resistance by public officials in different federal states than Sunni-Muslim instruction at schools has been causing for many years.

Certain other ethno-religious minorities like the Jews or the Roma are today generally not discussed as receivers of tolerance, as tolerance talk would be viewed as absolutely inappropriate towards groups who have been major victims of the Nazi regime and the Holocaust. There have, however, been recent debates about Jews as victims of a rising anti-Semitism, which has lately mainly been portrayed as a phenomenon amongst Muslims, as described above in more detail. Another recent debate, in which prominent Jews, too, have raised their voices, is the debate about rising Islamophobia. There have been different public representatives who attempted to counter this perceived social development. For example the general secretary of the Central Council of Jews in Germany Stephan Kramer has together with Ayman Mazyaek, then general secretary of the Central Council of Muslims in Germany visited the family of the murdered Marwa El Sherbini in 2009 in Dresden and cautioned about rising Islamophobia in German society. ANother prominent member of the Jewish community, the former vice president of the Central Council of Jew, Michel Friedman, recently demanded ‘no tolerance for intolerance’ pointing at the debate around the anti Muslim arguments of the then board member of the Federal German Bank, Thilo Sarrazin, and called the latter a ‘hate preacher’.

The positioning of representative Jews is of specific importance within the debate about Islamophobia, because of the unparalleled German history of persecution and extermination of Jews during the Holocaust.

As the authors Bodemann and Yurdakul argue, tolerance was a term that in Germany “invariably evoke(d) the Jewish question and anti-Semitism” (Bodemann, 2008; 76). In the view of Bodemann and Yurdakul “the ideological labour of Jews in German society today encompasses the role of ‘guardians of memory’, not merely on their own behalf but also on the behalf of their German surroundings” and their mere presence in contemporary Germany was “‘proof’ that Nazism has been overcome and that German society is now truly democratic and tolerant of outsiders”. (Bodemann, 2008; 78) As can be seen from this quotation, however, Jews are still always in danger of being perceived as outsiders; such adjustments are made more rhetorically than in practice, made evident by the frequent reference by German politicians to a ‘Christian-Jewish’ heritage of Germany and Europe. In their article Learning Diaspora: German Turks and the Jewish Narrative Bodemann and Yurdakul also describe how Turks and other Muslim groups in Germany increasingly refer to the Jewish history in Germany as well as to the handling of Jewish religious issues today – like the slaughtering of animals - in order to have their own claims for acceptance of religious difference met as well as their fear of Islamophobic developments better heard in German society.

Other immigrant groups like the Poles, or even more the ethnic German resettlers, have largely disappeared from public debates. It can be suggested that they are more and more becoming part of the ‘we-group’,
maybe in line with the development of the stronger integrative character of the EU towards EU-citizens, which would have to be further investigated. It can, however, be observed that Poles are no longer debated in the context of tolerance or integration. The best example for the different debates is the German soccer team. The majority of the players in the team have an immigration background. While players with Polish background are, for example, not seen as ‘others’ any more, players with Arab or Turkish origin are heavily debated in regard to integration. In the positive sense, the team was portrayed around the World Cup in South Africa as a sign of an inclusive and multicultural Germany, while in the negative sense a politician of the far right called the national player with a Turkish background, Mesut Özil, a ‘passport-German’.

However even mainstream media made a difference between the players with different ethnic backgrounds by according Özil a prize for integration at the Bambi award 2010 in Potsdam, which was perceived by some as a sign of exclusion, as it expressly marked the Turkish background of the German player.

Here, we see an example of the general effect that the focus on the concept of integration, and the way in which it is perceived often as mainly a duty of the immigrants or their descendants, has an exclusionary rather than an integrative effect. Especially German citizens, raised in the country but whose parents or grandparents had once immigrated to Germany, perceive the strong political and discursive focus on integration, which they have actually been living all their lives, as marking them as outsiders. A young Muslim woman is quoted in the survey of the Open Society Foundation on Muslims in Berlin as stating that the integration debate made her feel “being pushed into a corner” (Mühe, 2010: 51).

**Concluding remarks**

Similar to other neighbouring countries, like France, the Netherlands or Denmark, German society is struggling today with the transformation of its population, a transformation that has become more visible and more accelerated in recent decades. The most important factor for this development has been immigration, which mainly started during the 1960s as workers were recruited from different countries – mainly from Turkey – in order to help build up the destroyed country after World War II, and continued with refugees and asylum seekers from war torn countries mainly during the 1990s. Unlike countries like France or the UK, Germany had hardly had any experience with immigration from formerly colonised countries.

Another difference in relation to some neighbouring European countries lies in the national identity and national self-perception of German society. Until very recently, the close coupling of national identity and ethnic origin stood largely unchallenged, and until today the idea that a non-ethnic German could not be a ‘real’ German is still widespread.

In this national atmosphere it is still difficult today for young people, whose parents or grandparents were immigrants, to feel as an equal part of the society and to identify positively with the country, especially as unequal treatment of non-ethnic Germans is widespread in various areas of life. The situation has become additionally difficult for people of
the Muslim religion or with a Muslim cultural background, since hostility against Islam has risen in many European countries. Different surveys show that Germany is especially affected by it. In the recently published survey “At Home In Europe” of the Open Society Foundations on Muslims in European Cities for example the German cities Hamburg (22%) and Berlin (25%) had the lowest percentage of Muslims who perceived themselves as German (resp. British, French...) and even lower percentages of those who thought others would perceive them as such. (Mühe, 2010: 58; Hieronymus, 2010: 55).

At the same time, the diversity in the country keeps growing, and the necessity for social and structural change becomes evident and is especially felt on the local level, as in certain regions and cities the diversity is higher than on the overall national level. Projects and reforms that aim towards more inclusion are therefore especially to be found on the local level.

It is in this context that the discourse on tolerance becomes especially strong. It is, however, used not primarily in order to demand tolerance towards Muslim cultural and religious practices, but more as a discourse of border drawing between tolerant and intolerant minority groups, both within and between Muslim and other subgroups in German society. Naming certain minority groups – especially Muslim ones – as intolerant is within this discourse often used as an argument for not tolerating certain Muslim practices in return or creating stricter laws against religious practices, like the Muslim headscarf in certain public services or accommodations for prayer at public schools. Tolerance is thus used more and more often as a discourse that draws lines between in- and out-groups, between the ones to be tolerated and those who are only grudgingly or not at all to be tolerated.

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CHAPTER 4. THE NETHERLANDS

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University of Amsterdam

Introduction: A highly regarded reputation of practices of toleration

The Netherlands has a reputation of being a country which has played a vital role in developing the ideas and practices of tolerance. During the period of the Dutch Republic (1588-1795) the Low Countries offered a safe haven to religious dissenters that were persecuted in other European countries. For instance, at different moments in the history of early modern Europe Spanish Jews and French Huguenots sought and found refuge in the Netherlands. Cities such as Leiden and Amsterdam were home to the major thinkers of tolerance, including Baruch de Spinoza (Bogers, 2011) and Pierre Bayle. John Locke wrote his Letter concerning toleration (1689) while in exile in Holland. Another well-known aspect of Dutch history which is traditionally related to its approach to pluralism and tolerance is ‘pillarisation’. During this period, from approximately the 1900s until the 1960s, religious and other denominational groups – Catholics, Protestants, Socialists and Liberals – lived ‘parallel lives’ in separate institutions and organisations. Elite agreements and avoidance of sensitive topics in public and political debate ensured societal stability between the different groups. The ‘rules of the game’ belonging to pillarisation and the related Dutch consensus democracy have often been represented as important lessons on how to organise stability top-down in deeply divided societies (Lijphart, 1990). A third historical period in which Dutch practices of toleration became internationally renowned was in the wake of the cultural revolutions of the 1960s. Life-styles associated with youth culture of the 1960s were tolerated in the public sphere. Especially Amsterdam was seen as one of the most ‘tolerant’ or ‘permissive’ cities in the world. This openness to different life-styles and the decline of religious adherence also resulted in new liberal legislation in domains such as medical ethics (euthanasia, contraception, and abortion), gender equality and equality of sexual orientation (gay rights, gay marriage). Finally, a Dutch reputation of tolerance was established when in the 1980s and 1990s, it was one of the first countries to adopt a form of ‘multiculturalism’ in response to large scale immigration. A policy slogan such as ‘integration with retention of cultural identity’ served to demonstrate that also in the domain of immigrant integration the Dutch would pursue strategies of governance that were grounded in respect for
cultural difference and equal treatment of minority groups. Governments responded positively to emerging separate institutions and organisations that catered to the needs of ethnic minorities, believing these would allow newcomers to integrate fully in a culturally diverse society.

Whereas the Netherlands used to have a reputation as a country welcoming other cultures and respecting the rights of immigrants, it is now often mentioned as an example of the ways the critique of Islam and multiculturalism dominate public debates on immigration and integration issues in Europe. In the course of this chapter we will argue that in the past 20 years or so, there are two categories of communities which are most outspokenly challenged in debates on cultural pluralism. These are religious groups and immigrants. We analyse public debates on Orthodox Calvinist groups, which often concern principles such as gender equality, religious freedom and associational autonomy, especially in the domains of education and politics. We also include analysis of the main immigrant groups and how their cultural and religious differences have given rise to public contestation. In debates on migrant groups the focus is usually on specific ethno-religious practices, on the need for ‘integration’ and on a wide range of societal problems that are associated with cultural difference and socio-economic disadvantages, such as unemployment, social isolation and crime. The group that is most outspokenly seen as both ethnically and religiously ‘different’ are Muslims and we will discuss issues and events in which Islam dominates the public discourse concerning toleration and diversity challenges.

**National identity and state formation**

**Governance of diversity challenges and societal transformations**

Understanding contemporary diversity challenges in the Netherlands requires an analysis of the history of religious pluralism and the ways various civil authorities have handled this form of pluralism. In the first place, as we will show in this section, the process of state formation in the Netherlands, which began in the second half of the 16th century, was closely related to the development of religion, shifting relations between majorities and minorities and changes in the institutional relations between church and state. In the second place, some important institutional arrangements for handling diversity, notably in the domains of education and politics, have been profoundly shaped by ideological struggles and social and political processes that date back to the late 19th and early 20th century. In the third place, religion and migration are at the centre of contemporary debates about diversity. In what follows we focus on inter-faith strife and its settlement and in particular on the ways they left their imprints on Dutch institutions, political culture and strategies of governance.

The Netherlands emerged as an independent political entity out of the Dutch Revolt. The repressive reactions of Catholic Spain to the Reformation greatly fuelled anger and unrest in the Northern parts of the Low Countries, and local nobility and urban patricians believed the unrelenting Spanish decrees to be an undue imposition of power (Knippenberg, 2006: 318). The 1579 Union of Utrecht was imposed as a defensive unity against Spanish rule but also came to form the basis of the Dutch Republic. Through the Union of Utrecht the Inquisition was renounced and each province of the new federal state could now decide
for itself the status and practical exercise of religion in the public realm. The Dutch Republic was praised throughout the seventeenth century by foreign visitors for its comparative freedom of religious organization and its lack of uniform imposition of religion. Although religion and politics were heavily intertwined, power ultimately lay with the civil authorities.

The Calvinist Reformed Church dominated the public sphere. Its leaders often pressed for persecution of protestant dissenters and the extirpation of Catholicism. However, the civil authorities were not inclined to answer this request out of concern for the disruption of commercial and social stability. This did not mean the civil authorities could simply tolerate all forms of religious activity in the public realm. In practice civil authorities would choose to look the other way as long as the tolerated religious practices did not cause any social disturbances (Price, 1994: 190, 203-204). In 1813 after the fall of Napoleon, William I, heir to the last stadtholder of the Dutch Republic, was proclaimed sovereign head of state of the Netherlands and in 1815 king of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, which included the former Austrian Netherlands, present-day Belgium. Encouraged by the state, the new nationalism of the nineteenth century became heavily intertwined with Protestantism with the aim of providing Dutch citizens with a moral upbringing (Van Rooden, 2002: 122). After the separation with Belgium in 1839, the northern part of the Netherlands above the Rhine-Meuse delta was a Protestant dominated area. The southern part of the Netherlands below the Rhine-Meuse delta held strong Catholic majorities.

After the 1848 constitutional reform, liberals such as Thorbecke and Kappeyne van de Coppello saw it as the task of a modern nation to create modern citizens. Modern for liberals entailed agnosticism and an emphasis on the natural sciences. Liberals in the 1870s argued for obligatory education throughout the nation, so children could be brought up to become modern citizens. In practice this meant that in places where confessional schools were absent, children would be sent to public schools. Confessional politicians heavily opposed these proposals. From then on, the political strife between confessional and liberal politicians was channelled through the question of education (De Rooy, 1998: 183-184).

In opposition to the liberal modernisation campaign, Protestant politicians under the leadership of Abraham Kuyper organised themselves as a political party with popular support. Although anti-modernists, the Protestants thereby in fact introduced modern mass-politics in the Netherlands (De Rooy, 1998: 188-189). The dispute over education was settled with a political agreement that has become known as ‘the pacification’ or ‘the Great Compromise’ of 1917. Privately founded confessional schools were entitled to equal state financing as were public schools. In return for conceding this confessional demand, the liberals obtained general male suffrage (Lijphart, 1990: 105-106).

Since the early decades of the 20th century until the mid 1960s, the Netherlands was a ‘pillarised’ nation, meaning that most areas of human activity were marked by separate organisations representing the different religious and secular points of view (Monsma and Soper, 2009: 11). Each pillar was defined by religious conviction or the lack thereof. There was a Catholic, a Protestant and a general pillar. Within the general pillar socio-economic cleavages resulted in the formation of a Socialist and a Liberal pillar (Lijphart, 1990: 34).
People lived in relative isolation from those who did not belong to their pillar. Only the pillars’ elites were in regular contact with each other (Lijphart, 1990: 106). These elites endeavoured to reach consensus on issues that were controversial between, but not within, the homogenous pillars. The resulting politics of pacification led to noticeable democratic stability during the period of pillarisation (Lijphart, 1990: 110).

In the period following World War II, Dutch society and politics have undergone significant changes. These societal transformations occurred especially in the period following the cultural revolution of the 1960s. In the first place, the rise of a modern welfare state meant that the state would take over many tasks and services that were carried out by different organisations belonging to the various pillars until then. In the 1980s the welfare state receded again and neo-liberal policies of reform were implemented. In the second place, a widespread process of secularisation and decline of religious participation brought an end to the authoritarian character of pillarised Dutch society (Van Rooden, 2010: 71). Gradually a society developed that conceived of morality in secular terms which resulted in legislation of abortion, euthanasia and same-sex marriages. In many respects, the Dutch came to think of themselves as a progressive ‘guiding nation’ that set an example for other countries.

The emancipation of the voter from the confines of the pillars resulted in a changing political landscape. In the 1970s the three confessional parties merged into the Christian Democratic Appeal (Christen-Democratisch Appèl, CDA). From 1994 to 2002 the Netherlands were governed by the ‘purple’ coalition governments composed of the Labour Party (Partij van de Arbeid, PvdA), Liberal Party (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie, VVD), and Liberal-Democratic Party (Democraten 66, D66). This was the first time that the Netherlands was governed solely by non-confessional parties. The current coalition government is a minority government, a novelty for the Netherlands, consisting of the Christian Democrats (CDA) and the Liberal Party (VVD), condoned in parliament by Geert Wilders’ Freedom Party (Partij voor de Vrijheid, PVV).

Another major societal transformation of Dutch society over the past decades is related to the successive waves of immigration, which have changed the religious and cultural composition of the population. In the next session we discuss the main diversity challenges in the Netherlands and explain how these have been influenced by post-war immigration.

**Minority groups and diversity challenges**

**Defining the boundaries between what is tolerable and intolerable**

Minorities in Dutch society can roughly be categorised into ‘native minorities’ and ‘post-war immigration minorities’. The first category contains those groups that continue to be seen by others (and continue to define themselves) as different from the mainstream society, mostly for cultural or religious reasons. The second category contains post-war immigration groups. Here we make a distinction between colonial migrants (Indonesians, Moluccans, Antilleans and Surinamese) and labour migrants (Turks and Moroccans). Given the prominent role issues around Islam have played in public debate over the past decade we briefly discuss Muslims as a separate group. We provide a very brief introduction to each group that serves as a background for the discussion of the main diversity challenges.
Table 1. Religious Minorities in the Netherlands in % of the population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman-Catholic</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch Reformed</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox Reformed</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant Church Netherlands</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other religious (including Islam)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source. Statline - Central Bureau for Statistics (CBS, 2010)

Table 2. Dutch population and main post-war immigration minorities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1996</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>15,493,889</td>
<td>15,863,950</td>
<td>16,305,526</td>
<td>16,574,989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autochthonous</td>
<td>12,995,174</td>
<td>13,088,648</td>
<td>13,182,809</td>
<td>13,215,294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allochthonous</td>
<td>2,498,715</td>
<td>2,775,302</td>
<td>3,122,717</td>
<td>3,359,603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Allochthonous</td>
<td>1,327,602</td>
<td>1,366,535</td>
<td>1,423,675</td>
<td>1,501,309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Western Allochthonous</td>
<td>1,171,113</td>
<td>1,408,767</td>
<td>1,699,042</td>
<td>1,858,294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesian</td>
<td>411,622</td>
<td>405,155</td>
<td>396,080</td>
<td>382,411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moluccan</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>40,000*</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surinamese</td>
<td>280,615</td>
<td>302,514</td>
<td>329,430</td>
<td>342,279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antillean and Aruban</td>
<td>86,824</td>
<td>107,197</td>
<td>130,538</td>
<td>138,420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>271,514</td>
<td>308,690</td>
<td>358,846</td>
<td>383,957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moroccan</td>
<td>225,088</td>
<td>262,221</td>
<td>315,821</td>
<td>349,005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Main asylum seeking immigrants from CEE countries

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>5,910</td>
<td>5,645</td>
<td>10,968</td>
<td>43,083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgarian</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>713</td>
<td>1,924</td>
<td>12,340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanian</td>
<td>1,466</td>
<td>1,397</td>
<td>3,020</td>
<td>7,118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarian</td>
<td>1,133</td>
<td>1,385</td>
<td>2,029</td>
<td>5,294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakian</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>579</td>
<td>1,239</td>
<td>2,844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>887</td>
<td>1,707</td>
<td>2,602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuanian</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>970</td>
<td>2,126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvian</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>1,143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Soviet Union</td>
<td>13,485</td>
<td>22,625</td>
<td>44,419</td>
<td>55,896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Yugoslavian</td>
<td>56,220</td>
<td>66,947</td>
<td>76,301</td>
<td>70,119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somali</td>
<td>20,060</td>
<td>28,780</td>
<td>21,733</td>
<td>27,011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudanese</td>
<td>943</td>
<td>3,919</td>
<td>7,285</td>
<td>6,329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi</td>
<td>11,278</td>
<td>23,449</td>
<td>42,708</td>
<td>52,102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistani</td>
<td>4,916</td>
<td>21,468</td>
<td>37,021</td>
<td>38,664</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Estimate, see Smeets and Veenman, 2000: 41
Source. Statline, 2010

Religious groups as native minorities

In 2009 Catholics were by far the largest religious group in Dutch society with 30% of the population belonging to the Roman Catholic Church (CBS, 2010). Regular church visits in this group are in decline, with 23% of all Catholics visiting church at least once a month in 2008 (CBS, 2009: 23). Catholicism remains dominant in the provinces south of the Rhine-Meuse delta, namely North Brabant and Limburg (CBS, 2009: 42).

In 2009 there were almost 52,000 Jews in the Netherlands, less than 1 percent of the total population (Solinge and Van Praag, 2010). When compared to other European countries, a relatively high number of Dutch Jews
were murdered in the Holocaust. From the 107,000 Jews that were deported only 5,200 survived. In 1941 the Jewish population in the Netherlands totalled more than 160,000 people. In 1966 this number was a small 30,000 (Knippenberg, 2001: 196-197). Where Calvinists and Catholics developed their own pillar within Dutch society, Jews developed along the opposite route of assimilation. Areas with a large presence of Jews were the cities of Amsterdam, The Hague, Rotterdam and Groningen.

One native religious minority that figures repeatedly and prominently in public debates on diversity challenges in the Netherlands are Orthodox Reformed Calvinists, who live in a ‘Bible belt’ from the South West province of Zeeland to the North East part of the Country. Orthodox Reformed Calvinists adhere to a strong version of neo-Calvinism and seceded from the mainstream Dutch Reformed Church in the 19th century. Within this group the so-called pietistic Dutch Calvinists (bevindelijk gereformeerden) adhere strictly to the Bible as the word of God. They are characterised by conservative teachings, opposing abortion, euthanasia and work on Sundays, rejecting modern amenities such as television or cinema and opposing mandatory vaccination (Schuster, 2009: 157).

Of the Dutch population in 2009, 9% sees itself as Dutch Reformed, 3% as Orthodox Reformed and 6% as belonging to the Protestant Church Netherlands (CBS, 2010). In these communities of pietistic Dutch Calvinists, the Political Reformed Party (Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij, SGP) finds most of its voters. The party program of the SGP is founded on the Bible as the word of God and states that the political aim of the party is a political order based on the word of God. Since the election of 1922 the Political Reformed Party has consistently obtained between 1 and 3 out of 150 seats of parliament.

Post-war immigration minorities

In the period following the Second World War there have been different forms of immigration to the Netherlands. Between 1946 and the early 1960s immigrants mainly came from the former Netherlands East Indies (Indonesia). In the 1960s and 1970s immigrants were mostly ‘guest workers’ from the Mediterranean region and post-colonial immigrants from the Caribbean region (Surinam and the Dutch Antilles). Even though labour recruitment policies were ended in the mid 1970s, immigration from Turkey and Morocco continued throughout the 1980s and 1990s because of family reunification. Asylum seekers constitute a significant group of immigrants, especially since the 1990s (Bruqueutas-Callejo et al., 2007: 9-11).

Colonial immigrants

From 1946-1962, as many as 300,000 repatriates from the Netherlands East Indies migrated to the Netherlands (Vermeulen and Penninx, 2000: 5-6). This group consisted of people who had a relation with the former colonial regime, amongst them a significant portion was of Indonesian-Dutch decent. The successful and rapid integration of the Indonesians is usually contrasted to the very painful and difficult incorporation of Moluccans. In 1951 around 12,500 inhabitants of the Moluccan Islands, a part of the Indonesian Archipelago, migrated to the Netherlands. This group consisted mostly of soldiers from the former colonial army
and their families. It is estimated that in 2000 there were almost 40,000 Moluccans in the Netherlands (Smeets and Veenman, 2000: 41). Experts agree that the second generation of Moluccans made a great leap forward when compared to the first generation, yet this trend seems to have lost some of its momentum among the third generation (Amersfoort, 2004: 168).

The Netherlands’ other colonies, Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles, remained part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands after the Second World War. Citizens from these overseas parts of the Kingdom had free access to the Netherlands. From 1965 onwards unskilled workers from Surinam moved to the Netherlands (Vermeulen and Penninx, 2000: 7). In the years leading up to its independence, immigration from Surinam reached its peak from 1973-1975 and again from 1979-1980 towards the end of the transitional phase. Immigration continued after 1980 but on a smaller scale (Vermeulen and Penninx, 2000: 7). At present about 40 per cent of all Surinamese people live in the Netherlands, a total of 329,279 people in 2010 (CBS, 2010).

Because the Netherlands Antilles has remained part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Antilleans can still move freely throughout the Kingdom (Oostindie, 2010: 37). Immigration from the Netherlands Antilles grew considerably after 1985 due to crises in the local oil industry, and has remained high ever since (Vermeulen and Penninx, 2000: 7). Only recently, on October 10 2010, have the Netherlands Antilles been dissolved with some islands becoming independent nations within the Kingdom, and the others becoming municipalities of the Netherlands. In 2010 there are 138,420 Antilleans living in the Netherlands (CBS, 2010).

The vast majority of Surinamese and Antilleans are Dutch nationals. Although there is still a gap between Surinamese and native Dutch in socio-economic terms, Surinamese find themselves in an upward trend of social mobility. Concerning Antilleans in the Netherlands there is less reason for optimism. A large majority of Antillean families are single mother households, often dependent upon benefits. Among Antilleans unemployment is three times higher than among Dutch. Furthermore many Antilleans find themselves at low levels of socio-economic rankings and criminality among Antilleans is high (Van Hulst, 2000: 106, 119).

**Labour immigrants – Turks and Moroccans**

After the Second World War the education level of the Dutch grew rapidly, resulting in a shortage of low-skilled labourers. This was especially felt during the economic boom from the 1960s until the first oil crisis in 1973 (Vermeulen and Penninx, 2000: 10). To fill these labour shortages so called ‘guest workers’ were recruited from Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Yugoslavia. Recruitment agreements were also set up with Turkey (1963) and Morocco (1969). Guest workers from Morocco but also from Turkey did not return to their country of origin, as was anticipated by the Dutch government, but instead became permanent residents.

In 2010 there were 383,957 Turks in the Netherlands (CBS, 2010). Turks in the Netherlands form tight-knit communities wherein traditional norms and values are upheld. However the adherence to traditional values forms an impediment for Turkish youths to fully participate in Dutch
society and climb the social ladder. The relatively low socio-economic position of most first generation Turks is very unlikely to change. On the other hand, Turks have set up a wide network of ethnic organisations and there is a relative high turnout of Turks at local elections (Böcker, 2000: 173-174).

In 2010 there were 349,005 Moroccans in the Netherlands (CBS, 2010). Around 40% of Moroccans are born in the Netherlands (Nelissen and Buijs, 2000: 189). The role of teenage Moroccan men often dominates the debate on integration in the Netherlands, more so than Turks and other ethnic minorities. Their integration into Dutch society is perceived as especially problematic partly due to recurring negative reports on certain Moroccans’ deviant behaviour. Even though in public perception the situation of Moroccan migrants is worse than that of Turkish migrants, they are nowadays often subsumed under the category of ‘Muslims’.

Muslims in the Netherlands

Over the past decade the discussions on immigration and integration in the Netherlands has more and more focused upon the situation of Muslim migrants and the role of Islam in society. At present one finds many references to the situation of ‘Muslims’, which are now seen as a distinct group, whereas until the mid 1990s the main focus was on different ethnic groups.

It is estimated that in 2009 there were 907,000 Muslims in the Netherlands, which is about 5.5% of the population. Of all Muslims in the Netherlands 73% is of Turkish or Moroccan decent (FORUM, 2010: 7). Only small minorities of Turks and Moroccans in the Netherlands, 3% and 5%, see themselves as non-religious.

Three major issues dominate the almost continuous debate on Islam and Muslim in the Netherlands. First, there is a wide debate on the degrees of collective autonomy that should be given to Muslim communities and Islamic organisations and on whether or not religiously motivated forms of behaviour should be tolerated or not. These debates usually focus on widely mediatised individual cases of Muslims who refuse to shake hands with members of the opposite sex, who refuse to stand up in court or who want to wear specific forms of dress (headscarf, face-veil). Second, especially since the murder of Theo van Gogh in 2004, there has been a wide debate on the dangers of radicalisation among young Muslims in the Netherlands. Many local governments have developed special programs to prevent radicalisation. Simultaneously programs have been set up to combat discrimination of Muslims and create more understanding and tolerance between different communities living in the Netherlands. Finally, there is a more general debate on whether or not ‘Muslims’ are sufficiently ‘integrated’. This debate primarily focuses on the need for cultural assimilation. Some politicians claim that Muslim immigrants lead ‘parallel lives’ and they argue that the conservative values that are dominant in Muslim communities clash with the norms and values of a liberal and secular Dutch society. In the latter context political leaders of the Freedom Party (PVV) repeatedly demand ‘less Islam’, meaning both a curb on ‘immigration from Muslim countries’ as well as creating obstacles for the creation of Islamic institutions, such as mosques, ritual slaughtering and Islamic schools. Overall the present debate on Muslims
in the Netherlands is more focused on defining the boundaries between what is tolerable and intolerable than on moving from tolerance to genuine recognition and equality.

**Diversity Challenges**

Whereas in some other European countries ‘diversity challenges’ can be neatly related to distinct minority groups, in the Netherlands it makes more sense to focus on clusters of events around which forms of ethnic, cultural or religious differences are challenged.

We distinguish between two clusters of events. On the one hand, events and discussions related to the existence of special institutions catering to different ethnic and religious groups (faith-based schools, ethnic organisations) and whether or not these enhance segregation and feelings of alienation between different groups in Dutch society. On the other hand, events and issues related to gender and sexual equality. In what follows we aim to identify the relevant practices, norms, and institutions at play, and, if relevant, the various usages of concepts such as tolerance, acceptance, respect, pluralism, national identity and national heritage.

A major issue in Dutch public debates on diversity relates to the relationship between the cultural and institutional legacies of pillarisation and immigrant integration policies and the ways ethnic organisations and institutions have been recognised by Dutch authorities. In public debate Muslims are on centre stage, but depending on the events or issues that set off debates, other religious groups (Orthodox Calvinists or Jews) or other immigrant groups, enter the picture. A major concern is whether the existence of special religious institutions and networks of ethnic organisations will not result in a highly segregated society in which different groups lead ‘parallel lives’. Another issue is whether there is not too much room for conservative cultural and religious groups to adhere to extremely illiberal ideas and values. And consequently, to uphold forms of behaviour and cultural practices that violate liberal norms of equality and individual freedom. Public debates concentrate on what practices and ideas should not be tolerated in a liberal society.

In some respects the institutional structure stemming from pillarised society is still in place today. A fundamental part of the institutional inheritance of pillarisation is the Dutch educational system. Confessional schools are granted equal material resources as public schools, but they are not administered by the state. Most pupils in the Netherlands are enrolled in confessional schools. All schools are obliged to follow the same general curriculum, but the confessional character of a school can be expressed through extra-curricular activity and additional religious education. Religious newcomers, including Islam and Hinduism, have founded many faith-based schools and other institutions that now exist alongside Catholic, Jewish and Protestant institutions. For example, there were 43 Islamic primary schools and two Islamic secondary schools in 2010 (FORUM, 2010: 41).

Early Dutch immigrant integration policies of the 1980s, known as Ethnic Minorities Policies, showed a structural similarity to the foundational ideas of pillarisation. These policies were based on the distinctions between cultural minority groups. The approach was driven by the
twin ideals of equal opportunities and respect for cultural differences. The slogan 'integration with retention of cultural identity' became the motto of Minorities Policies. Emerging ethnic elites rapidly picked up this policy slogan to argue that successful integration did not require cultural assimilation and to justify their attempts to create community based institutions. Part of this policy was encouraging the creation of immigrant organisations through government subsidies (Penninx, 2006: 243-244). It was thought that group membership would have positive integrating effects on its migrant members (Sunier, 2010: 122). Groups were assumed to be homogeneous, ignoring diversity within groups and overemphasising differences between them. This system of subsidisation contributed to the fossilization of views about minority groups (Schrover, 2010: 335, 345, 348).

Towards the end of the 1990s, public discourse on multiculturalism became more critical (Penninx, 2006: 252). National and international events like September 11th 2001, the murder of anti-establishment parliamentary candidate Pim Fortuyn in 2002, and the slaying of Theo van Gogh in 2004, contributed to a more critical public and political stance towards the integration of Muslim minorities in Dutch society. Leading concepts became ‘citizenship’ and ‘individual responsibility’ and the emphasis was on the cultural adaptation of immigrants to Dutch society (Bruquetas-Callejo et al., 2007: 20).

State funding for confessional schools is still in place but over the past decade there is more and more debate on the structure of the Dutch educational system. There is a discussion on secularism and whether or not the state should finance faith-based schools. There are also discussions about the degrees of associational autonomy of denominational schools, for example with regard to curriculum, the hiring of teachers and the right to refuse to admit pupils. Especially the will to see immigrant Muslim minorities assimilate into Dutch society has led to questions on the desirability of state funded confessional education.

A second, and related, debate concerns the ways the Dutch history of pillarisation and policies of multiculturalism continue to hinder, rather than facilitate, immigrant integration. For instance Sniderman and Hagendoorn conclude their book on identity politics and conflicts of values in the Netherlands by writing: ‘Multiculturalism has helped to make it unclear whether Muslim immigrants will commit themselves as a community to the liberal Dutch society, precisely because it has made it unclear whether they should’ (Sniderman and Hagendoorn, 2007: 138). There is disagreement among scholars, however, on the actual effect the legacy of pillarisation had on immigrant integration policies and the development of Muslim institutions (see critically Maussen, 2012). The general thrust of these debates is to define the limits of tolerance in a liberal state that operates in a context of a society of immigration.

**Gender equality and equality of sexual orientation**

Different incidents have occurred in the last decade wherein religious and immigrant minorities conflicted with dominant societal norms of gender equality and equality of sexual orientation. These debates often focus on events related to religious diversity and especially confrontations between progressive values and the principles held by Orthodox religious groups.
One exemplary debate about the limits of tolerance and the associational autonomy of Orthodox Calvinist institutions concerns the stance of the Political Reformed Party towards the participation of women in politics. In 2003 the Clara Wichmann Institute and other advocacy groups for women’s rights, filed a court case against the state for subsidising the Political Reformed Party. According to the Clara Wichmann Institute the Political Reformed Party discriminates against women because its statutes prohibit women from becoming members of the party, a practice which the state should not allow let alone subsidise. Because women cannot become members of the Political Reformed Party they also cannot be elected into public office. The judge ruled in favour of the complainant motivating that there should be a level playing field for men and women in politics and that political parties should ensure this is the case (Dölle, 2005: 110-114). Hereupon subsidy for the Political Reformed Party was cancelled for 2006. Taking this into consideration and under pressure from some of its members, the Political Reformed Party decided to allow membership for women, although women are still excluded from obtaining political office. Both the state and the Clara Wichmann Institute have filed several appeals in reaction to the 2005 ruling. In 2007 the Council of State (Raad van State) argued that in practice women are not discriminated against in Dutch politics because they can become members of other parties and can be elected into office through them. Due to this verdict the Political Reformed Party was re-allowed its 2006 subsidy. However, in 2010 the Supreme Council (Hoge Raad) ruled that the state should take appropriate action to ensure that female members of the Reformed Party can also be elected into office (Reformatorisch Dagblad, 14 April 2010).

Another major issue concerns how principles such as equal treatment and equal respect for homosexuals relate to the associational autonomy of religious organisations. In April 2001 the Netherlands was the first nation to legalize same-sex marriages. However, there is an ongoing debate on whether or not civil servants can refuse to bind a same-sex marriage on religious grounds. In relation to Islam, the political presence of Pim Fortuyn fuelled the debates concerning gay rights and homophobia. Pim Fortuyn fiercely opposed Islam for its rejection of homosexuality. According to Fortuyn, who was openly gay himself, Muslims view homosexuals as inferior beings. Fortuyn emphatically remarked that he did not want to ‘have to re-do the emancipation of women and homosexuals all over again’ (De Volkskrant, 9 February 2002). In May 2001 Moroccan born Imam Khalil El-Moumni condemned homosexuality and labelled it as a contagious disease which threatens Dutch society (De Volkskrant, 4 May 2001). In April 2004 it became known that the Amsterdam El Tahweeed-mosque sold Dutch translations of Islamic publications which stated that homosexuals should be killed by throwing them from high buildings with their ‘head first’ followed by stoning (Trouw, 21 April 2004). The alderman for Amsterdam at the time, Ahmed Aboutaleb (Labour Party), Moroccan born and at present the mayor of Rotterdam, declared that the mosque’s leaders need to be aware that such statements have no place in a mosque (Trouw, 21 April 2004).

The tensions between, on the one hand, gay rights and equality, and, on the other hand, conservative values and religious convictions do not only concern high held principles. Intolerant behaviour and violence against homosexuals continues to be a problem. In the Netherlands reports of violence against homosexuals had risen by a quarter in 2009 when compared
to 2008, meaning that such incidents occur on a daily basis (De Volkskrant, 19 January 2010). The incidents and discussions show an increasing awareness in Dutch society of the tensions between liberal values (concerning sexual morality, gender equality and equality of sexual orientation) and the values and opinions of conservative religious groups. Regarding religious organisations and faith-based organisations this often leads to debates on the limits of associational autonomy. These debates primarily revolve around the distinction between what is tolerable and what is intolerable.

Conceptualisation of tolerance and their use in Dutch society

Perceived traditions under siege: conflicting views of toleration

From the above it has become clear that Dutch society is increasingly facing new challenges of diversity. These challenges are addressed by drawing upon national traditions and institutional repertoires. In this section we discuss five conceptualisations of tolerance that, so we argue, structure the discursive space in which ideas about toleration and acceptance are being articulated in the Netherlands. We discuss each by looking at what conceptualisation of tolerance and acceptance it consists of and what the historical contexts, social practices and institutional arrangements are that are primarily associated with it.

Toleration of minorities

The first conceptualisation concerns toleration between a majority and different minorities. The values, beliefs and norms of the majority are represented as normal, whereas those of the minorities are seen as deviating and as inferior for moral, religious or cultural reasons. Diversity becomes an issue when minorities claim recognition for their position in society and demand a more equal say in affairs of the state. The reasons invoked for not actively suppressing or persecuting minorities are primarily pragmatic: maintaining public order, upholding peaceful relations with other countries, or protecting the interests of commerce.

Historically, ideas about toleration initially concerned relations between the dominant Calvinist group and religious minorities. In the Dutch Republic of the 16th and 17th century, dissenting protestant groups, among which were the Anabaptists, Mennonites, and Lutherans, but also Catholics and Jews, were publicly tolerated (Aerts, 2001: 63). An important social practice illustrative of toleration was the clandestine church (schuilkerk) which allowed dissenters to worship in spaces demarcated as private, thereby preserving the monopoly of the official church in the public sphere (Kaplan, 2007: 176). Their existence was not a secret because many people openly visited them. However, there were no symbols on the exterior of the buildings marking them as churches, nor did they have towers or crosses or bells calling everyone to come to service. This symbolic invisibility sufficed for the civil authorities to look the other way (Kaplan, 2007: 172-197). Another characteristic was the fact that all groups, including Catholics, would choose a relatively reticent and introvert style of presenting themselves in the public realm. All would share in a puritan public order which disapproved extravagant behaviour (Aerts, 2001: 69). There was little open debate and criticism between the different groups. The governing elites of
the cities were mainly concerned with maintaining peace and public order in a religiously divided country, motivated in part by the interests of commerce and industry.

The practices and virtues associated with toleration are sometimes presented positively. For example, despite the fact that religious minorities were often discriminated against they were not violently persecuted in the Netherlands. In contemporary debates the notion exists that ‘deviating’ minorities have to be tolerated, but that this also entails obligations on the side of these minorities. For instance in discussions concerning the presence of Islam in Dutch society, some argue that Islam should not be too visible in the public realm and that Muslims should not cause ‘offense’. To that end Muslims should express their differences in a ‘more reticent’ or ‘modest’ style.

There are also more critical perspectives concerning toleration of minorities. These basically argue that toleration alone is not enough, and that minorities are entitled to full recognition and equal treatment in society. Illustrative is the case of Catholics who since the mid 19th century demanded a more equal position in Dutch society and protested against rampant ‘anti-Papist’ sentiments. Their demands consisted of the right to hold processions, institute Catholic schools and build Catholic churches. Another illustrative case is that of homosexuals who since the 1960s demanded equal rights and recognition for their sexual orientation as equal to heterosexuality. Both these examples show how toleration of deviance from the perspective of the tolerated, can be unsatisfactory. The tolerated demand acceptance and equality from the majority, instead of being seen as merely a deviant group whose practices are to be ‘tolerated’.

*Principled acceptance*

A second conceptualisation sees tolerance as a matter of reciprocity between established minorities. This approach is more principled because it builds on the assumption that there are different religious and non-religious ‘philosophies of life’ (levensovertuigingen) that should respect one another. Also these philosophies of life should have equal positions in society and within the state. The aim is a society wherein these different views can be visible and institutionalised, whilst keeping sufficient distance between them to allow separate communities to develop themselves.

This second conceptualisation developed in tandem with a changing social imagery of the Dutch nation as composed of people belonging to different groups. These groups could agree to give one another equal rights allowing everyone to live peacefully together (Van Rooden, 2010). The various groups presented themselves as sovereign moral communities within the nation-state. One of the main theorists of this approach to difference was the neo-Calvinist Abraham Kuyper, founder of the Orthodox Reformed Party (Anti-Revolutionaire Partij, ARP) and the VU University Amsterdam. Kuyper spoke in support of ‘parallelism’ by which he meant ‘the right and freedom of differing religious and philosophical perspectives and movements to develop freely on separate, parallel tracks, neither hindered or helped by the government’ (Monsma and Soper, 2009: 59). This implied that all the different groups and communities were entitled to visibility and institutionalisation in the public realm. This can be seen as a form of group recognition.
The ideas associated with principled acceptance have found a strong institutional base. General suffrage and proportional representation allowed each group to be represented in Parliament, leading to a situation in which coalition governments have to be formed and therefore demands must be moderated (Ten Hooven, 2001: 291). One of the major institutional features of pillarisation was proportional public financing of institutions that allow a subculture to exist, e.g. in media or education. During the period of pillarisation toleration was primarily a tool used by the pillars’ elites to discourage their rank and file from intolerance against members of a different pillar. Each pillar formed a separate minority and toleration of other minorities guaranteed toleration of their own pillar. However, in practice this form of toleration resulted in a lack of contact with members of other pillars. As Aerts observes: ‘The communities recognised one another as national partners but rejected one another’s ideas and subculture. They combated one another continuously but without much passion. Tolerance came down to avoidance at best, but without positive recognition’ (Aerts, 2001: 77).

The more positive perspectives on principled acceptance view it as a way of organising a deeply pluralistic society with profound differences. Communities should respect one another’s sovereign spheres and the state should aim to be equi-distant to all citizens. Thus the state needs to guarantee the associational freedoms which allow cultural and religious communities to live-out their respective conceptions of the good life. These conceptualisations are still important for ideas articulated by Christian Democrats and orthodox Christians. In the 1980s and 1990s this model of acceptance was also applied to notions concerning the cultural incorporations of immigrants. The now notorious phrase ‘integration with retention of cultural identity’ and the notion that ethnic and religious subcultures should be accommodated and should be allowed to institutionalise in society, reflect the approach of principled acceptance.

However, in the past decade or so these views have been criticised in the context of discussions on immigrant integration, Islam and Orthodox Christian demands. Critics argue that ‘parallel societies’ and ‘pockets of backwardness’ have come into being and should disappear. Furthermore, it is believed that too much respect for the ‘moral sovereignty’ of groups stands in the way of the need to protect individual rights and freedoms. It is also questioned what levels of ‘parallelism’ are viable in the context of societies that are highly individualised and obtain large numbers of immigrants. Social goals such as economic participation and integration require a more firm socialisation into one dominant culture, so critics argue.

**Pragmatic toleration or condoning (gedogen)**

A third approach to acceptance is seen as illustrative, or even unique, for the Dutch situation, but is also more difficult to distinguish from what we have called toleration of minorities. These are the conceptualisations of toleration around the concept ‘gedogen’, usually translated as ‘condoning’ or ‘pragmatic toleration’. Gordijn describes acts of pragmatic toleration as consisting of a declaration in advance, that under certain specific conditions offenders against a particular norm do not need to fear punishment (Gordijn 2001: 230-231). Well known examples include the use and possession of (soft)drugs, prostitution, the existence of brothels, euthanasia and medically assisted suicide, and squatting. The
motivations for such practices of condoning are multiple: for instance the material or social costs of upholding a legal norm are said to outweigh the societal damage when it is being violated. Or, an official ban on paper combined with toleration in practice, provides room to balance and respect the sensitivities of different social groups.

Condoning is often seen as a continuation of the social practices associated with toleration of minorities, meaning that the state and dominant groups would seek to avoid sharp confrontations by ‘looking the other way’ when minorities or individuals would engage in acts that were formally illegal. In post-war the Netherlands, this model of pragmatic toleration smoothened the transition from a society dominated by Christian norms to a progressive and secular society. Formally legalising acts and practices that violated Christian norms, such as drug use, homosexuality or prostitution, would provoke fierce resistance by Christian groups. But the effective persecution of individuals and the active suppression of these practices would also lead to strong protest from liberal factions. Pragmatic toleration serves as a tool to upset as few people as possible. Since the 1960s new life-styles of younger generations which were still seen as offensive to many in the Dutch petty bourgeois society, could nevertheless be accommodated through condoning.

In recent years condoning is less and less seen as a virtuous style of governance. Some argue that legal norms should be upheld and that pragmatic toleration will only result in erosion of the legal system (Gordijn, 2001: 239). The debate on pragmatic toleration took a new turn when it became associated with the debate on immigrant integration. The notion of ‘looking the other way’ was now represented as functioning as an escape route when immigrants were violating legal and cultural norms. The concept came to be linked with so-called strategies of social avoidance which were seen as a sign of a lack of social cohesion. Paul Scheffer attributes the failure of immigrant integration to pragmatic toleration because immigrants who were confronted with a Dutch state that was unwilling to uphold the law, began to believe that Dutch law does not need to be taken seriously at all (Scheffer, 2007: 169).

**Multicultural recognition**

The guiding concepts in a fourth approach to the handling of diversity are recognition and equal respect for cultural, ethnic, religious, and linguistic differences in a society of immigration. This corresponds to a conceptualisation of acceptance that emphasises full recognition, respect, normality and equality as values. These concepts build on the notion that inter-group relations in a multicultural society require both virtuous citizens who are open-minded, free of prejudices and want to embrace difference, and institutional guarantees to protect vulnerable newcomers, both individually and collectively. Examples of the latter are anti-discriminatory and anti-racist legislation, subsidies to maintain and develop ethnic identities, and institutional guarantees allowing for cultural and religious practices and associational and collective autonomy. Dominant in multicultural recognition is the notion of ‘acceptance’ by the host society which should be willing to change its ethnocentric views, primarily on national identity and cultural norms. Also, the host society should make a principled choice to allow newcomers to participate on equal footing in society and affairs of the state.
These notions of multicultural recognition have been developed in post-war the Netherlands and remained dominant throughout the first immigrant integration policies of the 1980s and early 1990s. Horrors of the war were used to draw lessons from in terms of dealing with right-wing extremism, racism and vulnerable minorities like Jews, gypsies, and homosexuals. Also, the notion became dominant that the Netherlands should become a ‘guiding nation’ in the process of building a democratic Europe, advocating human rights and developing liberal legislation in domains such as medical ethics, gender and sexuality, and differing life-styles. The Netherlands also became one of the leading countries in creating institutions to monitor and combat racial discrimination in Europe. The Netherlands were among the first countries in Europe to pick up on ideas about multiculturalism and the need to develop policies of integration that were supportive of ethnic diversity.

These conceptualisations of acceptance have had several institutional counterparts. One concerns the legal arrangements to combat discriminatory and racist speech and the extreme right. The creation of the Equal Treatment Commission in 1994 served to demonstrate the importance of upholding article 1 of the Dutch constitution, which prohibits discrimination and guarantees equal treatment. Other measures associated with multicultural recognition include the scrutinising of Dutch legislation in 1983 to see whether it contained elements of discrimination on the basis of nationality, race or religion, the introduction of migrants’ native language in schools, and the creation of local and national representative councils for ethnic groups. Another set of social practices were the attempts to create more understanding between communities. Towards this end attempts were made teach children about other cultures, curricula was revised to include more references to issues such as slavery and colonialism, and initiatives such as the ‘day of dialogue’ were instituted.

Despite the fact that in contemporary public debate the ideas associated with multicultural acceptance have come under heavy fire, there are still articulate defenders of it. First, there are those who argue that a principled choice in favour of equality and pluralism combined with the notion that immigration and the existence of culturally diverse societies are a fact of life, inevitably resulting in a manner of engaging with difference that goes beyond mere toleration and entails respect, recognition and equal opportunities. Second, some argue that multiculturalism provides a more sensible approach to deal with differences in societies that are highly individualised and in which migration has resulted in far deeper forms of cultural diversity than ever before. The notion of a unified, singular and stable ‘Dutch culture’ which will re-emerge is portrayed as unrealistic.

However, the more critical voices towards multicultural recognition dominate the debate. One of the main critiques is that multicultural acceptance results from an unhappy marriage between excessive subjectivism and cultural relativism. Subjectivism has resulted in the notion that being tolerant or ‘having an open mind’ means refraining from judging others. Here we see an example of the wider debate on value relativism in Europe. The argument is that cultural relativism has led to the notion that all cultures are of equal worth and that it is inappropriate to impose Dutch or European cultures on immigrants. Critics also point to the forms of intolerance that the strong norms of anti-racism and multiculturalism have introduced in the Netherlands. Forms of speech or behaviour that
could be seen as offensive to minorities or hurting the feelings of immigrants were banned from the public sphere.

The divide between the tolerable and the intolerable: Dutch liberal intolerance

A fifth and final approach entails conceptualisations of acceptance arguing that true toleration can only be achieved when the boundaries between the tolerable and the intolerable are very clearly demarcated. Consequently, different groups and individuals have to clearly spell out where they stand and what their differences are. A distinction is made between toleration which requires engagement, disagreement and disapproval, and toleration as a form of ignorance, relativism or disinterest. In a part of his book entitled meaningfully ‘The Netherlands, country of avoidance’ Scheffer explains that toleration is undermined by a laissez-faire attitude. Scheffer pleads for a stronger adherence to core values, like the foundational principles and values that support the legal-democratic order. Otherwise the conditions for a peaceful and free society will be gravely undermined: ‘upholding the norms of an open society is one of the main tasks of the state’ (2007: 167). The dissatisfaction with multiculturalism focuses on the contradictions in the multicultural dogma ‘toleration of the intolerant’ by pointing to the position of vulnerable minorities, notably women. The critics motivate that one of the main reasons not to tolerate specific ideas or practices is to uphold progressive values, notably with regard to gender equality, gay rights, and liberal education and science (Sniderman and Hagendoorn, 2007).

In terms of institutional arrangements these conceptualisations entail a firm protection of free speech. This includes the right to offend and to critique religious dogmas, religious practices, and cultural practices. It also entails an obligation for minorities to justify their acts and worldviews, entailing the risk that these will not be tolerated. Thus, certain moral or legal norms, such as non-discrimination and gender equality, can result in the limitation of associational autonomy, notably of religious institutions such as confessional schools and political parties, but also of social practices in communities and families. In Empty tolerance. On freedom and lack of commitment in the Netherlands, Ten Hooven argues that the notion of respecting the sovereignty of specific groups does no longer work and that in contemporary times toleration is an individual virtue and an element of good citizenship. In terms of social practice, interactions between groups should not be based on avoidance and ‘looking the other way’, but rather on identifying, if not amplifying, differences, exposing them and confronting them (Ten Hooven, 2001).

In a more positive evaluation, this way of thinking about toleration entails the opportunity of maintaining a free society in which liberal rights and individual opportunities are guaranteed. To some it also means that there should be a willingness to challenge conservative groups, especially if they violate the rights of vulnerable minorities. One issue that appears on the agenda repeatedly is the refusal by some Orthodox Christian groups, including Jehovah’s witnesses, to let their children be vaccinated against polio. Others frame the issue as concerning the need to maintain a threshold of cultural norms that are recognisably Dutch and argue, for example, that these should be taught in schools by creating a canon of Dutch history and civic orientation classes.
More critical perspectives entail, first, that despite the fact that this is presented as a conceptualisation of tolerance, the main thrust of the discussion is to point out what is not to be tolerated and to ban specific practices or limit associational freedoms. Especially in the case of Islam and immigrants the category of intolerable practices and symbols becomes larger and larger and the ways in which disapproval is expressed becomes more and more violent. Thereby the notion of tolerance as ‘putting up with what one disapproves of’ becomes an empty signifier. Secondly, the process of exposing differences in order to discuss them through a ‘healthy confrontation’ is usually dominated by gross stereotypes. The alarming tone of public outcries about, for instance, ritually prepared food, lawyers who do not stand up in court or imams who refuse to shake hands, results in far more social conflicts than strategies of avoidance do. Some argue, therefore, that this way of thinking about tolerance as requiring confrontation and open debate hinders rather than facilitates societal cohesion and peace.

Concluding remarks

The challenges of pluralism in a depillarised society of immigration

In contrast to dominant notions, debates concerning cultural diversity and minority acceptance in the Netherlands do not exclusively focus on the position of Muslims and the role of Islam in society. There is also an ongoing discussion on the position of native religious minorities, notably Orthodox Calvinist groups. The history of the Netherlands is not the history of a distinct development of toleration. It is important to emphasise this point because portrayals of the tumultuous political developments in the first decade of the 21st century are often contrasted to a supposed ‘Dutch tradition of tolerance’. It would be wrong to maintain the image that until recently the Netherlands was an exemplary tolerant country and that it recently has become ‘intolerant’ and has fallen victim to a ‘backlash against multiculturalism’. In practice, however, as we have argued in this report, each time is confronted with its own specific challenges which are met with their own specific answers. From the above we want to extract some conclusions and major issues that require further examination and empirical research.

First of all, it is clear that since about ten years, notably since the Fortuyn revolt in 2002 and the following stable presence of populist parties in Dutch politics, the discourses of ‘liberal intolerance’ have become particularly influential in the Netherlands. The main thrust of this shift in public debate is that there is a need to identify the core values that characterise ‘Dutch culture’, ‘liberalism’ and ‘secularism’ and that these should become ‘non-negotiable’. As a result, so it is argued, there is a need to confront immigrant communities to enforce full respect for these values and principles. One effect of this shift in discourse has been a renewed interest in Dutch history, including attempts to identify the essence of ‘the Dutch canon’, the creation of a ‘national historical museum’ and efforts to instruct immigrants about ‘Dutch culture’ during compulsory ‘civic orientation lessons’. Citizenship, national solidarity and respect seem to require a renewed enthusiasm about ‘Dutch culture and Dutch values’. Politicians have also demanded that schools should teach tolerance and respect in the form of ‘citizenship education’. Another aspect of this shift in the dominant
discourse on diversity issues is a widely advocated need to strengthen the principles of the separation between church and state. In the Netherlands people who position themselves as modern, liberal and progressive speak out loudly to defend values such as equality, individualism and secularism. Often this is taken to mean that religious groups and organisations should no longer be allowed to use their collective and institutional autonomy to divert from core values and norms. According to these voices, liberal values are under siege, mainly from religious groups and immigrant communities.

One striking feature of contemporary cultural diversity challenges and discussions in the Netherlands is the focus on religious minorities. Orthodox Calvinist groups, Catholic institutions and Muslims are publicly challenged with respect to their beliefs and practices, which are often perceived as crossing the boundaries of the ‘intolerable’. Especially around issues related to gender equality and equality of sexual orientation, many believe that principles such as non-discrimination, that have already been established legally, should also function as shared values across Dutch society. They reason that this means that exceptions to the rule should no longer be accepted. This provides opportunities for populist politicians to camouflage more general feelings of hostility towards Islam and Muslims as well-intentioned attempts to contribute to the emancipation of Muslim women. Nonetheless, in a society that secularised in rapid pace since the 1960s and that has come to define itself as ‘liberal and progressive’, there is a genuine concern about the ways conservative immigrant groups undermine norms that have become well established over the past decades. The focus on Muslims and Orthodox Christians also results in the fact that other minority groups are far less exposed and criticised. For example, there is hardly any debate on the position of the Surinamese community in the Netherlands.

A third aspect of diversity challenges and discussions on tolerance in the Netherlands that merits attention is that there appears to be a radical change in prevailing Dutch conceptualisations of tolerance. For a long time, ‘principled acceptance’ has been crucial to Dutch governing traditions. Its philosophical foundations were developed in the second half of the 19th century, amongst others by Abraham Kuyper. It was institutionalised in the course of the 20th century, especially in the form of church-state traditions, in the model of consensus-democracy and in the educational system. However, at present, secular voices demand less room for religious schools, a ban on ritual slaughtering and less accommodation of religiously motivated demands with regard to dress. Other elements of Dutch traditions of tolerance are also criticised. The notion that a majority in society may well disapprove of the ideas and practices of a religious minority whilst still ‘tolerating’ them, has lost much of its appeal in public discourse. The same applies to the idea that ‘pragmatic toleration’ or ‘condoning’ is an adequate governing strategy in a deeply plural society. At present public discourse on toleration centres around the ideas that tolerance should not mean value relativism and avoidance, but confrontation, defining what is acceptable and combating that which is intolerable. Interestingly, the autochthonous majority often expresses its unwillingness to ‘put up with’ or ‘tolerate’ other cultures and religions. A recurring topic in the national elections throughout the last decade has been the call to severely curb flows of immigration to the Netherlands. Although instigated by populist parties, traditional parties too advocate the need for a highly selective immigration policy. Overall, the notion of the Netherlands as an immigrant nation has become supplanted by the notion of the Netherlands as a nation rooted in a distinct European
Judeo-Christian tradition. A tradition that needs to be ‘defended’ from external influences stemming from immigration.

Finally, it is remarkable how the overall concern about ‘societal cohesion’ and ‘immigrant integration’ result in demands to restrict pluralism, for example in the form of ethnic subcultures, special institutions and the accommodation of religiously motivated demands. In public debates there are often outcries about ‘multiple loyalties’ of immigrants with dual nationality, about the existence of ethnic ‘parallel societies’ or about religious orthodox groups that isolate themselves from mainstream society. This is paradoxical because at the level of individualised life-styles the embrace of ‘diversity’ is paramount. Also, according to popular culture everyone should be as ‘different’ and ‘unique’ as possible. It appears that the Netherlands is still trying to strike a balance in accommodating various forms of pluralism in a depillarised society of immigration.

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Introduction

The aim of this report is to describe and analyse some of the more salient challenges that Sweden faces with regard to cultural diversity during the last 30 years. Cultural diversity is here understood as a societal fact, i.e. that Sweden as a country consists of citizens/inhabitants with different cultural backgrounds. This form of diversity has often been assumed to present political and ethical challenges to the society and the state, and with respect to the more regional and local spheres of society. Even though large-scale migration to Sweden is a post-world war II-phenomenon, Sweden has been characterized by cultural encounters between native inhabitants and so-called newcomers for many generations. In addition, cultural encounters between the majority population, national minorities and the indigenous population the Sámi people show that the history of Sweden could be seen as multicultural in several ways. This report gives a presentation of this history. It also attempts to show how the multicultural history of Sweden reflects itself in the current situation and political debate.

Since the middle of the 1970s has Sweden officially adopted multiculturalism as a guiding policy with respect to immigrants and national minorities (even though immigrant groups were in focus when the policy was formulated). It is striking that the interests of so-called internal minorities such as the national minorities were more recognized in the light of the political attention directed towards immigrants, for example, with respect to language rights. The basis for the policy was summarized through the concept “equality, freedom of choice, and cooperation” which was used in the guidelines adopted by Parliament in 1975. In the Swedish Instrument of Government (Regeringsformen = “the constitution”) from 1974 it is also emphasized that various groups defined through language, ethnicity and religion should be supported in order to maintain their cultural heritage and identities. However, these multicultural guidelines were formulated more or less on the basis of the assumption that the main cultural diversity could be exemplified through the so-called man-power or labour immigration that increased during the 1950s and the 1960s. This immigration came mainly from the Mediterranean countries, Central Europe and Finland.
During the 1970s and the 1980s the migration pattern changed in a radical way. Sweden closed the door for labour migration in the beginning of the 1970s and the following decades were characterized by immigration through family reunification and refugee immigration. In the latter case the sending countries also changed in a striking way in comparison to the previous decades. Now the indeterminacy (and/or the tacit assumptions concerning cultural diversity) in the official guidelines became more or more obvious in political and academic circles. In different governmental reports the question of what should be seen as essential common values in a multicultural society set the tone for the discussions. Hence, questions concerning the limits of pluralism grew in political importance.

One could say that one central challenge regarding cultural diversity in the last three decades has been the gap between theory and practice in the multicultural policies. This phenomenon also applies to Sweden’s official endorsement (ratification) of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. Here the gap could be seen as practical in the sense that the authorities have not been engaged in any substantial measures in, for example, the field of education. Critics of the official guidelines both in political and academic circles have been eager to emphasize that the traditional assimilation model, which characterized Swedish policy for several decades in the post war period is – on the whole - far from dead, and that the cultural diversity which has been endorsed officially has been rather limited in nature. In addition to this “cultural discrimination” Sweden has also, according to some analysts, problems of discrimination both with respect to the labour market and with respect to the provision of various important goods and services such as housing and educational opportunities.

**National identity and State formation**

Sweden gained independence from Denmark in the 16th century, during the reign of Gustav Vasa and his successors, and the Swedish nation state was considerably consolidated. During the 17th century, after winning wars against Denmark, Russia, and Poland, Sweden-Finland, emerged as a great power by taking direct control of the Baltic region. Still, with a population of scarcely more than 1 million inhabitants, the recurrent wars called for a rigorously organized state power, which could manage the large-scale recruitment of soldiers to the army. Thus, Sweden witnessed a centralization of power and a thoroughly effected bureaucratization as early as in the 17th century, and since then centralization has been one of the constituents in the execution of official power.

In the period of consolidation of Swedish political power at the beginning of the early modern era, policies were characterized by pragmatism and a rather open attitude towards immigrants. Foreign ideas and groups were welcomed if they could contribute to state consolidation and development. In this period, many leading merchants, artisans and soldiers were of foreign origin. However, immigrants during the so-called great power era (especially during the 17th century) came in relatively small groups. In most cases the members were linguistically and religiously assimilated after a few generations and were integrated through marriage, residence, education and profession.
During the heyday of the Swedish empire, several ethnic groups inhabited its territory; not only Swedes, but Finns, Estonians, Germans, Sámi, Romas, Russians and others. With the loss of the Baltic and German provinces during the second decade of the 18th century, the territory of the Swedish state gradually came to take the shape of what today is considered to be Sweden, a process which was finished in the first years of the 19th century, when Finland was lost to the Russian empire. After the loss of Finland, the state authorities concentrated on building up Sweden as a national state and demarcating it from the outside world.

In general, the 19th century is often called the century of nationalism; romantic nationalism with its credo “one people, one nation, one station” took root throughout Europe, and in Sweden this meant greatly limited immigration during certain periods, and a highly introverted approach to the national identity and belonging, even though Scandinavianism and a growing Nordicism characterised certain intellectual and political circles, and there also was a considerable import of foreign ideas in connection with early industrialisation.

The loss of Finland had a negative impact on multicultural relations more generally. Arctic Scandinavia, which had previously been characterised by intense trading between the Sámi, the Finnish-speaking population, Norwegians and Russians increasingly declined as a multicultural meeting place, now that there was a sharp focus on the geographical frontier with Finland, which had become a Grand Duchy of Russia. Furthermore, parts of northern Sweden became an extended area of colonisation, where the interests of the majority Swedes clashed with those of the Sámi over hunting and fishing rights. The growing industrialisation of Sweden in the late 19th century also meant that the Sámi’s and their culture were perceived as more and more irrelevant and obsolete with reference to the development of society (Ingvaldsen, Larsson and Pedersen, 2009).

Although the nineteenth-century nation was assiduous in drawing up boundaries – geographical, ethnic and cultural – the frontiers with the outside world remained open in significant respects. From the middle of the nineteenth century Sweden was also characterised by emigration, first and foremost to the U.S.A. In general, the causes behind the migration processes were mostly the widespread poverty, but also lack of religious freedom and an authoritarian social climate with limited freedoms. This migration meant a significant loss in terms of population which created a rather open attitude towards newcomers. Sweden’s borders remained more or less open until World War I, when a strict law of deportation was introduced.

One could trace various forms of nationalism in the history of Sweden. From the period of the establishment of the centralized Swedish and until the 19th century a “nationalism” with a sharp focus upon religion dominated, which allowed for a rather generous form of cultural diversity as long as the people expressed their belonging to the Lutheran church. During the end of 19th and until the middle of the 20th century a racialized form of nationalism, heavily influenced by Social Darwinism and racial biology, dominated the public discourse and state policies. This nationalism expressed itself through the sterilization laws that were introduced during the 1930s, laws that actually were in play until the middle of 1970. These laws meant that people who were seen as
“unfit” for ordinary social life were forced to be sterilized. This targeted group was quite diverse and it included Roma people, mentally disabled and single mothers.

After the second world war the official form of nationalism and social belonging changed to more cultural forms of nationalism that were seen as more acceptable in the light of world politics. A common hypothesis among scholars is that the post war period of Sweden has been dominated by rather thick cultural-ethnic nationalism in spite of an official multicultural ideology – especially during the two last decades of the 20th century (Svanberg and Tydén, 1999). In this national narrative the concept of the welfare state and its assumed Swedish expression (“folkhemmet”) has played an important role – especially for many of the supporters of the Swedish labour party – Socialdemokraterna. Still, the fact that the Swedish society has become a receiver of migration has changed it in a number of ways. To a certain extent, it has also changed the ways in which Swedes perceive themselves and others.

The alterations in Swedish national identity which has occurred during the last three decades cannot only – or even primarily – be explained with the reference to the increased presence of other ethnicities. Scholars (cf. Löfgren 1987; Daun 1996) have pointed to the fact that notions of modernity, progression and general welfare during the post-world war II period by the Swedes themselves was associated with Swedishness. In tandem with the political and economic development in Sweden during the decades after the war, Swedes developed an understanding of themselves as a progressive and modern. Following your political inclination, one could emphasize either economic and technological improvement and engineering skills, or the success of the welfare state and the progressive, democratic and humanistic values that accompanied that political project.

The new membership in EU 1995 meant that two cornerstones in the earlier Swedish national identity were challenged, i.e. the stance of neutrality and being a role model in “modernity” and welfare state policies. Sweden could no longer see itself as neutral in the sense that was prevailing in the national consciousness and in the official post war rhetoric. The political foundations for a rhetoric of neutrality was established during the 19th century, and this rhetoric was given different interpretations and applications given the changing political circumstances during the 18th and 19th centuries. Concepts such as non-alliance became especially salient, not at least during the Cold War. After the Second World War Sweden’s neutrality policy also became intertwined with international commitments in support of developing countries within the framework of United Nations (Stråth, 2004). The new membership in EU/EEC implied that Sweden no longer could see itself as a special role model in “modernity” and welfare state policies. The entrance into EU 1995 not only diminished Sweden’s independence in foreign policy matters. It also meant that Sweden more and more was seen by the states around the world as just one country among many in the European Community – a state struggling with more or less the same kind of economic and political problems as the other member states (Johansson, 2004).

Some present-day constituents of the Swedish national identity are shaped in line with the lingering propensity to regard Swedishness as
progressive, modern and democratic, and on the other directly worked out in relation to - and dissociation from - the migrant population and non-European ethnic groups. For example, equality of opportunity between women and men is often referred to – in policy as well as in public - as a typical Swedish value. In reverse, male migrants from the Middle East are frequently depicted as bearers of patriarchal cultures and thereby alien to the standards of the Swedish.

Main cultural challenges

Swedish society may – as was said before - be characterized as culturally diverse in several senses (i.e., external cultural influences, national minorities and certain migration flows from different parts of the world given the political crises and turmoil). Sweden did not become a country of immigration until after the World War II. It is important to stress those different policies and official attitudes have appeared with reference to different minorities throughout history. In certain periods tolerance or respect has been shown towards certain immigrant groups and not to the national minorities. In later years, after 2000, a positive recognition towards some of the national minorities has appeared (for example through educational support and language policies), a tolerance or a recognition that has not been granted towards the immigrant communities.

The modern era of immigration to Sweden in the post war period can roughly be divided into four stages, with each stage representing different types of immigrants and immigration: 1) refugees from neighboring countries (1938 to 1948); 2) labor immigration from Finland and southern Europe (1949 to 1971); 3) family reunification and refugees from developing countries (1972 to 1989), and 4) asylum seekers from southeastern and Eastern Europe, and the Middle east (1990 to present) and the free movement of EU citizens within the European Union. As a result of these differing flows, the once-dominant Scandinavians, who composed well over half of Sweden’s foreign-born population in 1960, made up only one-fourth of the foreign born in 2004. The population of Sweden today (2010) is 9,26 million and it is estimated that more than 12 percent of the population is of so-called foreign background.

Since the years following the end of World War II, the pattern of migration to Sweden is similar to other Western European countries (Runblom, 1994). From the late forties to the early sixties, the migration was characterized by free movement between the European Community member states and the Nordic countries. In 1954, the Nordic countries set up a common labour market, which enabled large-scale migration from Finland to Sweden during the 1950s and 1960s. Much of the immigration was a planned recruitment by Swedish enterprises and the Swedish Labour Market Board, and formal agreements were made between the Swedish government and governments in Central and Southern European countries. Through Sweden’s success in remaining outside the war, the country had a comparative advantage in the form of intact industrial facilities, which demanded an increased labour force after the end of the war. Sweden did not set up a guest worker program like the German Federal Republic or Switzerland in order to meet labour demands. On the contrary, Sweden had a policy of permanent residence that treated labour migrants as future citizens.
The spontaneous labor migration halted around 1973 in most West European countries, as a reaction to the so-called oil-crises and the following economic recession. Migration to Sweden halted one year earlier, just before the crisis, mainly as result of political pressure from the Swedish Trade Union Confederation, LO. This marks the beginning of a new phase, during which migration is dominated by refugees.

The first non-European refugees that were accepted by Sweden were the Ugandan Asians expelled in 1972. Following the coup against Chilean President Salvador Allende, Sweden accepted 18,000 refugees from Chile between 1973 and 1989 and 6,000 refugees from other Latin American countries. In addition, many refugees came from the Middle East during the 1970s and 1980s. Christian Orthodox Syrians sought asylum because of religious persecution, and the Kurds were another salient group, seeking asylum on the grounds of political persecution, and emigrating from Eastern Turkey, Iran, and Iraq. The largest groups from the Middle East were from Iran and Iraq; the Iranians arrived in the 1980s, mainly as a result of the war against Iraq and in opposition to the Islamic government in Tehran. Kurdish Iraqis started to arrive in the 1990s, mostly in response to increasing political oppression (Westin and Dingu-Kyrklund, 2003).

During this period, many migrants were granted asylum on humanitarian grounds. This allowed the immigration authorities meet the criticism from those liberal critics who claimed that Sweden didn’t live up to its commitments to the UN. By not recognizing these asylum seekers as UN Convention refugees, they did not enjoy the full rights to protection as written in the convention. As Charles Westin (2006) points out, Swedish authorities instead interpreted “humanitarian grounds” without having to follow international conventions. Thus, the authorities could change their interpretations if necessary. During the 1980s, the perception of an increased flow of refugees impelled the government to rule that political asylum applications would be treated more strictly and in accordance with the statements of the 1951 Geneva Convention. Humanitarian grounds for asylum would no longer be used. It is commonly held that this marks the beginning of new phase in Swedish immigration policy, when a stricter asylum policy was implemented. In the early 1990s, a significant number of refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and Kosovo arrived to Sweden, and the government introduced visa requirements for persons coming from the former Yugoslavia. Still, there was support in the public opinion for assisting refugees from the Balkans, and 50,000 asylum seekers were granted temporary residence. Moreover, asylum seekers have continued to come from Iraq, above all since the 2003 US invasion (Westin, 2006). In the middle of the 1990s, Sweden became a member of the European Union (EU), and this exerted a profound influence on Swedish migration policy. In 1996, Sweden became a party to the Schengen agreement, which allows for free movement of people across all Member States. In comparison to non-European immigration, the numbers of EU immigrants are small, though.

The table below (Table 1) gives a short survey of the main minority and immigrant groups in Sweden, which is the five national native minority groups and the 20 largest immigrant groups, categorized with reference to country of origin. In the category of Swedish Finns, the numbers for the migrant and native groups are added together. More
than the actual size of the group, we will also try to show some of the mayor dimensions of difference and differentiation which are regularly paid attention to. The parenthesis enclosing the “x” in some of the columns indicate that the status may be uncertain, contested or in a state of transition. For instance, it could be questioned whether having English as first language is an emblem of difference in everyday Swedish life or not.

Moreover, some groups that earlier has been “othered” with reference to the racialized category of “invandrare” (immigrant) has to gradually become associated with a general, neutral European identity. There is a clear tendency in Sweden that migrants from “western” countries - such as Denmark, Germany or the United States – very rarely if ever becomes categorized as “invandrare”, but the extension of that category is variable. Being categorized as “invandrare” is in general an experienced shared by migrants from the Asia, Latin America, Africa and – to certain extent – Eastern Europe, and not seldom also by their children, even though may be born in Sweden and hence lack experience of migration per se (Mulinari & Neergaard, 2004). Rather than depicting an experience of migration, the category denotes a prescribed alterity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions of difference</th>
<th>Number (thousands)</th>
<th>Citizenship</th>
<th>Racialized</th>
<th>Religious</th>
<th>Linguistic</th>
<th>Perceived “cultural distance”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National minorities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swedish Finns</td>
<td>675</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>(X)</td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(born in Sweden)</td>
<td>(500)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>(X)</td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(born in Finland)</td>
<td>(175)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>(X)</td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meänkieli *</td>
<td>40-70</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>(X)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma **</td>
<td>30-65</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>5-6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews **</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>(X)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sami **</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>(X)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants (country of origin)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>5-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Yugoslavia</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>(X)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>4-5*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>(X)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>3-4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>5-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>2-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>5-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>5-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>(X)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other forms of categories</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims ***</td>
<td>100-250</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub Saharan Africans</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: SCB (Statistiska centralbyrån), except where indicated: * Sveriges Radio, ** Nationalencyclopedin, *** Hunter (2002). Perceived “cultural distance” is a measure utilized by Mella and Palm (2009:46). *) The number comes from the categories “croatsians” and “serbs”.
The diversity of national minorities and the indigenous population the Sámis has been recognized through Sweden’s decision to ratify the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. Hence, the following groups and languages are ascribed national minority status: Sámi (even though the self-perception often has been “an indigenous population”), Tornedal Finns (Meänkieli or Tornedals Finnish), Roma (Romany Chib) and Jews (Yiddish), Finns (Finnish). This special recognition of the national minorities constitutes a break with earlier political traditions. The multicultural policy of 1975, as exemplified through the notion of freedom of choice (see below), had a more integrated or uniform stance towards national minorities and immigrant communities. For example, home language instruction was initiated for the national minorities at the same time and on the same premises as for the immigrant groups.

The size of the minority groups in Sweden is hard to estimate because of the lack of ethnic statistics, which is forbidden in Sweden, as is statistics concerning religious background. However, more informal statistics circulates which could give a clue of the approximate numbers. What sets Sweden, Norway and Finland apart from other countries in Europe is the presence of an indigenous population – the Sámis - which presents special political and ethical challenges in comparison to other groups. The most striking issue has been the case of land rights and the debates concerning the importance of signing the ILO convention.

In general, it is possible to claim that Swedes has accepted the multicultural condition. At least, they report a relatively positive experiences of and attitudes towards migration and migrants (Mella and Palm 2008, 2009). More than 60 % of the population had good or very good experiences of working, studying or in other ways interacting with persons with immigrant background. No more than 14 % had negative or very negative experiences, and just above 20 % claim that they have no experiences of this specific kind of interaction. The experiences are not randomly distributed in the population, though. A number of demographic or social factors have an effect: there is a positive correlation between level of education, sex/gender and the experiences concerned.

This is not the whole picture, however. There is a body of research that reports the incidence of intolerance towards migrants and minority groups – which may manifest itself in such forms as discrimination, harassment, insults, threats and physical violence. For example, a number of reports from a governmental committee on structural discrimination (cf. Pincus 1994) shows that recurrent patterns of everyday racism and indirect discrimination characterizes or affect the migrant existence in Sweden (Dahlstedt and Hertzberg, 2005; Neergaard 2006). Other studies point to the proliferation of exclusionary mechanisms on the labour market, primarily targeting migrants (Behtoui, 2004, 2006). The scope and signification of ethnic discrimination has, from time to time, been intensely debated in Swedish academia, and it’s hard to draw a conclusion in this specific matter. Nevertheless, it would not make sense to deny the occurrences of racism and discrimination in everyday life of many migrants and minorities. It is relevant in this context to mention that segregation (such as housing segregation) may have its ground in various forms of discrimination and is often structured on the basis of non-Swedishness and not necessarily on the basis of specific ethnic backgrounds. Hence, the poorer neighbourhoods in the
suburbs of the major cities of Sweden such as Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmö are genuinely multi-ethnic, consisting of people of many origins.

The lack of tolerance and respect that native and/or migrant minority groups in Sweden experience come from different sources, and have different causes. Sometimes it targets groups which are ethnically defined, sometimes groups which are religiously defined. Sometimes it targets singular norms and customs, which could be more or less shared by different groups. And even though the social category of “race” is rejected in mainstream media and public debate, and common only in the discourses of right-wing extremist social movements, some exclusionary practices may undoubtedly be defined as “racialized” or overtly racist. In the following section, we will review the position of a number of minority groups in Sweden, whose practices and worldviews sometimes are met with a lack of respect and tolerance, and also suffer from outright discrimination. Following the argument outlined above, we will focus and different forms of group formations – religiously, ethnically and “racially” defined – and how they are treated by the ethno-nationalistic defined majority.

The Sámi

The Sámi are Europe’s northernmost and the Nordic countries’ only indigenous people. Sámi ancestral lands span an area of approximately 388,350 km², almost the size of Sweden. The Sámi languages are a part of the Finno-Lappic group of the Uralic language family. Traditionally, the Sámi have pursued a variety of livelihoods, including coastal fishing, fur trapping, and sheep herding. Their best known means of livelihood is semi-nomadic reindeer herding. Only about 10% of the total Sámi population is connected with it, but it remains an important industry among Sámi in Sweden. The estimated (unofficial) number of Sámi living in Sweden is somewhere between 20 000 and 35 000, of which 8 000 has registered for voting in the Sámi parliament.

In 1751, the border was drawn up by Sweden and Denmark-Norway, dividing Sámi along the mountain ridge from Jämtland to Finnmark. The border between Sweden and Finland was established in 1809, and in 1826 the border between Norway and Russia was established, thereby completing the division of Sámi. Despite the colonization and division of the Sámi area, the Sámi people were able to maintain some independence. When the national border between Sweden and Denmark-Norway was established, the Sámi were guaranteed ownership of land and water in what was known as the Codicil to the Border Treaty (1751).

The land issue continues to be of uttermost importance for the Sámi group, even in the present. With the practice of reindeer herding, which is central to the Sámi way of life and often regarded as the defining feature of Sami culture, the Sámi exhibit a slightly different form of territorial organization, which could be characterized as flexible and overlapping, in comparison to the modern property system of the European states which colonized them. Contradictions between these two conceptions of territoriality have been a defining feature of state-Sami relations in the following ways:
1. Nordic states viewed the Sami as nomadic, thus having no ownership of their land.
2. Traditional Sami activities, notably reindeer herding, were viewed as illegitimate or backwards, resulting in the privileging of modern forms of land use such as agriculture.

During the last decades, roughly one thousand land owners has taken Sámi reindeer herds to court, in an effort to keep them from grazing reindeer in private forests (Borchert, 2001). Reindeer breeding and keeping has often been counteracted on local level. There are a number of examples when conflicts have arisen around land rights. The rights and the interests of farmers and landowners in northern Sweden have clashed with the rights and the interests of the Sámi, when migratory reindeers have damaged plants in forests and arable land. Although the rights of the Sami in part are regulated in law, the prejudices and negative stereotyping to Sami among other people living in northern Sweden has been accompanied with a marked lack of tolerance towards their rights to preserve their main industry, and thereby their way of living.

A quick glance at the Swedish history of ideas shows that the knowledge on the Sámi group that was produced during the 19th and early 20th century, and circulated in academia and mainstream media, was informed of the racializing stereotypes that were common back then. Sámi were regularly depicted as inferior “Others”, belonging to another race and not having reached the same level of civilization as the rest of the population. In line with this frame of interpretation, collected from racial biology and Social Darwinism, segregation laws were formulated during the first decades of the twentieth century.

Segregation took a number of forms. The Sámi group suffered from this in a number of ways. One example in the field of education was the nomadic “kåta schools” introduced after 1913, where Sámi children received an education that was said to be adapted to their specific life conditions in the Arctic tundra. Here the Sámi received an inadequate education characterized by stereotypes and insufficient means, which reinforced their alienation from the Swedish state and the rest of society. The Sámi has been exposed to both segregation and assimilation strategies from the state. With respect to religion (Lutheran Christianity) the general stance from the state could often be characterized as assimilatory, while segregation strategies often prevailed in areas such as social life, work and education.

For several decades during the 20th century, speaking Sámi languages was not allowed in the elementary school. Sami wasn’t even a school subject in the nomadic school. The Sami children were not given the opportunity to learn to read and write in their own language. It was quite common among older generations of Sami of have Sámi only as a social language, and use Swedish to read and write. Thus, the right to education in their own languages has been a key issue for Sámi activists.

The generation exposed to unpleasant experiences from their school years chose to a greater part to not speak Sámi with their own children. As adults, many of the 60’s and 70’s generations cannot speak Sami.
“although they should be able to”. They have Sami as a passive language to a more or less degree. It can be a rather steep threshold to reclaim one’s language, and many speak of “psychological barriers”. Here there is a need for great education efforts and a positive attitude from the surrounding society, both the Sami and the Swedish (Sametinget, 2011).

Still, the right to education in Sámi language is seldom contested in present day Sweden. There is a state funded Sámi school in Sweden today, centrally administrated by Sameskolstyrelsen (SamS, The Sami Education Board), although education in the Sámi language at primary or secondary level did not exist until 1976, when the Swedish government introduced home language education for immigrant children and linguistic minorities. The goals of Sami school education are stated in the curriculum. The Sami school is responsible that every pupil after graduating: a) is familiar with his or her Sami background and cultural heritage, b) can speak, read and write in Sámi. According to the Sámi School Decree all education should be given in Sami and Swedish, and the subject Sámi is obligatory in every grade (SamS, 2011).

It could reasonably be argued that the right to education in Sámi language is officially accepted and recognized. In reverse, the land claims by Sámi are neither publically nor officially accepted and/or recognized in their entirety. The demand of special land rights - in the sense of article 169 in the ILO convention - has not been seen favourably by the Swedish government, which has had a long tradition of scepticism towards notions such as cultural autonomy and self-determination. As a guarded conclusion, it could reasonably be said that the conflicts over land-use remains to be a question where Sámi claims are neither fully accepted nor recognized – although it would be a mistake to categorize the viewpoint of Swedish authorities as totally indifferent or neglectful of Sámi land interests.

Roma

As in many other European countries, the discrimination, hostility and lack of tolerance of Roma have a long history. For example, during the so-called Age of Liberty (1718- 1772), when Sweden began its retreat to small power status, policies regarding cultural divergence were tightened. There was a particular focus on religious and behavioural “deviants”. Although members of the Roma group today share the formal civil and political rights which are included in Swedish citizenship, it could be argued that they lack some of the significant social rights in terms of their fulfilment such as educational rights. During the span of the 20th century, they were more or less forced to abandon their main industries, and the life forms associated with it; this process was completed in the 1960s. Since then, the policy towards Roma from official bodies has been characterized by different inclusionary - rather than excluding - measures, albeit seldom designed “from the inside”, in other words how the needs of the group are assessed by the members themselves. Moreover, their religious or cultural rights have not often been denied by official bodies.

Since Sweden does not allow for ethnic registration, and thus do not have statistical databases relevant for an estimation of the living conditions among the Roma, all descriptions of the social conditions must be
tentative. However, other sources of information concludes that the living conditions of Roma in Sweden is relatively poor, and that they are more or less excluded from mainstream Swedish society (cf. SOU 2010:55). One can discern a strong pattern of social, economic and political exclusion and marginalization. Living standards are lower than average. Considerable health problems are reported, and life expectancy is judged to be clearly below average. At a rough estimate, 80 percent of adult Roma are unemployed. Most Roma children do not complete primary school, and very few continue to secondary school. This being so, even fewer reaches university level.

Discrimination is widespread. Attitudes towards Roma are more negative than towards any other group, and they suffer strongly from labour market exclusion. According to Geza Nagy (2007, in Palusuo, 2008), the unemployment rate is considerably over the average. The exclusion is, Nagy continues, a consequence of several factors, such as failures in the educational system, lack of demand for services from “traditional” Roma industries, and widespread negative attitudes towards Roma in general. The governmental white paper quoted above draws a similar conclusion: “Attitudes towards Roma are more negative than towards any other group. They remain the most clearly discriminated group on the labour market.” (SOU 2010:55: 36)

Moreover, discrimination in the housing sector is also reported, in public as well as private housing; discrimination within the housing market stands out as a very large problem for Romanies, it is concluded in report from the governmental agency Diskrimineringsombudsmannen (DO, the Equality Ombudsman; DO, 2003).

Since they have met far-reaching difficulties in entering the labour market, and also been subject to negative stereotyping and ethnic discrimination, and partly as a consequence of those excluding activities, they have not been able to obtain the rights implied by the social citizenship of the welfare state (Marshall 1950). Their access to the political rights implied in the notion of citizenship may also be questioned, at least in the sense that a lack of representation can be noted. “Roma are virtually absent from politics” (SOU 2010:55, s. 36) the above mentioned white paper claims; their civic organisations are weakly developed and they lack official representation as a minority, and there is no “umbrella” organisation on the national level.

Apart from the general exclusion processes, a certain lack of recognition can be noted, in the educational system (Rodell Olgac, 2006) and elsewhere. For instance, children do not have full access to education in their mother tongue as stipulated in law, and there is no or little mentioning of Roma as a national minority in school books. Moreover, Roma cultural institutions and media are few and with scarce resources and do not have a secure financial situation. The culture and language of Roma Travellers is endangered, much because of the stigma connected with being a Traveller.

Some of the cases of discrimination that have been filed at the DO (DO, 2003), and that concerns discrimination in everyday life, may also give a hint of how the lack of tolerance and recognition vis-à-vis Roma in Sweden is constituted. In general, it concerns the forms of discrimination that makes goods and services unavailable. Not making goods and
services available is form of discrimination treated under the Swedish law on discrimination (2003:307) in the Penal Code. Discrimination concerning goods and services is often about Roma being denied access to shops, restaurants and hotels, or in other ways are being treated in a discriminatory fashion by establishments (DO, 2003:18).

Thus, it can be said that Roma claims on acceptance and recognition has been met at the official level – but only to a certain degree. What is lacking is the financial and organizational official support that follows from at least some strong definitions of recognition, i.e. the definition inherent in the official Swedish multiculturalism from 1975. Following the argument outlined just above, it could also be argued that tolerance and recognition towards some cultural practices which express a Roma identity is absent in the everyday life of mainstream Swedish society.

**Muslims**

As in many other European countries, Muslims in general and religious Muslims in particular has been singled out in Sweden as a matter of interest, suspicion and debate during the decade following the attack on World Trade Centre, New York, in 2001. Muslims has become a highly visible minority in Swedish society, and the enactment of Muslim belief practices has caught public attention in many different ways. The attention is frequently mixed with suspicion, and anti-Muslim sentiments and opinions have been reported, as well as relatively high frequency of outright discrimination. Against the background of militant forms of Islam and terrorist attacks - lately the suicide bomber in Stockholm in December 2010 - generalizations and stereotypes about Islam and Muslims have become more widespread and amounts to “Islamophobia” especially among members of right-wing populist parties (Gardell, 2010).

Arguably, Sweden has one of the most heterogeneous Muslim populations of all Western European countries. They have different ethnic, political, linguistic and/or educational backgrounds. They come from over forty different countries in north and sub-Saharan Africa; from Arabic, Turkish or Persian parts of Asia, and from Europe. They come from secularized states as Turkey, religious states such as Iran, and from former socialistic states such as Bosnia-Herzegovina and several of the new states that formerly belonged to the Soviet Union. Clearly, this heterogeneity makes it hard to make categorizations about Muslims in Sweden (Sander, 2004).

The Islamic institutionalization in Sweden has, from a slow start in the 1960s and 1970s, begun to move into a consolidation phase during the past few years has. Swedish Muslims have now achieved what Åke Sand er (2004) calls a “rudimentary institutional completeness”. Many of the most essential Islamic and Muslim institutions - such as mosques, musallas, Muslim periodicals, Muslim burial grounds, pre-schools, schools and shops - now exists in Sweden. It could be argued that they manifest a physical and ideological presence in Sweden, and gradually Swedes are beginning to consider them an integral part of Swedish domestic religious life, as Swedish Muslims.

Despite the fact that the institutionalization of Islam has developed during the last decade, many Muslims finds it hard to enact their religiosity in a proper way, according to the norms and beliefs inherent in their faith.
One reason for this could, according to Sander (2004), be found in the discrepancies between different perspectives on religion; or, more exactly, different viewpoints on the notion, nature, position and place of religion in a society. In Sweden, there is widespread notion – common in many secular countries – that religion should not be allowed to affect your behaviour outside your very private sphere, in the public life.

The occurrence of this widespread secular mind-set might also explain why so many expressions of Islamic faith have received negative attention during the last decade. The construction of Mosques does seldom take place in silence; frequent and high-pitched voices of rejection and disapproval are common, and when the buildings once are completed, the congregations receive numerous threats and insults (Gardell, 2010). The opposition is evident, and two mosques have been burned down. Moreover, women wearing burqa or niqab report being harassed in public (Gardell, 2010). Widespread calls for prohibition of burqa and niqab are raised. Those acts of depreciation are not only caused by different views on religiosity or piety; as Mattias Gardell (2010) has argued, one can also track the effect of Islamophobia in present-day Sweden. There is a tendency to understand and depict the agency of migrants from Muslim societies in general and Islamic believers in particular as unreflective, rigid and fundamentalist.

It must be said, though, that certain claims from active Islamic believers are met in Sweden, at least formally. Despite the limitations discussed in the beginning, the institutionalization of Islam is in process. The most basic religious needs have been met, with certain degree of support from local municipalities, the Swedish church, etc. On the other hand, a widespread (but actually declining; cf. Gardell, 2010: 223-24) suspicion - or even contempt - to certain belief practices continues to constitute an obstacle to the enactment of Islam in Sweden, and towards a fully developed recognition, or even acceptance, of Islam in Sweden.

**Sub-saharan africans**

The groups of Sub-Saharan migrants in Sweden come up to just above 80 000 persons. They are composed of the most nationalities from the African continent, but among the most numerous groups we find migrants from Somalia (32 000), Ethiopia (13 000), Eritrea (9 000), Gambia (3 500) and Uganda (3 000). Sub-Saharan migrants face the most far-reaching obstacles in their efforts to get a position in the Swedish society. African-born migrants are the group most likely to be unemployed or subjected to discrimination in the Swedish labour market, and employers perceive African-born as more different than the European-born migrants. For example, the chance for a migrant from Sub-Saharan Africa to find a job which matches his/her education or training is over 60 per cent less compared to a native Swede (Integrationsverket 2002). Also, the most low-paid groups in the Swedish labour market are found among the African born migrants (Englund, 2003).

The relative lack of economic integration in Swedish society is to a certain degree followed by a lack of social integration. Numerous studies of “perceived cultural distance” among native Swedes point in that direction (Lange, 1992; Mella and Palm 2008, 2009, 2010). The category of Africans or specific African nationalities such as the Somali (Mella and Palm, 2008,
2009, 2010) is thus placed at the far end of a continuous scale where notions of similarity or difference should be measured. Obviously, what is perceived and constructed as “African culture” - or “Somali culture” - among Swedes moulds a *gestalt* that signifies radical difference. Needless to say, this affects those who are forced to represent this alterity. In-depths studies of the identity formations of young people of African descent in Sweden (Sawyer, 2000, 2008) shows that the experience of racial categorization and harassment is a part of their everyday life – although the strategies developed to cope with it differ in a variety of ways. A number of scholars (Mulinari and Neergaard, 2005; Sawyer 2000, 2008) claim that the willingness to acknowledge the scope of those expressions are very limited, for instance among scholars, civil servants and other “key actors”. In tandem with the argument that outlined above, concerning the acceptance and recognition of Roma culture, it might be said that the prevalence of racist or racializing stereotypes make up certain obstacles to the enactment of the norms, values and expressions that sub-Saharan Africans share, whether they are related to an ethnic or national identity, or a general African identity. Although there’s a lack of research on this particular topic in Sweden, it might be said that stereotyping, discrimination and hostility have a restraining effect to the public display of cultural expressions. Still, there is no particular cultural expression of sub-Saharan African groups in Sweden that has been opposed as frequent and large-scale as the opposition to the construction of mosques and the wearing of burqa or the niqab.

**The definition of tolerance in Sweden**

Policies towards different immigrant and minority groups during the first two decades of the post-war era were in general assimilatory, and the tolerance for or recognition of various cultural identities and customs was by and large absent from the official political agenda and the public discussion. In addition, there was no systematic reception policy. The period of assimilationist policy was not put to an end until 1975, when multiculturalism became an important element in the Swedish model of welfare-state politics. The new policy established the principles that have guided Sweden’s immigration policy ever since: according to Ålund and Schierup (1991), Sweden’s multicultural immigrant policy could be viewed as a rejection of a “guest worker” strategy for labour import; with its quest to create social equality among ethnic groups, respect for immigrants ways of living, and with an emphasis on providing immigrants and ethnic minorities with resources to exercise political influence. In Swedish multiculturalism, welfare ideology objectives focused on “equality” (*jämlikhet*) occupy a central position. Other policy objectives include “freedom of choice” (*valfrihet*) and “partnership” (*samverkan*).

These goals were formulated in the mid-1970s, and it was implicated that foreigners not only would enjoy the same legal privileges as Swedish citizens, but also that the general public should accept multicultural aims. Moreover, the proclaimed egalitarian and multicultural ideology has substantial legal backing. In most important matters, formal equality before the law holds true, as for example equal access to unemployment contributions and a large number of other social welfare benefits. Officially, there has been a strong emphasis on the formula “same rights-same responsibilities” in public policymaking. Models or ideas of differentiated citizenship, implying different rights and provisions depending on one’s groups status, has not gained wide-spread acceptance in the public
debate, and have never exerted any influence on Swedish citizenship legislation; “one salient characteristic of the Swedish welfare state during the 20th century has been a model of general and uniform policies, for all citizens” (Blanck; Tydén, 1995: 64). It is obvious that this political tradition influences contemporary legislation and policy. Still, Sweden introduced a new citizenship law in 2001, and then it became possible to have dual citizenship.

The Citizenship Act of 2001 differs in several respects from previous laws such as the citizenship laws of 1894, 1924 and 1950. The law of 2001 has open up the door for some ius solis considerations with the purpose to avoid statelessness even though the ius sanguinis principle is still operating. According to the current legislation a child acquires Swedish citizenship by birth under condition that the mother is a Swedish citizen and the child can also get citizenship by birth if the child was born in Sweden and if the father is a Swedish citizen. However, in the previous mentioned citizenship laws the principle of ius sanguinis was the main, overriding principle. The Citizenship Act of 2001 also accepts dual nationality which was previously not allowed and the act has also strengthened the importance of the principle of domicile. (Lokrantz Bernitz, 2010).

The content of the requirements for gaining citizenship in the Citizenship Act of 2001 is rather “thin” compared to several other countries in Europe (and other countries in the world). There is no language requirement in the Swedish citizenship law and new citizens do not need to express an oath of loyalty to the country (However, a “good conduct” requirement has been more emphasized in recent years which imply that persons who have committed crimes have to wait longer until they gain citizenship status; Lokrantz Bernitz, 2010). The rights that are exclusive for citizens (compared to more or less permanent residents) are also few – for example the right to vote in elections for Parliament, the prohibition against deportation and being eligible for important public offices.

The introduction of the Citizenship Act of 2001 could be seen in the light of an increased internationalization of the Swedish society. Before the new act on citizenship was introduced Sweden ratified the European Convention of Nationality from 1997. This convention (which has been ratified by 12 countries in Europe) has as one of its main purposes to make it easier to gain dual citizenship and introduce “good practice” in the field of citizenship law such as more reliability, “neutrality” and inclusiveness. The convention is open not just for members of the European Council but also for other countries - including Non-European states. However, in the Swedish case members of the neighbouring Nordic countries still receive a so-called preferential treatment (concerning principles of naturalisation and the conditions for acquiring citizenship through notifications).

Another important legal achievement of Swedish immigrant policy has been the granting to foreign citizens of the right to vote in local elections, which first was exercised in the local elections of 1976. The voting rights amendment to the Swedish constitution was also considered as a way means of giving immigrants access to the advantages of the welfare state, and at the same time safeguarding their right to autonomous cultural development. It could be said that the policy of multiculturalism provided a legal and moral foundation to support “freedom of choice”, to encourage “partnership”, to give “equality” a social basis, and to prevent ethnic conflicts and the development of a segregated society. A political consensus
was instituted, which embraced government and state institutions, as well as political parties (across the traditional left-right spectrum) and important social movements.

The policies of Swedish multiculturalism - and the concomitant legislation - were characterized by an endeavor for recognition of minority rights, but it might also be acknowledged as an extrapolation of the Swedish welfare model. The goal of equality was enlarged with the goal of “freedom of choice”, by assuring the members of ethnic and linguistic minorities a genuine choice between retaining and developing their cultural identity and assuming a Swedish cultural identity. In so far, the reformist socialist ideas of the Social democracy underpinned this policy, with its emphasis on equality. But the policy was also influenced by a liberal, individualistic political philosophy, with its focus on individuals and individual rights and skepticism towards group-orientated rights, such as collective self-determination, land-rights and cultural autonomy. As an example of this particular skepticism, we find the long-time prohibition of butchery in line with Halal and Kosher rules. Generally, the Swedish legal system has shown limited interest in and acceptance of the idea that ethnic belonging and cultural traits could be recognized as a reason for differential legal treatment (Nygren, 1999).

It might be said that the policy of 1975 suffered from compartmentalization: calls for recognition of collective, cultural practices was mixed together with a classical, liberal emphasis of individual rights. It did not take long until the multicultural policy implemented in 1975 was heavily criticized. Some scholars claimed that the policy as designed from the vantage point of an aesthetic and narrow conception of culture (e.g. Rojas 1993, Roth 1996; cf. Hertzberg 2003). The expressions promoted under the heading of “freedom of choice” were besides the publication of exile newspapers, magazines or journals, mainly folkloristic in character: literature, poetry, dances and music. Consequently, the prospect of possible conflicts between values, norms and ways of living were seldom addressed.

But a change was about to come. Subsequently, the authorities recognized that the multiculturalism developed in practice was limited in scope. During the 1980s, a number of governmental white papers pointed to the need of recognizing the width of promises inherent in liberal, multicultural political philosophy. They also highlighted a perceived risk of “cultural clashes” between norms and considered to be “typically” Swedish such as the ideal of gender equality and those held to be alien and external to Swedish society. Less than a decade after its implementation, a discourse was articulated which stressed the limits to multiculturalism; the articulation of multicultural policy was circumscribed by a perceived need to clarify what was inherently Swedish culture, and which norms and values that are unconditional to the Swedish society (and thus mandatory for migrants to conform to). Hence, the scope of what was tolerated and recognized was diminished (Ålund and Schierup, 1991). The wish to narrow the scope of multiculturalism followed a changing pattern in migration. As stated earlier, the migration changed quite dramatically in the early 1970’s, when labour migration halted and was replaced by refugee migration. From now on, most migrants came from countries outside Europe.

We witnessed a shift in Swedish multiculturalism policy in the mid-1990’s. In 1995, the multicultural policy based on equality, freedom of choice and partnership was replaced with a new policy, with a focus on integration. The issue of inclusion of migrants into society was by and large
transformed to a matter of inclusion of migrants into the labour market, and integration policy consisted mainly of measures promoting employability (although the legal rights of the minorities were left unchanged). From the vantage point of labour market conditions, the new policy puts its emphasis on the responsibilities and rights of the individual - not his or her affiliations. Thereafter, the political rhetoric in Sweden’s integration and minority politics often contains the words “same rights and responsibilities” and “same possibilities” (Roth, 2006), although the focus in public debate was firmly put on migrant responsibilities, not minority rights. We witnessed an increased attention to ethnic discrimination; but the ideal of a multicultural Sweden as well as the recognition of cultural differences was gradually downgraded.

Some other important changes during the 1990’s in the discourse on multiculturalism and tolerance could be noted. It became more and more usual that advocates of multiculturalism – or similar political ideas – tended to support the value of a multi-ethnic or multicultural society. The notion of “mångfald” (diversity) became a catch-word in policy and public debate, focussing on economical values and other positive effects, but not so much on the moral virtues of tolerance and respect (de los Reyes, 2001).

All the same, the attempts to delineate the basic norms of Swedish society has since the late 1980’ies been a central issue in the public policies on integration, tolerance and recognition (Hertzberg, 2003). For instance, when a new educational policy for primary and secondary education, Lpo 94 and Lpf 94, was developed during the mid-1990s, it was clearly stated that education in Swedish schools should be firmly based on a set of values considered to be Swedish, and also derived from a Western and Christian tradition.

Another discussion has evolved during the last decade on the pros and cons of private faith schools, where especially leading members of the Social Democratic party has been critical of their presence from the perspective of social and cultural integration (Roth 2006). However, several parties in parliament have been more inclined to show tolerance instead of non-tolerance as Sweden has ratified well known human rights conventions such as the European Convention that open up the door for these kinds of schools. The establishment of private faith schools followed the “free-school” reform in Sweden in 1992, when private actors was allowed to arrange education, but has by many been seen as an unintended consequence of an reform which first and foremost was intended to open up for new educational philosophies, freedom of choice and/or parental-run cooperative schools.

Religious customs such as the headscarf has received mixed emotions and the overall stance could probably be describes as tolerance (in comparison to the burqa or the niqab which have attracted a more negative stance such as non-tolerance). For instance, in 2003, The National Agency of Education allowed for a prohibition of niqab and burqa, on the basis of educational concerns. However, the juridical legitimacy of this prohibition has been questioned, with reference to the law against discrimination. The current official guideline from the National Agency of Education is that the responsibility to decide if religious clothing should be allowed or not in the classrooms should be assigned to the individual teachers.
Many political commentators from different political quarters have - in the light of the dramatic examples mentioned above – been eager to draw lines between norms that could be seen as central in public and private lives (not at least for sustaining a common social identity) and norms that could be more negotiable and flexible. The candidates for the first kind of norms have often been - as was mentioned before - principles in criminal law and well known basic norms in human rights instruments such as the right to life, physical integrity, anti-discrimination principles, the protection of the basic interests of the child (“the best for the child”) and freedom of expression (Roth, 2005).

This shift has taken place in a more explicit way during the period of the Social democratic government in the beginning of the 21st century and it has been even more emphasized during the present right wing government (2012). From the current right wing government’s perspective - and from the perspective of the previous Social Democratic government - there has not occurred any inclination to delineate any special ethnic groups as groups in need of special protection or assistance. A general anti-discrimination policy has prevailed where all groups in society should receive the same kind of assistance in terms of equal rights and responsibilities. The governments have left the job to give more specific assistance to the local municipalities as the problems for various ethnic or national groups may differ depending upon the specific context.

In Sweden as elsewhere, the significant gulf between theory and practice haunts the political philosophy of multiculturalism. A number of studies (for a summary, see Hertzberg 2006) of the policy developed in the practice of street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky, 1980) clearly show a tendency to assimilatory ambitions. Partly counter to the relativistic or pluralist core of the multiculturalism and the diversity oratory, the practitioners of the welfare state repeatedly express – in discourse as well as in practice – a plea for conformity to perceived Swedish norms and standards. There is an attitude of non-tolerance vis-à-vis the norms and customs of minority groups that are perceived to be not in tune with the norms of the majority culture.

**Concluding remarks**

The Swedish state formation is relatively old. For a large portion of its history as a political entity, Sweden has exemplified cultural diversity in different senses - in terms of cultural contacts as well as population structure. Cultural exchanges with other countries have always taken place, and members of ethnic groups from other countries have been a constant presence, even though the numbers compared to the period after 1945 have been comparatively speaking rather small. From the period of the establishment of the centralized Swedish state and until the 19th century, a “nationalism” with a sharp focus upon religion dominated the public discourse, a nationalism which allowed for a rather generous form of cultural diversity as long as the people expressed their belonging to the Lutheran church.

After the second world war the official form of nationalism and social belonging changed to more cultural forms of nationalism that were seen as more acceptable in the light of world politics. The post war period of Sweden has been dominated by a cultural-ethnic nationalism in spite of an official multicultural ideology – especially during the two last decades of the 20th century. In this national narrative the concept of the welfare state and
it's assumed Swedish expression ("folkhemmet") has played an important role. During the first decades following the Second World War, the policies towards different immigrant and minority groups were in general purely assimilatory and the tolerance or respect for various cultural identities and customs were not very widespread.

In the middle of the 1970's, multiculturalism became an important element in the Swedish model of welfare-state politics. It established the principles that have guided Sweden's immigration policy ever since: equality, freedom of choice and partnership. It states equality of opportunity in all fields of social and economic life, freedom of choice as to the cultural identity the immigrant wants to assume, and partnership between immigrants, their associations and the larger society. The proclaimed egalitarian and multicultural ideology has legal backing. In most important matters, formal equality before the law holds true, as for example equal access to unemployment contributions and a large number of other social welfare benefits.

During the mid-1990's, we witnessed a shift in Swedish multiculturalism policy. Thereafter, the political rhetoric in Sweden's integration and minority politics often contains the words "same rights and responsibilities" and "same possibilities". The ideal of a multicultural Sweden was more and more downgraded and the emphasis was instead placed upon notions such as same rights and responsibilities and non-discrimination. If affirmative action or special rights for minorities were accepted it was only seen as a limited policy in the initial phases for the immigrant groups. This shift has taken place in a more explicit way during the period of the Social democratic government in the beginning of the 21st century and it has been even more emphasized during the present right wing government (2010).

During the last three decades, one central challenge regarding cultural diversity has been the gap between theory and practice in the multicultural policies. This also applies to Sweden's ratification of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. The gap could be seen as practical in the sense that the authorities have not been engaged in any substantial measures in, for example, the field of education. Critics of the official guidelines both in political and academic circles have been eager to emphasize that the traditional assimilation model, which characterized Swedish policy for several decades in the post war period is – on the whole - far from dead, and that the cultural diversity which has been endorsed officially has been rather limited in nature.

According to some analysts, Sweden has also problems of discrimination both with respect to the labour market and with respect to the provision of various important goods and services such as housing and educational opportunities. These problems have often gone hand in hand. For example, the Romani people have faced both cultural and economic discrimination. In the case of the organized members of the indigenous population - the Sámis - one of their central ways of living - the reindeer enterprise - also clashes with the economic activities of the majority population in northern Sweden, and the property rights institution of the modern market economy.

As a concept in official discourse, tolerance is - for example - among the core values in the national curriculum of 1994 for primary and secondary education (which was changed in the 2011). In addition to values such as democracy, generosity, gender equity tolerance is here seen as a
cornerstone in the civic education of the public school system. However, it is fair to say that the concept of tolerance has not received so much public attention and endorsement in the general public debate in recent years. Concept such as acceptance and respect are seen as more in tune with ideas of multiculturalism and integration as they mainly have been expressed by left-wing parties in parliament (Roth, 1999). Advocates of a multicultural society often express that multiculturalism in various forms are seen as a positive asset for all citizens – and – integration is also seen as a two way process which also include the majority population.

From the perspective of anti-discrimination law and officially endorsed human rights principles, intolerance is shown towards cultural traits and norms that are seen as violations of basic rights such as the respect for human dignity, physical integrity and life. As was mentioned above, “honour killings” and violence are seen as non-tolerable practices as well as practices that violate gender equity or practices that express homophobic attitudes. In certain areas the practices and rituals may be contested in the sense that there are advocates for but also critics that completely reject the practices.

Other religious customs such as dress codes receive mixed attitudes depending upon their characteristics. Thus, the perceived intolerance of migrant groups has been as much discussed as the perceived tolerance of the majority towards the minority. As mentioned above, the occurrences of burqa and niqab often receive heavy criticism in public debate. Obviously, the questions of tolerance and recognition of the practices of religious and cultural minorities has changed depending upon which values are emphasized. As in the example of burqa and niqab, tolerance and recognition of claims from religious minorities – in this case, Muslims – has repeatedly been turned down in various political settings with reference to universal human rights.

Some scholars claim that the strategy of the majority to employ universal rights in order to restrict the minorities’ freedom of religion, and deny the enactment of cultural practices, is a way of enforcing assimilation rather than a pluralistic integration (Billig, 1992), not least when concept of human rights is couched in a nationalistic idiom. Tolerance can also be, according to (Brown, 2006), comprehended in terms of power and as a productive force – a force that fashions, regulates and positions subjects, citizens and states as well as one that legitimates certain kinds of action. The history of Swedish multiculturalism shows how different political traditions inevitably shape – and even obstruct - the implementation of tolerance and recognition, even when there may be benevolence behind the scheme. The complexity at hand calls for a close attention to the national as well as the local contexts, where the religious practices in question, for instance the wearing of burqa or niqab, become an issue.

**Bibliography**


Introduction

Britain’s colonial legacy, together with various migratory movements in the 20th century, has led to an unprecedented diversity of ethnicities, cultures and religions in the composition of its population. The most recent census counts 4.5 million inhabitants of ‘ethnic minority’ background (for a population of around 59 million and not counting 700,000 Irish). While the history of immigration, notably from the Indian subcontinent and the Caribbean, and the formation of ‘post-immigration groups’ in the 20th century have been variously explored, recent patterns and new formations of cultural diversity are only beginning to be considered. Estimates for the recent arrival of Eastern European immigrants from the ‘A8’ accession countries vary, and the patterns of settlement and work such as of Poles and Lithuanians in the UK are insufficiently documented. ‘Cultural diversity’ in Britain today is multifaceted, complex and located in between old and established patterns of post-immigration diversity and newly emerging patterns of immigration, settlement and cultural difference.

The presence, in particular in Britain’s urban centres, of populations marked by unprecedented diversity, has been characterised as a new form of diversity, ‘super diversity’ (Vertovec, 2007) or ‘hyper diversity’ (Muir and Wetherell, 2010). It is suggested that this new diversity challenges conventional assumptions about how difference should be accommodated. Contemporary formations of ‘difference’, such as the presence of people of 179 nationalities in contemporary London, are seen to imply new challenges that require new and fine-tuned political responses. ‘Super diversity’ creates “gaps between policy and practice at all levels” (Muir and Wetherell, 2010: 9) and, according to Steven Vertovec (2007: 1027-8), challenges an older version of multiculturalism that fails to recognize an increasing fragmentation of ‘difference’.

While new constellations are undoubtedly significant, this picture may be incomplete. Demographic differentiation in one urban sphere does not change that significant numbers of people, and in particular those who are less visible or interesting as specimen of ‘old’ kinds of diversity, continue to subscribe to overarching identities that show no sign of abating. The Fourth Survey, a large quantitative study of identity patterns of British
minorities, established the significance of religious identities for British Asians (Modood, Berthoud and Lakey, 1997). Such shared experiences of diasporic life continue to shape identities, not least in relation to religion, for groups that are ready to mobilize around grievances and common claims and in particular when shared value commitments are seen to be under attack. ‘Super diversity’, new immigration or the emergence of ‘hybrid’ identities in one domain of British life do not discount other, more consolidated and less differentiated, group positions. The ‘diversity challenges’ that this report explores, are thus both old and new—they arise in relation to claims for respect, recognition and equality made by or on behalf of ethno-religious groups as well as in relation to newly emerging, urban and more individualized expressions of cultural diversity.

For this purpose this report is predominantly concerned with the accommodation and more broadly the political negotiation of the difference represented by two British post-immigration communities, Black-Caribbeans and Asians, in particular British Muslims. Our concern with these two communities allows considering relevant debates about cultural diversity, claims for equality and accommodation and the political response to such claims. In fact, most of the currently salient issues and conflicts over equality and cultural diversity can only be understood in the historical context of how these communities have made themselves heard and of how their claims and politics have been perceived as a ‘challenge’. The mobilization for religious equality and for the public accommodation of religion occurs against the background of concerns that have been raised and debated since, and even before, the Rushdie Affair of 1989/90. Contemporary struggles for racial equality are connected to the historical experiences of Black Caribbeans and to the mobilization and protest in response to inequality and discrimination, such as the Brixton uprising of 1981. While we do not wish to marginalize experiences and issues that do not fit these two narratives, we believe that a discussion of the most salient ‘diversity challenges’ of contemporary Britain needs to begin with these accounts.

In the first part of the report we thus prepare the ground for the discussion and introduce the historical context of current cultural diversity discourses. We offer a brief overview of the development of British debates on national identity, of British nationality law and race relations legislation. In the second part of the report, we provide an overview of the historical presence of the two post-immigration communities we are concerned with, Black-Caribbeans and Asians. We are particularly interested in moments of political mobilization and when claims advanced from minority positions were considered a problem. For the first community, Black Caribbeans, this means that we are particularly interested in responses to varying problematisations of their presence in Britain and, in particular, in the stigma of ‘black criminality’. In relation to Muslim claims, we consider the mobilization around claims and grievances in relation to the accommodation of religion in public life. We then proceed to discuss what the British experience of post-immigration diversity implies for ideas of acceptance, accommodation, recognition and tolerance and consider the place and development of such notions as public values, within law and institutions, and in everyday practices. We suggest that Britain finds itself in a position where there is the potential for post-immigration minorities not merely to be tolerated but to be actively and positively recognized and respected. Britain shows potential to move beyond a situation where diversity is only a negative challenge, requiring toleration, but is turned into a positive experience through equality and respect. This, however, remains a potential that for its achievement depends on continued
effort, political willpower and pressure from below. We also caution against a conception of linear progress. When claims for public recognition and equal respect are rejected, the fallback position may not be toleration but intolerance and an outright rejection of more minimal positions of forbearance. This could be characterized as the ‘enough already’ position: concessions that in the past were seen to have gone too far are said to require the muscular assertion of majority identities and majority claims, which – since the two are seen to be linked – is to be achieved primarily through a rejection of minority demands. Taking notice of ambiguous tendencies, the report explores ‘cultural diversity challenges’ with a view to positive opportunities as well as to the obstacles that are at hand in contemporary Britain.

Great Britain: State formation, national identity and citizenship

Roy Jenkins, then British home secretary, famously defined integration in 1968 “not as a flattening process of assimilation but as equal opportunity, accompanied by cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance” (Jenkins, 1967: 267). Jenkins’ notion of respect for the differences represented by post-immigration communities forms a powerful ideal in the development of British multiculturalism. As an ideal, it hardly gives a full account of the realities of how cultural diversity has been recognized, debated and politically accommodated in Britain. It highlights, however, that (some) British policy-makers were ready to acknowledge and positively engage with the reality of post-immigration diversity. In view of this diversity, Stuart Hall (1999) coined the notion ‘multicultural drift’ which he considers as the “unintended outcome of undirected sociological processes” geared towards an increasing visibility of post-immigration groups. In opposition to this drift, mono-cultural and racialized conceptions of ‘Britishness’ have been and continue to be articulated and to resonate strongly with significant numbers of the British population. Adapting the title of Enoch Powell’s infamous 1968 address, the pollster Ipsos Mori, in its ‘Rivers of Blood Survey’, finds that roughly 20% of the population admit to racial prejudices whilst significantly higher numbers consider immigration and its impact a negative (MORI, 2008). While the subsequent parts of this report give a more detailed account of the historical formation of ethnic minorities in Britain in between those two poles, the ideal of multiculturalism and the ‘spectre’ of homogeneous nationhood, this part prepares the ground with some numbers, an excursion into aspects of the development of British identity, of British nationality law, race relations policies and, finally, theoretical and normative perspectives on cultural diversity in Britain.

The picture of diversity

Reflecting the more than 200 languages spoken (CMEB, 2000: 236), the 2001 Census revealed that the British population is more ethnically diverse than ever before. Alongside the ethnic breakdown the Census shows that there are at least 1.6 million people in the United Kingdom who currently describe their religious faith as Islam. This represents 2.9% of the British population, and makes Islam the most populous faith after Christianity (72%); more numerous than Hinduism (less than 1%, numbering 559,000), Sikhism (336,000), Judaism (267,000) and Buddhism (152,000). Of the Muslim constituency, 42.5% are of Pakistani origin, 16.8% of Bangladeshi,
8.5% of Indian, and—most interestingly—7.5% of other white. This is largely taken to mean people of Turkish, Arabic and North-African ethnic origin who do not define themselves in racial terms. It will also however include East European Muslims from Bosnia and Kosovo, as well as white Muslims from across Europe. Black-African (6.2%), Other Asian (5.8%) and British (4.1%) dominate the remaining categories of ethnic identification in the census options. Even with this heterogeneity, it is still understandable—if inadequate—that Muslims in Britain are associated first and foremost with a South Asian background, especially since they make up roughly 68% of the British Muslim population.

Britain’s ethnic minority communities are not equally distributed but concentrated in England (95.5% as 9% of the population). In 2001, 45% of the ethnic minority population resided in Greater London (19% of all residents) and another 8% in region South East of London. 13% live in the West Midlands (conurbation of Birmingham), 8% in the North West (Liverpool, Lancashire), 7% in Yorkshire and Humberside (Newcastle) and 6.3% in the East Midlands, mainly Leicester, where they represent a third of the population. There are 23 constituencies with an ethnic minority population between 40.5% (Vauxhall) and 66.3% (East Harrow) (ONS, 2003). 85% of all refugees and asylum seekers reside in London or the South West. Immigrants and ethnic minorities form distinct, recognisable communities.

British public opinion generally seems appreciative of the fact of cultural diversity (MORI, 2005), with a majority (77%) disagreeing with the statement that ‘to be truly British you have to be white’, though 18% agree (MORI, 2009). Positive attitudes towards diversity however do not necessarily translate into support for multiculturalism. This might also be a result of the dichotomous framing of issues in public discourse (that is replicated in survey questions), such as a contrast between ‘celebrating diverse values’ (27%) and ‘developing a shared identity’ (41%) (MORI, 2009: 3). What this then shows is a widespread appreciation of the fact of cultural diversity and a decline of colour racism that is particularly stark in its historical dimension (Park et al., 2010). However, this positive spirit does not equally extend to more specific attitudes of respect for concrete manifestations of diversity, such as for religious identities (Voas and Ling, 2010).

### Table 1. British population by ethnicity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Born</th>
<th>Overseas</th>
<th>% of total population</th>
<th>% of all ethnic minorities</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Total Population</td>
<td>58.789.194</td>
<td>4.900.000</td>
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<td>100</td>
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<tr>
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<td>54.153.898</td>
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<tr>
<td>Irish</td>
<td>691.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>All ethnic minorities</td>
<td>4.635.296</td>
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<td>7.9</td>
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<td>677.117</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>11.0</td>
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<td>All black</td>
<td>1.148.738</td>
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<tr>
<td>Black Caribbean</td>
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<td>238.000</td>
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<td>1.0</td>
<td>13.6</td>
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<td>Black African</td>
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<td>322.000</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>All Asian</td>
<td>2.331.423</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.97</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>1.053.411</td>
<td>570.000</td>
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<td>1.7</td>
<td>21.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pakistani</td>
<td>747.285</td>
<td>336.000</td>
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<td>1.3</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladeshi</td>
<td>283.063</td>
<td>152.000</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>6.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>247.403</td>
<td>176.000</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Asian</td>
<td>247.664</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Ethnic</td>
<td>230.615</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Census 2001
National identity

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland came into being in a series of treaties between its constituent nations, England and Wales in 1536, with Scotland in 1707 and with Ireland, thus formalizing its long-standing occupation, in 1801. Not dissimilar to other nation states, its creation involved political, administrative and imaginative efforts. Such efforts, however, had to take account of the fact of internal diversity, represented by the United Kingdom’s constituent nations of England, Scotland, Wales and (Northern) Ireland, and the legacy of empire.

Linda Colley (1992) suggests that British national identity, based on a Protestant culture and in opposition to Catholicism within and to the Catholic powers on the continent, was forged in relation to religious ‘Otherness’ and to the difference represented by the vast overseas territories of the colonial empire. Such repertoires of identity have been lost along with the empire and in line with the declining political salience of Protestant religious identification. Devolution and the resurgence of national identities in Wales and Scotland have further put into question what a source of British identification might be. This sense of uncertainty about the content of British national identity has recently become the point of departure for political attempts to give new meaning to what it means to be British.

This has been a concern for Gordon Brown who in numerous public statements since 2005 made the case for a new emphasis on ‘Britishness’. The content of ‘Britishness’, however, appears somewhat undecided. The definition of particularities that invite identification seems difficult. Historically, internal diversity had often remained unacknowledged and attributes that were considered British had been revealed as mere generalizations of cultural Englishness. Englishness, however, will be less than welcome in Scotland and Wales, and a comprehensive set of cultural attributes might be perceived as an obstacle in the way of post-immigration communities to subscribe to the idea of a national identity.

Citizenship and immigration law

Similar to the difficult negotiation of British identity, British citizenship had to catch up with changing conceptualisations of the nation state and with the legacy of the empire. One such legacy was the tension between broad principles of citizenship, which with the British Nationality Act 1948 granted some 800 million subjects the right to entry and settlement on the British Isles, and the growing salience of anti-immigrant sentiment. The 1948 Act created the category of ‘Citizenship of the United Kingdom and Colonies’ (CUKC) and encompassed all formerly or presently dependent, and now Commonwealth, territories (regardless of whether passports were issued by independent or colonial states).

One outcome was Caribbean immigration as migrants from the Caribbean were invited and recruited to assist in post-war reconstruction. During Winston Churchill’s post-war Caribbean tour, for example, he famously appealed to Jamaicans to “Come and help rebuild your Motherland!” (quoted in Murphy, 1989: 88), whilst London Transport and the British Hotels and Restaurants Association set up recruiting offices in Barbados (ibid.).
The 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act discarded the principle of free entry for CUKC persons and introduced work voucher quotas. It continued to permit free entry only to those CUKC whose passports had been issued in Britain and not by a dependent or protectorate territory. Later, the 1968 Commonwealth Immigration Act restricted the unqualified right of British passport holding former dependents to enter the UK whilst the 1971 Immigration Act implemented a combination of ius soli (citizenship by territory) and ius sanguine (citizenship by descent) in order to severely curtail primary Commonwealth immigration by establishing a “partiality” clause (or the right to abode) as the legal basis of rightful belonging. Instead of replacing the CUKC with an exclusive definition of British citizenship, the Act put Commonwealth immigrants on the same legal footing as other aliens whilst prioritising entry from the ‘old Commonwealth’ if people from Australia, Canada and New Zealand could demonstrate British lineage (and others such as Anglo-Indians). The 1981 Nationality Act later withdrew a right to settlement to most Commonwealth citizens.

Table 2. Main Minority and Immigrant Groups in Britain and their Dimensions of Difference

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions of difference</th>
<th>Citizenship</th>
<th>Racial</th>
<th>Ethnic</th>
<th>Religious</th>
<th>Cultural</th>
<th>Linguistic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Native minorities</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welsh</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scots</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladeshis</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indians</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistanis</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Caribbeans</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africans</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘A8’ Countries</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Roma</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own elaboration

Race-relations legislation

The history of citizenship and immigration law thus shows a transition from imperial subjecthood to a ‘normalized’ version of national citizenship. Britain’s racial equality agenda was developed in the context of such restrictions. In the first place, it took some time for policy makers to recognize that racial discrimination constituted an embarrassment and a normative, political and legal problem. In the 1960s, the ‘colour bar’ in British society, the widespread and open discrimination on grounds of race was increasingly perceived as a problem. The connection to restrictions of immigration rules was, as the Labour politician Roy Hattersley MP suggested, that “[w]ithout integration, limitation is inexcusable; without limitation, integration is impossible”. The outset of the British racial equality agenda was thus conditionally tied to restrictions of immigration.

There has been legislation in United Kingdom outlawing discrimination on racial grounds since the mid-sixties. The Race Relations Act 1965 introduced relatively moderate legislation outlawing discrimination, based upon colour, race, nationality (including citizenship) or ethnic or
national origins, but not on grounds of religion or belief, such as in relation to access to premises open to the public such as hotels, bars and restaurants. Three years later, and running parallel to the aforementioned Commonwealth Immigration Act 1968, an additional Race Relations Act (1968) extended protection to employment, housing, education and the provision of further goods, facilities and services. The main legislation currently in force is the Race Relations Act 1976, as amended in 2000, which provides individuals with the right to bring civil proceedings for discrimination, defines permitted ‘positive action’, established the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE), and covers all areas of employment, education, housing and, more recently, urban planning.

This legislation was substantially strengthened by the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 after the inquiry into the London Metropolitan Police investigation of the murdered black teenager Stephen Lawrence, which extended its scope to cover nearly all functions of public authorities (for the first time including the police but still excluding the immigration service), simultaneously widening the remit of the statutory duty of public authorities to promote race equality. The way in which this Act relates to the longer history of British colour racism and, in particular, to the theme of ‘black criminality’ will be one of the concerns of the following (see 3.b), as well as the more recent efforts to update the equality agenda with the Equalities Act 2010 (3.c).

**Multiculture and ethno-religious identities**

There are contending perspectives on cultural diversity in Britain. The ‘super diversity’ theme that we have introduced previously points to a fragmentation of difference, as the sheer diversity of the various minority groups makes it difficult to lump them together. It contrasts with a continued interest in groups, their claims and their political agency. A related tension exists between, on one hand, ‘multiculture’ that prioritises practices of mixing and hybridity, and, on the other, a perspective that considers and takes seriously claims geared towards the preservation of difference.

‘Multiculture’ has been coined in relation to situations of everyday cultural and ethnic diversity, ‘conviviality’ and particularly the Black-Caribbean experience in Britain. It captures moments of contact, mixing, cultural exchange and interaction often in, but not restricted to, urban settings. It is concerned with the hybridisation of culture and the creation of cultural and social spaces that allow for relatively effortless encounters. ‘Multiculture’ is generally not introduced as a programme of social change that would lend itself to implementation by policy makers and in public institutions. Paul Gilroy (1995: 4) suggests that it is not a “clearly delineated goal or a refiend state”; rather, it is something that happens in the microcosm of urban life. It consists of the “promise and hetero-cultural dynamism of contemporary metropolitan life” (ibid.).

While the history of immigration in the United Kingdom is one of hybridity and cultural change, it is equally marked by attempts to maintain ideas and practices, or to change them in a way that preserves the core of what is considered valuable. Where the goal of ‘multiculture’ is to transcend the mere presence of cultural difference in favour of a hybridization of minority and majority culture, the claims of ethno-religious
difference are for public spaces that allow for, refrain from penalizing, and, ideally, respect the simultaneous assertion of claims for difference and inclusion. The goal is to transform the public sphere in order to turn negative into positive difference and to allow for the expression of religious beliefs and the accommodation of religious practices in the public rather than their confinement in the private realm (Modood, 2007).

Cultural diversity challenges in a historical perspective

In Britain the distinction between ‘multiculture’ and ethno-religious difference is despite the fact that a conventional view had assumed a unity of experience, claims and politics. With the fracturing of ‘political blackness’ in the late 1980s and in the course of a new Muslim assertiveness dissimilarities between the politics of minority groups became more apparent. Such dissimilarities have challenged the idea of a unified politics of multiculturalism and so they also challenge a one-size-fits-all type of tolerance.

This part of the report investigates how both types of differences have been made and re-made. It is concerned with moments of correspondence and separation and with coalition-building and political antagonism. It does not claim that the experience of Black-Caribbeans is synonymous with ‘multiculture’ while the claims of British Muslims correspond, in each and every case, with the preservation of ethno-religious difference. It does, however, suggest that the way British multiculturalism has developed over the last decades makes it reasonable to discuss ‘multiculture’ with reference to the Black-Caribbean experience and ethno-religious diversity with reference to British Muslims.

We need to take account of the Black-Caribbean presence and the Asian, and in particular Muslim, presence in the United Kingdom and of the claims to public accommodation and tolerance that have been put forward by members of these groups. The discussion is organised along three periods, 1948-1989 (with emphasis on the 1980s), 1989-2001 and from 2001 onwards. Rather than offering a detailed chronology and an in-depth account of post-immigration communities in Britain, it highlights crucial events of political mobilization that paved the way for new politicizations of difference, new grievances and new claims. Finally, it highlights social practices of ‘racial mixing’ and religious claims-making, in particular in the area of public education, and attempts a snapshot of the various responses such practices have elicited by majority society.

1948-1989: The development of post-immigration communities

The British experience of ‘coloured immigration’ has been seen as an Atlantocentric legacy of the slave trade, and policy and legislation were formed in the 1960s in the shadow of the US civil rights movement, black power discourse and the inner-city riots in Detroit, Watts and elsewhere. It was, therefore, dominated by the idea of ‘race’, more specifically by the idea of a black-white dualism.

It was also shaped by the imperial legacy, one aspect of which was that all colonials and citizens of the Commonwealth were ‘subjects of the Crown’. As such they had rights of entry into the UK and entitlement to all the benefits enjoyed by Britons, from NHS treatment to social security
and the vote (The right to entry was successively curtailed from 1962 so that, while in 1960 Britain was open to the Commonwealth but closed to Europe, twenty years later the position was fully reversed).

Socio-economically, ethnic minorities entered British society at the bottom. The need in Britain was for cheap, unskilled labour to perform those jobs in an expanding economy which white people no longer wished to do, and the bulk of the immigration occurred in response to this need. Research from the 1960s onwards established quite clearly that non-white people had a much worse socio-economic profile than white people and that racial discrimination was one of the principal causes.

Anti-discrimination legislation was introduced in 1965 and strengthened in 1968 and 1976. While this eliminated the open discrimination that was common up to that time (the ‘colour bar’), it did not mitigate its various less visible forms. The public appeal of anti-immigration rhetoric, its emphasis on themes of cultural incompatibility and conflict (Enoch Powell’s Rivers of Blood address; Britain, according to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, being ‘swamped’ by immigrants), did not contribute to an atmosphere of respect towards post-immigration communities. In line with anxieties over immigration that were (and are) open to be mobilized, the extension of racial equality was connected to restriction of entry: “without integration, limitation is inexcusable; without limitation, integration is impossible” (Roy Hattersley).

Even though this logic furthered the expansion of rights for those post-immigration groups already present, it did nothing to change that the presence of ethnic minorities was seen as a problem. Despite the abolition of the open “colour bar”, racism persisted in crude and polite forms (Fenton, 1999). The history of Britain as an immigration country is thus not only one of accommodation and increasing equality for settled communities, but also one of the changing ways in which the presence of ethnic minority groups is considered problematic.

Black Caribbeans

A symbolic moment in the beginning Black-Caribbean presence was the landing of the S.S. Empire Windrush in June 1948 with 491 Jamaicans on board responding to appeals by Winston Churchill, amongst others, to come help ‘rebuild the Motherland’. Annual arrivals from 1948 to 1952 numbered under 27,550. For several reasons including the United States Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) (1952) (also known as the McCarran-Walter Act) curbing Caribbean emigration to the US; economic and political instability accompanying immediate decolonization; and the growing threat of immigration legislation in Britain, a dominant view arose that prospective immigrants had to leave the Caribbean immediately – ‘to beat the ban’ (Hiro, 1992) - or not at all. By 1960, annual arrivals rose to 49,650 before increasing to 66,300 during the following year. By the time the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act was introduced the number had decreased to 31,800. Soon after arrivals from the Caribbean numbered only 3,241 in 1963, but peaked at 14,848 in 1965 before falling rapidly to less than 10,000 in the average year. By 1976 the Caribbean immigrant and post-immigrant population had reached half a million people.
Black-Caribbeans arriving in Britain were highly anglicized (Hiro, 1992: 19-25). Nonetheless, they encountered a hostile environment with ‘No Coloured’ or ‘Europeans only’ signs in frequent display. The ‘colour bar’ in British society and widespread attitudes of hostility made the early presence of Black-Caribbeans, and their position in employment, housing and public services, marginal and problematic. The characterization of what made their presence problematic, however, changed over time. In line with biological racism and powerful cultural conceptions, ‘miscegenation’, racial mixing and inter-ethnic partnering, was one such problem account. Laziness, drug use, prostitution and disease were additional notions applied in public discourse to characterize the Black-Caribbean population (Gilroy, 2002). The 1970s saw in particular the discovery of ‘black criminality’ (see below).

The anti-racist mobilization of the 1980s, as well as various outbreaks of urban unrest (‘race riots’), was not least in response to the discriminatory exercise of police powers towards black people. Conflicts occurred frequently in the proximity of youth clubs, parties, reggae festivals and local fairs when police intervened to ‘restore order’. Observing that public disorder often broke out around such venues, a memorandum by the London police force, the Met, remarked in 1976 with a measure of surprise that “members of London’s West Indian community do appear to share a group consciousness” (quoted in Gilroy, 2002: 118).

Inspired by the politicisation of black cultural expression and black pride in the United States, the quest for self-affirmation and the celebration of black identity occurred in the context of a discovery of new types of expression in art, music and literature. Arguably, the gradual normalization of the Black-Caribbean presence in Britain is closely connected to the development of these cultural forms and to their adoption in majority youth and popular culture (Gilroy, 2002: 204-5). This route, however, has not been without setbacks and contradictions. In particular, the appeal of black culture and the development of hybrid cultural forms in black urban Britain did not mean that prejudices vanished, as, for example, in relation to how the theme of ‘black criminality’ became a widespread image in the media and public representation in the course of the 1970s (Hall et al., 1978).

Asians

The British Asian presence in the United Kingdom is a result of labour migration in the 1950s and 1960s, of the expulsion of Indians from East Africa in the early 1970s, and of the family unification that continued after the restrictions of the late 1960s and up to the mid-1980s. While ‘Asian’ refers to South Asian and, in particular, to Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi origins, the label covers a variety of backgrounds. It includes Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims as well as a variety of languages or dialects. It entails a variety of local backgrounds that are of importance for understanding how patterns of kinship and solidarity impact on political mobilization.

While the majority of Indians is of Punjabi or Gujarati background, some London boroughs, in particular Southall, are home to large numbers of Sikhs. Bradford Muslims, for example, originate in particular from the Mirpur district of Pakistani Kashmir. Diverse patterns of local settlement
and the variety of ethnic and religious backgrounds point to difficulties with the label ‘Asian’. ‘Political blackness’ as a designator for shared Black and Asian experiences came under increasing strain in the course of the 1980s.

The category ‘Asian’, in turn, encompasses a variety of experiences and position that made this label too appear rather loose and increasingly meaningless for an understanding of political mobilization among differentiated communities. Majority perceptions of the difference represented by Asians and black Caribbeans further served to separate the two. Michael Banton (1979: 242) captured such changing problematisations of difference in earlier decades of the post-immigration presence:

the English seemed to display more hostility towards the West Indians because they sought a greater degree of acceptance than the English wished to accord; in more recent times there seemed to have been more hostility towards Asians because they are insufficiently inclined to adopt the English ways.

More recently, Pnina Werbner (2004: 899) points to a further, internal differentiation that leads her to identify two diasporic spheres of British Asianness: “Whereas Asians are perceived to be integrating positively into Britain, contributing a welcome spiciness and novelty to British culture, Muslims are regarded as an alienated, problematic minority.” In addition, Werbner suggests that the way differences are negotiated within Asian communities is muddled and conflictual. Intellectuals and artists within the minority groups challenge customs and traditional structures of authority. Their contributions, such as Salman Rushdie’s writings or movies like Bend it like Beckham not only give accounts of the negotiation of difference in minority groups but are increasingly well received by British majority society.

This hybrid and, in Werbner’s terms, “impure” sphere of British Asianness contrasts with a second sphere of diaspora where differences are preserved and kinship groups continue to play a significant role. The average Pakistani in Britain, for instance, feels a sense of not only belonging to an extended family but also to a birādari (kinship group) of which a branch is in Britain but the centre of which is in Pakistan (Shaw, 2000).

Such patterns and practices, for Pakistanis and other South Asian groups, are neither stable nor deterministic of individual behaviour. They do however constitute repertoires of identification that continue to be meaningful and important for significant numbers of people. For British Muslims such differences of kinship groups and the diversity of cultures, languages and national backgrounds have meant that a homogeneous version of British Islam has not emerged, nor is it likely that it will. Nonetheless, shared belief (as well as the shared experience of rejection on grounds of belief) have meant that in recent years Muslim identity has become increasingly salient.

**Political blackness**

While the politics of difference in the United Kingdom underpins various kinds of political claims and types of cultural expression, there has been considerable reluctance to differentiate. The categories of
‘political blackness’ proceeded from the idea of a shared experience of discrimination across ethnic and religious backgrounds. The British population was thus divided into two groups, black and white. The former consisted of all those people who were potential victims of colour racism, though in both theory and practice they were assumed disproportionately to have the characteristics of the African-Caribbean population (Modood, 1994). Thus a fundamental problem for political blackness came from an internal ambivalence, namely whether blackness as a political identity was sufficiently distinct from and could mobilize without blackness as an ethnic pride movement of people of African descent. This black identity movement, in a growing climate of opinion favourable to identity politics of various kinds, was successful in shifting the terms of the debate from colour-blind individualistic assimilation to questions about how white British society had to change to accommodate new groups.

But its success in imposing a singular identity upon a diverse ethnic minority population was temporary and illusory. What it did was pave the way to a plural ethnic assertiveness, as South Asian groups, including Muslims, borrowed the logic of ethnic pride and tried to catch up with the success of a newly legitimized black public identity. Indeed, it is best to see this development of racial explicitness and positive blackness as part of a wider socio-political climate which is not confined to race and culture or non-white minorities. Feminism, gay pride, Quebecois nationalism, and the revival of Scottishness are some prominent examples of these new identity movements which have come to be an important feature in many countries, especially those in which class politics has declined.

While anti-racism and political multiculturalism in the period up to the late 1980s operated and mobilized with reference to a unified position of ‘political blackness’, this position turned out less and less suitable for the actual issues of anti-racist concern. This became more apparent in the course of Brixton riots of 1981 and the ‘Honeyford affair’ of 1986.

*New cross fire and Brixton riots*

We have already suggested that the Black-Caribbean presence in Britain has been associated with various and changing types of problems. ‘Miscegenation’ was one such problem account that we will return to below. Another one was black criminality. This theme was developed and extended in the course of the 1970s (Hall et al., 1978; Gilroy, 2002: Ch. 3). In particular low-level street criminality, mugging, was framed as a quintessentially black type of deviance. The police response was to identify ‘high risk’ neighbourhoods in which it would come down in a heavy-handed manner, using stop and search laws (so-called ‘sus’ laws) in a fashion that amounted, frequently, to racial profiling. The insensitivity, if not downright racism, of such operations precipitated hostility towards the police.

While ‘sus’ operations created tensions in a variety of British communities, 1981 saw a heightening of such tensions in London. A fire in New Cross, south-east London, that led to the death of thirteen black teenagers marked the starting point for remarkable episodes of unrest. It is contested whether, in an area known for racist attacks, the fire was
deliberately set off or the result of an accident. It is clear, however, that the police reacted with insensitivity and indifference. The New Cross Fire, or—for those who took it to be arson—the New Cross Massacre, became the single largest moment of political mobilization, with 20,000 protestors marching through London (Howe, 1999). Together with Operation Swamp ’81, a particularly intrusive, heavy handed stop-and-search operation by the London Metropolitan Police (the ‘Met’) in Brixton, it marked the context of some of the most significant episodes of urban unrest in recent British history.

The Brixton riots of 1981, together with various other episodes of unrest such as in St. Pauls (Bristol), Toxteth (Liverpool), Chapeltown (Leeds) and Handsworth (Birmingham) are frequently regarded as a turning point in British race-relations as they brought into focus the response of newly assertive youth cultures to the experience of racism and deprivation. The Brixton unrest became the subject of an inquiry chaired by Lord Scarman. Identifying the immediate causes of the riots, the inquiry pointed to “spontaneous act of defiant aggression by young men who felt themselves hunted by a hostile police force” (Scarman, 1986: 46).

Controversially for those who subscribed to the notion of ‘high risk neighbourhoods’ to justify ‘sus’ operations, it thus took notice of how police operations and discriminatory stop-and-search practices had prepared the ground for discontent. In its further diagnosis, however, Scarman fell short in identifying more fundamental causes for the police conduct: how, institutionally, the theme of ‘black criminality’ permeated the Met and made heavy-handed and discriminatory policing the natural response to the ‘problematic’ nature of the Black-Caribbean community. The report noted how economic deprivation had facilitated the unrest and it advocated a programme of urban renewal that, due to a lack of funding, did not yield tangible results.

The Honeyford affair

An early conflict in which racial equality, ethnicity, and religion came to be combined was ‘the Honeyford Affair’ (Halstead, 1988). Ray Honeyford was headteacher of a Bradford local authority school in which the majority of pupils were of Pakistani descent and Muslim. In a series of articles in 1983-1984 in a national right-wing journal, the Salisbury Review, he argued that the education of children such as those in his school was being stifled by the cultural and religious practices of their parents. These, he argued, prevented Pakistani ethnicity children, especially girls, from becoming proficient in English, participating in the full curriculum (e.g. in sport, dance, and drama), from socializing with whites, and from succeeding fully in British education and society. He was particularly critical of what he said was the widespread practice of Pakistani parents taking or sending their children to Pakistan for weeks or months at a time, disregarding the school calendar. These comments—many of which were indeed the concerns of educationalists—were presented in an extremely critical, generalizing way that portrayed Pakistani working-class culture and aspects of Islam in a negative way and were augmented by comments about Pakistan as ‘obstinately backward’, plagued by ‘corruption at every level’, and the ‘heroin capital of the world’ (Honeyford, 1984).
The articles were judged as racist by white anti-racists, locally and nationally, and some secular Asian activists, who initiated a call for Honeyford’s resignation, which soon came to be supported by most of the parents and the leading local Muslim organizations, including the Bradford Council of Mosques. The Bradford Pakistani community was agitated by the public airing of unflattering comments about them, exacerbated by the distribution of Urdu translations of Honeyford’s views by his opponents (Samad, 1992: 513).

These communities, largely from peasant Kashmiri background, culturally more conservative, and influenced by ties of kinship, began to stand up for itself against what it perceived to be insults to its culture and to its religious restrictions, especially as they applied to gender and sexuality. Leftwing anti-racists therefore came to mobilize alongside conservative Pakistanis on the issue of community honour and in due course the alliance was successful and Honeyford was pressured into early retirement. The wider and longer-term effect of the alliance and of other local developments of the time was to develop the Pakistani community, especially the mosque leadership, as a political force in Bradford, at the expense of white anti-racists and others rooted in a secular, multi-ethnic coalition, as the former considerably outnumbered the latter (Samad, 1992).

The Honeyford Affair suggests that, by the late 1980s, the label of ‘political blackness’ had become increasingly unsustainable. Indeed, political blackness was unravelling at a grass-roots level at the very time that it was becoming hegemonic as a race relations discourse in British public life (see Modood, 1994).

**1989-2001: New ethnicities, new claims, new politics**

While earlier events had shown cracks in the coalition, subsequent moments of political mobilization showed the extent to which claims and grievances of different ethnic minority groups in British society developed along different trajectories. In the period from 1989 and 2001, the Rushdie affair and the murder of Stephen Lawrence are two such moments of particular visibility.

**The ‘Rushdie affair’**

The single event that most dramatically illustrated the emergence of new forms of ethno-religious actors —with again Bradford a scene of action, and damaged honour a cause of mobilization— was the battle over the novel, *The Satanic Verses* (SV), that broke out in 1988–9, with Muslims protesting its portrayal of the Prophet Muhammad and other revered figures. This time the secular anti-racists were virtually absent from the conflict, for while many were sensitive to the racial stereotyping and divisions it was causing, they were unhappy that it was fuelled by religious anger. Above all they saw it as a case in which freedom of speech should not be compromised, but reluctant to join in the chorus against Muslims they mainly kept a low profile.

On the Muslim side, however, it generated an impassioned activism and mobilization on a scale greater than any previous national campaign.
against racism. Many ‘lapsed’ or ‘passive’ Muslims (Muslims, especially, the non-religious, for whom hitherto their Muslim background was not particularly important) (re)discovered a new community solidarity and public identity. This is movingly described by the author Rana Kabbani, whose *Letter to Christendom* begins with a description of herself as ‘a woman who had been a sort of underground Muslim before she was forced into the open by the Salman Rushdie affair’ (Kabbani, 1989: ix).

What was striking was that when the public rage against Muslims was at its most intense, Muslims neither sought nor were offered any special solidarity by any non-white minority. It was in fact some white liberal Anglicans that tried to moderate the hostility against the angry Muslims, and it was inter-faith forums than political-black organizations that tried to create space where Muslims could state their case without being vilified.

Political blackness —seen up to then as the key formation in the politics of post-immigration ethnicity— was seen as irrelevant to an issue which many Muslims insisted was fundamental to defining the kind of ‘respect’ or ‘civility’ appropriate to a peaceful multicultural society, that is to say, to the political constitution of ‘difference’ in Britain. The SV affair, then, divided anti-racists and egalitarians, giving rise to organizations like Women Against Fundamentalists, an offshoot of Southall Black Sisters, who turned up at Muslim demonstrations to publicly express their support for Rushdie. Other egalitarians tried to assimilate Muslim concerns into the equality movement and to some extent this division has since become a feature within the broad politics of ‘multiculturalism’ in Britain.

*Stephen Lawrence and the Macpherson inquiry*

On 22 April 1993, a black teenager, Stephen Lawrence, was stabbed to death while waiting for the bus in Eltham, South-East London. Even though the attack was visibly racist in motivation, the Met operated under the assumption that drug-related violence among teenagers had led to the stabbing. The failure to consider evidence that did not accord with the foregone conclusion that an altercation among criminals had taken place meant that the five suspects were never successfully prosecuted (the testimony of Lawrence’s friend, Duwayne Brooks, who had been present during the attack was dismissed).

The murder of Stephen Lawrence, and the police handling of the inquiry, thus pointed to, as Stuart Hall (1999: 189) suggested “how racialized difference is … negotiated at a deeper level, where unreconstructed attitudes find a sort of displaced but systematic expression in places which the utopian language of ‘multicultural Britain’ cannot reach.” Only the efforts of Stephen Lawrence’s parents in pressing for an investigation into the murder of their son kept the issue alive in the following years, until the scandal attracted attention in the broader public and the mainstream media (Daily Mail).

An inquiry, commissioned by Home Secretary Jack Straw (promised when Labour were in opposition) and chaired by Sir William Macpherson, to investigate the Metropolitan Police’s handling of the investigation into the murder of Stephen Lawrence, detected both “incompetence and racism” (Macpherson, 1999: para. 2.11) and noted
the “hitherto underplayed dissatisfaction and unhappiness of minority ethnic communities […] as to their treatment by police” (Macpherson, 1999: para 2.15).

‘Institutional racism’, though no individually attributable racist conduct, were seen to prevail in some branches of the police and the report highlighted “the collective failure of an organization to provide an appropriate and professional service to people because of their colour, culture or ethnic origin” (Macpherson, 1999: para. 6.34). Home Secretary Jack Straw promised to make the report a watershed (see McLaughlin and Murji, 1999), and introduced the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 that imposed a set of obligations on public authorities to deal with internal discrimination and institutional racism.

There are continuing concerns about the disproportionate exercise of stop and search powers against black and Asian people. However, the years from Stephen Lawrence’s murder and since the adoption of the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 have seen institutional discrimination on grounds of colour become an established concern. This has led some commentators, for example Trevor Phillips and John Denham, to diagnose the end of racism in Britain. While the last two decades have indeed seen great strides forward in combating discrimination on grounds of colour, such statements are blind to different forms of racism that do not fit the colour schema.

Considering black/police relations from Scarman to Macpherson, Stuart Hall pointed to processes of “differentiation” among ethnic minority groups. With reference to findings from the Fourth Survey (Modood, Berthoud and Lakey, 1997), Hall noted that such processes undermined the tired notion of an undifferentiated block of ‘ethnic minority’ people, homogenously characterized by their ‘otherness’ (Them), versus an equally homogeneous white ‘majority’ (Us) to whose unified culture and ‘way of life’ the former must assimilate or perish. These fundamentally binary terms in which British race relations have been mapped have essentially collapsed. (Hall, 1999: 191)

The discontent that had been articulated on the streets of Brixton was, in short, not what brought Muslims to the streets of Bradford. While this does not mean that, in principle, solidarity between such groups should have been impossible, it highlights that ‘political blackness’ did not lend itself as a unifying theme, particularly in light of new types of Muslim political mobilization. In a very short space of time ‘Muslim’ became a key political minority identity, acknowledged by Right and Left, bigots and the open-minded, the media and the government. This politics has meant not just a recognition of a new religious diversity in Britain but a new or renewed policy importance for religion.

After 2001: Cohesion, equality and islamophobia

Turning to contemporary conditions of racial equality and ethno-religious accommodation, various forces seem to be at play. The Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 revealed a strong commitment on the part of the Labour government to extend and consolidate the field of racial equality. This commitment coincided with a new accentuation of civic commonality and shared lives, a priority that was reflected in the turn
towards the concept of ‘community cohesion’. In the summer of 2001 various episodes of unrest in the north of England, and the involvement of young British Muslims in this violence, were generally seen as a case for how previous strategies of multicultural accommodation had led to separateness and segregation. This was then diagnosed as a root cause of unrest, an explanation that could be extended to cover, in 2005, the bombing of London buses and underground services.

**Community cohesion and the ‘civic turn’**

In the summer of 2001 after civil unrest and ‘rioting’ that had taken place in some northern towns, home to both a small and large number of Muslims, David Blunkett (2001: 3) stated that ‘one of this government’s central aims is to achieve a society that celebrates its ethnic diversity and cultural richness; where there is respect for all, regardless of race, colour or creed’. In the same statement he gave notice of Home Office-funded teams which would ‘undertake an urgent review over the summer of all relevant community issues’ (Blunkett, 2001: 3). A contemporaneous local Bradford report set the pattern for official questioning of multiculturalism by arguing that particular communities, widely understood as Muslim communities, were self-segregating, an alleged tendency that was described in another report as the phenomenon of leading ‘parallel lives’ (Cantle, 2001).

In charging Muslim communities with self-segregating and adopting isolationist practices under a pretence of multiculturalism (for an analysis see Bagguley and Hussain, 2006), these reports pioneered an approach found in other post-riot accounts, and which provided many influential commentators with the licence, not necessarily supported by the specific substance of each report, to critique Muslim distinctiveness in particular and multiculturalism in general. This has given rise to discourses of ‘community cohesion’ and a greater emphasis upon the civic aspects of integration, which have increasingly competed and sought to ‘re-balance’ the recognition of diversity in previous discourse and policy (Meer and Modood, 2009).

It is also important to understand, however, that in contrast to the ‘civic turn’ in much of North West Europe, the original interest in civic matters in Britain was not stirred by Muslim political claims-making. For following New Labour’s general election victory in 1997 a range of key actors, including politicians, pundits, academics, think-tanks and pressure groups, become increasingly concerned about a range of different problems, of which civic integration/participation was only one, but which mapped neatly onto the concerns of then salient social capital theorists such as Putnam with issues around trust, norms and networks (Kisby, 2006).

These perceived problems included concerns about a ‘democratic deficit’ and low voter turnout and, in particular, about civic and political disengagement and cynicism among young people. And it is for this reason that citizenship was revived as an educational issue. What needs to be understood is that issues of Muslim integration initially came to rest in this mould before the mould would be later re-cast. Thus when the term ‘community cohesion’ enters the lexicon, following an inquiry into civil unrest or ‘rioting’ in some Muslim areas in the North of England, the
commissioners conceive it as encompassing a ‘domain of social capital’ which facilitates ‘people [to] feel connected to their co-residents’ (Cantle, 2001: 74).

Equality and non-discrimination

We note the different trajectories charted in the legal system between those characterized as racial minorities and those conceived in religious terms. This is something that has potentially left Muslims vulnerable because, while discrimination against yarmulke-wearing Jews and turban-wearing Sikhs was deemed to be unlawful racial discrimination, Muslims, unlike these other faith communities, are not deemed to be a racial or ethnic grouping. Nor are they protected by the legislation against religious discrimination that did exist in one part of the UK: being explicitly designed to protect Catholics, it covers only Northern Ireland.

Similarly, incitement to religious hatred was unlawful only in Northern Ireland, while the offence of incitement to racial hatred, which extended protection to certain forms of anti-Jewish literature, did not apply to anti-Muslim literature. Many years after this complaint was first raised, the hand of the British government was forced by Article 13 of the EU Amsterdam Treaty (1999), which issued the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations of 2003 which made discrimination on the grounds of religious belief illegal in the labour market, but fell short of demands for a wider social protection against incitement to religious hatred.

Of course while the directive was issued by the EC, it has been argued that its provenance in British and Dutch models such that “in effect, the British framework has been ‘uploaded’ to EU level” (Geddes and Guiraudon, 2008: 129). Indeed, it was not only the British but also some variation of the Dutch model, both of which are “linked to a network of actors including NGOs and academic activists with good links to European institutions, particularly the Commission and the Parliament” (ibid., 133). The Anglo-Dutch led Starting Line Group (SLG), although never present at actual negotiating tables, is illustrative of the way in which tested practises from British and Dutch contexts could be marshalled and mobilised to influence “the content of legislation because they had been fed into the Commission policy development process”.

This in Britain was, however, only a partial ‘catching-up’ with the existing anti-discrimination provisions in relation to race and gender. While religious discrimination was extended to cover the provision of goods and services in 2007, there was no duty upon the public sector to take proactive steps to promote religious equality as was created in respect of racial equality by the Race Relations Act (Amendment) Act 2000 and as also existed in relation to gender and disability, till the Equalities Act (2010). After considerable lobbying the government extended the public duty to include religion and belief and this was eventually included in this legislation that the recent Equalities and Human Rights Commission has been created to monitor.

As yet there is no prospect of religious equality catching up with the importance that employers and other organizations give to sex or race. A potentially significant victory, however, was made when the government
agreed to include a religion question in the 2001 Census. This was the first time this question had been included since the inception of the Census in 1851 and was largely unpopular outside the politically active religiousists, among whom Muslims were foremost. Nevertheless, it has the potential to pave the way for widespread ‘religious monitoring’ in the way that the inclusion of an ethnic question in 1991 had led to the more routine use of ‘ethnic monitoring’.

In sum, then, while original legal approach to anti-discrimination in Britain was the statutory tort of unlawful discrimination, subsequent developments, especially through European developments, have meant that this ‘public function’ of discrimination law has become more explicit. Moreover, UK discrimination law has come to accommodate some of the provisions of the ECHR through the Human Rights Act (1998).

These developments have led to what is sometimes described as the ‘constitutionalising’ of discrimination law. In other words the incorporation of the ECHR through the HRA has proven to be catalyst in shaping recent changes to anti-discrimination measures. This is perhaps most evident in the decision to name the commission entrusted with the task of monitoring the implementation and practice of all previous anti-discrimination legislation, as well as the two most recent EC Directives, as an Equality and Human Rights Commission and the move to recognize ‘intersectionality’ as a legitimate ‘ground’ in itself (Meer, 2010). Most significantly, the new legislative developments have, on the one hand, created a duty of multi-faceted equality in the public sector, and on the other hand, included religion. Whilst the latter involved the utilisation of an EU directive, it has gone much further than the EU required. Hence, in less than a decade, mainly under pressure from a Muslim lobby, the UK government has moved from denying the existence of religious discrimination to the strongest legislation on the offence in Europe.

**Definitions of respect and recognition in Great Britain**

With regard to claims advanced by post-immigration groups, we have pointed out some of the dissimilarities. Diverse experiences and social locations underpin particular concerns, responses to different experiences of stigmatization and different ideals of equality and respect. Beyond the practical specificity of this variation, we suggest that there are two broad versions of claims and that accommodation may take two basic forms, equal dignity and equal respect (Taylor, 1994; Modood, 2007).

Equal dignity requires the abolition of discriminatory laws and the incorporation of individuals *despite their differences* into a horizon of universal rights. Equal respect by contrast suggests that identity markers are considered for the value they represent to their bearers and that *because of such differences* law and policy need to respond differentially to the nature of the difference at stake. Where equal dignity has not been achieved, this is more often than not a question of the inadequate application of principles of equality and non-discrimination. This, however, is not the case with some of the most contested demands for equal respect that are advanced in contemporary Britain. Here political debates often showcase fundamental disagreement over the respect and recognition that is due to ethno-religious communities in the public sphere.
Recent debates on cultural difference in Britain have tended to pit the two varieties of claims and the ‘two kinds of difference’ against each other in a binary manner. Various theorists have over the last two decades contrasted *multiculturalism* with *multiculture*, suggesting their practical irreconcilability and a necessary antagonism. While to us such binary oppositions appear unnecessary (see Modood and Dobbearnack, 2011), we need to recognize that a regime that unites equal dignity with equal respect requires considerable fine-tuning and will inevitably raise conflicts and misunderstandings.

Britain is undoubtedly a forerunner with regard to the two domains. There has been a quicker recognition than, say, in Germany that post-immigration groups were here to stay; a greater readiness than in France to make symbolic representations of the nation and the national story hospitable to difference; and a greater concern with equality and greater respect for differences than what has been achieved in comparable immigration countries. The following thematizes the achievements of the British case in relation to the horizon of public values that are present and discernible in British discourses on difference, as an institutional arrangement and in social practices. Such achievements, it may be worth restating, are neither unambiguous, nor irreversible. They should be seen as potentials that depend for their achievement on continued political effort, such as the pressure from minority groups and political actors’ willpower.

**Values of the British regime of accommodation**

Roy Jenkins, we have noted in the beginning of the report, conceived of integration ‘not as a flattening process of assimilation but equal opportunity accompanied by cultural diversity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance’ (Jenkins, 1967: 267). A value horizon of what accommodation, ideally, should be about was thus formulated early on: it includes equality in a situation where partaking in the benefits of equal political and social citizenship would not require immigrants or their descendents to abandon cultural or religious attributes. We have suggested that this idea remains a powerful principle that despite problems in its implementation constitutes an ideal of British multicultural acceptance.

The accommodation of difference by means of equal respect, what Jenkins pointed to as the legitimacy of “cultural diversity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance”, has not been uncontested. It had to go against the idea of homogeneous white, protestant nationhood that Linda Colley (1992) points to as the past ferment of Britishness. In fact, as official discourse is ready to ‘celebrate diversity’, homogeneity continues to exert a pull such as when the space for religious difference is disputed or when economic crises reanimate racialized self-conceptions. The Report of the Commission on the Future of Multi-ethnic Britain (CMEB, 2000) highlighted how ‘rethinking the national story’, as the commission put it, was a necessity to open a space for post-immigration groups to find a place. This attempt to rethink Britain is not without ambiguities and continues to be marred by uncertainties as illustrated by Gordon Brown’s recent attempt to formulate a more tangible notion of Britishness (Brown, 2005).
Policies and institutional arrangements

We have pointed to the successive consolidation and institutionalization of racial equality since the 1970s. It is arguably not merely a desire for standards of racial equity that underpinned this development. The agenda was partially driven, on the centre-left, by the guilty conscience of policy-makers wanting to compensate for increasingly restrictive immigration rules and, on the right, by the desire to countervail racist unrest.

In its early days as well as in its more contemporary development, the broadening of the equality agenda is characterized by successive ‘discoveries’ of problems of inequality, invariably in response to minority mobilization. The ‘colour bar’, the openly racist discrimination in the labour market, including the public sector, and open racism in housing and social services, were first ‘discovered’ as a scandal in the 1960s and early 1970 and the first Race Relations Acts were thus intended to put an end to openly racist discrimination.

The insufficiencies of these first responses and the continued presence of an underbelly of racism were again revealed and thematized such as in the uprisings in Brixton and elsewhere. A more engaged response to the persistence of racism thus had to take account of more subtle stigmatizations of post-immigration groups, such as of the (more or less) coded representations of black criminality that Stuart Hall (1978) brought out.

The mobilization against ‘sus’ in the 1980s is thus in line with the scandalizing of the police response to the murder of Stephen Lawrence in the 1990s. Racism, in coded and institutionally entrenched forms, made public authorities adopt racist practices and prevent them from delivering an equal service to the members of post-immigration communities. The new legislative response to the Macpherson inquiry was not least welcomed as it engaged with the deeper structures of British racism that had previously been left undisturbed.

Equality in terms of the accommodation of religious beliefs and protection against discrimination on grounds of religion is, as mentioned above, another area where minority grievances – after long debates and in a process of tough lobbying – have been heard and codified such as, most recently, in the Equality Act 2010. Opening a place in British education for non-Christian faith schools or allowing for Muslim curriculum objectives are further challenges that continue to be politically contentious (Meer, 2007).

As regards the political process, the adoption of equality measures rarely proceeded without pressure from below. Minority agency in various forms, through public protests, advocacy groups or party-political channels, played an indispensable role. The most recent elections showed for example that the British Muslim electorate, though politically heterogeneous and difficult to mobilize en bloc, was considered a force to be reckoned with and candidates from all three major parties went to lengths to vow Muslim constituents.

Acceptance and accommodation as social practice

There is hardly an unambiguously discernible picture of the values that are embodied in the relations between British minorities and major-
ity groups on a variety of social levels. While this report has pointed to differences among post-immigration groups, ‘majority’ is an equally unwieldy denominator that potentially conceals the diversity of interactions between minorities and different strata of majority society. With regard to ‘racial mixing’ we have suggested that this differentiation is highly significant. Differential everyday experiences of diversity need to be considered as well as the way in which various socio-economic groups may have different experience of the post-immigration groups and individuals they encounter.

In a different matter, the problematisation of ‘mixing’, with its long-standing history in the theme of *miscegenation*, has not been displaced but at least amended by the official theme of celebrated diversity. British diversity is in fact often presented as an ‘asset’, as was particularly discernible in the early years of the Labour government of the late 1990s or in the more recent run-up to the London Olympics 2012. Cultural diversity as an asset is however at least partially counterbalanced by the rhetoric on immigration that tends to present outsiders as a threat to British economic well-being. The previous Prime Minister Gordon Brown, who was not above giving voice to such resentments – ‘British jobs for British workers’ –, experienced a backlash just before the May 2010 election when his remarks on the ‘bigotry’ of a staunch Labour supporter were accidentally recorded and subsequently made public. While immigration and asylum thus continue to be noxious political issues, such debates do not necessarily tarnish the more wide-spread appreciation of the fact of cultural diversity in Britain (MORI, 2005; 2009).

Conceivably, the increasing acceptability of cultural racism and in particular of Islamophobic resentment may tarnish this picture, even though the significance of ‘culture versus colour’ in British racism is contested. Robert Ford (2008) uses the British Social Attitudes (BSA) survey to advance a broader claim on the relative insignificance of cultural attributes. Other data, not least in the most recent BSA survey of 2010 (Voas and Ling, 2010), appears to challenge his account (which still works with the unwieldy and imprecise category of ‘Asians’) in particular in relation to Muslims.

There is thus considerable evidence of how everyday interaction across ethnic and cultural lines is more common and less remarkable than it used to be, say, two decades ago. There are practices of conviviality that are certainly difficult to capture with a view to how majorities tolerate minority practices. Rather we need to take notice of how in such processes of everyday exchange, as suggested by Paul Gilroy and Stuart Hall, culturally hybrid forms emerge and spread. The claims for respect and recognition that British Muslims put forward, too, are not predominantly about tolerance but for the public recognition and accommodation of religious belief.

**Conclusion**

Summary analyses of the British response to ethnic minority difference run into difficulties. Contravening tendencies are at play and progress in one domain may well coincide with regression in another. Achievements, such as in response to the Macpherson Inquiry, are not irreversible. An increasingly entrenched animosity against Islam mobilizes not only fringe groups but animates significant numbers within majority society. At the
same time, the Equality Act 2010 points to the readiness to engage with the claims and positions of minority groups and to further develop an agenda of multicultural accommodation.

Various scenarios are thus conceivable. The approach that was taken in relation to other types of differences could be carried forward and extended to ethno-religious groups; however, a second and equally conceivable path may involve a break from the better traditions of British multiculturalism and the rejection of identities and claims of British Muslims and other ethno-religious groups as impossible to accommodate. While there is the potential to ‘rethink the national story’ and to establish a kind of multicultural citizenship that has equality and respect written into it, there is equally the potential for regression even going back and beyond the norms of a more minimalistic *modus vivendi* towards ethno-nationalist parochialism.

As was the case with the relative waning of colour racism, historical analysis suggests that prejudice, even when it is deeply entrenched, is not beyond change. Such change may be driven by the liberalization of new generations’ attitudes. It may also be prompted by new visibilities of cultural or religious groups and an appreciation of their place in the broader cultural, social and political context of the nation, its narratives and representations. While some of the examples highlighted in this report offer considerable hope, the contemporary situation is aggravated by the amalgamation of global anxieties with local concerns. National debates continue to be at risk of being taken hostage by the ‘clash of civilization’ thesis and security concerns continue to be unhelpfully combined with questions of cultural pluralism.

British cultural pluralism has been positively captured by two different approaches. Multiculturalism, as concerned with the place and claims of ethno-religious groups, and multiculture, accounting for life, social practices and cultural production in urban diasporas, fit loosely and imperfectly to the experiences of South Asian and Black Caribbean post-immigration groups. Multiculture envisages the re-modelling of majority society’s standards of acceptance in a way that inscribes aspects of minority identity into majority culture. Multiculturalism is concerned with the reappraisal of difference as a positive fact instead of an unwelcome aberration. Its concern is with equal respect and with the need for Britain to adapt its regimes of citizenship, policies and laws to recognize cultural pluralism. In particular the focus is on making Britain hospitable to the practices and claims of ethno-religious groups. Multiculture, by contrast, is concerned with fashioning a form of equality that affords minority groups a place in the cultural representations of the nation. One of its achievements, we have suggested, was the abolition of the stigma that was historically directed at ‘mixed race’ individuals not merely for their imagined inferiority or ‘problematic’ identities but for how they constituted a challenge to classificatory regimes of national belonging.

The demands of both for public accommodation are discernible in the various claims and grievances of post-immigration groups. On the whole, British policy-making has been responsive to such claims and law and policies have been adapted to make space for various post-immigration differences, though this has been not without contradictions and countervailing tendencies. This report then suggests that there is the potential in Britain to further forms of respect, equality and multicultural recognition.
What this report could not fully investigate is a further area of critical questions regarding toleration and respect. These are not merely thrown up in the relationship of minority and majority groups. They extend further to how different forms of difference can be brought together, coexist and acknowledge each others’ legitimacy. For Britain, this is the challenge facing multiculturalism and multiculture, as the two paradigms that have frequently put in opposition, rather than allowing for a meaningful relationship and a ‘conversation across differences’ (Modood and Dobbernack, 2011). Too often this conversation is barred as the modalities of one are imposed on the other. Among contemporary cultural diversity challenges in Britain thus numbers the challenge to recognize that the reality of post-immigration groups requires a pluralized normative and conceptual vocabulary that makes space for coexistence and respect between two ‘kinds’ of difference.

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PART II. NEW HOST COUNTRIES

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CHAPTER 7. GREECE

Anna Triandafyllidou and Ifigeneia Kokkali

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Introduction

Geographically, Greece is located at the southeastern corner of the European continent, indeed closer to the Middle East, Turkey and the Balkans rather than to what is today defined as the ‘core’ of the Europe, notably countries like France or Germany. This geographic position of Greece at the fringes of the European continent is to a large extent matched by a geopolitically and economically peripheral character of the country within the European Union, despite the fact that the successive enlargements of the EU to the East in 2004 and 2007 have made Greece more central both culturally and politically. The position of Greece however may also be seen as a pivotal one, between East and West. Dominant discourses on Greek national identity reflect a geopolitical and cultural ambivalence between being ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ (Roudometof, 1999; Tsoukalas, 1993).

Although politically Greece has been firmly anchored in western Europe in the post World War II period, the cultural positioning of Greece remains ambivalent, modern Greek-ness being of but not in Europe (Triandafyllidou, 2002a). While the European-ness of modern Greece has been officially confirmed by its accession to the European Communities (later European Union) in 1981, the geopolitical, cultural and economic relations between Greece and its fellow member states are often fraught with misunderstandings. During the 1990s, the confrontation between Greece and its fellow partners in the EU on the Macedonian question1 as well as Greece’s unpleasant position as the only country who had striven but could not make it to the first phase of the European Monetary Union have been two obvious expressions of these tensions.

The 21st century has brought new developments and new challenges for Greece and its national self-understanding. The inclusion of Greece in the first phase of the Euro zone implementation, on 1 January 2002 has confirmed the Europeanness of the country at the monetary but also at the symbolic level (Psimmenos, 2004). Moreover, the 2004 and 2007 enlargements to Central and Eastern Europe and the shifting of the EU geopolitical, cultural and religious borders farther East has made Greece inevitably more central geographically and religiously (since other Christian Orthodox countries have joined the EU) even though geopolitically it

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1. i.e. the question of recognition of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as an independent Republic, the name that this last would take, as well as its nationalist claims to what the Greeks deemed as ‘their’ national heritage (Triandafyllidou et al. 1997; Roudometof 1996).
remains quite peripheral (Triandafyllidou and Spohn, 2003). The economic crisis though that Greece is undergoing at the time of writing (spring and fall 2010), the risk of a national bankruptcy and of quitting the Euro zone have on one hand emphasised the firm anchoring of political elites to the EU but also greatly shown the weakness of Greece as an actor in the European economic and political system.

The expansion of the EU to the east which continues, even if with a slower pace, with a view to incorporating Croatia, the western Balkans and Turkey poses new identity and geopolitical challenges. Enlargement is desired as a factor of stability, democracy and peace in the region, but also for economic reasons, since many Greek firms are highly oriented towards the Balkan markets. Greek public opinion has marked an interesting shift between 2006 and 2008 regarding EU enlargement to southeast Europe and especially to Turkey. In 2008, 47% of Greeks declared in favour of the entry of Turkey in the EU (Eurobarometre, 2008: 30), contrary to the respective 33% registered in 2006 (Eurobarometre, 2006). The possible future accession of Turkey to the EU certainly keeps stiring unsolved identity and geopolitical issues, not least the Cyprus question.

In light of these considerations, this paper first offers a brief excursus on the main factors that have conditioned the development of the modern Greek state and the dominant conception of Greek national identity. The second part of the paper concentrates on the internal Significant Others (Triandafyllidou, 1998) of Greek society over the past 30 years with a view to identifying which have been the important minority groups that have challenged with their diversity the reputed cohesion and homogeneity of Greek society during the last three decades. We cover three distinct time periods: the 1980s and the end of the Cold War, the 1990s and the rise of multiculturalism in Western Europe but also the debacle of Communist regimes and the subsequent transition of central Eastern Europe to liberal democracy, and the last decade with the expansion of the EU to the east, the rise of international terrorism, the financial and economic crisis and the contest of multiculturalism (in Western Europe) in the last couple of years.

In the second part we shall seek to highlight the aspects of ‘difference’ of specific groups that have been particularly contested. Those aspects that the groups advocate as important for their identity and that the state or the majority group consider ‘intolerable’ or at least difficult to accommodate. Pointing to such challenging differences will help locate different instances in which ‘tolerance’ has been an important concept or practice with a view to allowing for diversity to exist. Naturally we shall also take note of the competing concepts in favour of a more active accommodation and respect for diversity or concepts and behaviours that call for the rejection of diversity and the imposition of not only unity but also homogeneity within Greek society.

**Greece and Europe**

**National identity and state formation**

While the foundations of Greek nationalism in the late eighteenth century were based on European Enlightenment and its civic ideals (Veremis, 1983: 59-60; Kitromilides, 1990: 25-33), the Greek nation has eventually
been defined in strongly ethno-cultural terms. Common ancestry, culture and language have been the main tenets of the development of the modern Greek national identity together with Christianity – a heritage of the Byzantine Empire (constructed essentially as Greek and related linearly to the Greek classical past.) The dominant national narrative concluded with Greece’s subjugation to the Ottoman Empire, the national resurrection in 1821 and the creation of a small independent Greek state in 1831. A unified national consciousness was successfully instilled in Greek society through state policies in military conscription, education and culture throughout the nineteenth and twentieth century.

The state and the political and intellectual elites propagated however for several decades an irredentist view of the Greek nation that extended further north to Macedonia and Thrace and further east to Minor Asia. This ‘Great Idea’ – to unite all the territories where people who shared the Orthodox Christian faith and spoke the Greek language lived – dominated the Greek national project and politics and, as such, also the successive enlargements of the Greek state until the early 20th century. It was only in 1923 and after the debacle of the Greek forces in Minor Asia by the Turks that irredentism was largely abandoned. Nonetheless the modern Greek state took its present territorial form after World War II when the Dodecanese islands were incorporated into Greece in 1948. This gradual path to the territorial integration of modern Greece has marked Greek nationalism and the national project as a whole, making the conception of Greek national identity – and by extension Greek citizenship – predominantly ethnic, religious and cultural (much less civic and territorial) (Christopoulos, 2006; see also for a review Triandafyllidou 2001, Chapter 3).

Overall, modern Greek identity developed in a web of complicated relationships that evolved around a main contradiction or dilemma concerning the belonging to ‘the West’ or to ‘the East’. This has been articulated in the following characteristics of what one could consider as intrinsic to modern Greek identity: a national pride for a unique past; a frustration of grandeur ‘lost’ as the modern Greek state emerged into independence as a poor, agricultural economy and an incomplete and fragile democracy; and last but not least a perpetual need to ‘catch up’ with the rest of Europe as there was much ground to cover in terms of Greece’s industrialization, modernization, and democratic consolidation. The intertwining of such contradictory elements has resulted in an ideologically confusing notion of ‘Helleno-christianity’ and an underlying East–West tension in Greek identity and politics.

Besides, although territorial and civic features have gained importance through the expansion and consolidation of the national territory, the ‘essence’ of Greekness is still often defined as a transcendental notion in Greek public discourses (Tsoukalas, 1993). In addition, the implantation of modern institutions in the new-born Greek state of the 1830s (with its traditional – largely rural – Greek society) generated a combination of puzzling characteristics that even nowadays persist (Diamandouros, 1983: 47-50). The late and limited industrial development of Greece (and the imperfect functioning of liberal democracy/capitalism in this ‘peripheral’ country) in conjunction with the introduction of parliamentarism resulted in the distorted functioning of the political system through the preservation of traditional power structures under the cover of Western-type institutions (Diamandouros, 1983, Mouzelis, 1995).
Citizenship in Greece

These features of Greek national identity have marked the definition of Greek citizenship which has been based (until 6 months ago) almost exclusively on the jus sanguinis principle. The previews to the 3838/24.3.2010 laws (voted on March 2010) provided for a separate procedure for acquiring Greek nationality (the so called procedure of nationality definition) that has been reserved for people who could prove that they were of Greek descent and ‘behave as Greeks’. The terms used for this procedure imply that Greek descent and national consciousness exist prior to the acquisition of Greek nationality (Christopoulos, 2006: 254). This rule refers to people of Greek ethnic origin, the omogeneis (meaning those of the same genos, i.e. of the same descent).

There are two broad categories of omogeneis in Greece currently: the Pontic Greeks (numbering a little over 150,000), notably people of Greek descent that resided in the former Soviet Republics. The Greek state has adopted a generous naturalisation policy allowing the large majority among them to naturalise through a simplified citizenship definition procedure called ‘specific naturalisation’ (Christopoulos, 2006: 273). The second group of omogeneis (co-ethnics) are ethnic Greek Albanians. These held until recently Special Identity Cards for Omogeneis (EDTO)° issued by the Greek police which gave them full socio economic but no political rights in Greece. As of November 2006, a joint decision by the Ministries of Interior and Foreign Affairs facilitated the naturalization procedure for them, waiving the fee and the discretionary character of the judgment, encouraging thus ethnic Greek Albanians to naturalise. Indeed this change of policy has led to an exponential increase of naturalisations from two-digit numbers each year to several thousands. While in the period 1998-2006 only a handful of people had naturalised, in the period between 2007 and 2009 approximately 45,000 foreigners, in their vast majority of Albanian nationality, have acquired Greek citizenship.

The distinction between co ethnics and ‘other’ migrants that Greek law had introduced as early as 1997 had been subject to severe criticism by NGOs, the liberal press and international organisations (ECRI, 2004) for being discriminatory and unfair. ECRI in particular had raised concerns regarding the preferential path to citizenship available to individuals of Greek origin, noting that there are subjective elements in the assessment of such origin, making the applicants liable to discrimination.

It was only in March 2010 that the Greek Parliament voted a new law (law n. 3838/2010) on citizenship and naturalisation which introduced provisions for the second generation of migrants, notably children born in Greece of foreign parents or children born abroad of foreign parents but who have completed at least 6 years of schooling in Greece and live in Greece. In either case, these children can naturalise by a simple declaration by their parents when they are born or when they complete their sixth year of attending a Greek school. The new law also lowers the requirement for naturalisation from 10 to 7 years of residence, provided the foreigner has already received the EU long term resident status which can be acquired after 5 years of legal residence. The new law also introduces local political rights (both passive

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2. There were 197,000 EDTO holders on 31 December 2009, according to data released by the Ministry of Interior in December 2010.
4. Greek authorities are generally required to respond within specified time limits to applicants addressed to them and to provide justification for their decisions.
and active) for foreign residents (living in Greece for 5 years or more). In introducing a substantial element of *jus soli* in the concept of Greek citizenship, the new law has made a breakthrough. Nonetheless, we could maintain that, for mainstream society, Greek citizenship is synonym with Greek national identity, both of which are strongly defined in ethnic, cultural and religious terms.

The role of Europe and the “West”

In the pre-World War II period, Europe played an indirect role in national self-understandings of Greekness: it was part of the classical Greek heritage but also perceived as alien and threatening. Culturally speaking, Greece and Europe were constructed by Greek historiography as part of the same classical Greek/European civilization. From a political viewpoint however, other European countries were seen as — and indeed were actually — ‘foreign powers’ which imposed their interests on Greece and interfered with domestic affairs. While European foreign powers were perceived also as economically and culturally more advanced than Greece, they were also despised because they could not ‘compete’ with Greece’s glorious classical heritage.

Since the end of World War II Greece has been politically and ideologically part of Western Europe. This largely determined the outcome of the Greek civil war (1944-1948) as well as its post WWII political history. Western military, trade and energy interests held Greece firmly within the Western part of Europe and away from Communist and left-wing tendencies. Greece joined NATO in 1952 and in 1962 signed a pre-accession agreement with the European Communities (EC).

During the post war period the stance of Greek social and political actors towards Europe has alternated between ‘Europhilia’ and ‘Europhobia’ given the role that various western actors have played in Greece’s political history (particularly the UK and the USA), and the way this has translated in a deep polarization of domestic politics — between the pro-western right and centre-right and the communist and left political forces. The foreign influence over the outcome of the civil war; the 1960s political instability and the Colonels’ military coup (1967-1974); the importance of the Marshall Plan for the country’s economic recovery; the participation in NATO’s southern flank in the context of the Cold War confrontation; Cyprus and the Greek-Turkish dispute, are all factors and events that determined Greece’s relationship with the rest of Europe and the West.

At the level of public attitudes, Kokosalakis and Psimmenos (2002: 24-26) show (on the basis of Eurobarometer survey data) that Greeks have been overall positive as regards their country’s participation in the EC and later EU, saw no conflict between their national and their European identity, and were overall supportive of European unification which they perceived as economically and politically advantageous for the country. However, qualitative studies have shown that Greeks tend to look at other Europeans as ‘others’ and as ‘different’ to the foundations of Greek tradition and collective identity (Kokosalakis, 2004; Anagnostou, 2005). Indeed, legacies of the past, territorial insecurities and antagonistic identities in Greece’s immediate neighbourhood the Balkans, have not been easily understood by Western and Northern EU
CHAPTER 7. GREECE

6. This number referring to valid stay permits does not include ethnic Greek Albanians holding EDTO cards.

member-states, and have at times been exaggerated in Greek politics, largely for domestic political reasons. Indeed, during the 1990s, the feeling of alienation that Greeks at times expressed towards the West (Tsoukalas, 1993; 1995) was further accentuated by the controversy between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), the failure of resolving the Cyprus question, and the inability of other EU countries to appreciate Greece’s sensibility on these issues (Roudometof, 1996; Triandafyllidou et al., 1997, Triandafyllidou, 2007).

In the early 21st century a more flexible understanding of Greek national identity seems to emerge, mainly due to the increasing salience of European policies and symbols, such as the European currency. Besides, the actual experiences of belonging to the European Union reinforce a civic and political value component in Greek national identity (Triandafyllidou et al., 1997; Kokosalakis, 2004; Anagnostou and Triandafyllidou, 2007).

**Cultural diversity challenges during the last 30 years**

The new European context at the end of the twentieth and early twenty-first century has raised new challenges to Greek national self-understandings and the country’s geopolitical positioning within its immediate neighbourhood and of course within the EU and Europe writ large. These challenges are related to the continuing (even if slower) expansion of the EU to the Balkans and Turkey. Moreover, during the last two decades, Greece has had to make room – even if hesitantly and only to a limited extent – for cultural, ethnic and religious diversity within the nation. These developments have had to do with two different population groups: native, historic minorities and immigrants. Regarding minorities first, regional legal and institutional frameworks—such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)—have furthered progress in promoting the recognition and protection of minorities (linguistic, ethnic, religious, racial) across Europe (Psychogiopoulou, 2009). This progress has also increasingly influenced debates and policies on the position and rights of minorities in Greece, which for long has been a sensitive matter in Greek political life and society. Nikiforos Diamantouros (1983: 55) had described this ‘sensitivity’ as an indication that the process of national integration is incomplete.

Regarding migrants, even since the early 1980s, Greece can no longer be described as a solely emigration country. The country’s population has increased by 10-12%, with large numbers of migrants mainly from the Balkans (Albania, Bulgaria and Romania), ex-Soviet Republics (Georgia, Russia and Ukraine) and, increasingly, Asia (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and China). Immigration poses a challenge to dominant Greek nationalist discourses; there has been a gradual recognition on behalf of state institutions and public opinion that Greek society has become de facto multi-cultural and multi-ethnic (Triandafyllidou and Gropas, 2009). Tables 1, 2 and 3 below present an overview of the size and composition of the immigrant and native minority population in Greece.
### Table 1. Immigrant Stock in Greece, 31.12.2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of immigrant stock</th>
<th>% of total resident population</th>
<th>Source of data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legal immigrant population</td>
<td>636,258</td>
<td>5.86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-ethnics from Albania</td>
<td>197,814</td>
<td>1.82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimate of irregular immigrants</td>
<td>280,000</td>
<td>2.58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total stock of foreigners</td>
<td>1,114,072</td>
<td>10.26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total population of Greece</td>
<td>10,856,041</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-ethnics from the Soviet Union</td>
<td>154,000</td>
<td>1.42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total stock of immigrants and naturalized co-ethnics</td>
<td>1,268,072</td>
<td>11.68%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 2. National Composition of the Migrant Stock in Greece, 31.12.2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>501,691</td>
<td>59.74%</td>
<td>414,445</td>
<td>70.65%</td>
<td>414,445*</td>
<td>56.64%</td>
<td>136,151</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>54,492</td>
<td>6.48%</td>
<td>51,006</td>
<td>37.46%</td>
<td>55,909</td>
<td>7.64%</td>
<td>4,903</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>33,870</td>
<td>4.03%</td>
<td>17,655</td>
<td>3.00%</td>
<td>17,655</td>
<td>2.41%</td>
<td>6,215</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>33,773</td>
<td>4.02%</td>
<td>38,388</td>
<td>28.19%</td>
<td>41,954</td>
<td>5.73%</td>
<td>2,566</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>22,965</td>
<td>2.73%</td>
<td>17,097</td>
<td>2.91%</td>
<td>17,097</td>
<td>2.33%</td>
<td>5,900</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>19,522</td>
<td>2.32%</td>
<td>13,512</td>
<td>2.30%</td>
<td>13,512</td>
<td>1.84%</td>
<td>5,910</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>13,748</td>
<td>1.63%</td>
<td>21,644</td>
<td>3.68%</td>
<td>21,644</td>
<td>2.95%</td>
<td>5,910</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>12,533</td>
<td>1.49%</td>
<td>5,910</td>
<td>1.00%</td>
<td>5,910</td>
<td>0.80%</td>
<td>6,622</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>12,401</td>
<td>1.47%</td>
<td>7,962</td>
<td>1.35%</td>
<td>7,962</td>
<td>1.08%</td>
<td>4,440</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>12,339</td>
<td>1.46%</td>
<td>6,277</td>
<td>1.07%</td>
<td>6,277</td>
<td>0.85%</td>
<td>6,062</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>11,773</td>
<td>1.40%</td>
<td>5,972</td>
<td>4.38%</td>
<td>5,972</td>
<td>0.81%</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>11,204</td>
<td>1.33%</td>
<td>10,876</td>
<td>7.98%</td>
<td>11,258</td>
<td>1.53%</td>
<td>3,984</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>10,289</td>
<td>1.22%</td>
<td>14,732</td>
<td>2.51%</td>
<td>14,732</td>
<td>2.01%</td>
<td>4,945</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>7,849</td>
<td>0.93%</td>
<td>1,183</td>
<td>0.20%</td>
<td>1,183</td>
<td>0.16%</td>
<td>6,666</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>7,654</td>
<td>0.91%</td>
<td>13,127</td>
<td>2.23%</td>
<td>13,127</td>
<td>1.79%</td>
<td>5,474</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>7,539</td>
<td>0.89%</td>
<td>7,811</td>
<td>5.73%</td>
<td>7,811</td>
<td>1.06%</td>
<td>962</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>7,270</td>
<td>0.86%</td>
<td>5,914</td>
<td>4.34%</td>
<td>5,914</td>
<td>0.80%</td>
<td>1,356</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>4,682</td>
<td>0.55%</td>
<td>12,217</td>
<td>2.08%</td>
<td>12,217</td>
<td>1.66%</td>
<td>7,535</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>3,548</td>
<td>0.42%</td>
<td>2,201</td>
<td>1.61%</td>
<td>2,201</td>
<td>0.30%</td>
<td>1,347</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>3,302</td>
<td>0.39%</td>
<td>9,668</td>
<td>1.64%</td>
<td>9,668</td>
<td>1.32%</td>
<td>6,366</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>47,262</td>
<td>5.62%</td>
<td>31,161</td>
<td>5.31%</td>
<td>13,983</td>
<td>10.27%</td>
<td>45,144</td>
<td>6.17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>839,706</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
<td>586,590</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
<td>136,151</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>731,592</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*This number referring to valid stay permits does not include ethnic Greek Albanians holding EDTO cards.
Table 3. Native Minorities in Greece

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Native Minorities</th>
<th>1961-1991**</th>
<th>1999/today Absolute numbers</th>
<th>% of the total population of Greece</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholics, Protestants, Jews and new religious movements</td>
<td></td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>1-1,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholics</td>
<td></td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestants</td>
<td></td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jehovah's Witnesses</td>
<td></td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims of Western Thrace*</td>
<td></td>
<td>80,000-120,000</td>
<td>0,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish-speaking</td>
<td></td>
<td>36,000-54,000***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pomaks</td>
<td></td>
<td>28,800-43,200***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma</td>
<td></td>
<td>14,400-21,600***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma (all over Greece)</td>
<td></td>
<td>300,000-350,000****</td>
<td>2-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arvanites/Arberor</td>
<td></td>
<td>200,000****</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonians (Slav-speaking Greeks)</td>
<td></td>
<td>10,000-30,000****</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vlachs/Aromanians</td>
<td></td>
<td>200,000****</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compilation and treatment of data from different sources/estimations (see notes below).

* The Muslims of Western Thrace according to the Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations (Treaty of Lausanne), in 1923, counted for 106,000 individuals. According to the Greek census of 1928, 1940 and 1951, there were registered respectively 126,000 individuals, 140,090 individuals and 112,665 individuals. Human Rights Watch, ‘Greece: The Turks of Western Thrace’, Vol. 11, No. 1, 1999/January, available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/greece/index.html#TopOfPage [consulted on the 02/11/2010]. It is to note that the report on Muslims of Thrace does not distinguish between the sub-populations that are included in this category (that is to say Roma and Pomaks), referring thus to all as ‘Turks of Western Thrace’.

** Unlike the 1951 census, more recent censuses have not addressed issues of national/ethnic origin, language and religion (GHM, Report about Compliance with the Principles of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, 1999, available at http://www.greekhelsinki.gr/Minorities_of_Greece.html [consulted on the 02/11/2010]). Therefore, no official data is available and we can only rely on estimations.

*** Estimation of Alexandris (1988) for the numbers in 1981, according to which from about 120,000 individuals 45% are Turkish-speaking, 36% are Pomaks and 18% Roma. According to an estimation of GHM (at http://www.greekhelsinki.gr/english/reports/pomaks.html [consulted on the 02/11/2010]), the Pomaks nowadays count for 30,000 (i.e. the minimum estimated by Alexandris above mentioned).


In this section we shall briefly outline the main native and immigrant minority groups of Greece, and the main diversity challenges that they pose to Greek society. In table 4 below we present schematically the main native and immigrant minority groups and identify the diversity dimensions on which they challenge the dominant conception of Greek citizenship and national identity.

Table 4. Main Minority and Immigrant Groups in Greece and their Dimensions of Difference

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions of difference</th>
<th>Citizenship</th>
<th>Racial</th>
<th>Ethnic</th>
<th>Religious</th>
<th>Cultural</th>
<th>Linguistic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Co-ethnics</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pontic Greeks</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Greek Albanians</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native minorities</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turks/Muslims of Western Thrace</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slav-speaking Macedonians</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albanians</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgians</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Muslim migrants*</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africans***</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s compilation.

* Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Afghani citizens mainly.
Minority groups in Greece can actually be classified into three broad categories in terms of their closeness to the majority group. The term ‘national majority’ is here to identify Greek citizens born of Greek parents, in Greece, who are Christian Orthodox (at least via a familial affiliation). In terms of the national identity and citizenship conception, omogeneis, that is co-ethnics, are the minority groups that differ less from the national majority. There are two populations within the larger category of co-ethnics: Pontic Greeks and ethnic Greek Albanians.

The second category of minority groups are native minorities, that is people who are ethnically, culturally, religiously different from the national majority but which have formed part of the modern Greek state since its creation. These include the Muslims of western Thrace (which may be further sub-divided into Pomaks, Muslim Roma and ethnic Turks) who largely self-identify as ethnic Turks, and the Roma populations of Greece.

The third category of minority groups in Greece are migrant populations. We identify here five different populations: Albanians, as the largest group; Georgians and Ukrainians as the second and third largest nationalities among immigrants; Asian immigrants and asylum seekers (Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, Filipinos and Afghans) who are Muslims from southeast Asia; and last but not least Sub-Saharan Africans who come from many different countries and are Christians in their large majority.

**Omogeneis/Co-ethnics**

**Pontic Greeks**

Pontic Greeks are ethnic Greeks who either emigrated from areas of the Ottoman empire (the southern coast of the Black Sea in particular) to the former Soviet Union in the beginning of this century or left Greece in the 1930s and 1940s for political reasons (Glytsos, 1995). The right of Pontic Greeks to return to their ‘homeland’ (Greece) has been conceded by presidential decree in 1983. Pontic Greeks are defined by the Greek state as members of the diaspora community who ‘return’ – even though most of them had never lived in Greece before – to their ‘homeland’ and are, therefore, given full citizen status and benefits aiming to facilitate their integration into Greek society. Pontic Greeks naturalised under the ‘definition of nationality’ procedure foreseen by the Greek legislation for people of ethnic Greek origin (Christopoulos 2006: 254).

In 2000 there were 155,319 Pontic Greeks in the country. More than half of them (about 80,000) came from Georgia, 31,000 came from Kazakhstan, 23,000 from Russia, and about 9,000 from Armenia (General Secretariat of Repatriated Co-Ethnics, 2000).

**Diversity challenges:** Pontic Greeks are considered to be similar to native Greeks as regards their national consciousness, culture, and religion. They only differ from natives in terms of their language (as at least the first generation of returnees spoke Russian and/or ΠΟΝΤΙΑΚΩ (Pontian language) as a mother tongue) and at least the first generation in terms of the socio-economic system that they had been brought up in. Representatives of EIYAPOE interviewed by the author in the mid 1990s considered that the main problem for Pontic Greeks’ socio-economic
integration was their excessive reliance on the state to provide for anything and their inability to adapt to a free market economy. There are unfortunately not enough recent studies to assess this claim however it is clear that the cultural and linguistic difference of the Pontic Greeks is still present in Greek society even if on the whole it is not perceived as challenging the national unity. Indeed, Pontic Greeks (together with other ex-Soviet nationals, such as Georgians, Russians, and in a lesser extent Armenians) dispose a non-negligible ‘ethnic infrastructure’, this is to say their own shops, mini-markets, cafés, festivity halls, dentists, churches, at least in the city of Thessaloniki where they have mainly settled in the 1990s (Kokkali, 2010).

**Ethnic Greek Albanians**

The second large group of co-ethnics that has recently ‘returned’ to Greece are ethnic Greek Albanians, widely known as “Vorioepirotes” (Βορειοηπειρώτες). The State Council (judgement no. 2207/1992) attempted to provide a description of their status: co-ethnics from Albania are the people that descend from Greek parents and their place of birth (theirs or their parents) is “Vorios Epirus” (Βόρειος Ηπειρός). The legal status of ethnic Greek Albanians has been clarified in detail with the Presidential Decree 395/1998. Following from this decree, Greek co-ethnics who are Albanian citizens (Vorioepirotes) hold Special Identity Cards for Omogeneis (EDTO) issued by the Greek police. As of November 2006, holders of these Identity Cards were encouraged to apply for citizenship. They were exempted from the high citizenship fee and were generally granted citizenship if they satisfied the requirements (in other words, no negative discretion was exerted). Indeed during the past 3 years more than 40,000 Albanian citizens of ethnic Greek origin have acquired Greek citizenship.

**Diversity Challenges**: Ethnic Greek Albanians differ from native Greeks mainly in their citizenship and to a lesser extent in their language. Contrary to Pontic Greeks, the use of Greek language, especially among the older generation, was more widespread in southern Albania. Also the geographical and cultural proximity was higher – native Greeks of Epirus in northern Greece and ethnic Greeks born in southern Albania had many cultural similarities. Overall ethnic Greek Albanians’ public image has also been constructed as ‘positive’, contrasted to that of ‘other’ Albanians whose image was negative (Triandafyllidou and Veikou 2002), at least during the 1990s. The ethnic, religious and cultural proximity of ethnic Greek Albanians with native Greeks makes them a minority group that is gradually assimilating into Greek society and poses no strong cultural diversity challenge to the country. At the same time their presence forces to clarify how national and cultural unity and homogeneity is pretty much constructed rather than given depending often on beliefs of common genealogical descent more than actual cultural proximity. It is interesting how the cultural diversity of Vorioepirotes has been treated during the 2000s by contrasting to how the cultural diversity of ‘other’ Albanians has been perceived at the same time. Actually, however, such distinctions seem to have faded, since Albanian citizens (either omogeneis or allogeneis) are largely considered as very well integrated to the Greek society, while other – more recently arrived – foreigners (such as Afghani, Pakistani and Bangladeshi immigrants or asylum seekers) monopolise the public discourse.
Native minorities

There are a number of native minorities in Greece whose population however is rather small (Clogg 2002). According to the data provided by international and Greek NGOs the following national, ethno-linguistic and religious minorities are present in Greece (percentages refer to the total resident population): Roma 3.3%; Arvanites 2%; members of the Macedonian minority 2%; Vlachs 2%; Turks 0.5%; Pomaks 0.3 (Lenkova, 1997; Minority Rights Group (MRG), 1994). Religious minorities, which include Catholics, Protestants and new religious movements, make up nearly 1% of the citizens of Greece. Among these minorities, the Greek State only recognises the existence of the Muslims of western Thrace, the Roma population and Greek Catholics and Protestants. Since official recognition of other minorities of any kind is withheld, these groups are subjected to discriminatory treatment, whether at the collective and individual level. The recent mobilisation of the Macedonian minority (during the 1990s) has been dealt with by refuting its existence and persecuting its activists. In this report we shall only discuss the Muslims of western Thrace and the Roma of Greece.

Muslims of western Thrace

The border region of Western Thrace in the northeast part of Greece is home to a small but politically significant population of about 120,000 Muslims, inhabiting the region together with a Greek Christian majority. With its strategic location between three states and two continents, the Muslim community of Western Thrace marks a particular kind of geographical and cultural-historical boundary between East and West. In Europe’s southernmost corner, the region of Thrace borders with Turkey to the east and Bulgaria to the north.

Comprising individuals of Turkish origin, Gypsies (Roma), and Pomaks, the Muslims of Thrace prior to World War II coexisted largely as a religious community characteristic of the Ottoman millet system. Since the 1950s, however, they have transformed into a minority with ethnic consciousness, and in the past twenty years they have mobilized to assert a common Turkish identity. The latter has caused a major and ongoing rift with Greek authorities who officially recognize a ‘Muslim minority’ in reference to the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 that has defined the status of the latter until the present.

Diversity challenges: The Turks of Thrace pose an important ethnic and religious diversity challenge for Greece as they question its ethnic and religious homogeneity. They share with other Greek citizens neither their genealogical descent nor the religion – they differ in the two fundamental elements that define the dominant vision of Greek national identity and citizenship. Their claims for collective recognition of their ethnic identity have generally been met with intolerance and rejection. At the same time Greece has been pressurised by the policies of the Council of Europe and by the European Court of Human Rights to adapt and update its policy towards its largest native ethnic minority. It has thus abolished the infamous article 18 of the Greek Nationality Code which had been used discretionary to deprive members of the minority from their Greek citizenship unilaterally.

8. The overall (resident) population of Thrace is 358,426 (www.e-demography.gr, 2010). The precise size of the Turkish Muslim population is a matter of dispute due to their large-scale immigration over the years and the lack of an official census since the 1950s. Estimates range from 90,000 to over 120,000 while official accounts put it between 110,000-135,000.
Overall Greek policies towards the minority have become more liberal, defending the equality of individuals before the law and the state no matter what their collective affiliation is in terms of religion. These policies however have been defended in the name of the common, compact and unitary national interest, that is the Greek Christian Orthodox majority’s interest (Anagnostou 2005) not by reference to human rights norms. There is no re-consideration or re-definition of what it means to be Greek or a sort of collective level recognition of the existence of minorities that are part of the Greek nation state. There is as yet no room for these minorities to contribute to the definition of what it means to be Greek in the 21st century.

Interesting key events, where the tolerance and intolerance of the Greek state institutions, the norms applied as well as everyday practices adopted can be tested, is the quest of two different cultural associations to include the word Turkish in their title, the rejection of this request by the Greek Supreme Court (decision of January 2005) and the condemnation of Greece on this issue by the European Court of Human Rights in 2007 (Human Rights Papers, 2008). Additionally, it would be interesting to explore the political juxtaposition and the reactions of the society arisen after the announcement of Gulgöy Karahasanc’s (a young Muslim woman) candidature in the 2007 regional elections by the leader of the socialist party (PASOK) and former Prime Minister George Papandreou (Skoulari, 2009: 69-93).

**Roma of Greece**

Greek historians’ attempts to account for the Roma presence in Greek history have often contributed to the negative stereotyping of their behaviour and ways of life, often stirring thus anti-Romani discourses in Greece (ERRI and GHM, 2003). As any other ethnic minority in Greece, the Roma were subjected to homogenisation, to the imposition of the dominant Greek identity and history and to the misrecognition of their cultural difference. During World War II, the Roma of Greece suffered persecution from the Nazis and, in some cases, even deportation and concentration into camps in Germany, although accurate figures are not available (ERRI and GHM, 2003; EODM, 2002: 2-3).

According to the National Action Plan for Social Inclusion (NAPSI) 2008-2010, Roma are considered Greeks with no separate ethnic identity (NCHR, 2009). They are not recognized as a national minority by the Greek State (Pavlou, 2009: 33), which accepts this term only for those groups explicitly mentioned in bilateral treaties namely the 1923 Lausanne Treaty, according to which there is a 12,000-person Roma population, as part of the recognised Muslim minority of Western Thrace. Roma people outside Thrace are not considered by the Greek authorities as members of a minority, but as a `vulnerable social group` (CommDH, 2009; cited in Pavlou, op.cit.).

The size of the Roma population in Greece is actually unknown. Recent estimations concord into the number given by the Minority Rights Group-Greece, i.e. 300-350,000 people, half of whom are tent-dwelling Rom. Even after citizenship acquisition through the Decrees 69468/212 and 16701/51 in 1978 and 1979, the Roma of Greece still face marked discrimination and social exclusion, the main types of which include:
Spatial segregation, appalling housing conditions and eviction from their settlements: All national and international reports on Greece agree that Roma live under heavy spatial and social segregation (Pavlou, 2009: 12-13). Allegedly, Pavlou (op.cit.) suggests that the only regulatory framework providing for Roma settlements promotes segregation and ghettoisation. Moreover, Roma in Greece are frequently faced with forced eviction (and/or the threat of forced eviction), the subsequent demolition of their homes, destruction of property, etc. Many evictions are linked to major sport or cultural events, in which cases Roma must be made invisible or removed at any cost (Pavlou, op.cit., e.g. the 2004 Olympic Games of Athens). According to Alexandridis (2004) and Rinne (2002), the traditional hostility of the local authorities, who perceive the existence of Roma in vicinity to their localities as a threat to public order, as well as a source of crime (drug dealing, thievery, etc.), is another reason behind their frequent evictions.

The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) has noted, already in its Second Report on Greece (1999), that Roma living in settlements often face extremely harsh living conditions. Similarly, the more recent report of HLHR-KEMO/i-RED on the ‘Housing conditions of Roma and Travellers in Greece’ (October 2009) suggests that ‘inhuman and degrading conditions, as well as the deprivation of a wide range of their fundamental rights is the common conclusion met in different national and international reports on housing of Roma minority in Greece […]. Roma live in tragic conditions right next to dumps, in shacks, without water and electricity, without basic hygiene, among rodents, and at the mercy of extreme weather conditions and phenomena, affected by epidemic diseases, mainly caused by the trash they are paid to collect and remove’.

Police violence towards Roma and persistent identity-controls in their settlements: Abusive police behavior towards Roma is a major issue when considering this particular population (Pavlou, 2009: 13; ERRI/GHM, 2003; ECRI, 2009: 32), and one of the main issues raised in the complaints that have been handled by the Greek Ombudsman in recent years. More precisely the complains are related, first, to misbehavior on the part of the police in individual cases, as well as excessive use of force, ill-treatment and verbal abuse; second, to the excessive use of force and illegal massive controls in camps, where all residents are treated as suspicious or even guilty of specific crimes or offences; third, to the Police involvement in the evictions of Roma from their camps in co-operation with the local authorities. The illegal character of the procedure of investigation followed by the police was one of the main issues on which the Greek Ombudsman has been focused (Lykovardl, 2006). It should be stressed, however, that, according to Kalliopi Lykovardl, Senior Investigator in the Greek Ombudsman’s Office/Human Rights Department, since 2001, the Greek Ombudsman has received no reports indicating that massive investigations and controls in Roma camps continue (op.cit.).

Exclusion of Roma from the Educational System: A combination of racial discrimination and extreme poverty makes that very few Romani children complete even the basic primary education. The children are all too often subjected to segregation in ghetto schools and Roma-only classes that – most of times – provide inferior education. Municipal
and school authorities have actively hindered access of Romani children to education by refusing to register Romani students in local schools and dispersing them to schools far away from their places of residence as well as by failing to provide school transport for Roma (ERRI and GHM, 2003; ERRI, 2003; ECRI, 2009).

**Barriers to Access to Health Care and Other Social Support Services:** It is not exceptional for Romani individuals to lack basic identity documents, what then makes it impossible for them to claim necessary health care and state social benefits. ERRI and GHM (2003) report that, in a number of Greek municipalities, local authorities have refused to register factually residing Roma as residents, effectively precluding them from access to public services (such as hospitals) necessary for the realisation of a number of fundamental social and economic rights (such as enrollment to school).

As a consequence Romani people and most particularly children are entrapped in a vicious circle, in which lack of official documents affects their health, education and living conditions (ERRI and GHM, op.cit.; ECRI, 2009. See also Divani, 2008). Romani children are not sufficiently vaccinated because they fail to attend school regularly, but also because of the lack of readily-understandable information available to their mothers. But, the insufficient vaccination hinders their enrolment at school anyway.

**Employment:** Only few Roma are employed in the mainstream labour market, and this is mainly related to discrimination and prejudice, but also to their lack of qualifications (as a result of a low education). Most Roma living in settlements earn their income from scrap and garbage collection, while Roma in rural settlements occasionally earn a living by seasonal agricultural work. All above types of work are usually informal, thus not giving access to health or social insurance. It seems that many claim it is difficult and expensive to obtain the necessary permits, what then may lead to problems with the authorities (Abdikeeva et al., 2005).

According to the National Commission on Human Rights (NCHR, 2008), due to low levels of education and illiteracy, only an estimated 40 per cent of Roma have a job from which they can make a living. However, apart from education and housing, Roma suffer serious discrimination also in employment from members of the majority group, without exempting state and local-level officials (ECRI, 2009: 31). This is a key issue to their unemployment or under-employment.

**Diversity challenges:** The Roma have always posed important ethnic and cultural challenges for Greece. Their phenotypic features (colour of skin, face traits) and their traditions and way of life (tent-dwelling, nomadic, traditional dress code for women, under age marriages, patriarchal extended families) make them appear alien to the Greek nation despite their centuries-long presence in the country. Even though a large part of the Roma populations in Greece are Christian, religion does not seem to matter here as a bridge between the majority population and the Roma minority. The Roma in western Thrace are also a more complex case as they are also discriminated against within their own Muslim community (Troumpeta, 2001).

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12. For instance, ECRI reports that, in Spata and Aspropyrgos of the Athenian agglomeration, Roma living in settlements do not benefit from the requisite attention from the local social services. (ECRI, 2009: 32).

13. Unsurprisingly, Greek language and culture had an important impact on Romani language and culture. Words derived from Greek make up by far the largest component of the so-called “inherited lexicon” of Romani (ERRI and GHM, 2003).
Immigrants

The third category of minority groups that live in Greece are economic migrants who arrived in the country during the past two decades. We have identified here the three largest groups (see table 2 above), notably Albanians, Georgians and Ukrainians, and southeast Asians (Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and Afghans), mainly because these last have been increasingly visible during the last year (although they have been present in relatively small numbers in the country for at least 2 decades) and because of their religious (in the case of southeast Asians) and sometimes phenotypical difference from the national majority population.

Albanians

Albanian migration to Greece took massively place basically in two periods: in 1991 (following the collapse of the Albanian economy and polity) and in 1997 (after another crisis due to the implosion of the financial pyramid schemes). The availability of various access points from the difficult to guard mountainous north-western border of Greece and the proximity of this latter to Albania, together with the reactivation of existent post-WWII societal networks of kinship, friendship, partnership, etc. (that stayed ‘frozen’ for nearly 50 years due to the isolation Enver Hoxha imposed to Albania in the 1950s) (Kokkali 2010: 161-174 and 2008: 214-218, Sintès 2002) were among the main factors that qualified Greece as by far the major migration destination for Albanians during the 1990s. In addition the attraction of Greece’s large grey economy to undocumented immigrants (who saw in this a rapid economic integration) played a role (Kokkali op.cit.).

Gradually, during the last twenty years, a substantial part of Albanian migrants have settled in Greece. Still, different patterns of migration and various ideal-types of the immigrant can be distinguished among Albanians, basically those who have brought their families in Greece and those who did not. Generally speaking, the former enjoyed much more acceptance from the local communities than the latter, who – in many cases – remained isolated from the “autochthones” and enclosed themselves in exclusively male Albanian-speaking milieus with poor linguistic abilities in Greek (Kokkali, 2010: 206-215, 303). By offering cheap, unqualified labor thus filling the gaps of the Greek economy, Albanians were firstly employed in any possible job. They have been working mainly in construction, agriculture, small industries and a number of other sectors (commerce, transport, hotels and restaurants). Gradually, some have started their own little business of cleansing or slight-repairing of apartments, in which they have been employing other Albanians, mostly relatives. Albanian women work as domestic workers, in the food and catering industry, in tourism and in agriculture. Lyberaki and Maroukis (2005) also showed that Albanian women are progressively moving out from unskilled work and cleaning services to become housewives, if they can afford it.

Georgians and Ukrainians

According to the 2001 national census, there were approximately 30,000 Georgian and more than 13,500 Ukrainian citizens living in Greece. Nikolova and Maroufof (2010) estimate that in 2008 Georgian citizens
living in Greece (both under legal and irregular status) numbered 80,000 while Ukrainians were about 30,000. Women account for 3/4s of all Ukrainians living in Greece. However during the last few years new arrivals of Ukrainian women have slowed down and it is rather members of their families that join them in Greece. By contrast among Georgians women account for slightly more than half of all migrants. Both groups are in their vast majority (81% of Georgians and 92% of Ukrainians) in an economically productive age (between 15 and 65 years of age) and more than half were between 20 and 45 years.

Georgians are for the most part Christian Orthodox while Ukrainians are Catholic, Orthodox or Uniates. Many among them have revived Greek Orthodox churches by attending Sunday mass. However, relations between Greece and Georgia or Ukraine were quite limited before 1989 and both Georgians and Ukrainians were faced with a foreign environment upon arrival in Greece. Their difference is linguistic, cultural, ethnic, and less markedly religious.

Southeast Asians (Bangladeshi, Pakistani, Afghani)

The influx of Pakistani immigrants in particular began during the 1970s but their population augmented significantly during the period between 1991 and 2003. According to the 2001 census the Pakistani community of Greece numbered more than 11,000, 92% of which came to Greece in search of employment. According to the same census, 96% of the Pakistanis in Greece were men who work mostly in manufacturing industries but also in the fields of construction and services. Based on data of the Labour Force Survey (LFS) there were at least 23,000 Pakistanis residing in Greece on 31 December 2009.

Bangladeshis are a more recent community since they began migrating to Greece after 1991. Based on the data of the 2001 census of the National Statistical Service, 94% of about 5,000 migrants from Bangladesh who resided in Greece in 2001 came with the purpose of working and were mostly employed in small shops and restaurants while 97% of them were men. Data from the Labour Force Survey however suggest that there were 13,000 Bangladeshis living in Greece at the end of 2009. Lazarescu and Broersma (2010) estimate that there are between 30,000 and 60,000 Pakistanis and approximately 20,000 Bangladeshis living in Greece today.

Both groups are characterized by a stark gender imbalance: in their overwhelming majority Pakistani and Bangladeshi immigrants are men. Indeed qualitative research (Lazarescu and Broersma op.cit.) suggests that most of them are married but only 20% live in Greece with their families. They are generally unable to ask for family reunification because their income is too low and probably too unstable.

Afghanis in Greece are very recent arrivals. They are not included in high ranks in the labour force survey or in the database of the Ministry of the Interior, but have been among the top three nationalities among those apprehended at the Greek Turkish borders in the period 2008-2010 (See www.astynomia.gr). Actually only in 2010 there were more than 20,000 arrests of people with Afghan citizenship at the Greek Turkish border. We therefore assume that there may be as many as 40,000 Afghans in Greece at this time. Further research is of course needed to confirm this number.
*Diversity challenges raised by immigrant groups:* All immigrant groups raise important identity challenges to the Greek majority to the extent that they are ethnically alien to the Greek nation. However, these challenges have been most acutely felt in relation to Albanian citizens for a number of reasons: because Albanians are by far the most numerous immigrant community in Greece, they are visible in the labour market, in schools, in leisure, among youth, in culture and the arts. Albanians also challenge Greek identity and culture because they are very close to it: the two groups share a common history (of conflict and coexistence), common culture and traditions (of the wider Balkans). Albanian immigration touches the most sensitive points of Greek national identity as it challenges the authenticity of the Greek nation and its symbolic boundaries with its neighbouring nations. Thus, it forces the Greek Christian Orthodox majority to re-consider both its internal and external boundaries: it obliges public opinion and a variety of social institutions such as the school, the welfare state, the labour market, state authorities defending equality in the labour market and in society to re-consider what it means to be Greek today (when 10% of the population is of immigrant origin, a vast majority of whom Albanian) and what are the rights of immigrants in Greek society and polity. It is interesting to note that the religious diversity of Albanians has been largely invisible or indeed blurred not least because they have opted for an assimilatory path in this (but also in other) respect(s). By their silenced otherness they did not challenge the values and the practices of the dominant society. They are thus actually considered – and in this respect they are indeed – the most integrated migratory group in Greece (Kokkali, 2011).

The debate that has arisen in December 2009 and January through March 2010 with regard to the citizenship law reform is an interesting point in question which highlights the predominantly ethnic diversity challenges that immigration raises for Greece.

Other groups of immigrants from Eastern Europe (Ukrainians, Georgians) have not posed important ethnic or religious challenges to Greek society probably because of their lower numbers (compared e.g. to Albanians). Besides, the fact that, on the one hand, Georgians largely share with the Greek majority the Christian Orthodox faith, and, on the other, Ukrainians are overwhelmingly female migrants who usually take care of younger and/or older members of Greek families (thus being very close to these latter), seems to attenuate any ethno-cultural challenge.

The immigrant groups that have most recently raised important diversity challenges in Greece by their visibility in the urban space are Asians. While Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Afghani immigration has been largely male only (and hence has not yet posed issues in school life for instance) and is overall numerically rather small, their largely clandestine entry to Greece (crossing the Greek Turkish borders ‘with the help’ of migrant smuggling networks), their concentration in downtown Athens, in crammed apartments where each room is inhabited by an entire family, and most importantly their instrumentalisation during the past few years (2007 onwards) by the Greek authorities has converted them (in the media and policy discourses) to the epitomy of the ‘migration evils’ that Greece suffers. The question of irregular Asian migration through Turkey was related even to the discussion of the citizenship law reform in Parliament in March 2010. Yet, this is not surprising if we consider the criminalization of immigration that has taken place in Greece during
the 1990s and early 2000s and the undifferentiated use of the term ‘lathrometanastefsi’ (clandestine immigration) in public and media discourses, even when issues of regular migration were at stake (see Petrukou, 2001: 31-56). When discussing the new citizenship law, while the new naturalisation provisions did not concern of course irregularly staying and recently arrived aliens, several MPs used the argument of controlling and combating irregular migration to argue in favour or against the relaxation of naturalisation provisions. In the parliamentary debate Greece was presented to be in danger because it is the ‘door to Europe’ for millions of destitute and war-ravaged Muslims. Thus, while there has so far been only one major public issue (the construction of an official mosque in Athens, see Triandafyllidou and Gropas 2009), Asian Muslims have now started raising important religious and ethnic diversity challenges for Greek society.

**Diversity, Tolerance and Integration**

The minority issues for long have been treated in Greece as taboos; they have thus stayed outside the public sphere and the public debate, what then permitted the emergence of non-transparent, arbitrary and oppressive regulations. Even if some NGOs and politicians (mainly of the left) support minority rights, the public discourse is dominated by fearful attitudes on “national dangers” that correlate any claim of a particular linguistic and/or religious identity to foreign interests and irredentist aspirations (Heraklides, 1997; 2004).

According to Skoulariki (2009: 69-70) after 1990, the political discourse on the minorities in Greece has been characterised by:

- A formalistic invocation of the principle of fairness and egalitarianism.
- An obsession with national homogeneity and the fear for otherness.
- Suspicion towards minorities, which *a priori* are thought to be the “Trojan Horse” of foreign interests and a threat for the country’s territorial sovereignty.
- A legalistic approach: only minorities recognised by international treaties, such as the Muslim religious minority of Thrace, are officially recognised by the state.
- A selective reference to the ethnic dimension. For example, while the Slavic origins of the Pomak language are emphasised with a view to distinguishing the Pomaks (who are Muslims) from the ethnically Turkish majority of the Muslim minority in Thrace, the Slavic language and cultural identity of the Slavic-speaking Macedonians of Greece is not recognised by the Greek state.

Despite the above situation regarding minorities, the linguistic and religious difference comes unavoidably into light, imposed by the undeniable socio-demographic changes that migration has brought to Greece. Indeed, given that in some schools of the Athenian city-centre, such as Petralona and Gazi, the foreign pupils in a class reach 50%\(^{14}\), there is not any doubt that issues of otherness are here to stay.

More generally, while multiculturality in Greece is gradually being accepted as a fact, multiculturalism is seen as a normative approach that predicates the parallel (but not integrated) co-existence of different ethnic and cultural communities. By contrast, Greek policy makers and

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\(^{14}\) “In the battle for grades without equal opportunities”, Ta Nea, 18 March 2010.
scholars tend to favour intercultural dialogue: notably the integration of individuals (not communities) into Greek society. In the Greek debate, the intercultural approach is seen as favourable to societal cohesion and as a normative and policy approach that is in line with modernity and liberalism. In practice, however, there is little change in education, anti-discrimination or political participation policies towards this direction (Triandafyllidou and Gropas 2009).

The debate on the 2010 law on citizenship and the immigrants’ brand-new right to vote in the local elections is telling of this discordance, which is again related to the understanding of Greekness. While an attempt to differentiate national identity from citizenship sees gradually the light in the public discourse the reference to Greek ideals and turbulent history (1821 war of independence, Asia Minor refugees, etc.) is dominant. Indeed, as Kouki, Gropas and Triandafyllidou (2011) show in their analysis of a recent parliamentary debate on the new law, while there is a clear right-left wing rift as regards the dominant views on modern Greek identity, both views are based on the same elements of reference: national history and tradition and the national heroes. In this respect, the role of education is again put into debate. For those in favour of a civic citizenship, education is the means for becoming Greek, whereas, for those in favour of an ethnically based Greek nation, education should reinforce the existing ethno-religious conception of the nation but cannot convert to Greeks those who were born ‘foreigners’, that is to say of foreign parents.

The above discourses confirm, once more, the genealogical aspect of the nation related, on one hand, to the common language and ancestry, and, on the other, to Orthodoxy, which is also considered as intrinsic to Greekness.

The media and parliamentary debates regarding the construction of a mosque in Athens, on the occasion of the 2004 Olympic Games, are indicative of the dominant understandings of difference in Greece and of how religious difference, in particular, should be accommodated. In their analysis of the debates in the press, Triandafyllidou and Gropas (2009) point out that, while it is generally considered that constructing a Mosque is not only a reasonable religious freedom but also a necessary venue for the needs of the Muslims who desire to practice their faith, a significant underlying unease still exists. This latter partly concerns geopolitics and identity, thus clearly linking some practical issues of Islam (such as the construction of a mosque) with the question of national security and the relationship between Turkey and Greece. As such, the question of the mosque becomes intertwined with Greece’s most significant Other (Turkey) and the West’s most significant threat (violent Islamic fundamentalism) rather than being treated as part of internal arrangements within Greek society. In other words, cultural and religious differences are defined as coming from outside and/or necessarily related to a sense of threat – both military and symbolic – to the nation and its well-being (op. cit., 966-968). The analogies with the discourses held on the internal minorities of Greece as “Trojan horses” of foreign factors are more than evident.

In the above debate, another central issue was the disassociation of religious and national identity. Here again, “modernity” was at stake, meaning that the establishment of a temple of worship for another faith
was considered necessary in a ‘European’ and democratic country like 21st century Greece. The terms ‘tolerance’ and ‘democracy’ were thus repeatedly mentioned. However, as Triandafyllidou and Gropas (2009: 969) maintain, diversity (and the tolerance of it) were recognised only as an individual private matter and not as an issue associated with the recognition of collective rights.

In the public discourse, the limits of tolerance (that is to say what and who is tolerated or considered as intolerable), apart from the above mentioned issue on the ‘individual vs collective’ recognition of diversity, are also set from what is said to be the democratic values of a modern state, 21st century Greece that is. In this respect, the main argument has been that, in the name of tolerance, we cannot abort basic civil rights as for instance equality in front of the law. The case of the Muslim minority of Thrace, where the Islamic law of the shari’a is valid instead, was abundantly cited. Another issue raised even if hesitantly, probably inspired from the western-European and north-American discourses on terrorism, is the Islamic veil of women. A number of articles have recently dealt with whether the veil is a symbol of fundamentalism or of culture, as well as if it is compatible with the multiculturalism experienced in Greek schools. Despite its democratic, liberal and modern coverage, this discourse is undoubtedly intertwined with the same unease that has characterized the debates on the construction of a Mosque in Athens (see also Triandafyllidou and Gropas 2009).

In the above debates, the term tolerance is either not used at all or very scarcely. In the Greek context, tolerance (ανοχή /anohi/) corresponds to liberal tolerance, notably the will to tolerate practices, beliefs or behaviours with which one does not agree although one has the power to suppress them. The use of the Greek term for tolerance is so far not connected to any sense of egalitarian tolerance, notably to acceptance, let alone respect of cultural diversity.

Terms such as pluralism (πλούραλισμός) or liberalism (φιλελευθερισμός) are not used in the Greek political debate on migrants and minorities. There are no arguments made in the name of pluralism (let alone religious pluralism) nor in the name of liberalism. Liberalism is understood in the sense of right-wing neoliberal ideology not as regards diversity. The terms national heritage, national identity and the nation are often used and hotly debated as we have noted above and indeed in relation to issues pertaining to migrant diversity accommodation, integration or assimilation.

Indeed, it is the term integration (ένταξη) that is mostly used in Greek political and policy debates on ethnic minority and immigrant diversity. Conveniently, its meaning is often not clarified and hence can range from

- integration in a multicultural perspective (of both individual and group diversity, reconsideration of the meaning of national identity, pluralisation of national identity – but these views are held by a very small minority of left wing parties and intellectuals), to
- integration in an intercultural perspective (integrating individuals as bearers of specific cultures, view of culture as a box, promotion of dialogue between cultures, acceptance and respect of other cultures, but no reconsideration of the Greek national culture and identity, nor
Circa 1850, there was still a sizable Albanophone population in Greece, located mainly in Attica, north of Euboea, etc. According to the 1928 census, the ethnic Albanian population reached 19,000 people, but it seems that this figure is underestimated and that we should instead consider a figure around 65,000 people (Poulton, 1991) of the fact that for instance migrant or minority children are of ‘hybrid’ cultural upbringing), and/or to

- assimilation understood as the (peaceful and welcoming but however) total cultural, ethnic and linguistic assimilation of immigrants and minorities into the dominant Greek national culture and language.

Concluding Remarks

Massive immigration flows towards Greece and the consequent shift of the country from an emigration to an immigration pole bring into light and stir old, unsolved issues of the Greek national identity. Moreover, given that the majority of those new immigrants are either nationals of neighbouring states or countries related to Greece’s not-so-distant past, it becomes clear that the newcomers, with their presence and their potential claims for respecting their cultural diversity, disturb old equilibriums and established orders. They challenge the idea of national security and territorial sovereignty, as well as the up-to-now crystallized idea of Greekness. Therefore, important parts of the Greek society tend to interpret any minority/immigrant claim of rights as a territorial claim of a neighbouring state that seeks to interfere in the domestic affairs.

Greece’s main immigrant groups are not complete “strangers” to Greece: Albanians and “Vorioepiroti” are added to the Albanophone Arvanites, by now completely assimilated by the Greek element, but who have - for long - been a distinct community (18th-19th centuries); their descendants can still be found in Greece and are – in many cases – conscious of their (or at least of their fathers’ and grandfathers’) ethno-linguistic difference. Bulgarians are linguistically very close to a part of the recognised Muslim minority of Greece, the Pomaks, but also to the unrecognized minority of the Slavic-speaking population of the Greek region of Macedonia. Besides, the geographic proximity of this minority to the state of (the Former Yugoslav Republic of) Macedonia (in which the dominant spoken language is quasi identical to the one spoken by the Slavic-speaking Greeks) stirs up identity and territorial fears of various kinds.

Those fears substantiate the existing (traditional) suspicion towards minorities, but also nourish the unease of the Greek society regarding cultural diversity, and in particular religious – and most specifically Muslim – diversity. Despite the recent apparent changes in the general social climate (the media and parliamentary debates on diversity, the recognition of the need to implement changes in the educational system, the 2010 law on citizenship and the migrants’ participation to the local elections) and the undeniable fact that in the early 21st century a more flexible understanding of Greek national identity emerges (especially among elites), there seems to be little room for the accommodation of ethnic and religious diversity in practice.

The current acute economic crisis certainly does not make things any easier. Immigrants become easy scapegoats as impoverished Greeks start competing with them for jobs in the low skill sector and any claims for special measures (for Roma or immigrant children in schooling for instance) are seen through the lens of the budgetary constraints even more than before. The obvious arguments include: we have hardly enough money to provide for decent schooling for our own children. Can we really afford the extra effort for migrant children? We can hardly
save our jobs and make ends meet, how can we bother about the special problems that migrants and their families face? And if Afghans suffer persecution in their own country, does this mean that they have to come here to be fed? We cannot stand any more foreigners. The country has reached its limits.

In this negative climate the notion of tolerance can provide for a fruitful normative and policy basis because it allows for different groups and claims to be treated differently. Liberal tolerance can be defended for a variety of diversity claims that do not necessarily require a whole-hearted embrace by the majority population but just their tacit approval for letting be. Such issues include the codes of dress, the customs and life choices including issues of gender equality of minority and immigrant people, to the extent that these habits do not infringe Greek civil law. In addition there can be a claim for egalitarian tolerance, that is for acceptance and recognition of specific claims to cultural and religious diversity that require public recognition and state support to be satisfied. Such claims include the construction of one or more official Muslim temples in Athens; the introduction of alternative religion classes in schools; and the recognition of the native and immigrant populations’ contribution to the Greek history and to society and economy today. Last but not least, the principle of non-tolerance can also provide for a good basis for forbidding practices that are against the Greek Constitution and Greek civil law (for instance some provisions of shari-a family law that treat daughters and wives as unequal to their male counterparts, marriages at the age of puberty, and female circumcision). Ultimately the issues that will be subject to non-tolerance, liberal tolerance and egalitarian tolerance will have to be decided on a case by case basis and in relation to their specific context. It is worth noting that deciding what is tolerable and intolerable is also a way of drawing boundaries between ‘us’, the ingroup, and ‘them’, the outgroup(s).

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**Introduction**

Along with a number of other countries, particularly those in southern Europe, Italy has only been a receiving country for international immigration for about 25 years. Italy itself has a long tradition of emigration and it is estimated that there are currently about 60 million Italian emigrants all over the world.

In Italian Law, the concept of “immigrant” first appeared as recently as 1986. Previously there was only the general juridical type of the “foreigner”, whose residence within the national boundaries was governed by public security law.

In the Italian public discourse, up to the end of the 1980s, “immigrants” were internal migrants from less developed southern regions (“Mezzogiorno”) who moved towards the more dynamic areas of Northern Italy, a huge phenomenon throughout the twentieth century, and particularly intense in the “golden period” of the industrial development (from the 1950s and the first half of the 1970s): initially migration was mainly towards the so called “industrial triangle” (Milan-Turin-Genoa), afterwards it was also towards the central and north-eastern regions, characterized by the growth of small companies and industrial districts. Based on a historical analysis, we know that today’s aversions and oppositions towards foreign immigrants were directed to migrants from the south of Italy in the past. However, in those times immigration was not a central issue in the political debate, essentially because the internal migrants were citizens and voters and they might be employed as civil servants.

The phenomenon of international migration has therefore developed in a national context characterized by certain aspects that should be taken into account throughout the analysis.

- The achievement of national unity is relatively recent: 2011 will mark the celebration of the 150th anniversary of the nation’s birth, after many centuries of political fragmentation;
• A national context characterized by deep socio-economic unbalances, since Italy is the country with the greatest territorial differences in Europe, in terms of rates of unemployment and indicators of economic development;

• A shared and lasting self-representation as a country historically burdened by huge problems of poverty and unemployment, without enough resources or jobs to be shared to people arriving from foreign countries; an institutional weakness of public authorities and a difficult relationship between the citizens and the State, a phenomenon that has become even more serious since the crisis of the so-called “First Republic”, at the beginning of the 1990s;

• The vitality of civil society (trade unions, associations, the Catholic church…) and the high number of SMEs making up the economy (8 million companies registered).

In this context, the surprising issue is how rapidly Italy went from being an emigration country to that of an immigration country (Pugliese, 2002). Presently around 5 million legal immigrants are living in Italy. It was mainly a spontaneous change, unforeseen and largely unregulated: it grew from the bottom of the labour market and in the local social contexts; afterwards, it became recognized by public institutions and regulated juridically, with all kinds of delays and oppositions (Calavita, 2005).

Public awareness of the transformation of Italy as an immigration country rose at the beginning of the 1990s, but the phenomenon was essentially considered “pathological”: a new social problem in a country already full of difficulties. Meanwhile, silently and in an almost invisible and fragmentary way, the labour market (companies, but also households) as well as the civil society actors, were going in the opposite direction, promoting the economic integration of the foreign immigrants; at the beginning the process was mainly informal, afterwards it became increasingly formalized in the richest and more developed regions, where the gap between job supply and job demand was becoming deeper and more evident.

The political regulation of this situation only arrived later; the discrepancy between the market and migration policy continued to grow as time went on. Not surprisingly the most important instrument for the migration policy consisted of regularization acts, introduced several times (Barbagli et. al., 2004): the last one was introduced during the summer of 2009, making a total of six regularizations in a little over twenty years, as well as some other non-declared regularizations, introduced through the so-called “flows decree”. Regarding this issue, it is clear that there has been considerable continuity in Italian migration policies, despite the left-right political power swings.

But it should also be stressed that Italy is more likely to receive working migrants in comparison with most of the EU countries, because of its yearly based system of admission “quotas” of foreign workers, which is not limited to seasonal or the highly qualified workers. But every year the manpower demand in the labour market (companies and households) exceeds the conservative forecasts for foreign workers employment made by the government, and it forces policy-makers to subsequently realign the rules to the real market requests and dynamics. In the Lombardy region, according to the data (Blangiardo, 2005) two regular immigrants out of three have been irregular for a certain period during
their stay in Italy. The percentage is even higher among workers, since the immigrants that have always been regular are often those who have arrived to reunite with their families.

In contrast with the labour market, where immigrants are accepted and economically integrated—albeit in a “subordinate integration” (Ambrosini, 2010)—the cultural and religious integration is a theme that is rarely discussed and is never considered carefully. Indeed Italy is experiencing a profound contradiction: while society is becoming more and more multi-ethnic, in its cultural self-representation it tends to reject religious and cultural plurality. Migrants are accepted as silent workers, with a specific and determined position in the labour market, when they are useful but they do not ask for rights or advantages.

**National identity and State formation**

The birth of the Italian nation state was a turbulent and long process that goes back to the 1800s. In this section we will try to summarize the main historical events which led to the formation of Italy as a democratic republic.

The birth of the Kingdom of Italy took place in 1861, when the national parliament was convened in Turin, after the 1859-1860 wars. The Italian ruling monarchy was the Savoias, sovereigns of Piedmont and Sardinia, who were managing the unification process of the so-called Italian Risorgimento, under the guidance of Prime Minister Camillo Benso, count of Cavour, who finally achieved much longed-for expansionism in the peninsula.

The new State tried to create a modern institutional structure that was centralized and was fundamentally inspired by the French model. Although formally the new subjects had spontaneously adhered to the unified state in many ways, the process was an annexation that was carried out by the Piedmont State that kept on deciding and controlling most of the political, administrative and military duties. The centralized monarchical structure that had few democratic characteristics (the right to vote was limited to a minority of well-off male citizens) disappointed all those who hoped for the construction of a different national entity, that was more federalist, democratic, and ready to take into consideration the needs of the popular classes. Moreover the new state was born with several elements of weakness.

The unification movement had been supported by the petit bourgeoisie and the intellectual elite, with the substantial indifference, and sometimes explicit hostility, of the popular classes: in Southern Italy (Mezzogiorno) the discontent about the taxes and the constraints imposed by the new legislators, as well as the worsening of the economic conditions, brought about the phenomenon of the “brigandage”, repressed harshly by the army with a conflict we can consider to be almost a civil war.

According to estimates, the Italian language was fluently spoken by only a small fraction of people, about 3% of the population, while 78% was illiterate. In the court the Piedmontese dialect was normally spoken or, in the most formal occasions, French. All the history books mention the

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1. Some indicators of this are: the amount of immigrant residents on the entire population, the rates of employment, the passage from employed jobs to autonomous ones, the increasing number of pupils of foreign origins in the schools.
famous sentence spoken by Massimo d’Azeglio, another leader of the Risorgimento: “Once Italy is made, we have to make Italians”.

The new state was born in contrast with the Catholic Church, it took away temporal power from a part of Central Italy, it adopted an anticlerical and Masonic ideological approach. The clash worsened in 1870, with the occupation of Rome, that became the new capital city, and with the laws of expropriation of many ecclesiastical properties, sold by auction to benefit the emerging bourgeoisie. This fact produced a deep fracture in the collective conscience and deprived the Italian state of the support of the popular masses, who were tied up to Catholicism.

The economic policy of the united Italy favoured the industries of Northern Italy, which were more advanced and better connected with the rest of Europe, while it was penalizing for the weaker economic infrastructure of Southern Italy. Rather than decreasing, the gap grew wider over the following decades, and among its consequences was emigration of great proportions, especially towards America, starting from about 1880 and reaching a peak in the first few years of the new century. Other migratory movements, on a smaller scale and with predominantly seasonal trends, were directed towards the more advanced European countries: France, Germany and Switzerland. In those times Italy was the European country that was most marked by emigration, that caused a massive decrease in the working population in many villages, especially in the south of the country. Italy became the nation of emigrants by definition.

Participation to the First World War was officially justified with the wish to complete the process of Risorgimento, “freeing” the “unredeemed” cities of Trento and Trieste, at the north-east boundaries from Austrian Hungarian domination. The majority of the population did not agree with the war, which was supported by part of the political elite in order to strengthen the national identity through the war effort and the sacrifice of lives, and it was promoted by the military apparatus and the war supplies industries.

The veterans’ frustration and the myth of the “mutilated victory” (territorial expansion was lower than people had been led to expect by the war propaganda and the allies’ promises), together with the impoverishment of the country, the post-war social conflicts, the growth of the socialist movement and the weakness of the governments produced the favourable conditions for the advent of the fascist regime in 1922. The fragile democratic institutions of the country were suppressed, and the regime developed - like many other totalitarian regimes - a nationalistic representation, based on the legend of imperial Rome.

The regions conquered during the First World War (for example the Südtirol, some Croatian and Slovenian territories) were submitted to a process of forced “Italianization”, with the prohibition to use other languages, the imposition of the Italian language in schools and in the public institutions, the installation of officials and soldiers from other regions, the translation into Italian of the names of cities and villages.

The government of Mussolini solved the so called “Rome issue”, with the stipulation of the Lateran Treaty (Patti lateranensi) with the Catholic Church in 1929, recognizing Catholicism as the official religion of the
State and obtaining consent for the regime from a big part of the ecclesiastical hierarchies, of the clergy and of the believers.

The alliance with Hitler's Germany led to the adoption of the racial laws in 1938 and to the expulsion of the Jews from public life, from universities and from the professional associations: this was a shameful event that was removed for a long time from the nation's history and which has only recently reached public awareness.

After the catastrophic Second World War, Italy became a republic (1946) and a new Constitution was drawn up (1948). Fascism was execrated and removed by a public representation that exalted Resistance to the Nazi-fascist regime in the last phase of the war (1943-1945) and represented Italians as victims of a foreign occupation. This attitude produced “democratic antibodies” and a lasting allergy toward nationalistic myths, militarism, authoritarian governments. But it has also prevented the recognition of Italy's responsibilities for the colonial atrocities, for the persecution of the Jews, for the mass support of the fascist regime during the 1930s, for the violence against civil and resistant populations in the occupied territories.

After the Second World War migration started again: almost a million Italians emigrated to foreign countries between 1946 and 1951 (Pugliese, 2002) but also many Italians moved from the rural areas to the cities, from the Veneto region to the so-called industrial triangle (Turin, Milan, Genoa), from the south (Mezzogiorno) to the north of Italy.

The ratio between exit and entry flows reversed in the 1970s, when arrivals from foreign countries started to exceed the departures. In the same decade, internal migrations started to decline, and they also changed in a qualitative sense i.e. fewer manual workers and more educated personnel. Between the two phenomena there was a relationship: the employers started to look for foreign immigrants, no longer being able to find the manpower they required in the south. Foreign migrants started to arrive after the border closure in the countries of Central and Northern Europe, thanks to the relative ease of entry into Italy, but they stayed because they found job opportunities, initially especially in the informal economy, in the domestic sector, in Mediterranean agriculture, and afterwards increasingly in the official economy. The turning point was the legislative reform at the end of 1989 (the “Martelli” law, named after the Minister of Justice), that allowed the employment of immigrant workers, regular residents, with the same procedures and conditions as Italian workers. Nevertheless, the political acceptance of the change in the country's multi-ethnic direction was problematic, and in the 1990s a new subject appeared on the political scene, i.e. the North League. Among the themes proposed in the political agenda by this new formation was the opposition to Rome centralism, the opposition to a transfer of resources to the southern regions, the promotion of a strong federalism (or even secessionism), finally the hostility towards immigrants and nomads, that assumed a greater importance in its political agenda and obtained a considerable success.

The events of 1989, with the end of communism, and the explosion of the scandals due to political corruption, caused the end of the so-called First Republic. The North League benefited greatly from the moral revolt of the citizens, and obtained the government of a great city, Milan. In
1994 Silvio Berlusconi started his political career, creating a coalition that included MSI-DN (which became known as “Alleanza Nazionale”), the North League and the newborn party named “Forza Italia” which governed for two years.

The centre-left coalition, governing from 1996 to 2001, succeeded in approving an important bill on immigration in 1998 (law Turco-Napolitano), but refused to face the issue of citizenship acquisition and the right to vote in local administrative elections. This dissonance, between an almost reluctant openness to economic immigration, together with some acquisitions in the field of civil rights, and a substantial difficulty in recognizing its political implications, is a constant feature of the Italian situation.

Cultural diversity challenges during the last 30 years

In 1946 Italy was voted a democratic republic by its electorate (through a referendum) and a Constituent Assembly was created to draw up the Constitution. In its work the Constituent Assembly formulated several principles that established citizens’ equality and protected minority rights. The Constitution articles were approved on December 22nd 1947 and became effective from January 1st 1948.

By the beginning of the new Italian republic it was recognised that all the citizens are equal and every difference has to be respected. Therefore, the Legislator took into account the necessity to guarantee equality and the rights of minorities.

We will summarise below the most important challenges in cultural diversity that the Italian State had to face, in terms of the requests of native minorities, the needs of religious minorities and, in recent years, the increase of a foreign population.

The native minorities

In the Italian context, when we speak of native minorities, we are referring to national and territorially concentrated minorities. After the Second World War, relations with the European neighbour states were sometimes difficult, because of their hopes to annex border territories into their sovereignty. France would have liked to annex Valle d’Aosta, while Austria wanted to recover the German mother-tongue areas of Sud Tirolo-Alto Adige. On the east boundaries, Tito’s Yugoslavia had annexed Istria and Dalmazia and wanted Trieste.

The Italian government limited the secessionist tendencies creating the “special statute” for some regions. In this way the border regions acquired great autonomy and privileged economic treatment, and the issue was resolved in a politically acceptable way on the international scene. Alto Adige, however, remained politically unstable, and it was only in the 1960s, following a period of bloody terrorist attacks, that an institutional solution was reached, with the agreement of Austria, with the creation of two autonomous provinces, Trento and Bolzano, the second of which had a prevalence of German mother-tongue speakers.
Territorial minorities are theoretically protected by the Italian Constitution, which declares in article 6: “The Republic protects the linguistic minorities through special rules”. Except for the regions with a special statute, which protect their minorities through their statute, article 6 had never been applied in practice. Therefore, some linguistic minorities scattered across the Italian territory were not recognised and preserved de facto (for example the Slovenian minority in the eastern regions). It was only in the 1980s that some Italian parliamentarians began to formulate a law to implement article 6. After many years of parliamentary debate, law 482/99 was approved.

The law, “Rules on the protection of historical linguistic minorities”, recognises 12 languages: Friulian, Ladino, German, Slovenian, Occitan, French, Franco, Albanian, Greek, Sardinian, Catalan and Croatian. These languages can be taught in schools, used in public offices and by the media.

It is interesting to note that law 482/99 did not include the Roma language among the minority languages to be protected. The law was created to be applied to linguistic minorities who were settled in well-defined territories and it did not provide protection to minorities who did not have their own territory, such as the Roma and Sinti (Bonetti, 2010).

The religious minorities

Besides the native minorities, the Constituent Assembly had to define and regularize institutionally the relations with the Catholic Church and with the other religions. With regard to the former, after a relentless debate, article 7 recognized the validity of the Lateran Treaty, that was modified only in 1984. Italy chose therefore to follow an approach of agreement in the relationships with the religions, an approach that is still considered valid today. The minorities are protected with article 8, according to which “Religious denominations are equally free in the eyes of the law. Denominations other than Catholicism have the right to organize themselves according to their own by-laws, provided they do not conflict with the Italian legal system. Their relationship with the state is regulated by law, based on agreements with their representatives” (article 8, Italian Constitution). Moreover article 19 establishes the right to freedom of religion, without any doubt: “Everyone is entitled to freely profess religious beliefs in any form, individually or with others, to promote them, and to celebrate rites in public or in private, provided they are not offensive to public morality”.

Despite the articles about the right to freedom of religion contained in the Italian Constitution, a policy on the different religions was drawn up only in the 1980s, after the revision of the Lateran Treaty (1929). The revision was made after a long and difficult debate between the Italian government and the Catholic Church. The most important change was the removal of Catholicism as the religion of the state. Another important change was the removal of the Catholic religion as a compulsory school subject. After the revision, Italian governments began to sign various agreements with other religions, the first of which were the agreements with the Waldesian and the Methodist Churches (1984), then with the Adventist Churches and Assemblies of God (1986) and the Jewish church (1987). Some difficulties were to sign the agreements with
CHAPTER 8. ITALY

The last regularization act was in September 2009, and it was implemented to regularize immigrant domestic workers.

the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Buddhists (2000). As regards the first, the main problem was to reconcile the particular position of this religion in the state and the consequences of the religion’s obligations in civic life. Concerning Buddhism, the Italian government did not know how to draw up the agreement with this religion, which differs fundamentally from the Judeo-Christian tradition. In the end, the agreements were signed. The most recent agreements were with the Apostolic Church, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, the Orthodox Exarchate for Southern Europe and the Italian Hindu Union in 2007.

Nevertheless, the procedures to sign the agreements are very complex and long, and concrete enforcement does not occur. It could be said that there are two kinds of problems regarding the relations with other religions. Firstly, Italian society has historically been shaped by Catholicism, and so awareness of religious differences has remained low; consequently, non-Catholic religious organizations have difficulty obtaining recognition by institutions and society. Secondly, it is always questionable where the balance lies between the recognition of differences and guaranteeing equality of treatment.

In addition, in the last few years the issue of Islam has arisen in Italy because of the increase in Muslim migrants and because of their demands to be recognised, to practice their religion freely and to build their places of worship. However, an agreement with Italian Muslims has not yet been signed. The general explanation used to justify the lack of agreement with the Muslims is that in Italy there is not an official body which is representative of all the Italian Muslim communities.

Immigrants

The most recent issue regarding cultural diversity in the Italian context is the increase in the number of migrants. As we saw above, Italy went from being an emigration to an immigration country rapidly, and consequently it was not ready to manage the arrival and settlement of foreign people. If we look into the Italian Constitution, there is no reference to immigrants and immigration. When the Constitution was drawn up, the concern of the Constituent Assembly was to protect the Italians who had emigrated to foreign countries.

The first law about immigration was drawn up in 1986. The law’s aim was to guarantee immigrant workers the same rights as Italian workers, and to control the entry of new migrants. After that, three other laws were drawn up over the next few years: the Martelli law in 1990, the Turco-Napolitano law in 1998 and finally the Bossi-Fini law in 2002. Apart from some progress in the 1998 law which provided some measures to promote immigrant integration, the attitude of Italian institutions and of society towards immigration was characterised by a humanitarian approach on the part of some (i.e. charity organizations, trade unions) and by a defensive or restrictive approach by others (i.e. the League North party). As stated previously, immigration was considered a “pathological” phenomenon, an emergency that had to be resolved quickly. The common political solutions adopted by the Italian governments were the regularization acts, aimed at regularizing people already living on the territory.

2. The last regularization act was in September 2009, and it was implemented to regularize immigrant domestic workers.
Resident immigrants are 4,235,059, i.e. 7% of the total Italian population (tab.1). This population is very young, because over 50% of resident migrants are between 18 and 39 years old. The average age is 31.1 years compared to 43 for the Italians (Caritas Migrantes, 2009). Over half of all migrants are women (51.3%). The five main groups are the Rumanians, the Albanians, the Moroccans, the Chinese and the Ukrainians.

### Table 1. Migrant population resident in Italy - country of origin - 16 biggest nationalities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of origin</th>
<th>Absolute numbers</th>
<th>% of the total resident immigrants</th>
<th>% of Italian population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>887,763</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>1.47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>466,684</td>
<td>11,02%</td>
<td>0.77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>431,529</td>
<td>10,19%</td>
<td>0.72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>188,352</td>
<td>4,45%</td>
<td>0.31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>174,129</td>
<td>4,11%</td>
<td>0.29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>123,584</td>
<td>2,92%</td>
<td>0.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>105,863</td>
<td>2,50%</td>
<td>0.18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>105,608</td>
<td>2,49%</td>
<td>0.18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>105,600</td>
<td>2,49%</td>
<td>0.18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>103,678</td>
<td>2,45%</td>
<td>0.17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia, ex Rep. Jugos.</td>
<td>92,647</td>
<td>2,19%</td>
<td>0.15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>87,747</td>
<td>2,07%</td>
<td>0.15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>82,940</td>
<td>2,03%</td>
<td>0.14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>82,064</td>
<td>1,94%</td>
<td>0.14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>75,343</td>
<td>1,78%</td>
<td>0.12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>73,965</td>
<td>1,75%</td>
<td>0.12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 16 countries</td>
<td>3,190,696</td>
<td>75,34%</td>
<td>5,29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>4,235,059</td>
<td>100,00%</td>
<td>7,02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total dossier Caritas/Migrantes*</td>
<td>4,919,000</td>
<td>64,86%</td>
<td>8,15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Dossier statistico Caritas Migrantes/ Istat Data - 1st January 2010
*These data count all the legal immigrants, not only the resident ones.

### Table 2. Migrant population resident in Italy and Italian population for religion**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Absolute numbers</th>
<th>% of the total resident immigrants</th>
<th>Absolute numbers</th>
<th>% of Italian population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Christians</td>
<td>2,109,481</td>
<td>49,81%</td>
<td>59,335,790</td>
<td>99,55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>1,221,915</td>
<td>28,85%</td>
<td>57,500</td>
<td>0,10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chatolics</td>
<td>700,777</td>
<td>16,55%</td>
<td>58,461,290</td>
<td>98,06%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestants</td>
<td>137,430</td>
<td>3,25%</td>
<td>409,000</td>
<td>0,69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Christians</td>
<td>49,532</td>
<td>1,17%</td>
<td>426,000</td>
<td>0,71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>1,354,901</td>
<td>31,99%</td>
<td>43,000</td>
<td>0,07%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>6,809</td>
<td>0,16%</td>
<td>29,000</td>
<td>0,05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>111,871</td>
<td>2,64%</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>0,03%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhists</td>
<td>120,062</td>
<td>2,63%</td>
<td>107,000</td>
<td>0,18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>48,535</td>
<td>1,15%</td>
<td>68,500</td>
<td>0,11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonbelievers/non registered</td>
<td>483,400</td>
<td>11,41%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>4,235,059</td>
<td>4,235,059</td>
<td>59,619,290</td>
<td>59,619,290</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: **Data regarding migrant resident population come from Dossier statistico Caritas Migrantes/Minister of Interior data (31 December 2009). Data regarding Italians come from Centre of Studies on New Religions (31 December 2008).

### Table 3. Main Minority Groups in Italy and their Dimensions of Difference

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions of difference</th>
<th>Citizenship</th>
<th>Racial</th>
<th>Ethnic</th>
<th>Religious</th>
<th>Cultural</th>
<th>Linguistic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minority groups</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own elaboration
In this section we shall outline not the main immigrant minority groups in size, but those who are at the core of the public and political debate. We refer to Muslims, the Roma and the Chinese. We shall discuss their migration history in Italy, their relation with the institutions and with the Italian population. Secondly, we shall try to identify the aspects of their ‘difference’ that are contested and considered difficult to accommodate and tolerate in Italian society.

Muslims

The presence of Muslims in Italy became relevant in the 1980s-1990s, when a flux of migrants from North Africa started to emigrate and arrived in Italy. By that time they began to attract the attention of the institutions and society, which considered them as representatives of the diversity that was most difficult to deal with and to assimilate.

Muslims represent 33.2% of all migrants with a resident permit. In recent years they have become more visible because of the stabilization of families and the increase in the number of younger generations (but also because of the concerns arising after 11th September 2001). In the last few years Muslims have begun to make various demands regarding aspects of their everyday life, such as being allowed to build Mosques or to obtain recognition for their places of worship, the teaching of the Muslim religion and Arabic in schools, the recognition of festivities. Even though the Islamic organizations are weak and not completely representative of Muslims, some of them have begun campaigns to get some degree of public recognition and sometimes they were invited to collaborate with the government to promote dialogue between Muslim communities and the State. Among these organizations we could mention the UCOII (Union of Islamic Organizations and Communities in Italy), COREIS (Islamic Religious Community), the Islamic Cultural Centre of Italy, ADMI (Association of Muslim Women in Italy) and GMI (Young Muslim in Italy). All these organizations reflect the plurality and the complexity of Islam, and in particular of Italian Islam. So, it is difficult to recognize and represent all these organizations. At the same time the Italian State avoids addressing the demands of Muslims, sustaining that there is not a Muslim organization that is able to represent the entire world of Italian Islam.

In order to enhance dialogue between the Muslim communities and the State, in 2005 the centre-right government created the Assembly for Italian Islam. It is an institutional body which collaborates with the Interior Ministry to encourage dialogue with the Islamic communities and to promote good relations among different cultural and religious groups. It is consists of 16 members who are appointed by the Interior Ministry and chosen among the most important representatives of the Italian Islam.

Although the initial aim of the Assembly was to elaborate strategies of inclusion and to form an Italian Islam which could be compatible with Italian society, de facto it concentrated only on matters of principle such as terrorism, religious freedom, and the condition of women. Internal discussions and contentions arose among the representatives of the different organizations, and it became clear that the Assembly was only a consultative body, far removed from the everyday lives and practices of Muslims.

3. The groups which are the focus of public and political debate change over the time. In the 1990s the most stigmatized group was the Albanians, which were considered criminal and violent people. Over time the hostility towards them decreased, they entered the labour market and some became entrepreneurs, especially in construction. Today they are not the subject of prejudice that they were in the past.

4. 51.7% are Christians, the other religions are 5.5%, the remaining are atheistic - or are not included in the census (Caritas Migrantes 2009).

5. The pluralism of Italy's Muslims reflects the entire geographic and geopolitical diversity of Islam (Spena, 2010).
The most recent initiative is the creation of the Committee for Italian Islam (2010). It consists of 19 members and their task is to formulate concrete proposals to address the issues of Mosques, Imam training, mixed marriages, the use of specific clothes and in particular of the burqa, etc. The general aim is to propose solutions to achieve integration, to let people exercise their civil rights, to promote co-habitation while respecting the Italian Constitution and laws.

Besides the Muslim organizations and the representatives who are part of the institutional bodies cited above, in Italy there are many places of worship which exist at a grass-roots level. These places are not always recognized and tolerated, but they often produce some negative reactions from Italian citizens, local institutions and some political forces.

Permission to use some places to pray, to meet, to teach the Islamic culture and religion to young people are seen as ways the Muslims use to increase their power and visibility, and in extreme cases as a place where it is possible to recruit terrorists. The Italian state does not respond to the Muslims’ claims in a structured way, but on a case-by-case basis and in accordance with relations between the local institutions and Muslims. In fact the State is not prepared address the presence and the claims of Muslims, who undermine the traditional notion of identity and citizenship that are bound to the nation state, and its unity of language, religion, and culture.

The way the Italian State addresses the issue of the building of Mosques is an example of its difficulty in managing diversity, and in particular religious diversity.

In Italy only three Mosques are officially recognised, one in Milan (north), the second in Rome (centre) and the third in Catania (south). However, there are many other places of worship. The Interior Ministry estimates that there are 258 places of worship, the Central Direction of Police Prevention estimates 735 (Ismu, 2010). In recent years in many Italian cities the Muslim communities have asked for these places to be officially recognised or have asked for permission to build new Mosques, but their claims have been met with opposition from Italian citizens and from some political forces (like the North League in Padua).

The problems about the construction of Mosques reflect what has been found by recent research carried out by Makno (2008) and ordered by the Interior Ministry. The research findings outline that 55.3% of Italians interviewed consider migration from Islamic countries to be the most problematic, because Muslims bear more visible social, religious and cultural differences. It is pointed out that the respondents emphasize the cultural and religious problems regarding relations with Muslims. Secondly, 31.4% of Italians interviewed are against the building of Mosques.

Besides the building of Mosques, another important question is the education of second generations. In Italy the number of young people of foreign origin has been increasing more and more in the last decade (they represent 22,2% of all the foreign population and they have come to represent 7% of all the students in Italian schools (Caritas Migrantes, 2009). The educational system has to consider the presence of children of different cultures and to learn to relate to the foreign families.

6. Usually when we deal with the issues regarding migrants, the biggest problem which is emphasized is the public security, secondly the competition in the labour market (Valtolina 2005, 2010).
In this scenario, the construction of Islamic schools has created objections and opposition. We refer to the school in Via Quaranta in Milan, which was at the centre of political and public debate for a long time, until its closure. This school began about 15 years ago, and it contained a nursery school, a primary and a secondary school. The aim of the school was not only to teach Islam and Arabic to children (especially Egyptians), but also to prepare them for the final exams at the Embassy. These exams were recognised in the countries of origin and children sat them because the families’ aim was to go back home. To avoid educational segregation and the discontinuity in children’s educational careers, a project of integration was promoted with the support of the Regional Educational Department and the Milan Municipality. The programme that was implemented consisted of Italian language courses within the Islamic school, language teaching for Italian and Egyptian students, exam preparation for children and young people. Nevertheless, the Municipality unexpectedly began a campaign to close the Islamic school. The reasons used to justify the need to close the school were the inadequacy of the building and the lack of hygiene. Besides these reasons it was also stated that the school was not recognised by the state and that the best integration for children is through attendance of Italian state schools. The common fear is that the school becomes a ghetto. Although the Muslim families protested publicly, in September 2005 the school closed and the children were obliged to go to state schools.

After the closure of the school in Via Quaranta, attempts were made to open another school in Via Ventura, on the outskirts of Milan, in 2006. This school also encountered many difficulties before it could open: there were bureaucratic problems (i.e.: permission to use the spaces for educational purposes or the official declaration that the building could be used) that nevertheless hid ideological reasons. After overcoming all these difficulties, the school opened and continues to operate today.

Chinese

Migration from China to Italy is a very old concept. The first flux of migration was at the beginning of 1900, when a group of Chinese immigrants from the Zhejiang province arrived in Milan, after having worked in French firms during the First World War. A second flux was in the 1980s (from Fujian, a province near Zhejiang) and a third in the last few years. This flux is characterized by two kinds of people. Firstly, those who lived in the North of China and who worked in industries and mines that had failed and closed. These are economic migrants. Secondly, those who also come from northern China but who are young bachelors, and whose aim is to continue their studies in Italy (Caritas Migrantes, 2009).

The Chinese population is very young. Most Chinese are between 25 and 40 years old, the average age is 30, and the migrants over 60 years represent 0.74% of the total (Caritas Migrantes 2009). Children aged under 1 year old are equal in number to people aged between 25 and 35 years old. the Chinese population, therefore, has a high birth rate. At the same time there is a tendency to send children to China to study, and this fact is backed up by the decrease in children aged between 2 and 10 years old. After the age of 10, children tend to come back to Italy.
The Chinese are also one of the largest minority groups in Italy. It is the fourth group in size (see table 1), even though they represent only 4.4% of all immigrants. They are concentrated in certain Italian areas, situated especially in the north or in central Italy, such as Milan, Prato or Rome (Istat 2010). Almost half the Chinese workers are self-employed (56.7%), the others are employed permanently (40.8%) or temporarily (2.5%). As regards the sectors, 58.9% are employed in the service sector and 39.9% in the secondary sector. Among those who are employed in the service sector, 36.2% work as traders, 18.1% work in restaurants and hotels and 1.2% in families. The Chinese are mostly entrepreneurs in the retail trade and in the textile sector.

According to the Caritas Migrantes Dossier (2009) a characteristic of Chinese migrants is the tendency to work very hard and to move within the territory. They speak a very different language and they have difficulty in learning Italian. Their project is usually to go back home after a few years. All of these elements tend to hamper integration into Italian society. Moreover, in the last 10 years, a wave of discrimination has arisen against them. In particular there are various social representations of the Chinese which circulate throughout the mass media and public opinion. The research “Analysis and processing of data on Chinese immigrants” conducted in 2008 describes the main social representations of the Chinese and tries to deconstruct them (Di Corpo, 2010).

Generally, the Chinese are considered unfair competitors in the labor market: Chinese companies are accused of dodging tax and overworking their employees. Commonly it is thought that Chinese entrepreneurs exploit their compatriots, they make them work for many hours a day and they pay low salaries. In this way they can compete with Italian firms which work as subcontractors and they can offer their goods to Italian firms on the basis of lower prices than those of Italian subcontractors. However, the main thing that worries Italians is the industriousness of the Chinese and probably the argument about unfair competition is used to justify this worry.

But there are also other false beliefs. For example it is common among public opinion to think that there are many members of the mafia among the Chinese. This belief arose because the Chinese often have a lot of money available, consequently this is seen as an indicator of illegal activities. However, we could suppose that the fear of the growing economic power of China leads people to think that the Chinese conduct illegal business. Moreover, in China the Mafia is not widespread, because the Communist government pushed the Mafia out of the state.

Nevertheless, all the beliefs described here are social representations and are not reflected in the reality. The fears about Chinese, i.e. China's growing economic power, their industriousness and ability to compete with Italian firms, the difficulties in communicating with them, the closure of Chinese communities, all lead to the construction of negative and false stereotypes. Furthermore, these social representations are linked to actual discriminatory practices, as the Organizzazione internazionale per le migrazioni (transl.: International Organization for migrations) research (2008) outlines. There it is pointed out that 23% of first generation Chinese declare that they have been victims of discrimination, and 59% of second generation Chinese declare this. The second generation, Chinese also declare that besides the discrimination there are other prob-
problems: work, isolation and depression, difficult relations with Italians. The Caritas Migrantes Report (2009) links all these aspects to the increasing amount of money sent to China in the previous year. It is supposed that the increase of remittances signals their intention to go back home, a decision partly caused by the discriminatory wave against the Chinese.

An interesting example of discriminatory behavior towards the Chinese is the approach adopted by the Milan Municipality for the Paolo Sarpi neighborhood, called the Chinatown of Milan. It is an area situated in the city centre, where the Chinese started to settle in 1920 and where they opened their commercial activities. In the last few decades their activities have continued to develop and to extend in the neighborhood, changing the aspect of this historical area of Milan. The activities themselves also changed, because Italian crafts were replaced by Chinese wholesalers. The wholesalers seemed to be incompatible with the urban structure of the neighborhood, and the area became congested because of the number of vans and trucks circulating at all hours of the day. So, the Municipality decided to adopt a policy in order to restrict the traffic and to control the Chinese wholesalers. The Municipality's decision was encouraged by the Italian citizens, who opposed the growing presence of Chinese and organized many demonstrations against them.

Some restrictive ordinances were passed and a policy of control began in the neighborhood. But on 12th April 2007 the discriminatory practices reached a climax, when a Chinese woman was fined by the police for having disobeyed the restriction. The fact caused conflict between the police and the Chinese, and resulting in some injuries. After the conflict, which some newspapers and mass media unfairly compared to the French riots in the Banlieues, the Municipality continued to sustain its restrictive policy. Nowadays the neighborhood is an area where the access of cars and vans is limited to certain hours during the day and only with authorization. The Chinese wholesale business has been penalized by these restrictions and the relations between the Milan Municipality and the Chinese community have worsened. Furthermore, the Municipality wants to transfer Chinese businesses and activities to other areas in the city, but these areas refuse to accept the migrants. Probably, the Municipality's attempt to transfer the Chinese to other areas depends not only on the need to control this immigrant group but also to capitalise on Paolo Sarpi, an area situated in the city centre.

In addition to the Milan case we could cite the situation of Prato, where the Chinese settled in a neighbourhood (via Pistoiese) and developed their commercial activities, transforming the area into a so-called Chinatown. As in Milan, where a neighborhood committee was set up to defend the neighborhood from Chinese “colonization”, in Prato the Committee of via Pistoiese also began a campaign against the Chinese many years ago. The major concern was the Chinese entering the textile sector and competition with Italian firms. Chinese firms are accused of employing workers illegally, of exploiting workers, and of not respecting the legislation. In the citizens' opinion, the crisis among textile firms is partly caused by the Chinese black economy and they have asked the government to intervene to save the Italian firms. Public protests culminated in March 2009, when a demonstration was organized by the citizens to attract the attention of the institutions and to receive the support of the government and the region. The public protest was supported by the centre-right political forces, which managed to win the
municipal elections because of a campaign against the Chinese. For the first time the left-wing parties lost the election, after 63 years of government. In the following months many checks on Chinese textile firms and commercial activities were carried out by the police, supported by the newly elected municipality.

Besides these two local contexts, where the difficulties of relations between Italians and Chinese come to light clearly, at a more general level it can also be said that the approach of Italians towards Chinese is suspicious or intolerant. In a representative sample of Italians over 15 years old (Diamanti, 2007), 43% did not have confidence in the Chinese and confidence has decreased over the last few years. Generally, half of Italians have no confidence in foreigners, and the two major fears are that immigrants threaten Italian identity, culture and religion (35%), or the employment of Italian (34%).

**Roma**

Roma are a very ancient minority in Italy and they differentiate themselves from migrants because they do not have any territory to provide a sense of belonging or a geographical point of reference. This minority is very heterogeneous and includes Italian citizens, refugees, irregular migrants, EU citizens and stateless people. All these subgroups are different from each other not only in terms of their legal status but also in their history, language and migration processes: there are Rom, Sinti, Rom Harvati, Rom Khorakhanè, etc.

Based on a report written by Caritas Migrantes (2006), in the European Union there are about 9 million Roma, but in Italy they are only 120,000-150,000 of them. It is an estimate, because there are no official statistics about the size of the Roma population. It is certain that a large number of Roma living in Italy have Italian citizenship and they naturalized many years or even centuries ago. In addition to these, a lot of Roma arrived in Italy after 1990 from the Balkans. These people come from foreign countries and emigrated to escape from wars, famine, economic and political crises and ethnic discrimination. In their countries of origin they were sedentary and not nomad. Generally, the estimated number of Roma who are nomad is about 15% to 30% of all Roma who live in Italy. Despite this fact, the definition of “nomad” is usually used to define the Roma. It is commonplace to marginalize and label them, to define their diversity in terms of the majority.

The presence of Roma led the Italian state to implement the housing policy of “camps”: some areas which were situated on the outskirts of the cities, which should have been temporary but which became permanent without being suitable places to live in. In addition to these authorized “camps”, other areas were occupied illegally by people: cultivated fields, public areas, private properties, etc. All these solutions are precarious and they could influence the quality of life of people (work, health, education…). At the same time they draw the attention of the Italian citizens who live near these areas and lead them to react to and oppose the housing policy of “camps”, especially when these camps have arisen (legally or illegally) near Italians’ houses. So, the tendency is to build or to transfer these camps outside the city or on the outskirts, to remove the problem and to confine Roma to the edges of society. Camps are trans-
ferred to abandoned areas or near dumping grounds. They are places where the hygienic conditions are often bad, where sometimes there is no electricity or water or where there is no sewage system.

The public protests against the Roma and their camps began in 2006-2007 in many Italian cities and it was sustained by some political forces. Although hostile and discriminatory attitudes towards Roma have existed for a long time, in 2006-2007 a series of anti-Roma manifestations broke out.

It is interesting to provide an example by illustrating a shocking but significant event that happened in Milan. After being forcibly evicted from a camp, the Roma were transferred temporarily to an area situated on the outskirts of Milan (Opera). But the solution adopted, despite being temporary, provoked a violent reaction in some citizens who burned the tents set up for the Roma by the National Civil Defence. The arson attack was promoted by some representatives of local political forces (in particular the North League), who also participated in the event. In 2008 the local representative of the North League, Ettore Fusco, was elected Mayor of Opera Municipality. On the other hand, the Opera Parish priest, who was in favour of welcoming the Roma and who had protested against the violent behavior of the Italians, was transferred to another city.

Another event that provoked a violent reaction among citizens and that was sustained by the political forces was the murder in Rome of an Italian woman by a young Romanian man who lived in a Roma Camp. The crime became the pretext of the start of a campaign against Roma and Roma camps. The demonstrations have occasionally been extremely violent resulting into setting fire to Roma camps, without any real protection provided by the police who have also carried out violent Roma camp raids. The demonstrations have received the direct or indirect support of certain political forces and mass media. The result of all these campaigns against Roma was the approval of an emergency decree in May 2008 which declared a state of emergency in three Italian Regions. The Decree “Declaration of the state of emergency in relation to settlements of the nomad communities in Campania, Lazio and Lombardia” ordered the Prefects to assume the function of “Special Commissioners” with the duty to: 1) monitor and authorize settlements 2) carry out censuses of the persons living therein 3) adopt measures against convicts that may live therein 4) adopt measures of eviction 6) identify new areas where adequate settlements may be built 6) adopt measures aimed at social cohesion, including schooling. To carry out a census of Roma who live in the camps the proposal was made to fingerprint people of all ages, including children. The proposal was contested by many political forces and organizations - both at a national and an international level - condemning the discriminatory nature of this initiative. After a long debate in the European Parliament, the Italian government was urged not to take the fingerprints of Roma and not to subject them to a census.

The Italian state has been criticized not only for the matter of fingerprints, but generally for its policy and attitude towards Roma. For example the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) and the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) criticized the Italian approach to Roma, which is characterized by prejudice, and condemned not only the physical isolation, but also the political, cultural and economic segregation of camps.
Despite the criticisms and the recommendations, policies and attitudes towards Roma have not changed. As regards the policies, the forced evictions of Roma camps continue in many Italian cities, such as Milan or Rome.

Nevertheless, these initiatives have still not resolved the problem. Actual forced evictions of Roma camps are still occurring and a definitive solution has not yet been adopted. In Milan for example 370 Roma camp evictions were carried out in the last three years, and they cost about 5 million euros. The Municipality uses the evictions to demonstrate its interest in resolving the problem and in guaranteeing safety for its citizens. Nevertheless, every time the camps are evicted, Roma move to other camps and the problem is not resolved.

As regards public opinion and the attitudes of Italians towards Roma and Roma camps, the tendency is to not tolerate Roma and their lifestyle that people imagine they have. The mass media sustains and reinforces the prejudices and beliefs. An episode that demonstrates the Italians’ intolerance towards Roma is their reaction to the attempted kidnapping of an Italian baby by a 16 year old Roma girl in Naples. The girl did not mean to kidnap the baby, but she probably entered the house to steal and she had taken the baby to calm him down, not to kidnap him. But the old belief that Roma kidnap babies prevailed and, when the girl escaped, the neighbors managed to stop her and tried to lynch her. Finally, the girl was arrested. In the following days some Roma camps situated near Naples were burnt by Italian citizens and the Roma were obliged to escape.

The negative attitudes of Italians towards Roma are confirmed by research conducted by Arrigoni and Vitale (2008). The research shows that 56% of Italians do not know how many Roma there are in Italy, 49% think they are not Italian and 84% think that they are nomads. Interestingly, they are the least welcome population group, since 81% do not like them very much or do not like them at all and only 6.7% like them. The attitudes toward Roma are based on a feeling of aversion (49%) or on the idea of poverty and marginalization (35%). The Roma are thieves, they are a closed group, they live in camps situated on the outskirts of cities by choice, they take advantage of children.

If we look at the Roma’s ‘differences’ we could note that the most important aspect that is contested is their nomadic lifestyle. Regular migrants are accepted because they work, they are not involved in illegal activities and they obey the law; by contrast, Roma are discriminated against because the public opinion is that they do not want a house to live in and they do not want to work, but they prefer to be nomads and to steal. However, these social representations generalize behaviors that involve only certain members of a stigmatized group. For example, as we saw above, most Roma did not live as nomads in their countries of origin (e.g. those who come from the Balkans) or they have been sedentary for a long time. Above all, they do not work because their traditional jobs have disappeared, not because they prefer to steal: itinerant craft-making and commercial activities, musical or circus travelling exhibitions were typical of the past, but they are no longer suitable for the economic changes of the post industrial era. Besides this, some of them do not have permission to stay in Italy (e.g. those who come from the Balkans) or are discriminated against by employers. All these difficul-

7. Besides the strong reactions of Italians, it is interesting to report the court judgment towards the girl: she is “fully integrated in the typical schemes of Roma culture. Because she is completely integrated into those patterns of life, the risk that she will commit an offence again is concrete”. This judgment seems to link the Roma culture and the likelihood of committing an offence in a cause-effect relation.
ties force them to find a job in the black economy and to do precarious or seasonal jobs.

So, besides the necessity to deconstruct prejudices and beliefs about Roma, it is most important to implement housing policies and to improve the situation of Roma camps, which always have to be considered temporary accommodation.

**Definitions of tolerance in Italy**

The issue of cultural and religious pluralism regarding immigrant populations is perceived in Italy as a socially relevant problem. The issue of cultural minorities’ rights was previously marginal in public debate, due to the almost mono-linguistic and mono-religious composition of the country. The “problem” of the linguistic minorities was relegated to a just few areas near some national borders, whereas the issue of historically settled religious minorities (Jews and Protestants, especially Waldensian) was included in the historical dispute about the Catholic Church’s public role in Italy.

Among the fundamental elements that are useful for understanding the Italian situation, the electoral successes of the North League play a major role; the party’s political program has become increasingly characterized by hostility towards immigrants, which is manifested in the proposal to close borders to new immigrants and to impose cultural assimilation on legally resident immigrants. The 2001 terrorist attacks, together with those in Madrid and London, did not provoke changes in the political visions regarding immigration and cultural diversity; on the contrary, they provided new elements in the North League’s approach and reinforced its credibility in the public’s opinion, which was disoriented by the exceptional changes.

Support for the North League started in the Pre-Alps valleys, but in the first half of the 1990s it extended into all the northern regions, reaching greatest popularity in the Lombardy and Veneto regions. In the last elections, votes for North League extended to the cities situated in Pianura Padana; moreover, votes started to spread also south of the river Po, in some regions that were traditionally left-oriented, such as Emilia-Romagna. The political campaigns against immigrants are a distinguishing cause, maybe the main one, of this advance of the North League even in those territories that up to a few years ago were not very sensitive to its cause. This kind of cause, based on the intolerance of immigrants, became hegemonic in the center-right political alliance, with the only exception being a small minority led by the Chamber of Deputies’ president, Gianfranco Fini. Nowadays the North League is perhaps the only populist party in Western Europe that forms part of the government, it controls the all-important Ministry of the Interior, and carries out an aggressive anti-immigrant campaign together with certain political initiatives with a high symbolic impact, such as the so-called “security-package”. This is a package of regulations that mainly includes more severe sanctions against immigrants, especially against immigrants who are illegal residents. It also includes the use of the army in order to safeguard the streets and the formation of “patrols” consisting of private citizens, volunteers, to help keep public order.
In terms of its cultural message, in the 1990s the North League began a political campaign based on alleged origins in the Celtic civilization and used new-pagan symbols. In the last few years it has modified its claims and its approach, declaring itself the defender of Catholic traditions by defending for example the presence of the crucifix in schools and in other public places, or the display of the nativity scene during the Christmas period, and so on. In this way, hostility towards the opening of places of worship for Muslims has gained even more power and more coherence, being a central point in North League’s political stance. The Northern League sees the Catholic religion as a civil religion, a symbol of the shared cultural traditions, a social unifying element for the territory, that is useful in promoting communitarian identification, but which is disengaged from the actual practice of religious rituals and values: a religion that is used to excluding people or to drawing a boundary between “us” and “them”. So the North League even opposes the Catholic ecclesiastic authorities when they preach openness and tolerance toward Muslims and other religious groups, and it presents itself as the real principle of the Catholic tradition.

The local administrations have been promoters of initiatives that may seem curious or clumsy, and that are often declared inadmissible by courts of justice, but that are incisive in the public opinion: the refusal to give lunch to primary school pupils whose families were not able to pay for the service; the “White Christmas” operation, to control and identify, house by house, the possible presence of illegal immigrants; the refusal to celebrate mixed marriages, with the pretext of the risk of “marriages of convenience”. These and other similar initiatives appear in the front pages of newspapers and in television news headlines, causing debate but then they normally disappear. Nevertheless they communicate a message of suspicion and hostility toward immigrants in public opinion.

So we can say that religious and cultural tolerance in Italy has taken a few steps backwards over the last few years, especially in the northern regions: these regions are the richest and most developed in the country, most highly populated immigrants, but also the most receptive to North League’s message, which has now become accepted almost uniformly by the whole government majority. Also the local administrations led by center-left alliances have a great deal of difficulty when they have to decide on suitable urban spaces for the construction of places of worship and Islamic cultural centers, and to grant the relevant permission.

Roma and Sinti minorities are experiencing similar difficulties. In this case, as we explained above, the conflict is especially related with two aspects: first, the security issue, which has enormously influenced the perception of immigration in general, and in particular the attitudes towards Tzigane minorities; second, the establishment of “camps” (both with and without authorization) for the accommodation of these groups, defined as “nomads”, that are usually located in degraded areas of the urban peripheries. The spontaneous settlements consist of assembled huts without any bathrooms, not so different from the favelas found in large cities in poor countries. The periodical removal of these camps without the offer of feasible alternative solutions simply causes the inhabitants to move a few hundred meters away; in a year, removal after removal, the inhabitants come back to the original settlement.
In these conflicts, the North League has also led citizens’ campaigns “for security”, obtaining significant results in terms of visibility and electoral consensus. Open hostility towards a specific ethnic group has become a legitimate theme in public debate and it is used to justify mistreatment and violence. It may also be used to set “honest citizens” against “nomad predators”.

The case of Chinese immigration is different to some extent. Racist stereotypes and prejudices combine with an unheard-of fear for the economic efficiency and the commercial penetration capabilities of Chinese entrepreneurs. On the one hand, Chinese restaurants, abandoned by clients, are obliged to become Japanese or even Italian restaurants. On the other hand, the peddlers in the urban markets, like the sellers in the clothing industry in Prato (Toscana), complain about the aggressive nature of their Chinese entrepreneur competitors, their access to ample capital, their ability to adopt working hours, salaries and working conditions that are unsustainable for Italian companies.

The persistent political opposition to immigration can be seen through regulation of citizenship processes. Immigration laws were modified when Italy started to receive conspicuous flows of foreign immigration, eighty years after the approval of the original law (1912). The reform particularly affected “non-EU” immigrants who were subject to stricter conditions than others. The Italian law in question, approved in 1992 and passed by Parliament almost unanimously, sets out different requirements (according to the country of origin) for minimum periods of residence before any application for citizenship can be made. Foreigners from EU countries are only required to have four years residence, while residence of ten years is needed for others (the so-called “extracomunitari”, i.e. non-EU migrants), in comparison with the period of five years that was required of everyone under the previous law. Moreover processing the applications takes a long time (four years, on average) and the answer given by the authorities is discretionary (negative in most cases). The acquisition of citizenship, therefore, seems to be an obstacle race. By contrast, the granting of citizenship through marriage is more easily obtained in Italy than in many other European countries.

The same law, which is based on a facilitated procedure for acquiring of Italian citizenship for the descendants of Italian emigrants to foreign countries, basically defines the boundaries of the Italian nation in ethnic terms. Giovanna Zincone (2006) used the expression “familismo legale” (legality through family ties): “Italianism” seems to be essentially a matter of blood relationships, a commodity that is handed down through families, or a quality that can be acquired with marriage, thanks to a link with a partner belonging to the tribe of the Italians: in 2008, in Italy the percentage of citizenships acquired through marriage was 63.2% of the total number of citizenships granted (Caritas Migrantes, 2009). Moreover the total number (35,766) is much lower than that in other European countries that have older migratory flows, like France (154,827) and Germany (117,241), but also lower than the number of acquisitions in a country similar to Italy, e.g. Spain (42,860 in 2005, in comparison with 19,266 citizenships granted in Italy).

At the same time, between 1998 and 2004 the opportunity to acquire citizenship for descendants of those who had emigrated a long time
ago silently produced over half a million new citizens: the most numerous group were “returning” Italians from Argentina with around 236,000 acquisitions and from Brazil with 119,142. It is important to stress the fact that these people are not defined as “immigrants”, even if they choose to come and live in Italy (rather than to use their Italian passports to migrate to Spain, Great Britain or the United States), although on the social level they may face some difficulties that are not so different from those the migrants classified as “foreigners” normally face. For example, their educational qualifications are not usually recognized (unlike what happens in Spain), and they have to look for low level positions in the labour market.

The right to vote went more or less the same way. Many years after the end of mass Italian emigration to foreign countries, in 2006 citizens resident in foreign countries obtained not only the right to vote, but also the chance to elect their own deputies and senators in reserved electoral constituencies, located in Latin America, Australia, the United States, Central and Northern Europe: members of Parliament that vote on laws about fiscal or public safety issues that are not applied to their electors. By contrast, foreign immigrants resident in Italy, even long term residents, do not have the right to vote in local administrative elections.

The present centre-right political majority is resisting any change regarding these two aspects and the centre-left parties were not able to find an agreement about the issue when they governed. The whole issue is also conditioned by the perception of widespread hostility to change on the part of the public.

This reluctance has a clear symbolic dimension: Italy has trouble redefining itself as a multi-ethnic society. But it also has social and political consequences: without access to citizenship or the right to vote, it is very difficult for immigrants to demand their social and civil rights such as the freedom of worship. Consequently, the current pattern seems to be characterized by a decrease in tolerance, in contrast with an increase in the diversity which is transforming Italian society.

**Concluding remarks**

Italy has become an immigration country only recently and it appeared unprepared to face the issues of cultural and religious diversity, although these matters were not new in Italy’s history.

The lack of awareness about migration can be found in public and political debates: in the Italian context “immigrants” were considered those who moved within the country, especially from the southern regions to the northern ones. From a juridical point of view, migrants do not exist and there was no legislation that regulated immigration flows (the first immigration law was only passed in 1986). As a consequence, immigration was regarded as a social problem, an emergency to be resolved quickly, without carrying out any fundamental changes in public policies.

Whereas the politicians adopted provisional solutions, such as the regularizations acts, immigrants entered the Italian labour market silently,
Nevertheless, they also entered the building trade, the restaurant industry, the retail sector and agriculture (Caritas Migrantes, 2009; Inail, 2010). In short, immigrants entered Italian society from the bottom and starting with the labour market.

However, although the economic integration of migrants (albeit in subordinated jobs) is emerging, a parallel change in the law and in policies has not happened. On the contrary, strong hostility towards migrants has spread, sustained by some political parties, such as the North League. So, in the current Italian context two different approaches to migrants have emerged: on the one hand political and public debate is characterized by the intolerance towards migrants; on the other hand, the labour market promotes their economic integration, whereas some civil society actors (Catholic organizations, trade unions, NGOs), also support their social integration. As a result, there is a deep discrepancy between the sphere of the market and migration policy, between the civil society actors and public or political debate. There is also a discrepancy between declared policies and applied policies, between common representations and the actual attitudes, behaviours and actions.

In particular the political policies of the North League have acquired substantial support, based on “zero tolerance” –i.e. strict enforcement of the public safety rules, the need to fight against the illegal flows of migrants, and generally the hostility towards foreigners. Among the immigrant groups that are least tolerated are the Roma and Muslims, two groups that are considered a danger to public order and the safety of citizens. Nevertheless, the intolerance towards them is justified not only by the fact that they use urban spaces without formal authorization or they invade territories without the right to do so; they are also religiously or culturally different and they can not claim either recognition or rights.

In the same way, the Chinese are not tolerated because they are considered very different culturally; nevertheless, the hostility towards them is based not only in terms of these issues, but also because of fear of their economic efficiency and commercial capabilities. Competition in some economic sectors between Chinese and Italian entrepreneurs increases hostility and intolerance towards them.

In conclusion, religious and cultural tolerance in Italy has regressed over the last few years. Some events that repeatedly occur in local contexts, especially in the northern regions (where most immigrants live and where the North League enjoys wide support) demonstrate this. We refer to the dismantling of many Roma camps in Milan or Rome, prohibition or the difficulties in building mosques or places of worship, the closure of an Islamic school in Milan, the restrictive ordinances targeting the Chinese in Milan and Prato, etc.

Nevertheless, Italy can not oppose the transformation of society and the increase of diversity. It is necessary to take into account the social, cultural and economic changes that society is experiencing and the discrepancy between the policies declared and the public debate on the one hand, and the reality on the other.
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CHAPTER 9. SPAIN

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Introduction

Spain is often characterised as one of Europe’s countries of new immigration and one of the countries representing the so-called Mediterranean model. Although there is no consensus on the exact meaning of this label, Spain shares a number of trends with other Southern European countries such as Italy, Greece and Portugal. First, all these countries have changed from being regions of emigration to receiving significant migration flows and having a percentage of immigrants in relation to their total population comparable to those of Northern European countries. In Spain, the number of foreign residents increased from 250,000 (0.75 per cent of the total population) in 1985 to 900,000 (2.18 per cent) in 2000, 1.3 million (3.10 per cent) in 2002, 3 million (6.7 per cent) in 2006 and 4.8 million (more than 10 per cent) in 2010 (Spanish Ministry of Labour and Immigration, 2010).

Second, in most Southern European countries huge foreign labour demands in the last twenty years have been combined with rather restrictive or non-working admission policies, which led to a model of irregular migration with frequent regularisation programmes. Although keeping count of the number of irregular immigrants is always an impossible task, it can be said that most foreign residents in Spain have been irregular at least once. For example, at the end of 2000, regularisation papers accounted for two out of three residence permits then in force (Izquierdo, 2006: 74). In absolute terms, the periodical regularisation initiatives (1986, 1991, 1996, 2000, 2001 and 2005) have given some idea of the growing numbers of irregular immigrants.

Despite these similarities, there are also significant differences. The first relevant difference is in terms of national identity. As we will see, the multi-national character of the Spanish state influences how national identity is conceptualised and how immigration is perceived and accommodated. Another relevant difference concerns the discourses on immigration. In general terms, public perceptions of immigration are much more positive in Spain than in Italy or Greece. This has been accompanied by a policy discourse that enhances cultural difference and presents integration as a bi-directional process rather than as a unidirectional path towards assimilation into the dominant culture.
This chapter focuses on three main issues. First, we examine the main factors that have determined the development of the predominant conception of Spanish identity and its impact on the accommodation of diversity. Second, we outline the main immigrant minority groups and briefly identify the main diversity challenges. Diversity challenges are analysed in terms of categories rather than groups as this allows us to: a) establish a clear link between national identity and diversity challenges; b) focus on the conflict itself and particularly on those issues/practices under discussion; and c) look at diversity in a broader sense, including debates on national cultural and linguistic diversity. Third, we consider how tolerance has been thematised in the Spanish case. We aim to understand which diversity-related conflicts have been understood in terms of ‘tolerance’ and which ones as issues of equality, respect, recognition or accommodation. Finally, we highlight the main distinctive features of the Spanish case from a comparative European perspective in the conclusions.

National identity and state formation

In this section, we identify the two main markers of Spanish identity from a historical perspective: language and religion. We then consider how immigration has been perceived as a challenge to linguistic and cultural (national) diversity. In the following paragraphs, the focus shifts to the role played by Europe in understanding immigration and the formulation of immigration policies in Spain. Finally, we briefly examine the definition of integration and the predominant discourse of interculturality.

Spanishness

Language (Spanish) and religion (Catholicism) have often been presented as the main pillars of Spanish identity or Spanishness. This discourse of identity has created a strong narrative of similarity and difference: similarity in terms of those who speak Spanish and profess Catholicism, originally meaning Castilians and subsequently Latin Americans and Spaniards in general; and difference regarding those who either do not speak Spanish or profess other religions.

Spanish identity was initially codified in the late fifteenth century, and above all in the symbolic year of 1492, when the Sephardic Jews, Muslims and Gypsies were expelled and Castile officially began the conquest of America and what could be called the global expansion of Spanish Catholicism and Messianism. The politics of the so-called Catholic Monarchs has many elements of what we would today refer to as *ethnic cleansing* (Zapata-Barrero, 2006: 146). Islam has historically been excluded from the formation of the Spanish identity in which a Christian ‘us’ has been juxtaposed to an Islamic ‘other’ (Martín-Muñoz, 1996: 14).

The term *Hispanidad* was coined in the early twentieth century to counterbalance the loss of Spain’s last colonies (Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines) by emphasising the cultural proximity and historical ties between the newly independent Latin American countries and Spain. In the mid-twentieth century, it was taken up again by Franco’s dictatorship ‘precisely to comprise the whole Spanish area of influence, designating a linguistic (Spanish) and religious (Catholic) community and
creating a sense of belonging, excluding non-Spanish speakers, atheists and Muslims’ (Zapata-Barrero, 2006: 148). The political Francoist argument ‘habla cristiano’ (speak Christian) is a clear example of how the regime fostered an ambiguity between Spanish (the language) and Christianity (the religion) in order to build a culturally homogeneous society and exclude any sort of diversity.

The Spanish Constitution (1978), which emerged from the Transition period (1975-78) after almost forty years of Franco’s dictatorship, left aspects linked to religion and linguistic and national pluralism unresolved. For instance, the Catholic Church still has some degree of control over cultural hegemony in the educational system, and is actively opposing government decisions related to ‘education for citizenship’, which recognise homosexual marriages, amongst other disputed topics. The difficulty of multinational recognition in the social and political debate is another example of an unresolved issue concerning national pluralism in Spain.

**Minority nations**

Despite the construction of a Spanish identity in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Spain has to a great extent remained a multinational country (see Gagnon and Tully, 2001; Máiz and Requejo, 2005; Requejo, 2005) composed of at least three major historical minority nations with their own languages: Galician, Basque and Catalan. While these languages were forbidden or reduced to folklore status during the Franco dictatorship (1939-1975), they were finally recognised by the Spanish Constitution in 1978. Moreover, the Spanish democratisation and constitutional process led to a gradual decentralisation with a differential treatment for minority nations and the recognition of specific rights for historic ‘nationalities’ (Nagel, 2006).

In this context, immigration has often been perceived as a challenge to linguistic and cultural diversity. The conceptualisation of immigration as a threat to minority nations started at the beginning of the twentieth century, when regions such as Catalonia or the Basque Country witnessed important flows of immigration from elsewhere in Spain. Though Spaniards, these migrants were perceived as foreigners in linguistic and cultural terms. As a consequence, their arrival generated a major social, political and ideological debate on its impact on national identity and the difficulties arising from their integration (Calvo and Vega, 1978). Indeed, a similar debate emerged in the 1990s and 2000s, when on this occasion, the arrival of international migrants was seen as a challenge to linguistic and cultural diversity.

These debates on immigration have also acted as a battlefield for the continuous redefinition of the contours of national identities. As analysed by Gil Araújo (2009: 234-240), the immigration of the 1950s and 1960s led to a redefinition of the meaning of ‘being Catalan’ as ‘living and working in Catalonia’ or ‘wanting to be Catalan’. With the end of the Franco dictatorship and the democratisation process, language became the main marker of Catalan identity. This is clearly illustrated by the Catalan Citizenship and Immigration Plan (2005-2008) and the National Pact on Immigration (2009): while citizenship rights are linked to local residence (registration on the municipal census or el padrón), integration is now more than ever associated with speaking Catalan.
The role of Europe

It was not until Spain joined the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1985 that the need to unify and give legal status of law to the various regulations, decrees and bilateral agreements on immigration arose. This need was resolved a few months later with the urgent enactment of the Ley Orgánica de Extranjería (LOE – Organic Law on Foreigners), which made the entry of foreigners and their residence and access to the labour market subject to regulation. This change was particularly important for immigrants from Latin America, the Philippines and Equatorial Guinea, who had not needed a work permit to work in Spain until the enactment of the new law (Izquierdo, 1989: 47).

This thickening of borders for those ‘privileged foreigners’ coming from the former Spanish colonies continued more than a decade later with the extension of visa requirements for most Latin American citizens. While politicians and intellectuals from these countries protested by pleading historic ties of solidarity with Spain, the imposition of the visa was ushered in under the pretext of the need for a common European policy. In this regard, Europe was crucial not only as a factor pushing towards more restrictive immigration policies but also ‘as a way of diluting blame by attributing responsibility to Brussels for a measure that was strongly criticised both in Spain and in the Americas’ (Moreno Fuentes, 2005: 116).

Simultaneously, the regulations that followed the LOE in the EU context introduced preferential treatment for EU citizens and their families who unlike non-EU citizens, enjoyed freedom of circulation and the right to engage in economic activity regardless of their national employment situation. The result was the emergence of a new category of privileged foreigners (EU citizens) as opposed to the newly defined ‘rest’ (non-EU citizens). Interestingly, as the frontier of the European Union extended eastwards to include most of the Eastern European countries, this category of ‘privileged foreigners’ also expanded. For instance, when Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU in January 2007, the legal situation of their citizens living and working in Spain – many of them in an irregular situation – changed overnight.

‘Accommodation’ of diversity

Although Spain is a laboratory of diversities, there is very little policy discourse on immigration and identity (Zapata-Barrero, 2009: 119). Indeed, analysis of the parliamentary debates and the political parties’ declarations suggests a shared tacit fear of talking about immigration in identity terms. This may be explained by the fact that identity is an unsolved and incomplete question in Spain (Zapata-Barrero, 2010: 413). To talk about multiculturality would necessarily mean talking about multinationality. In other words, talking about ‘who is Spanish’ and who is not would mean beginning an unclear and politically undesirable debate about ‘what it means to be Spanish’.

The avoidance of debates around immigration and identity at Spanish national level to date has had two main implications. First, this kind of debate has only taken place at the level of the historic autonomous communities (particularly in Catalonia). As seen in the previous
section, this is where immigration is discussed as a political identity problem. Second, diversity is managed not on the basis of established and preconceived ideas – such as French republicanism or British multiculturalism – but rather by induction, taking into account questions and answers generated by the practice of governance of diversity linked to immigration. This pragmatism or ‘practical philosophy’, as defined by Zapata-Barrero (2010: 412), leads to a problem-driven policy (2010: 426).

While there is hardly any debate around immigration and identity at the national level, integration is often defined in policy documents and by administrations at various levels, politicians and stakeholders as a bi-directional process based on the concept of *convivencia intercultural*. As a key concept in the Strategic Plan of Citizenship and Integration (2007-2010), *convivencia* is used as synonym for integration, and literally means ‘living together,’ and *interculturalidad* is defined as a mechanism for interaction between persons from different origins and cultures that leads to the positive valuation and respect of cultural diversity. *Convivencia intercultural* therefore means living together under conditions of solidarity, tolerance, respect and recognition of cultural, religious and ethnic differences (Zapata-Barrero, 2011a).

**Diversity challenges**

In this section, we first outline the major immigrant minority groups in Spain, by highlighting their main features and identifying the main key challenging events regarding their presence in Spain. Second, we examine the main debates on diversity. Since Spanish identity has been constructed on the basis of language and religion, it is no surprise that the main debates emerged around these two categories. Note that while conflicts around religion could be characterised as social conflicts, those around language are of an eminently political nature.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of origin</th>
<th>Absolute numbers</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>793,205</td>
<td>16.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>758,900</td>
<td>16.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>382,129</td>
<td>8.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>264,075</td>
<td>5.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>225,391</td>
<td>4.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>163,763</td>
<td>3.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>154,353</td>
<td>3.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>152,853</td>
<td>3.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>138,478</td>
<td>3.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>129,756</td>
<td>2.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>116,178</td>
<td>2.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>113,570</td>
<td>2.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>89,410</td>
<td>1.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>89,201</td>
<td>1.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>35,031</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other countries</td>
<td>1,086,050</td>
<td>22.90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Observatorio Permanente de la Inmigración, 2/2010*
Immigrant minorities

There were 4,744,169 foreign residents in Spain in June 2010, accounting for more than 10 per cent of the Spanish population. Most foreign residents come from other EU countries (39 per cent), Iberoamerica (29.9 per cent), Africa (20 per cent), Asia (6 per cent), non-EU European countries (3 per cent) and North America (0.4 per cent). The largest national immigrant groups are Romanians, Moroccans, Ecuadorians, Colombians, British, Italians, Bulgarians, Chinese, Peruvians and Portuguese (see Table 1) (Spanish Ministry of Labour and Immigration, 2010).

Romanians: There were 793,205 Romanian citizens in Spain in 2010. Most of them arrived in Spain after 2000. While in 2006 there were 211,325 Romanians living regularly in Spain, in 2007 this amount increased to 603,889 (Ministry of the Interior 2006: 154; 2007: 189). This growth cannot be explained by an increase in the migratory flows but rather by the fact that when Romania joined the EU in 2007, those living and working irregularly in Spain became EU citizens and were therefore automatically ‘regularised’.

In April 2010 the right-wing party Partido Popular (PP) in Badalona – a town near Barcelona – published a pamphlet stating ‘We don’t want Romanians’. Its leader Xavier García Albiol subsequently clarified that they were referring to Romanian Gypsies and added that they were a ‘plague’ and that ‘they came exclusively to relinquish’, associating them with ‘insecurity’, ‘dirt’ and ‘criminality’. These statements were criticised by all political parties, including the representatives of the Partido Popular at regional level, the Romanian embassy and Gypsy associations. Interestingly, the (indigenous) Gypsy association in Badalona supported the pamphlet. Some months later, during the expulsions of Romanian gypsies in France, García Albiol organised a visit in Badalona with Marie-Thérèse Sanchez-Schmid – a EP deputy for Sarkozy’s UPM party – arguing that the situation in Badalona was much worse than that in France.

Moroccans: Moroccan citizens in Spain are almost as numerous as Romanians (see Table 1). Their number has doubled several times in recent years, and was around 200,000 in 2000, 400,000 in 2004, 650,000 in 2007 and 760,000 in 2010 (Spanish Ministry of Labour and Immigration, 2010). Despite their proximity in both geographic and cultural terms, Moroccans have often been seen as the ‘problematic’ migrants. Zapata-Barrero (2006: 145) argues that this is not exactly Islamophobia or religious/cultural racism but Maurophobia (phobia of Moors). The historical iconography of the Moors, and the opposition between Moors and Christians, started with the Reconquista and intensified from the sixteenth century onwards, becoming particularly acute in the nineteenth century with the African War of 1860. Finally, the outbreak of the Civil War led to the bipolarisation of the image of Moroccans. While republicans, socialists, communists and anarchists and peripheral nationalists depicted the Moroccans enlisted in Franco’s armies as ‘cruel’ and ‘mercenary’, Francoists gave the respectful and paternalistic image of the Moroccan official status (Zapata-Barrero, 2006: 146).

The three-day campaign of violence against Moroccan immigrants in El Ejido – a market-gardening town in south-eastern Spain – in February 2000 shows how this historical racism has sometimes led to obvious conflict. In this case, the murder of a young Spanish woman by a mentally
disturbed Moroccan (who had been refused admittance to a health centre shortly before) led to the persecution of Moroccans, who demonstrated and went on strike for several days immediately afterwards. This process concluded with the ‘El Ejido Agreement’, according to which the various government bodies undertook to ensure better living conditions for immigrant workers in the area. Despite this agreement, in subsequent seasons the Moroccan workers found that they were being replaced by female workers from Eastern Europe. When NGOs, immigrant organisations, unions and some opposition parties condemned this situation, the government argued that employers were free to employ whoever they wished (El País, 12 June 2002).

When explaining the attacks in El Ejido, Martínez Veiga (2002: 133) concludes that these were perpetuated as a way to ‘impose discipline, exclusion and, in some ways, let them know where they stand: outside. (…) They are expected to work and then to disappear. They are made into an instrument of production without bearing in mind the costs of reproduction’. The two main factors that according to the author account for the racist campaign against Moroccans were labour exploitation and spatial segregation between migrant workers and the native population.

**Latin Americans:** The largest Latin American national groups are from Ecuador (382,129), Colombia (264,075), Peru (138,478), Bolivia (116,178), Argentina (89,201) and the Dominican Republic (85,831). In contrast to Moroccans, Latin Americans have been for long the ‘privileged’ and ‘desired’ immigrants in Spain. This preference has also been enshrined in law.

As an example, the visa requirements for most Latin American citizens did not come into force until long after those for other non-EU citizens, and particularly those from North-African countries. The Citizenship Law is also a good example of this kind of distinction. Dating back to the 1889 Civil code, this Law concedes citizenship after two years of legal residence to people from Latin America, the Philippines and Sephardic Jews, and ten years of legal residence for other foreigners.

This differential treatment has been justified by an alleged need to cultivate relations with the former colonies (but not all of them, as in the case of Morocco, which was one of the last Spanish protectorates) and as answering for the historic debt that Spain had incurred with those countries that had been receiving Spanish immigrants for decades. It has also been explained by the objective of promoting immigration (or integration) of ‘people like us’ in linguistic or religious terms (López Sala, 2000: 375).

The outcome of this policy was a process of Latin Americanisation of immigration during the 1990s and much of the 2000s, and the fact that a high proportion of foreigners who acquire Spanish nationality (81.52 per cent in 2006) come from the countries of Latin America (Spanish Ministry of the Interior, 2008). In terms of rights, this means inequality of access to the civil, political and labour rights associated with citizenship. In short, it is a selective, exclusive and discriminatory policy.

One of the major conflicts regarding Latin American immigrants in Spain has involved the so-called street gangs or street organisations (see
In 2002 a high school in Barcelona asked the municipal police to intervene after several violent events involving Latin American youth. The main street gangs in Spain are the *Latin Kings*, created in Chicago in the 1940s, and *la Ñeta*, created in Puerto Rico in the late 1970s. As Feixa (2006) observed, these street organisations should not be understood as a mere continuation of the original groups but rather as resulting from the new context of immigration. Interestingly, the municipality of Barcelona has recently recognised them as cultural associations (the *Organización cultural de Reyes y Reinas Latinos en Catalunya*, and the *Asociación sociocultural, deportiva y musical de Ñetas*) with the aim of institutionalising their presence and, by so doing, preventing processes of social exclusion and violence.

**Chinese:** The number of Chinese foreign residents in Spain grew from 28,692 in 2000 to 85,745 in 2005 and 152,853 in 2010 (Spanish Ministry of Labour and Immigration, 2010). Chinese immigrants are concentrated in urban areas and along the Mediterranean coast. In terms of the labour market, most of them work in services (restaurants and retail trade) and in the garment industry and sweatshops. Though the Chinese are often seen as an ‘unproblematic’ immigrant community, their presence in some particular economic sectors has sometimes aroused fear and distrust.

In September 2004, around 500 people demonstrated in Elche (near Valencia) to protest against the presence of Chinese businessmen in the area. In a context of a severe recession in the footwear sector, the demonstrators argued that Chinese were disloyal competitors as they operated beyond any governmental (tax) control. The demonstration concluded with the burning of two warehouses and a truck full of merchandise. In his thorough analysis of the event, Cachón explains it in terms of a result of pre-existing negative stereotypes and prejudices together with the unrest caused by a huge economic transformation and the consequent crisis in the sector. Quoting Wieviorka (1998: 44), Cachón defines it as the ‘racism of the fall and social exclusion’ or the racism of the ‘poor white’ (Cachón, 2005: 268).

**EU citizens:** Europeans represent almost 40 per cent of all immigrants in Spain. The largest national groups are Romanian, British, Italians, Bulgarians, Portuguese, Germans and French (see Table 1 for absolute numbers and percentages). A significant proportion are pensioners migrating from North-Western Europe (mostly from the United Kingdom and Germany) and professionals. Moreover, there is a sizeable new immigration of economic migrants from Central and Eastern Europe, namely Romania and Bulgaria. Apart from the case mentioned above regarding Romanian gypsies, the presence of EU residents in Spain has not aroused particular distrust.

**Sub-Saharan Africans:** Sub-Saharan Africans account for a small percentage of the total immigrant population in Spain. Most of them are from Senegal (38,716), Gambia (21,249), Mali (16,202), Nigeria (26,227) and Equatorial Guinea (9,985) (Spanish Ministry of Labour and Immigration, 2009). Although they are perceived as less problematic than Moroccans, their presence is commonly associated with illegality.

First, they are associated with illegal border crossing. Images of fishing boats full of African migrants trying to reach the Spanish shores have
been broadcast all over the world. Second, they have also been associated with informal work. Particularly in the summer, Spanish newspapers and television often report on their precarious status as illegal workers in the fields of Andalusia and Catalonia. Third, in recent years, they have also been associated with illegal street trading (the so-called top manta) in public spaces. Being mainly present in the tourist resorts on the Mediterranean coast, many municipalities are now trying to control their presence either by exploring the possibility of legalising their trade (Calafell and El Vendrell) or in most cases, by increasing police control. The municipality of Barcelona – one of the cities with the largest presence of African street traders – is now trying to persuade them by making regularisation difficult for those who have been fined for selling illegally on the streets (La Vanguardia, 14/09/2010).

Religion

Most diversity challenges in Spain have been related to religion, and more particularly to Islam. For instance, whenever the members of a Muslim community want to construct a mosque, an immediate reaction of neighbourhood protests begins, which is generally supported or at least not obstructed or contradicted by local authorities. It is a fact that in Spain, Muslim and Islamic issues have appeared in the public sphere with rather rigid images attached to them. Invariably, public opinion polls on these issues reveal that the majority of Spanish citizens link their opposition to immigrants in general to the Muslim community in particular (Pérez-Díaz et al. 2004).

Conflicts around Islam should first be understood in the context of the Spanish identity construction, which as explained above is based on a traditional negative perception of Muslims and more specifically Moroccans, who are considered in pejorative terms as ‘the Moor’ (el moro) (Zapata-Barrero, 2006: 143). Second, these conflicts should also be explained in terms of a dual and apparently contradictory process: the secularisation of the state but the ongoing predominant position of the Catholic church. While the shift to a secular state has tended to relegate religious practices to the private sphere, the asymmetrical relationship with the Catholic church has in practice led to the non-fulfilment of the agreements signed with minority religions (see Zapata-Barrero, 2011a). Third, and finally, as in many other European countries, some cultural practices of Muslim communities are increasingly perceived as opposed to liberal values such as human dignity, freedom and equality.

Conflicts around mosques, oratories and cemeteries: Conflicts around mosques and oratories (Muslim places of workship) have various strands (see Zapata-Barrero and de Witte, 2010):

- Opposition to the building of mosques and/or opening of religious centres or oratories by both citizens and government. This shows a lack of social recognition of Muslims in the public space.
- Discussion on the access of women to mosques and oratories. A particular criticism is that women’s access to mosques is either prohibited, or they have to use separate rooms. It is often perceived as unacceptable from the perspective of the principle of gender equality, or the principle of religious freedom.
• Opposition to foreign funding of mosques. The main concern is that poorly resourced mosques depend on funding from foreign sources, including extremist groups.
• Criticisms of radical imams leading mosques. As these religious leaders are either educated abroad or completely uneducated at all, the fear is that they advocate interpretations of Islam that are in conflict with the legal and social norms in Spanish society. In an attempt to prevent imams from spreading hateful and violent ideas, the government proposed to monitor and censor mosque sermons in May 2004. Protests by Muslim and civil liberty groups led to the retraction of the proposal. As an alternative, the main Moroccan immigrant workers organisation (ATIME) proposed a system of self-control of mosques (including supervision of mosques and appointment of imams) led by local and national Muslim councils.

Conflicts around religious education: Conflicts around religious education have been based around three main topics (see Zapata-Barrero, 2011a):

• Discussion on the predominance of Catholic education. Catholic education must be offered in public schools, although students are free to choose it or otherwise. While no alternative needs to be provided in primary schools, in secondary school an alternative course (history of religions) should be offered but students are also free to choose neither of these options (Rodríguez de Paz, 2006; Morán, 2006). There have also been debates on the presence of Catholic symbols in schools. Interestingly, when some parents criticised the presence of crucifixes in the classroom, the council of education of the Castilla y León Autonomous Community asked them to be ‘tolerant,’ arguing the need for toleration in a sphere of convivencia (peaceful coexistence). In 2010 the draft of the new Organic Law for the Freedom of Conscience and Religion prohibited the presence of religious symbols in public schools.
• Discussion on the right of religious education in both public and private schools. Although the agreements between the Spanish state and the Jewish, Evangelic and Muslim communities guarantee the right of religious education, in practice most schools do not provide this.
• Discussion on the new compulsory course (final year in primary education and throughout secondary school), called ‘Education for Citizenship and Human Rights’ (Educación para la ciudadanía y derechos humanos). Following recommendations from both the Council of Europe and the European Union, this new course was introduced in 2006 in order to teach individual and social ethics and democratic values, including topics such as climate change, human rights, immigration, multiculturalism, etc. The arguments for were the need to create democratic citizens and prevent inequalities between sexes, minorities, etc. The arguments against come from the Catholic Church and related groups who argue that it might lead to value indoctrination by the state and is against the principle of freedom of ideology and religion.

Conflicts based on dress code: Conflicts have arisen around headscarves in schools and burqas and niqabs in public spaces. The terms of the debates have been the following:

• Headscarves in schools: the wearing of the Muslim headscarf in public schools has not been as controversial as in other European countries
until very recently. However, opinion has been divided between those who defend religious symbols as part of religious freedom and those who would like to see the prohibition of religious signs in the public sphere in the name of liberal-republican values (Pérez-Barco & Bastante, 2006; Martí, 2007). When schools prohibited girls wearing from the Islamic veil (hijab) based on the internal rules of the centre that prohibits all elements of discrimination, the responses were also diverse. For instance, the Catalan government intervened in 2007 to reverse the school prohibition by arguing that the right to education had priority over the regulation of (religious) symbols (Escríche, 2007). In spring 2010, the right-wing regional government of Madrid supported a school prohibition, while the Socialist national government opposed it arguing that the right to education took priority. This latter case led to a major national debate that continued with the discussions on the draft of the new Organic Law for the Freedom of Conscience and Religion.

• Burqas and niqabs in public spaces: In 2010 some municipalities (first in Catalonia and then in Andalusia) began to prohibit the burqa and niqab in public buildings. In June the Senate also approved – albeit by a thin majority – a proposition made by the Partido Popular to ban the use of the burqa and niqab in all public spaces. Those who defend these measures argue that the burqa and niqab violate women’s dignity and the principle of equality, and pose a threat to public security. Those against the ban argue that these measures have the effect of shutting women in their houses and polarising positions around Islam.

Language

Immigration is often seen as a challenge to Spain’s linguistic diversity. For instance, in the Spanish case, the presence of Latin American immigrants reinforces the weight of Castilian Spanish and is therefore often perceived as a threat to the situation of minority languages such as Catalan, Galician or Basque. In consequence, when traditional and new linguistic diversity come together, immigration policies tend to turn into linguistic policies.

Conflicts around education: Conflicts around language education have mostly taken place in Catalonia and the Basque country. While both examples reveal the difficult balance between the promotion of native languages and the acceptance of immigrants’ languages in the public space, the institutional responses have been different in each case:

• Catalan education: the Language and Social Cohesion Plan from the Catalan Education Department (2007) was aimed at consolidating social cohesion by simultaneously promoting intercultural education and the Catalan language. While its starting point is to guarantee equality for all and respect for diversity, social cohesion is understood as a precondition for the celebration of cultural diversity and Catalan language learning is deemed to be the main tool to create this. One of the aims of the Plan is therefore to consolidate Catalan as the vehicular language in schools. In practice, this tends to take the form of a rather assimilatory linguistic policy and creates an extra difficulty for newcomers that neither speak Catalan as a mother tongue nor have the opportunity to learn it in their immediate (Spanish speaking) social environments.
Basque education: parents in the Basque country are free to determine the linguistic model they want for their children. Model A is Spanish-language teaching with Basque as a compulsory subject. Model B combines Basque and Spanish as vehicular languages under comparable conditions. Finally, Model D involves Basque being the vehicular language of instruction for all subjects, with the exception of Spanish language and literature (Ruiz Viyetze, 2007: 8). The coexistence of different linguistic models raises the question of whether this will lead to a retreat of the Basque language in schools or to a segmented educational system with immigrant students following Spanish speaking teaching, and autochthonous students using the educational models with a higher profile of Basque.

Conflicts around Catalan as preferential language: The new Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia (2006) provides Catalonia's basic institutional regulations. It defines the rights and obligations of citizens in Catalonia, the main political institutions with their competences and relations with the rest of Spain, and the financing of the Government of Catalonia. Moreover, the Statute stipulates that Catalan is the preferential working language (lengua vehicular) in Catalonia. This has led to many discussions, particularly regarding the following aspects:

• Catalan as the preferential working language in the government and media: while the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia – approved by referendum in June 2006 – defined Catalan as the common and preferential language in the Catalan government administration and media, in June 2010 the Constitutional Court ruled that Catalan was indeed the common language but could not have a preferential position vis-à-vis Castilian Spanish.

• Catalan as the basic public language for the reception of immigrants: according to the Catalan Citizenship and Immigration Plan (2005-2008) and the National Pact for Immigration (2008), one of the main challenges for the construction of a ‘common public culture’ is making Catalan the basic public language in Catalonia. Based on this claim, the Reception Bill (Llei d’acollida) establishes that Catalan will be the working language for the reception and integration of migrants, meaning that immigrants will be required to learn Catalan first. This led the Spanish Ombudsman to present an appeal to the Constitutional Court in August 2010 on the grounds that Catalan could not be the only language recommended in the Reception Bill, as this infringes the right of immigrants to learn Spanish and the official bilingual situation in Catalonia (see Zapata-Barrero, 2011b).

Definitions of tolerance

After having described the key features of Spanish national identity and integration philosophies and having mapped the main conflicts based around diversity in Spain, it remains to be seen under what terms these tensions have been perceived. With this in mind, in this section we analyse whether, in which context, regarding what issues and by whom is the term ‘tolerance’ used. This will allow us to understand which diversity-related conflicts have been understood in terms of ‘tolerance’ and which ones as issues of equality, respect, recognition or accommodation.
A review of parliamentary discussions and electoral programmes from the main political parties (the Partido Socialista Obrero Español and the Partido Popular) since the 1980s shows that the term tolerance is seldom used by Spanish politicians and, when referred to, it is exclusively in terms of value, habit/attitude/disposition or virtue. For instance, Canovas Montalban – a member of parliament for the PSOE – stated in the Spanish parliament in 1997 that tolerance was an ‘essential value’ and that ‘education for cultural, ethnic and ideological diversity, and for respect for diversity and the rejection of violence is an unavoidable obligation at a time when xenophobia, intolerance and lack of solidarity are not past but present terms’. In the electoral programmes of the right-wing party PP, the term tolerance always goes hand in hand with living together (convivencia) and with other terms such as respect, equality, freedom and solidarity.

A look at integration plans at both national and regional level leads to the same conclusion: the term tolerance is only used as a synonym of respect for difference. For instance, in the most recent Spanish integration plan (Plan Estratégico de Ciudadanía e Integración, 2007-2010), one of the ten general objectives is to ‘promote understanding from Spanish society for the phenomenon of immigration, to improve interculturality (convivencia intercultural) by valuing diversity and favouring values of tolerance, and to support the maintenance and knowledge of migrants’ cultures of origin’. Similarly, integration plans produced in Andalusia and Madrid refer to ‘tolerance’ as a basic democratic value and as a prerequisite for ‘living together’. The word tolerance is seldom used in the Catalan integration plans, while other concepts such as pluralism, equality, civic responsibility and convivencia are constantly referred to.

In general terms, we can therefore conclude that the term tolerance is rarely used and when it is, it refers to liberal respect, meaning the need for democratic citizens to respect each other as legal and political equals, according to a logic of emancipation rather than toleration (see Bader, 2010: 7). In fact, a more permissive conception of the term – accepting the power of interference or the power not to tolerate – would have been at odds with the common definition of integration as a bidirectional process based on the concept of convivencia intercultural, i.e. living together in solidarity, tolerance, respect and recognition for cultural, religious and ethnic differences.

Despite this reluctance to use the word tolerance in other senses than that of respect and recognition, there seems to be a general consensus that basic values such as human dignity and human rights, freedom, democracy and equality should be respected. In practice, even when not formulated in this way, these values define the limits of what can and cannot be tolerated. In this respect, it can be said that the notion of ‘tolerance’ does exist but that the concept does not. In other words, while the meanings and practices of tolerance are known and used, there is no term to cover them. In the following paragraphs, we will discuss in which context, regarding what and by whom the limits of what is tolerable and what is not have been imposed.

Regarding the context, it is possible to say that the ‘tolerance’ boundary is commonly referred to when cultural diversity is perceived as being contradictory to human rights, freedom and individual autonomy/dignity. Media debates are very illustrative of these arguments and terminologies. A review of the national newspaper El País since 2000 suggest that this
opposition is commonplace. For instance, Josep Ramoneda – a well-known Catalan intellectual – states that ‘tolerance starts by making clear the rules of the game of the open society that are in place here and by demanding their implementation’ (El País, 02/02 2010). In a similar vein, Marc Carrillo – professor of Constitutional Law at Pompeu Fabra University – argues the following: ‘[…] the democratic state is based on the tolerance towards cultural diversity that citizens express, as the holders of fundamental rights. But tolerance is not indifference. And respect towards traditions that become human behaviour in a multicultural society are not and cannot be unlimited. The guarantee of human rights is an impassable border, otherwise the democratic state would lose its identity’ (El País, 29/04/2009).

Regarding the what, we can conclude that the ‘tolerance’ boundary has mainly been drawn with regard to Islam. Once again on the basis of the articles published in El País, most debates on the opposition between cultural diversity on the one hand, and human rights and freedom on the other have been based around issues such as headscarves in schools, burqas in public spaces and, more generally, male/female relations. In these debates, there is a tendency to indulge in generalisations, i.e. discussions do not only focus on particular practices by particular people but tend to attribute particular practices to the whole group (Muslims) and religion (Islam). In some cases, these practices are presented as an illustration of the incompatibility between Islam and democracy, freedom and equality and, in other cases, they are thought as examples of the backward nature of Islam vis-à-vis the modern West. This leads us to conclude that when looking at media debates, there is a common (and dangerous) shift from targeting particular practices to targeting groups and ‘cultures’ as a whole.

Regarding the who, i.e. who has the power to tolerate or otherwise, most cases involve either local administrations (for instance, concerning the use of the burqa in public spaces) or practitioners, including social workers (with regard to male/female relations) and educators (with regard to the use of the headscarf in schools). This leads us to two main conclusions. First, local authorities and practitioners (within the state apparatus or otherwise) seem to be the main actors playing the role of ‘tolerators’. In this regard, although further research is needed, our hypothesis is that toleration is particularly exercised among the actors most deeply involved in the formulation and implementation of integration policies. Second, we can also conclude that, when looking at conflicts based around diversity and analysing the limits of what is considered as tolerable or not, we should take into account not only the central government but also a wider range of actors, including other administrative levels such as regional and local governments; other institutions, agencies and practitioners within the state apparatus; and other relevant actors, such as politicians, NGOs and private institutions. We suggest therefore – following Maussen’s (2007: 5) definition – to shift the focus from government to governance in order to widen the analysis beyond the state as an actor, and beyond the regulations via legal rules or law-like regulations.

Concluding remarks

In this concluding section, we highlight the main features that characterise the Spanish case from a comparative European perspective. In short, the question that underlines these final paragraphs is what the distinctive
features of Spain are when we consider issues such as immigration, identity, diversity and tolerance.

1. In comparison with other European countries, immigration in Spain is a recent phenomenon that has developed very intensively in a very short period of time. Indeed, the number of foreign residents in Spain increased from 250,000 in 1985 to almost 1 million in 2000, and more than 4 million in 2010. This means, on the one hand, that most immigrants have arrived in the last ten years and still have a temporary status and, on the other, that the debates on immigration and policies regarding immigration and diversity are still rather new.

2. Spanish identity, or what we called Spanishness, has been built upon two main pillars: language (Spanish) and religion (Catholicism). The Francoist political argument ‘habla cristiano’ (speak Christian) illustrates how these two markers were even merged in the attempt to build a culturally homogeneous society. At the same time, Spain has to a great extent remained a multinational country with three main historical minority nations with their own languages: Galician, Basque and Catalan. This explains why immigration has often been perceived as a challenge to national linguistic and cultural diversity in Spain.

3. The main conflicts around migrant minorities are socio-economic in nature. If we consider conflicts around diversity, a distinct feature of the Spanish case is that they have been articulated around the two main markers of Spanish identity. While conflicts around language have been of a political nature and have mostly referred to the status of the languages of minority nations, conflicts around religion have been of a more social nature and have focused on two main themes: the predominance of the Catholic church in the new context of secularisation and immigration, and the institutionalisation of Islam and the prohibition of particular (Muslim) practices.

4. Policy discourses emphasise interculturality, respect and recognition for cultural, religious and ethnic differences over concepts such as integration or assimilation. This discourse of interculturality may explain why the term tolerance is seldom used in Spain and, when it is, it refers to liberal respect, thus denoting emancipation rather than toleration. At the same time, there is a broad consensus that values such as human dignity and human rights, freedom, democracy and equality draw the line between what can and cannot be tolerated. This is where respect-based approaches turn into permission-based approaches, thereby accepting the power of interference or the power not to tolerate. While this power is mainly exercised vis-à-vis particular practices, there has been a shift in public debate from not tolerating particular practices to not tolerating particular groups and ‘cultures’.

5. Despite the general reluctance to use ‘tolerance’ in terms of permission, liberal values in practice establish the limits of what is tolerable. Here we find a clear convergence with other European countries. Examples include the French anti-headscarf law of 2004, and the invocation of ‘Dutch norms and values’ in Dutch civic integration courses. The relevant question here is which practices really do challenge liberal values. It is also essential to consider when or under which circumstances these prohibitions run contrary to the very liberal values upon which they are based. In more specific terms, by excluding those perceived as ‘not liberal enough’, when or under what circumstances do we run the risk of falling into the paradox of claiming liberal values for illiberal purposes?
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CHAPTER 10. IRELAND

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Introduction

Ireland’s peripheral position has historically often delayed the arrival of waves of social and cultural change in other parts of Europe. Part of its self-identity has derived from the narrative of its having been as a refuge for civilisation and Christianity during the invasions of what were once known as the ‘dark ages’, when it was described as ‘the island of saints and scholars’. Another part derives from its history of invasion, settlement and colonisation and, more specifically from its intimate relationship with Great Britain.

The Republic of Ireland now occupies approximately five-sixths of the island of Ireland but from the Act of Union in 1800 until 1922, all of the island of Ireland was effectively part of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. The war of Independence ended with the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty, and on 6 December 1922 the entire island of Ireland became a self-governing British dominion called the Irish Free State (Saorstát Éireann). Northern Ireland chose to opt out of the new dominion and rejoined the United Kingdom on 8 December 1922. In 1937, a new constitution, the Constitution of Ireland (Bunreacht na hÉireann), replaced the Constitution of the Irish Free State in the twenty-six county state, and called the state Ireland, or Éire in Irish. However, it was not until 1949, after the passage of the Republic of Ireland Act 1948, that the state was declared, officially, to be the Republic of Ireland (Garvin, 2005).

During British rule and initial independence, Ireland was one of the poorest countries in Western Europe and was regarded by most of the global community as a small and remote island, with high emigration (Fitzpatrick, 1996). The protectionist economy was opened in the late 1950s, and Ireland joined what was then the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973. This had an impact on Ireland’s development as a nation that not even the most optimistic observers could have predicted. Membership contributed to rapid progress and increased prosperity in a range of areas including agriculture, industry and services. EU funds have also contributed significantly in supporting the peace and reconciliation process in Northern Ireland.

Ireland has held the Presidency of the Council of the European Union on six occasions, and most recently, in 2004 when it oversaw the biggest
enlargement in the history of the Union with the accession of ten new Member States - it was also one of the only three countries to open its borders to the workers from these new member states without restrictions or the need for a work permit.

Ireland has consistently been one of the most pro-European member states, with 72% of the population thinking EU membership is a good thing and 81% thinking Ireland has benefited from being a member of the EU, according to a 2009 Eurobarometer poll.

As Ireland increasingly looked to Europe changes have not only been economic but political and psychological as well. Ardagh for instance has argued that the EU has ‘enabled the old unequal face-to-face relationship with Britain to change into a new, more relaxed partnership, within a wider club where both are equal members; and this has eased the old Irish complex about the English’ (Ardagh, 1994: 328). But Ireland has also entertained strong and complex relations with the United States, as Mary Harney, then deputy Prime Minister expressed in a speech in 2000: ‘Geographically we are closer to Berlin than Boston. Spiritually we are probably a lot closer to Boston than Berlin’.  

After a further period of economic recession in the 1980s, the 1990s saw the beginning of the substantial economic growth that became known as the Celtic Tiger. Social changes accompanied this process, ranging from the decline in authority of the Catholic Church to a dramatic rise of immigration. In 1996 the country reached its migration ‘turning point’, the most recent EU-15 member state to become a country of net immigration - a decade later, in 2006, non-Irish nationals represented approximately 10% of the population.

This sets the scene for the current dominant sense of Irishness, which is an amalgam of references to Gaelic culture, Catholic religion, invasion and oppression, historical emigration and recent experience of economic success and cultural diversity, and the subsequent exploration of ‘tolerance’ in the Irish context.

**National identity, State formation and citizenship**

**National identity**

It may be argued that Irish national identity is defined primarily in opposition to Britain, or more specifically, England – the ‘other’ in terms of which it has been formulated. This also has significance for the position of the Protestant minority, the internal other, who have been seen as aligned with England, even if descended from those resident in Ireland from as long ago as the seventeenth century.

Nonetheless, social connections with Britain but also with the USA were substantial, as up to the late 20th century these represented the principal destination[s] of the emigrant flow that became a significant feature of Irish life, especially from the Famine of 1845-49, in which, of a population of 8 million, 1 million died and 1 million emigrated. This particular event and the legacy of emigration are also formative experiences in Irish self-definition.
Relations with other Celtic neighbours have been less significant even though the Irish traditionally looked beyond England to France and Spain, which were for long Catholic powers, and traditional enemies of England, and where Irish exiles went for education, to serve in military, and to seek military and political support for independence.

In this sense, the conception of Irish identity has always been predominantly ethnic. Two principal strands intertwined in the nineteenth century: the Gaelic language and culture, and the Catholic religion. This identification of the two was maintained despite the leading role of a number of Protestant (Anglo-Irish) or English figures in both the national Gaelic cultural revival of the late nineteenth century and the political independence movement of the early twentieth century. This tension surfaced in a debate on Irish identity that raged furiously in the context of the Northern Ireland Troubles from the late 1960s. From this, a variety of interpretations of what it meant to be Irish emerged – was it to be Catholic, to be Gaelic speaking, to participate in Gaelic cultural and sporting activities, to live in Ireland, or to have been shaped by its history? Was it, as Conor Cruise O’Brien (1965) once wrote, ‘not primarily a question of birth, blood or language, but the condition of being involved in the Irish situation and usually of being mauled by it’?

Another historically important dimension of the Irish self-image has been that of a predominantly rural people. There was very limited industrialisation or urbanization outside Dublin in the southern part of the country in contrast to the area around Belfast. In recent years, this pattern has changed significantly, with population growth, and significant agglomeration of the population in urban areas, especially Dublin, and in 2010 over one and a half million people live in the Greater Dublin area, over one-third of the population.

A further aspect of identity, if less controversial, is that living in Ireland was for most Irish people considered a precondition of being ‘really’ Irish. Despite references to the evil of emigration in literature and policy documents, the Irish diaspora was given little attention until President Mary Robinson’s 1995 address to the Joint Houses of the Oireachtas, ‘Cherishing the Irish Diaspora’, in which she reached out to the ‘70 million people worldwide who can claim Irish descent’ and spoke of the ‘added richness of our heritage that Irishness is not simply territorial’.

Those who claimed to be Irish by descent, living in the United States or Britain were not seen as really Irish by those living on the island, and have sometimes been referred to in recent years as ‘plastic paddies’ (Hickman, 2002). This reflects a practical attitude of what has been termed a ‘twenty-six county nationalism’, which contrasted to the equally widely held official belief in the goal of unity of the whole island. At the same time, living in Ireland was not enough to be considered Irish, as even after living on Irish soil for many years individuals were regarded as ‘newcomers’.

The foundation of the State

The institutional framework set up in 1922 operated first on the basis of an agreement with the British Government, and while it gave Ireland a limited independence, it did not initially lead to a radical restructuring of Irish politics or Irish society. The partition however, led to a further characteristic of Irish political identity - irredentism - with respect to what were known in the

South as the ‘six counties’. In addition to its history, the geographic unity of the island was emphasised as a naturally defining characteristic.

However, from the 1930s more distinctive social and economic policies were adopted, and the 1937 Constitution set out a model for the Irish state that was guided by the intention to express and promote a specifically Irish and Catholic way of life and norms. Even though it did not establish the Catholic Church as the state church (and recognised other Christian denominations and Judaism), the Constitution did emphasise that Catholicism was the religion of the majority, and, while there was a separation of church and state in one sense, it explicitly embodied an extensive range of Catholic social principles in the text. From 1933 at least, the Irish language was to be restored to the position of national language, became compulsory in schools and was required for work in the public service, the legal profession and other areas. Thus from its foundation, the state set about constituting a system that would give priority to the Gaelic and Catholic elements of Irish identity.

Gradual change in the character of Irish society, and a motivation of rapprochement with the Protestant majority in Northern Ireland led to the removal of the reference to ‘the special position’ of the Catholic Church in 1973, and the repeal of constitutional elements and legal prohibitions seen as particularly connected with Catholic beliefs and practices, such as the prohibition on divorce in 1996, though this was driven also by a strong demand within the Republic itself. The peace settlement of 1998 finally brought about a redefinition of the constitutional self-description of Ireland.

An indicator of wider contemporary concerns for equality may be seen in current legislation that forbids discrimination in employment and services (in both the public and private sectors), on grounds of gender (including transsexuals), marital status, family status, sexual orientation, age, disability, race (including nationality), religion (or lack thereof), and membership of the Traveller community.

**Citizenship policy**

Despite the predominantly ethnic conception of Irish identity that prevailed in the twentieth century, Irish citizenship may be seen as representing a somewhat more civic conception of Irishness. Irish citizenship laws have evolved under the influences of British legal inheritance, republican ideas of political membership expressed in the state’s founding documents, the territorial claim over Northern Ireland, and the fact of emigration. The first three influences contributed to the centrality of *ius soli*, the last to the place of *ius sanguinis* in these laws (Honohan, 2007; Handoll, 2010).

In the system that emerged citizenship was granted on the basis of *ius soli* to those born on the island as a whole, and on the basis of *ius sanguinis* to the children and grandchildren of ‘natural born’ citizens. Thus, alongside a conception inclusive of the resident population, the children of emigrants were granted citizenship on a medium term basis.

The foundation of *ius soli* laid the basis for a relatively open conception of citizenship, albeit one that sat uneasily with the more firmly bounded and exclusive ethno-cultural conception of the nation that prevailed in the public consciousness and influenced many areas of policy.

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3. Article 44.2 Section 2 of the original 1937 Constitution read: The State recognises the special position of the Holy Catholic Apostolic and Roman Church as the guardian of the Faith professed by the great majority of the citizens.

4. The current conditions allow those with an Irish-born grandparent to claim Irish citizenship. Those born abroad to Irish citizens born abroad may become citizens on registration.
For those who come to live permanently in Ireland, the conditions for naturalisation are a relatively short period of residence (legal residence in five of the previous eight years), the intention to live in the country, being deemed to be ‘of good character’, and swearing an oath of fidelity to the nation and loyalty to the State. There is still no test of language ability or cultural knowledge. But there is a high level of ministerial discretion, including the power to dispense with conditions on the basis of Irish descent or associations. In practice until recently the numbers applying were also rather limited. In recent years applications have increased, and there is a concern that ministerial discretion has been used to refuse many applications, and that there is no procedure for appeal (Handoll, 2010).

The most significant recent change in citizenship laws arose in the context of developments in the Northern Ireland peace process, and, in particular, of the dimension of North-South reconciliation. As part of the Good Friday (or Belfast) Agreement, the article embodying the territorial claim to Northern Ireland was removed from the Irish constitution. It was replaced by Article 2, passed (with the rest of the Good Friday Agreement) by referendum in 1998. It basically granted the right to Irish citizenship to those born in Northern Ireland independently of the claim to territorial sovereignty over Northern Ireland. At the same time, it made a gesture towards the claims of Irish descendants that fell short of any explicit constitutional right to citizenship.

A significant change in the grant of citizenship was made in 2004, through which Ireland ceased to be the only country in Europe that granted unconditional ius soli. A referendum was held on this provision in the light of what was perceived as the instrumental use of birth in Ireland as a means to claiming residence in Ireland or another EU Member State. The Irish government introduced the proposal to restrict ius soli as a technical change necessary to remove a perverse incentive to give birth in Ireland.

Rather than removing or amending the recently introduced Article 2, the proposal inserted a provision in Article 9 (on citizenship) which returned the allocation of citizenship on the basis of ius soli to a legislative matter. Constitutionally it retained an element of effective ius sanguinis in making constitutional ius soli citizenship dependent on the citizenship of a parent. The legislation subsequently introduced (Irish Citizenship and Nationality Act 2005) grants ius soli citizenship only to a child whose parent has been legally resident for 3 of the previous 4 years, focusing thus on the parent’s status and length of prior residence. Not just a technical adjustment, this change effectively tilted the conception of citizenship embodied in the constitution towards ius sanguinis.

**Cultural diversity challenges during the last 30 years**

**Ireland’s current population**

Demographically, Ireland’s history has been one of invasion, settlement, colonisation, and net emigration. For decades dating back to the famine in the 1840s, emigration has been a significant feature of Irish life.

The population of the area now comprising the Republic of Ireland was over 6.5 million in the first major census of population, the Great Census of 1841. The deaths which resulted from the Famine of 1845/49 and the...
large scale emigration which followed led to a halving of the population by 1901, and the population low point of 2.8 million was reached in the 1961 Census. The population has increased in every intercensal year since then, apart from 1986-1991 when a fairly modest decline was experienced. As the economic recovery started to take hold, however, migration turned around in dramatic fashion, and since 1996 there has been strong net inward migration.

Comparing Ireland to other European Union countries underlines the rapid changes that took place during this period. During 1990-1994, Ireland was the only country among the member states of the then EU-15 with a negative net migration rate. In contrast, between 1995 and 1999, the country’s average annual net migration rate was the second highest in the EU-15 (MacÉinrí and Walley, 2003).

The 2002-2006 period witnessed record population growth with the annual increase amounting to 79,000 - consisting of a natural increase of 33,000 and an annual net inward migration of 46,000. As a result, in recent years, Ireland has experienced a rapid growth in ethnic, religious and cultural diversity. This diversity builds on the diversity (albeit in relatively small numbers) that always existed in Ireland and now includes Travellers, Protestants, Jews, Muslims and minorities from a variety of, Asian and African origins. Ireland is now a very diverse society – in terms of nationality, ethnic background and religion.

Ireland’s population enumerated by the census of 2006 was 4,239,848 persons, an increase of 8.2% since the 2002 Census. Most significantly, non-Irish nationals increased from 224,000 to 420,000 over the same period, an 87% increase. They come from 188 different countries and, in overall terms, make up 10% of Ireland’s population (see Table 1 below).

The fastest growing categories were EU nationals (66% of non-Irish nationals), 37% were from the EU15 including the UK; 29% were from the 10 countries that joined the European Union in 2004; 11% were from Asia; 8% were from Africa; and 5% were from America. The top ten nationalities were UK (112,548), Polish (63,276), Lithuanian (24,628), Nigerian (16,300), Latvian (13,319), US (12,475), Chinese (11,161), German (10,289), Filipino (9,548) and French (9,046), and these accounted for 82% of the total.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2006</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thousands</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish</td>
<td>3,585.0</td>
<td>92.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>103.5</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other EU 25</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of Europe</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other countries</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple nationality</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No nationality</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not stated</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,858.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Central Statistics Office (2007a)
A question on ‘ethnic or cultural background’ was included for the first time in the 2006 census. Both the format and the implications of this question have been contested; Cadogan (2008) for example argues that ‘the pre-given ‘ethnic categories’ of the Irish Census 2006 are questionable, in part, insofar as they implicitly consolidate a large ‘white Irish’ ethnic grouping as culturally homogenous, as an undifferentiated ‘majority’ against which ‘minorities’ are highlighted as exotic and deviant’. Among those who responded, ‘White’ was the predominant category accounting for nearly 95% of the usually resident population.

Increased immigration has also led to an important increase in religious diversity. The effect has been to increase all minority religions, especially the Protestant, Orthodox and Muslim populations (see Table 2).

The primary religion in the Republic of Ireland remains Christianity, dominated by the Roman Catholic Church. In 2006, approximately 86.8% of the population identified themselves as Roman Catholic. The number recorded increased by 218,800 or 6.3% between 2002 and 2006. However, as the percentage increase was lower than for the population as a whole over that period (8.2%), the share of Roman Catholics in the population fell from 88.4% in 2002 to 86.8% in 2006.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2. Population classified by religion, 2002 and 2006</th>
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<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
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<tr>
<td>Church of Ireland (incl. Protestant)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Muslim (Islamic)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other Christian religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presbyterian</td>
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<tr>
<td>Orthodox</td>
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<tr>
<td>Methodist</td>
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<tr>
<td>Apostolic or Pentecostal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lutheran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evangelical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jehovah’s Witness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baptist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pantheist</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agnostic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latter Day Saints (Mormon)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atheist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quaker (Society of Friends)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lapsed Roman Catholic</td>
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<tr>
<td>Baha’i</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brethren</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other stated religions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Central Statistics Office (2007c)
Significant Protestant denominations are the Church of Ireland (Anglican), the Presbyterian Church in Ireland, followed by the Methodist Church in Ireland; these have also grown in numbers. The most dramatic increases, however, have been the Muslim and Orthodox communities. Muslims represented the third largest religious category in 2006 – up 13,400 to just over 32,500. While adherents of the Orthodox religion doubled in number to 20,800 between 2002 and 2006. In percentage terms, this means that Orthodoxy and Islam were the fastest growing religions, up by 100% and 70% respectively (CSO, 2007).

There is now a resumption of net outward migration in Ireland (CSO, 2009). The number of emigrants from the State in the year to April 2009 is estimated to have increased by almost 44% from 45,300 to 65,100, while the number of immigrants continued to decline over the same period, from 83,800 to 57,300. These combined changes have resulted in a return to net migration for Ireland (- 7,800) for the first time since 1995.

Indigenous minorities

Since the foundation of the state in 1922, the principal minorities with respect to which tolerance issues could potentially arise have been religious: Protestants and Jews, and socio-cultural: Travellers. The relative position of the English and Irish languages also gave rise to some issues of toleration.

Protestants

There is a remarkable imbalance in the amount of research on Catholic-Protestant relationships in the two parts of the island: in the North the literature runs to thousands of items; in the South it comes to little more than a handful – it seems that in the South Catholic-Protestant relationships are not a significant issue.

With the partition of Ireland in 1922, 92.6% of the Free State’s population were Catholic while 7.4% were Protestant (Collins, 1993). By the 1960s, the Protestant population had fallen by half. Many Protestants left the country in the early 1920s, either because they felt unwelcome in a predominantly Catholic and nationalist state, because they were afraid due to the burning of Protestant homes (particularly of the old landed class) by republicans during the civil war, because they regarded themselves as British and did not wish to live in an independent Irish state, or because of the economic disruption caused by the recent violence. The Catholic Church had also issued a decree, Ne Temere, whereby the children of marriages between Catholics and Protestants had to be brought up as Catholics.

In 1991, the Protestant population of the Republic of Ireland was at its lowest point at approximately 3%, but the 2006 Census found that a little over 5% of the population was Protestant and that all the Protestant denominations have gained in numbers since 2002.

Rather than any deep sectarianism, available studies suggest that the situation is complex. Protestantism was established in Ireland as part of a British colonising process and ‘Irish independence placed Southern Protestants in the position that for centuries they had struggled to avoid: becoming a minority in a Catholic-dominated state’ (Ruane and Todd, 2009).
Traditionally, being a Protestant in Ireland has carried with it presumptions of British identity and loyalty, and of distinction from Catholics not simply in terms of belief, but by virtue of a different history on the island of Ireland and different ethnic origins.

Coakley (1998) posed the question whether Southern Irish Protestants are an ethnic or a religious minority, and his conclusions tended to indicate that they are now a religious rather than an ethnic minority. Most studies effectively indicate that Protestants in Ireland, with very few exceptions, see themselves as Irish rather than British. After partition, it was often considered that Protestants in many ways constituted a privileged minority in terms of ownership of land, industrial property, and income. However, Butler and Ruane (2009) argue that their situation was far from unproblematic. Between the 1930s and 1960s there were numbers of incidents that led to significant controversies in relation to cases of employment, education and intermarriage. Nonetheless, with the higher social and economic status of Protestants, freedom of worship, and state support for educational provision for Protestants, toleration of Protestants was not widely perceived to be an issue.

More recently, the dominant view is that the transformation of the Republic into a modern, outward-looking, liberal and pluralist state means that Southern Protestants are now much more at ease with it. Catholics and Protestants share inter-church religious and commemorative ceremonies, schools, workplaces and leisure activities, and there is more recognition by the state of the distinctive history, identity and memory of its Protestant citizens. The evolution of the situation in Northern Ireland has also given Southern Protestants an opportunity to re-negotiate their identity, separating the religious and ethnic aspects of Protestantism and renegotiating boundaries. While the question of a ‘dilution of the Protestant identity’ within the majority culture has been raised, Todd et al. (2009) argue that, rather than ‘disappearing’, Protestants in the Republic are redefining their identity and renegotiating their ways of being Protestant in various ways.

Controversies emerged in 2009 following the reclassification of schools in the October Budget and the decision to remove ancillary grants for fee-paying Protestant schools, covering expenses such as caretaker and secretarial supports, and to increase their pupil-teacher ratio. This special arrangement had been in place since 1967, and was seen as an acknowledgment that the schools were viewed by the Government as separate, serving a special purpose by allowing the geographically dispersed Protestant population to maintain affordable education provisions in accordance with their religious ethos. The decision was widely criticised by the Protestant community.

Jews

Ireland’s Jewish population dates mainly from the last years of the nineteenth century. In 1871, the Jewish population of Ireland was 258; by 1881, it had risen to 453. By 1901, there were an estimated 3,771 Jews in Ireland and by 1904, the total Jewish population had reached an estimated 4,800. Most of the immigration up to this time had come from England or Germany. In the wake of the Russian pogroms there was increased immigration, mostly from Eastern Europe and in particular from...
Lithuania. As Ireland was part of the United Kingdom at this time, the Jewish community benefited from the British government’s emancipation laws, and new synagogues and schools were established to cater for the community. Many of the following generation became prominent in business, academic, political and sporting circles.

Ireland’s Jewish population reached its peak in the late 1940s and declined steadily since (mainly through emigration to larger Jewish communities such as those in the United States, England and Israel). With the arrival of the Celtic Tiger and the immigration it has brought, the Jewish community has also benefited from new families settling down. According to the 2006 census, there are 1,930 Jews in the Republic of Ireland (CSO, 2007) – there are two synagogues in Dublin and one in Cork.

Although the Jewish community has always been small in numbers, it has generally been well-accepted into Irish life and incidents of overt anti-Semitism in Ireland have generally been few and far between. However, historically, there have been some cases of ‘institutional’ and ‘perceived’ anti-Semitism. One of the most serious incidents recorded is the anti-Semitic boycott in Limerick in the first decade of the 20th century known as the Limerick Pogrom, which caused many Jews to leave the city. It was instigated by a fundamentalist Catholic priest, Fr. John Creagh of the Redemptorist Order, whose sermons led to a two-year trade boycott of Jewish businesses accompanied by harassment and beatings and resulted in the almost total departure of the Limerick Jewish community (Rivlin, 2003).

There was also some domestic anti-Jewish sentiment during World War II, most notably expressed in a notorious speech to the Dáil in 1943, when independent T.D. Oliver J. Flanagan advocated ‘routing the Jews out of the country’ and a certain indifference from the political establishment to the Jewish victims of the Holocaust during and after the war. Ireland had an extremely restrictive policy on immigration for Jews from Europe during the Nazi period. Nevertheless, Jews were generally prosperous and respected in society from the middle of the twentieth century and at one time in the 1990s, there were three Jewish TDs (MPs). Although many Jews complain of increased apprehension in the community relating primarily to events in the Middle East and Europe, there appears to be no perceptible change in attitudes among the Irish population. Incidents of anti-Semitism are considered to be few and at a low level, with no evidence of systematic targeting of the Jewish community in Ireland.

Travellers

A cultural minority regarded as Irish, but becoming increasingly marginalised in Irish society throughout the 20th century are ‘Irish Travellers’. The historical origins of Irish Travellers are the subject of academic and popular debates. It was once widely believed that Travellers were descendants from landowners or labourers made homeless by Cromwell’s military campaign in Ireland and the 1840s famine. However, their origins may be more complex and difficult to ascertain because through their history Travellers have left no written records of their own. Furthermore, even though all families claim ancient origins, some families adopted Traveller customs centuries ago, while others did so in more modern times.
An exact figure for the Traveller population in Ireland is unknown. There were 22,435 Irish Travellers, representing 0.53% of the total population, enumerated in the 2006 census. This represents a decline of 1,254 or 5.3% compared with 2002. However, Traveller organisations estimate that there may be up to 30,000 Travellers with a further 1,500 Travellers in the North of Ireland.\(^8\)

Originally following a nomadic lifestyle and pursuing occupations of horse rearing and traditional rural crafts and services, the urbanisation of Irish society led to the disruption of their way of life. On the one hand there were calls for the provision of education and other services to improve their welfare; on the other hand policies promoted their settlement and conformity to urban norms. While there is a traveller dialect (gammon or cant) this does not create a linguistic division between Travellers and the rest of population.

There have been increasing tensions with the ‘settled community’, over locations of settlement and anti-social behaviour, feuding and inter-Traveller violence. The legal requirement of the state to provide serviced halting sites has generally not been met, in part due to local resistance to their establishment in particular areas, and laws of trespass have rendered many of their practices illegal.

The European Parliament Committee of Enquiry on Racism and Xenophobia found Travellers to be amongst the most discriminated against ethnic group in Irish society (Danaher, Kenny and Leder, 2009). Travellers fare poorly on every indicator used to measure disadvantage: unemployment, poverty, social exclusion, health status, infant mortality, life expectancy, illiteracy, education and training levels, access to decision making and political representation, gender equality, access to credit, accommodation and living conditions.\(^9\) Prejudice against Travellers is so strong that MacGréil (1996) described the prevailing attitude in relation to Travellers as one of ‘caste-like apartheid’.

Since the 1960s there have been several official initiatives to address these problems, even though early efforts blatantly identified the Traveller lifestyle as ‘the problem’ and advocated a policy of assimilation (Helleiner, 2000; Fanning, 2002).

One of the main issues regarding Irish Travellers is their recognition as an ethnic group. In December 2008 the Irish Traveller Movement launched the Traveller Ethnicity campaign (ITM, 2009) and their claim is supported by the Equality Authority, which emphasises that the lack of recognition as an ethnic group ‘has negative practical implications in the promotion of equality of opportunity for Travellers and in the elimination of discrimination experienced by Travellers’ (Equality Authority, 2006: 8). However, the Irish government does not officially recognise Travellers as an ethnic group and refer to them as a ‘cultural group’. In spite of this, since 2009 the government have indicated through a series of statements the possibility that ethnic group status may be recognised to Travellers\(^10\).

Language has been less central to matters of toleration, but issues have arisen with respect to Irish and English, the two historical and official languages of the state. Irish, the ‘first official language’, is spoken daily by a small percentage of the population, though knowledge at varying levels is more widely distributed. It is a compulsory school subject, is used in public

\(^8\) Pavee Point Website, www.pavee.ie
\(^9\) http://www.nccri.ie/travellr.html
\(^10\) See the combined Third and Fourth Reports by Ireland to the UN International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
The PPSN is a personal reference number used for access to public services, tax authorities and for health and social benefits. Until recently knowledge of Irish was required to pass the school Leaving Certificate, and to enter university or the public service; this requirement has been lifted in most areas, but continues to apply in some, mainly teaching, posts. Irish is given greater priority in the Gaeltacht – those areas of the country officially designated as Irish-speaking – where, however, the number of native speakers has steadily declined.

Immigrant minorities

As we have seen earlier, Ireland has experienced a strong net inward migration since the mid 1990s. Initially, the most significant groups of immigrants were returning Irish, or came from Britain and the USA, but by the end of the 1990s flows from other parts of the world came as workers in the expanding economy and as asylum seekers. After 2000 continuing economic expansion and the enlargement of the EU bought significant flows from Eastern Europe. These rose further when Ireland (together with the UK and Sweden) admitted workers from the 2004 accession countries without requiring work permits.

At the time of the last (2006) Census, there was a total of 420,000 non-Irish nationals living in Ireland, representing 188 different countries. We will focus especially on the groups which have made the strongest imprint on Irish society - three ethnic groups: the Poles, Nigerians and Chinese, and one religious group: Muslims.

Poles

Polish migration flows to Ireland started in the mid 1990s and were mainly motivated by economic considerations. After Poland joined the European Union in May 2004, Ireland was one of just three EU members to open its borders to Polish workers, and thus quickly became a key destination for Poles wishing to work abroad; in 2004 a website advertising Irish jobs in Polish received over 170,000 hits in its first day (RTE, 2004). Polish migrants to Ireland performed the classical 'chain migration': they came having been encouraged by someone who had already been staying in Ireland for some time; very often they had a place to live when they arrived, and in some cases they also had a job; in addition, as the issue of visa or work permits does not apply to Polish workers, they only need to register with the Department of Social and Family Affairs and receive a Personal Public Service Number (PPSN) to be entitled to work legally in Ireland (Kropiwiec and King-O’Riain, 2006).

The Polish community now represents the second biggest group of ‘non-Irish nationals’ in Ireland (after UK nationals). A total of 63,276 Poles were living in Ireland in April 2006 – almost 90% arrived in 2004 or later (CSO, 2008). While Poles appear to account for a significant number of those who have left in the post-Tiger period, Polish people still live in every town and city in Ireland, and in some towns make up a significant proportion of the population.

The Polish community is possibly the community that has established itself the most strongly as a community and Polish presence is quite visible in Irish society. The growing number of Poles in Ireland has led to the provision of a
number of media outlets catering to them. Newspapers include the Polska Gazeta and a section in Dublin’s Evening Herald entitled ‘Polski Herald’. Polish, although not officially an established subject in the school curriculum, can be taken as part of the Irish Leaving Certificate examination (as is the case with all official languages of the European Union). During the 2007 Polish general election, Polish parties campaigned in Ireland and three voting locations were set up in Dublin, Cork, and Limerick (RTE, 2007).

The overall perception of the community is generally positive – Poles are thought to be good workers and reliable, like the Irish they are fervent Catholics, good drinkers and share a common past of fighting against an empire - however there are many accounts of being discriminated against in terms of wages (Roos, 2006). In addition, while well integrated into the wider society, and blending in as white Europeans, Poles tend to live together, socialise together, they have their own media, their own food shops, etc. A significant proportion of the community does not speak English and tends to see Ireland as a ‘temporary’ home, and so many do not feel the need to learn (Lejman, 2006).

**Nigerians**

Although Ireland did not colonise any country in Africa (or elsewhere) in the official sense, through its church missionaries it was considered a part of the alleged western ‘civilizing mission’ in Africa and thus has always entertained strong links with the continent (Rolston and Shannon, 2002; Ugba, 2003). Africans’ reasons for coming to Ireland have changed overtime; from the 1950s to the mid-1990s, (the few) Africans in Ireland were mainly students, visitors, or specialized workers including doctors, and nurses. They were reasonably accepted, probably because of their very small numbers and the temporary nature of their stay (Mutwarasibo, 2002).

At the time of the 2006 Census, however, a total of 16,300 Nigerians were living in Ireland – an increase of 82 % on the 2002 figure of 8,969 - they now represent the 4th largest ‘non-Irish national’ community (CSO, 2008).

The African/Nigerian presence in Ireland – and especially in Dublin – is now very visible and for instance, so many Africans have set up grocery stores on historic Moore Street that it is known as ‘Little Africa’. As the main ‘visible’ minority, several issues regarding negative representations, stereotyping, incivilities, discrimination and racism have arisen. A small section within Irish society sees Africans generally as scroungers, illegal immigrants, and so on. According to Mutwarasibo (2002) this is partly a reflection of the images portrayed by some sections of the media that have tended to cover stories on the cost of looking after asylum seekers or the crimes committed by a minority within the immigrant population. As Nigerians were the greatest section of asylum seekers this increased their ‘negative’ visibility (Ruhs 2004; Coakley and Mac Einri, 2007).

Prior to 2004, some highly publicized cases of African women arriving in the latter stages of pregnancy supposedly to avail of the provision within Irish law that children born on Irish soil had a right to Irish citizenship were perceived by the government and some section of the population as unacceptable (Ruhs, 2004). This also led to a ‘racial targeting’ of African women and, by extension of the African community in Ireland – according to some (i.e.,

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Africans challenge Ireland’s conflation of national and racial identity and Nigerians, as the largest and most active and ‘visible’ group, have become the focus of discrimination as a result.

**Chinese**

From the 1950s to the 1970s the majority of Chinese immigrants originated from Hong Kong and many Chinese immigrants first travelled to Great Britain before travelling to Ireland. During the 1980s Malaysian Chinese came to Ireland primarily as students, however, it is only since 2002 that people from mainland China have started to come in greater numbers and to open Chinese restaurants. Research on Chinese immigrants in the Republic of Ireland is minimal and most of the academic interest has focused on the Chinese students rather than on the global community (Yau, 2007). Chinese students have been coming to Ireland in significant numbers since 1998, mainly as language students but also as third level students. This inward migration was greatly facilitated by a decision in 2000 to allow all non-EEA students to work part time to help finance their studies. However, in 2005 restrictions were introduced which meant that only full time students on third level courses of at least one year duration were allowed to work (Wang and King-O’Riain 2006).

A total of 11,161 Chinese people were reported as living in Ireland in 2006 - an increase of 91% on the 2002 figure of 5,842 - making them the 7th largest ‘non-Irish national’ minority community, though estimates suggest that the numbers are considerably larger.

Chinese are possibly the most ‘isolated’ minority community: they mainly develop contacts, friendships and support networks within their own community, do not generally socialise in pubs and have their own media. The major newspapers are CNexpress and the Shining Emerald Newspaper and there is a Chinese radio station called Chinatown Radio. As a result, Chinese people are still isolated from mainstream Irish society and have parallel communities to the mainstream. However, unlike the Poles or Eastern European generally, Chinese cannot ‘blend in’ society easily: most are not Catholic and they are racialised as ‘non-white’ and clearly a ‘visible’ minority in Ireland (King-O’Riain, 2008). On the other hand, according to Yau (2007), because of the ‘black-white dichotomous framework in Irish society’, Chinese can actually become ‘invisible’. In addition, in many cases, their immigration status severely limits Chinese people’s freedom - they cannot apply for jobs freely because of the work permit system. As non-white, non-Catholic, non-EU immigrants Chinese tend to report more experiences of racism both at work and on the street.

**Muslims**

Muslims are another rapidly growing minority, one which is potentially ‘visible’ and which may be the only ‘new religious minority’ with the potential to truly challenge Irish society. Compared with other EU countries, especially the neighbouring UK, the Muslim community in Ireland includes a great variety of ethnic and national origins including Malaysia, Somalia, South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, Libya, Bosnia and Pakistan. Muslims in Ireland also have a distinctive social and economic background as ‘the majority of Muslims that
came to Ireland already had a solid background and education. They were doctors, engineers, business people and students. It made it easier for them to integrate and become part of the community’ (Fitzgerald, 2006).

In 1976 the first mosque and Islamic Centre in Ireland was opened in Dublin. The ICCI now hosts the Muslim National School, a state funded primary school with an Islamic ethos.

According to the 2006 Irish census, there are 32,539 Muslims living in the Republic of Ireland, representing almost a 70% increase over the figures for the 2002 census (19,147) (CSO, 2007). Islam is a minority religion in Ireland, and, in terms of numbers, is relatively insignificant; although Muslims can claim to be the third largest faith group in Ireland (BBC, 2007). However the Muslim community is an important part of the growing ethnic, cultural and religious diversity in Ireland.

The Muslim community is well organised with a number of mosques, some of which have many hundreds of people participating in Friday prayers and others attracting only a small number of people, two Muslim primary schools established under the Department of Education and many societies. There are also several student Islamic societies (ISoC) in universities all across Ireland. In 1992 Moosajee Bhamjee became the first - and to date only - Muslim Teachta Dála (Member of Irish Parliament).

The experience of living in Ireland has been generally positive for Muslims. One of the spokespersons for the Islamic Centre, Ali Selim (2005), argues that the Muslim community has integrated well into Irish society and has avoided the assimilation model, preserving their faith and way of life. There are sporadic incidents related to racism/Islamophobia. Typical incidents relate to verbal abuse and other forms of harassment and disrespect rather than physical assaults or criminal damage. This can increase at times of heightened global tensions. In particular, the NCCRI Racist Incident Reporting Procedure reported in 2001 that almost one fifth (20%) of all incidents recorded between May and October 2001, were directly related to September 11th. 13

As Muslim schools are accommodated within the state funded system, there have not been contentious issues about separate schooling. Many Muslim children attend other schools, and there is as yet, no post-primary Muslim school. Thus Muslim students can encounter a number of issues e.g. food, prayer and hijab. There have been over the past few years some issues regarding headscarves. Many schools allow the wearing of the hijab, but some do not. In September 2008, the Minister for Education and Science and the Minister for Integration jointly agreed recommendations on school uniform policy. The recommendations were that: 1) the current system, whereby schools decide their uniform policy at a local level works and should be maintained; 2) no school uniform policy should excludes students of a particular religious background from seeking enrolment or continuing their enrolment in a school; 3) schools, when drawing up uniform policy, should consult widely in the school community; and 4) schools should take note of the Equal Status Acts before setting down a school uniform policy. They should also be mindful of the Education Act, 1998 - this obliges boards of management to take account of the principles and requirements of a democratic society and have respect and promote respect for the diversity of values, beliefs, traditions, languages and ways of life in society.

13. National Consultative Committee on Racism and Interculturalism (NCCRI)
The first comprehensive poll of Muslim opinion in Ireland was carried out in 2006 for the Irish Independent/RTE Primetime and revealed that the vast majority of Muslims living in Ireland have integrated successfully into society and strongly reject Islamic extremism (Byrne, 2006). However, it also showed that a minority holds more extreme views. Among younger people, more than a third (36%) would prefer Ireland to be ruled under Sharia law, while 37% would like Ireland to be governed as an Islamic state. It also found 28% of young Muslims aged between 16 and 26 believe violence for political ends is sometimes justified. These contrasting views suggest that there may be important cleavages within the Muslim-Irish community.

Sikhs

Finally, another religious minority, much smaller in size but also, to a certain extent increasingly ‘visible’ in Irish society, should be mentioned: the Sikhs. It is impossible to find an exact number for members of the Sikh community in Ireland as the category did not appear in any of the population Censuses and, while it is possible to ‘write-in’ a particular religion on the form, it does not seem that (many) people do as the term ‘Sikh’ does not appear at all in any of the Census findings. However, there are approximately 2,000 Sikhs in Ireland ranging from children to the very elderly. They are primarily of Punjabi descent and the main community lives in the Dublin area, but there are also small communities in Cork, Clare, Limerick, Sligo and Roscommon. The only Sikh public place of worship (Gurdwara) in Ireland is based in Dublin. Besides being a place of worship, it functions as an information and support centre for Sikh and Indian immigrants. The Irish Sikh Council was established in 2004.

Following 9/11, (male) Sikhs in Ireland became more vulnerable to prejudice and racism because of their turban and full grown beard that often led misinformed people to equate Sikhs with followers of Bin Laden. Some faced not just verbal abuse but also suffered physical attacks on the streets of Dublin and in other areas.

In 2007 an issue arose in connection with a Sikh applicant for membership of the newly instituted Garda (Police) Reserve, to which minorities were invited to apply. The applicant, who had taken part in the training process was informed just before being commissioned that he would not be allowed to wear his turban with the uniform. This ruling diverged from the established practice in the United Kingdom, and gave rise to considerable discussion. The applicant said that he would not take up the post on the Garda Reserve.

Definitions of tolerance/acceptance/recognition-respect in Ireland

Given the drive to promote a Gaelic and Catholic Ireland that succeeded the foundation of the state, it may be argued that the idea of tolerance was not a central term in the discourse of diversity in Ireland. It is only in recent years that the idea of tolerating or even respecting moral and cultural diversity, in addition to religious tolerance, has become part of the mainstream discourse.
Individual toleration was perhaps less recognised than collective toleration of specific, mainly religious minorities. In the Republic of Ireland, these were small and not regarded as a threat. Some structures of toleration for minorities were paralleled by official and popular attitudes that prioritised certain values, whether these were deemed to be prescribed by the Natural Law, Christian/Catholic teachings or an Irish way of life, whether democratically, or more likely, traditionally determined. Thus prohibitions on birth control, censorship of books, and prohibitions on divorce and homosexuality continued later than in many other western European states.

While the dominant position of Catholicism has been seen as a driver of intolerance of diverse religious perspectives, there is another view, which holds that because Ireland has traditionally been a religious society it may be more hospitable to religious minorities, and which has been expressed by members both of the Jewish and Muslim communities. While particular values were established in Irish institutions, officially promoting a particular view of Irish identity, in practice, practical accommodations were facilitated in areas of dispute.

The modernization of Ireland that has taken place over the last forty years has changed the conditions of tolerance considerably. Liberal reforms have removed most, though not all institutional restrictions on individuals. The consuming public debates through which these reforms emerged focused primarily on matters of individual, rather than groups/cultural diversity. Arguments in favour of a ‘pluralist’ society became more widely expressed from the 1960s onwards.

But tolerance of cultural or ethnic groups remains an issue. An indication of the grounds on which discrimination is likely to be a concern can be seen in the legal prohibition on discrimination in employment and services (from both the public and private sectors) on grounds of gender (including transsexuals), marital status, family status, sexual orientation, age, disability, race (including nationality) and membership of the Traveler community, as well as religion (or lack thereof).

While education is deemed in the Constitution to be the responsibility of parents, the State finances free primary education. This was set up on a denominational basis, with the Catholic Church being the main organiser of schools at elementary and secondary level, with small numbers of Protestant and Jewish schools. Nearly all primary schools are denominational in their intake and management. As the numbers in other religious denominations grew, there was no institutional obstacle to their setting up schools supported by the state. But a different strand of education is provided through multi-denominational schools, emerging in the late 1970s to meet ‘a growing need in Irish society for schools that recognise the developing diversity of Irish life and the modern need for democratic management structures’. The role of religion in schools and especially the role of the Catholic Church in managing schools has been an increasingly contentious issue.

Children of immigrants and non-nationals make up 10% of the primary school population and 8% of the post primary school population (ESRI, 2009). These represent many nationalities and religions. In this context, a new set of guidelines for Catholic secondary schools to deal with students

of other faiths was circulated in September 2010 after several Catholic schools asked for clarity on how to embrace other religions while still maintaining their Catholic ethos (Donnelly, 2010).

In Ireland the concepts ‘tolerance’ and/or ‘toleration’ are not noticeably articulated in the debates about diversity, and these concepts are actually seldom used. Interestingly, the term ‘tolerance’ is not used in most ‘official’ documents or policies which tend to refer instead to notions such as equality, interculturalism, accommodation of differences and, most of all, ‘integration’.

Since Ireland’s migration turn in the late 1990s/early 2000s, the Irish Government has taken several measures in response to the changes and increasing diversity in Irish society. A ‘Know Racism’ campaign, to stimulate awareness of racism and respect for cultural diversity was launched in 2001, followed by the National Action Plan Against Racism (NPAR) 2005-2008, designed to provide a strategic direction for a more intercultural inclusive society in Ireland. Support for national and local strategies promoting greater integration in workplaces, the police service, the health service, the education system, the arts and within local authorities was provided.

New structures have also been put in place to address the challenges of immigration to Ireland. In April 2005, the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service (INIS) was established to provide a ‘one stop shop’ in relation to asylum, immigration, citizenship and visas. In 2007 the Government appointed the first Minister of State for Integration and established the Office of the Minister for Integration (oMI) to develop and co-ordinate integration policy across Government departments, agencies and services. In 2008, the OMI published ‘Migration Nation: Statement on Integration Strategy and Diversity Management’ setting out the key principles of state policy with regard to integration: 1) a partnership approach between the Government, and civil society, 2) strong links between integration policy and wider state social inclusion measures, 3) a clear public policy focus that avoids the creation of parallel societies, and 4) a commitment to effective local delivery mechanisms that align services to migrants with those for indigenous communities.

Importantly, unlike in many other EU states, non-citizens enjoy political rights of various kinds in Ireland. On the one hand, all EU citizens are entitled to vote and stand in local and European elections, but voting and standing in local elections had been extended to all legally resident foreigners in Ireland independently of this EU provision. Ireland also grants reciprocal national voting rights to British citizens, which allows them to vote in national elections, but not referendums and presidential elections. Fanning and O’Boyle (2010) have recently observed that ‘high levels of immigration to Ireland have left an impact on the economy and society, but arguably less of an impact on politics’. Studies have shown that prior to both the 2004 local government elections and the 2007 general election, Irish political parties made few efforts to either attract the support of immigrant voters or to encourage immigrants to get involved in party politics.17 This ‘openness in principle’ but lack of concrete measures nevertheless translated into forty-four immigrant candidates contesting the 2009 local government elections - and four being elected.
Contemporary debates about how ‘tolerant’ Irish society is have often related to the idea that the Irish, having been for centuries a nation of emigrants, know what it feels like to be a foreigner in a new country and can not only understand immigrants’ experiences and difficulties but also empathise with their tribulations. The evidence with regard to this is mixed.

Ireland’s new ethnic and cultural ‘diversity’ has been relatively well perceived, it has been seen as an ‘enrichment’ and a ‘revitalization’ of society and overall the experience of most migrant communities is a ‘positive’ one. However, there are also concerns that there might be ‘too much’ diversity which has potentially negative implications for Irish society and ‘Irishness’. Institutional responses to issues of toleration with respect to the immigrant minorities have focused on themes of anti-racism and interculturalism. Racism has been identified as an issue in Irish society, but the extent of racism is a matter of debate. Several studies and surveys from the 1990s onwards have consistently found a significant minority who held hostile attitudes to ‘the other’.

In November 2006 an ESRI study explored the experience of racism and discrimination of work permit holders and asylum seekers in Ireland – it showed that:

- 35% of the migrants sampled reported experiencing harassment on the street, in public places or on public transport.
- Among those entitled to work, insults or other forms of harassment at work was the second most common form of discrimination, with 32% of work permit holders reporting this.
- Black Africans experienced the most discrimination of all the groups studied, in the work domain, in public places, in pubs/restaurants and in public institutions.
- Asylum seekers were much more likely to report discrimination than work permit holders (McGinnity et al., 2006).

Two other reports indicate that discrimination in work and other areas is experienced particularly by sub-Saharan Africans, and that immigrant children experience bullying at school (FRA 2009; Smyth et al., 2009).

The main findings of a Special Barometer survey revealed a more positive and optimistic picture (Eurobarometer, 2009). It showed that people in Ireland tend to have a fairly diversified circle of friends and acquaintances in terms of religion, disability and sexual orientation. However, results also showed that Irish people mixed less with people from a different ethnic background than respondents from other Member States did.

In all these surveys, an important issue is that both the level and the nature of discrimination – and, conversely, of ‘tolerance’ – vary across different types of migrant or ethnic minority groups. Under current conditions the principal groups that are likely to be seen as subject to prejudice and intolerance are Travellers and immigrants of different race or colour - it could be argued that these are the two groups who contradict the ‘ideal’ of Irishness as ‘white, Catholic and settled’ the most.

A body of work argues that identity in Ireland is indeed ‘racialised’, a phenomenon (if not a process) that originates in the country’s history of colonisation, oppression, struggle and threat and has led to a necessary ‘narrow’
definition of ‘authentic’ Irishness, more ‘exclusive’ than ‘inclusive’, and which has precluded and now negates diversity among its members. As a result, in this view Ireland can only ‘accommodate’ diversity and not ‘integrate’ it within its definition of the nation or its definition of identity/Irishness; hence the lack of references to ‘multiculturalism’ in Ireland, and this transpires at the level of the institutions of the state (Tannam, 2002).

Concluding remarks

A context and driver for recent developments in toleration and of the discourse of toleration, and one whose importance it is hardly possible to overestimate, has been the evolution of the peace process between Protestants and Catholics on the island, and in Northern Ireland in particular, as well as between Northern Ireland and the Republic, and the Republic and the United Kingdom. A second context and driver has been the area of sexual morality, from the increasing acceptance of unmarried mothers, to the admission of divorce and the tolerance of lesbian and gay sexuality, up to the recognition of civil partnerships in 2011.

Ireland’s experience of large-scale immigration and cultural diversity began later than in most other west European countries – taking place only in the last twenty years – and immigrant minorities still represent a relatively new phenomenon. In 1996 Ireland reached its migration ‘turning point’; a decade later, in 2006, non-Irish nationals represented approximately 10% of the population. While this change has already posed certain issues of integration and accommodation, many of the claims and challenges deriving from cultural diversity have yet to arise.

The pattern of diversity emerging in Ireland is distinctive in a number of ways. Its long history as a country of emigration and recent transformation into a destination of choice for immigrants distinguish it from most EU member states. Ireland has never been a colonial power; its migrants do not come from countries it had previously occupied, although some come from regions in which Irish missionaries were active in the western colonisation enterprise. Ireland did not have a guest worker programme in the 1950s and 60s, and therefore did not go through a process of coming to terms with the fact of a permanent migrant population that this entailed. As immigration is still a recent phenomenon in Ireland, the main focus is still on ‘newcomers’ or ‘new communities’ rather than second and third generations. The great bulk of migrants comes from within the European Union and includes a significant contingent of returning Irish migrants. The newcomers are predominantly of working age, and tend to be well educated and highly skilled.

It is also notable that increased immigration coincided with a period of economic prosperity, so that economic competition between the native population and migrants may have been less evident than under the conditions of recession that later came to prevail, and less liable to arouse fears of the potentially negative impact of the newcomers. These factors may account for the fact that Ireland has not seen the emergence of any real right wing, anti-immigrant party, or indeed any significant political campaign or protest against immigrants as a reaction to its recent

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18. See Lentin and McVeigh (2002); Ruth (1988)
19. Nearly three quarters of persons from the EU 15 (excluding Ireland and the UK) are educated to third level, and the equivalent figure for persons from the rest of the world is over 50% (CSO, 2008)
large-scale immigration. This is not to discount the evidence for significant underlying levels of racial discrimination.

It is noteworthy, also, that there has not been a strong emphasis on the ‘security’ issue connected with migration and diversity, unlike in other countries (UK, France for example), by either political parties or Government. Nor has ‘Muslim radicalisation’ come to the fore (so far at least) in Ireland. As we have seen, the Muslim community in Ireland is quite different in terms of origins and socio-demographic composition from that in other EU countries. This, and the fact that the Irish Government and institutions have sought to establish a dialogue with the Muslim community and have allowed for some accommodation of religious practices might be seen as the two main reasons for the absence of either major claims or problems with regard to Islam in Ireland.

Among the new religious minorities, Sikhs have encountered some difficulties and lack of understanding regarding the observance of their religious practices; this made the headlines in 2007 and 2008. On both occasions, the problems concerned the wearing of the turban – both gave rise to considerable debate, and neither was accommodated. But perhaps the most recurrent challenge to principles of toleration and acceptance arise with respect to Ireland’s indigenous cultural minority, the Travellers, in connection with their status as an ethnic group, the issue of halting sites and educational provision.

Ireland has had to generate immigration and integration policies against a background of rapid change, limited experience, and, until recently, a largely monocultural society. There was no official ‘planning process’ regarding immigration, and it has been argued that, initially, and for a number of years, Ireland lacked a coherent integration policy and that the dominant economic ethos of laissez faire translated into an amalgam of piece-meal policy statements and reactive policy responses to immediate issues’ and to a certain attitude of ‘welcome if you fit our national interest’ (Boucher, 2008: 22).

The language of toleration has not been prominent in discussions of diversity. From a historical context in which the toleration of diversity as permission was seen as suspect, Ireland has evolved to a situation in which ‘mere’ tolerance as permission, or even respect, are seen as inadequate responses to diversity. Rather the official emphasis has been on integration of diverse religious and cultural communities now present in Ireland, framed in terms of ‘interculturalism’, defined in Ireland by the National Consultative Committee on Racism and Interculturalism as the ‘development of strategy, policy and practices that promote interaction, understanding, respect and integration between different cultures and ethnic groups on the basis that cultural diversity is a strength that can enrich society, without glossing over issues such as racism’ (NCCRI, 2006: 29). This emphasis on interculturalism as a strategy for integration and social cohesion again distinguishes Ireland from other EU countries whose focus has been on either assimilation or multiculturalism. Yet the development of institutional and practical toleration, as well as attitudes of toleration, has been mixed. It may be speculated whether the late arrival of immigrant cultural diversity will or will not allow new approaches to tolerance, and lessons from other countries’ experience to be applied.
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CHAPTER 11. CYPRUS

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Introduction

Cyprus is the third-largest island in the Mediterranean; its geographical position, in the far eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea, historically adjoining Europe, Asia and Africa has been both a blessing and a curse. Invaders and occupiers for centuries sought to subordinate it for strategic reasons, followed by British colonial rule. In an area of 9,251 square kilometres the total population of Cyprus is around 754,800, of whom 672,800 (or 75.4%) are Greek-Cypriots (living in the Republic of Cyprus-controlled area). Upon independence from British colonial rule in 1960, Turkish-Cypriots constituted 18 per cent of the population, whilst the smaller ‘religious groups’, as referred to in the Constitution—consisting of Armenians, Latins, Maronites and ‘others’ (such as Roma)—constituted 3.2 per cent of the population. Today Turkish Cypriots are estimated to be 89,200 or 10% of the total population of the island.1

Peaceful coexistence between the island’s two communities, the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots had been short-lived. In 1963 inter-communal violence forced the majority of the Turkish Cypriots to withdraw into enclaves: over 30% of the Turkish Cypriots were forced to live in Turkish militia-controlled enclaves in isolation and squalid conditions. The economy was structured by the ethnic conflict that dominated the island since 1963 and the segregation of the two communities that penetrated economy and society deeply up until 1974, when a military coup staged by the Greek junta preceded the military invasion from Turkey a few days later. Since then, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots lived apart, separated by a barbed wire with very little contact until 2003, until the Turkish Cypriot administration decided to partially lift the ban on freedom of movement and opened up a few checkpoints around the island. For many Greek Cypriots and especially for the younger generation, this development offered the first opportunity to come into contact with Turkish Cypriots, who had for several decades lived so close and yet so far apart.

The Greek-Cypriot ‘economic ethos’ (Mavratsas, 1992), in Weberian terms propelled accumulation, growth and commerce, but was much premised on the fact that land-ownership, commerce and trade was

1. This chapter will cover mainly the southern part of the country, although there will be discussion of the position of Turkish-Cypriots in the country as a whole. In particular it concentrates on their position in the Greek-Cypriot controlled southern part of the country, where a few thousand work and visit on a regular basis.
dominated by Greek-Cypriots. The social class structure remained essentially the same as the pyramid of wealth and income did not change dramatically after independence: the church continued to be the largest land-owner and expanded its commercial activities, whilst at the same time there was a growth in the commercial classes. The recent history of Cyprus has been marked by rapid economic development since 1960 and the particularly spectacular growth in the aftermath of the 1974 catastrophe. The development of Cyprus has been structured by a number of internal and external factors. For instance, the Turkish military invasion and occupation of the north and the mass expulsion of Greek-Cypriots in 1974, by default created the preconditions for rapid (capitalistic) ‘modernisation’, in what Harvey (2004) refers to as conditions for ‘accumulation by dispossession’. In spite of the severe drop in the GDP during 1973-75 and the sharp rise in unemployment and mass poverty, cheap labour was provided by the 160,000 Greek Cypriot displaced persons, forcibly expelled from the northern part and living in government refugee camps. The conditions of the rapid development were reminiscent to the early industrialisation of Western Europe. This fact together with a concerted effort by the government, political parties and trade unions created the conditions for the development that was subsequently experienced in Cyprus (Anthias and Ayres, 1983; Christodoulou, 1992; Panayiotopoulos, 1996).

A troubled history of post-colonial identity, state and nation formation

National identity and state formation were shaped as a result of the recent troubled history, which tore the country apart: the ethnic conflict, international interventions during the cold war, and the coup and invasion which divided the country in 1974.

Cyprus became an independent Republic in 1960. The ethnic conflict of 1963-1974 brought about a coup by the Greek military junta and the paramilitary EOKA B, followed by an invasion from the Turkish army and the subsequent division of the island. Turkey still occupies 34 per cent of the territory. Thousands were displaced: 162,000 Greek-Cypriots in the southern part of the country and 80,000 Turkish-Cypriots were forced to move to the northern part of the island. Repeated attempts to resolve the Cyprus problem spanning over 40 years have not been successful so far. The election of a pro-solution left-wing President in February 2008 has given new impetus to solving the partition problem. However, after over 100 meetings, the leaders are yet to reach a final agreement.

A crucial aspect structuring national and state identity is the presence of a large number of migrants since 1990. Cyprus was transformed from a net emigration to a net immigration country. Immigration policy in Cyprus was largely formulated in the 1990s, when the government decided to abandon the restrictive policies followed until then and allow more migrant workers into the country in order to meet labour shortages. In the post EU accession era there is an increasing number of EU citizens utilising their right to move and work freely across the EU, who come to seek employment in Cyprus. Today, the total number of non-Cypriot nationals is estimated to be about 200,000 persons, including irregular or undocumented migrants from third countries.
The immigrant population has become an important component of the labour force. In October 2010, out of 376,300 employed persons, 114,425 were EU or third country nationals, comprising 30.4% of those gainfully employed. The sending countries are non-EU countries (Sri Lanka, Russia, Philippines etc) and some of the EU countries (Greece, the United Kingdom, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania etc). As of October 2010 third country nationals (TCNs) largely work in private household service (domestic workers, carers etc.) and other services. This has remained unchanged when compared to previous years, with the exception of the decline in TCN employed in construction, restaurants and the hotel sector. These sectors were among the hardest hit during the economic crisis of 2009, and although further research is needed, the decline of TCNs in construction is comparable to the decline of employment in that sector of Cypriots (Greek and Turkish) and of Europeans.

The question of tolerance/toleration is intimately connected to citizenship and economic development as construed in connection to the ever-present ‘Cyprus problem’, structured by the historical and politico-social context of the island and the wider troubled region of the Middle East. So long as the ‘Cyprus problem’ persists, the politics of ‘citizenship’, economic development and socio-cultural transformation cannot remain frozen in time, but are affected by the debates relating to the resolution of the problem. Citizenship has played a central role in political discourse, both during and following the referendum on the UN plan in April 2004. The particular construction of the RoC was such that the struggle for legitimacy was elevated to the primary struggle for control of the state. In this conflict the two communal leaderships of the Greek-Cypriots and the Turkish-Cypriots sought to materialise their ‘national aspirations’: For Greek-Cypriots the aim for enosis (union with Greece) and for the Turkish-Cypriots the goal of taksim (partition) would continue post-independence. The very concept of citizenship was not only ethnically/communally defined by the Constitution, but it was also a sharply divisive issue between the Greeks and Turks, acquiring strong ethnic and nationalistic overtones (see Tornaritis, 1982a, 1982b; Trimikliniotis, 2000 and 2010).

**Ethno-communal citizenship and the nationalising of legally divided subjects**

In 1960 Cyprus became an independent republic for the first time since antiquity, albeit in a limited way (see Attalides, 1979; Faustmann, 1999). The anti-colonial struggle, which started in the 1930s, led to a four-year armed campaign by the Greek-Cypriot EOKA (1955–59) for enosis (union with Greece) and the Turkish-Cypriot response for taksim (partition). The hostility and instability generated by these developments brought about a regime of ‘supervised’ independence, with three foreign ‘guarantor’ nations (UK, Turkey and Greece). The Cypriot Constitution, adopted under the Zurich-London Accord of 1959, contains a rigorous bi-communalism, whereby the two ‘communities’, Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots shared power in a consociational system. Citizenship was strictly ethno-communally divided. Beyond the two main communities (Greek and Turkish) Cyprus has three national minorities, referred to in the Constitution as ‘religious groups’: the Maronites, the Armenians and the Latins. In addition, there is a small Roma community, registered mostly as part of the Turkish-Cypriot community, which was only recognised as a minority in 2009.
In 1963, following a Greek-Cypriot proposal for amendment to the Constitution, the Turkish-Cypriot political leadership withdrew or was forced to withdraw from the government (depending on whose historical version one is reading). Since then, the administration of the Republic has been carried out by the Greek-Cypriots. Inter-communal strife ensued until 1967. In 1964, the Supreme Court ruled that the functioning of the government must continue on the basis of the ‘law of necessity’ or, better yet, the ‘doctrine of necessity’, in spite of the constitutional deficiencies created by the Turkish-Cypriot leadership withdrawal from the administration. The short life of consociation did not manage to generate a strong enough inter-communal or trans-communal citizenship. This brief period of peaceful inter-communal political co-existence was tentative; we cannot therefore speak of a ‘citizenship policy’ as such, above and beyond the politics of the Cyprus conflict and the separate national aspirations of Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots, who continued to work towards enosis and taksim respectively, even after independence. Although de jure the young Republic continued to exist as a single international entity, with the collapse of the consociational power-sharing, the Republic in practice was controlled by the Greek-Cypriots. The Turkish-Cypriot leadership exercised de facto power within small enclaves throughout the territory of the Republic. This was in a sense the first de facto partition.

During this 30-year period the de facto partition meant that in effect there were two separate ‘stories’: that of the Greek-Cypriots and that of the Turkish-Cypriots. Turkish-Cypriots are entitled to citizenship of the RoC and tens of thousands obtained a Republic of Cyprus passport. Up to April 2003 there were few opportunities for ordinary Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots to meet: Greek-Cypriots did not have access to the northern territories occupied by Turkey, whilst Turkish-Cypriots were prohibited by their own administration from entering the area controlled by the Republic.

In the post-1974 period the RoC attempted to reinforce its legitimacy claiming that Turkish-Cypriot citizens enjoy full and equal rights under the Republic’s Constitution, such as general civil liberties and the rights provided by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) as well as other human rights, save for those provisions that have resulted from (a) the ‘abandoning’ of the governmental posts in 1963–1964 and (b) the consequences of the Turkish invasion. The ‘doctrine of necessity’ was stated to apply only to the extent that it would allow for the effective functioning of the state, whilst the relevant provisions of the Constitution would be temporarily suspended, pending a political settlement. However, Turkish-Cypriot citizens of the Republic had been denied their electoral rights since 1964, a policy found by the ECtHR to be in violation of the European Convention on Human Rights. A new law was passed in May 2006 which at least partially remedied this problem but the wide spectrum of the ECtHR decision against Cyprus was not fully addressed by the government.

Successive governments have maintained that Turkish-Cypriots are entitled to full citizenship rights and to citizenship of the RoC. The children of Turkish Cypriots who now reside in northern Cyprus or abroad and were born after 1974 are entitled to citizenship (as with Greek-Cypriots and ‘others’) but children born to Turkish Cypriots and Turkish nationals are not automatically entitled to citizenship. The bureaucratic elements...
involved are due to the non-recognition of any documentation (e.g. birth certificates) from the TRNC, which renders the whole policy treatment of Turkish-Cypriots self-contradictory, reflecting the complexity of the Cyprus conflict and the constant contestation for legitimacy and recognition. Inevitably, ‘the discourse on recognition’ (Constantinou and Papadakis, 2002) spilled over into citizenship politics upsetting the officially declared policy of ‘rapprochement’. Ultimately, the consequences of the situation resulted in failing to properly treat ordinary Turkish-Cypriots as ‘strategic allies’, in the context of independence from the Turkish-Cypriots’ nationalistic leadership, who are perceived as ‘mere pawns of Ankara’. Even today, the RoC seems to be failing to address certain basic matters: In spite of Turkish being an official language of the Republic, its use has in RoC has been virtually abandoned, thus creating conditions of intolerance, discrimination and unconstitutionality (Trimikliniotis and Demetriou, 2008).

The post-referendum and post-accession period (2004-2011)

The year of 2004 was a watershed: the efforts to reunite the country would coincide with Cyprus’ accession to the EU, as Cyprus was called to vote in a referendum on a comprehensive plan put together by the UN after the two sides had negotiated it. The plan was approved by a large majority in the Turkish Cypriot community but was overwhelmingly rejected by the Greek Cypriots; this disparity added considerable tension and suspicion in the relations of the two communities which the two sides are yet to overcome. Following the referenda’s failure to solve the problem, Cyprus entered the EU as a divided country in a state of limbo. This has significantly shaped Cyprus’ relations with and position within the EU, as its unresolved problem and its tensions with Turkey have become a constant source of problems for successive EU presidencies.

The post accession period also saw an increase in the numbers of TCNs seeking employment or asylum in Cyprus, which in a way led Greek Cypriot society to come face to face with the new realities of cultural diversity and ‘otherness’ simultaneously with the new situation resulting from the opening up of the border between north and south of the country.

Cultural diversity challenges facing Cyprus in the last 30 years

Cyprus and periodisation

In the Cypriot context, time-wise the rise on multiculturalism, including the establishment of an institutional framework for combating discrimination and enhancing tolerance coincides with an increasing polarisation breeding intolerance. Therefore we can observe in the post-millennium period a rise in the discourse of tolerance, articulated mostly by human and labour rights supporters/groups and intellectuals; at the same time, there is a rise in intolerance and nationalism amongst powerful institutions deeply embedded within society such as mainstream centrist and right wing political parties, sectors of the
trade union movement, dominant fractions within the public education teachers and the civil service, the Church, etc. This polarisation takes place in the context of the transformation of institutions resulting from Cyprus’ accession to the EU and the transposition of the EU acquis but also within the revival of the negotiations for the resolution of the Cyprus problem which occurred in 2003.

The cultural diversity challenges in the post 1980s period are shaped by the historical antecedents of the ‘border society’ torn by war, the cultural effect of mass tourism and the large presence of migrants. The question of tolerance of the ‘other’ is characterised by antinomies and contradictions, which contain both a degree of tolerance as ‘philoxenia’, a popular value cherished and advertised as a ‘local tradition’, but simultaneously xenophobia and an intolerance towards the other. This ambivalence has been structured by a series of key events.

While in the international arena the 1980s marked the closing of the cold war era, in Cyprus these were the years of the consolidation of the de facto partition, as the Turkish Cypriot administration declared independence of its breakaway state, the ‘Turkish Republic in Northern Cyprus’ (TRNC). At the same time there was massive economic growth for the RoC and economic stagnation in the Turkish Cypriot community.

The 1980s was also the period where Cyprus started receiving its first wave of foreigners, mostly affluent people of Arab origin fleeing from the wars raging in the Middle East at the time (Lebanon, Kuwait, Iraq). The potential and actual contribution of this group to the national economy was recognised and utilised from the outset and thus manifestations of racism and discrimination were fragmented and few. However, in 1985 there was the first major incident of mass violence after 1974. In retaliation of an alleged rape of a Greek Cypriot by persons of Arab origin, a riot occurred in the tourist area of Limassol directed against all persons of Arab origin found in the streets. The media took a negative view of the riot and presented it as vandalism, focusing on the fact that such incidents created a bad image for Cyprus abroad – after all the Lebanese who fled to Cyprus were people of money.8

In the 1990s and early 2000, a number of key issues emerged, opening up the question of citizenship and requiring a declared and consistent policy. First, the arrival of migrant workers in the early 1990s, who today make up over 20 per cent of the total working population of the island, and then the arrival of Roma, who are classified as Turkish-Cypriots, from the poorer north in the south between 1999 and 2002, created a panic make up over 20 per cent of the total working population of the island, and then the arrival of Roma, who are classified as Turkish-Cypriots, from the poorer north in the south between 1999 and 2002, created a panic of being ‘flooded’ with ‘alien cultures’ and ‘gypsies’. In the case of the Roma and despite of the fact that they are Cypriots who simply moved from north to south of the country, the reaction of the authorities, the media and the public was that of outright hostility.9

The advent of migrants and the Cypriot Roma (from the northern part of the country) as well as the dynamics of EU accession, coupled with the prospects of a solution to the Cyprus problem which began to emerge in the early 2000s brought a powerful boost to multicultural ideas in Cyprus in the new millennium. This boost was met with intense polarisation which was not contained or exhausted in discourse but spilled over into policy making.10 The system as regards immigration control and monitoring was rigid from the beginning;
fact it had always been racially structured that assimilation was not even an option. Although the length of residence permits varied at different periods, it had always been fixed to a number of years (at the time of writing four years) leaving little possibilities for issues of integration and assimilation to apply to the vast majority of migrants. However, generally speaking Cyprus has not, in the aftermath of 9/11 developed a more stringent regime as regards security matters. Rather, these tight immigration control policies must be seen as responses to the panic and the irrational fear caused by the rising numbers of migrant workers and asylum seekers. At the same time, one needs to consider that the war in Iraq, a direct result of 9/11 has led several thousands of Iraqis to flee their homeland in search for a more secure future; some of these sought asylum in Cyprus where the communist government’s meagre handouts have been exaggerated and amplified by the media and by right wing circles.

Educational reform

In the field of education, the issue of tolerance, maltreatment of minorities and ethnic or ‘racial’ discrimination did not, for historical reasons, receive the required attention, as the field of education was deemed by the Cypriot Constitution to be a ‘communal’ affair, to be left to the ‘Communal Chambers’ of the two main communities of Cyprus, the Greek-Cypriots and the Turkish-Cypriots to regulate. The Cypriot Ministry of Education and Culture emerged after the ‘withdrawal’ of the Turkish Cypriots from the administration in 1963-64. Education nevertheless remained ‘communal’ in character for all those citizens who were deemed to be part of the Greek-Cypriot community, albeit it assumed a ‘national’ character for the Greek Cypriots (see Trimikliniotis, 2004).

The debates over the comprehensive educational reform, which has been on the table for over seven years now, and the virulent reactions to it, illustrate the polarisation that cuts across Greek-Cypriot society. The Reform, which aspires to render Cyprus’ ethnocentric educational system multicultural, was met with strong opposition by the church, right-wing, conservative and nationalist sections of teachers, parents and political parties who saw this as ‘conspiracy’ to ‘dehellenize’ education. The issue that attracted most of the controversy in the public debates is the curriculum revision and generally the way in which the lesson of history is taught at school. The history textbook which the Educational Reform sought to revise had been criticised for containing offensive references and inflammatory language. A new twist in 2010 has caused the reformists to water down their reformist agenda in the revision of history education: elections in the Turkish Cypriot community brought in power a hard line nationalist who immediately upon assuming office scrapped the new (revised) history textbooks which had up until then been used in Turkish Cypriot schools and replaced them with the old style anti-Greek mould. This has led the Greek-Cypriot reformers to succumb to mounting right-wing and nationalist pressure by teachers associations and parents; this time they were criticised by those who wanted to see a serious transformation towards an open, tolerant and multi-perspective history education. At the time of writing, discussions amongst stakeholders on the future of the history textbooks continued.

11. This included the three constitutionally recognised ‘religious groups’, who opted to be part of the numerically larger Greek-Cypriot community (80%) rather than the smaller Turkish-Cypriot community (18%).

12. Indicative of the negative climate in the education sector is a circular issued by the primary school teachers’ union POED urging its members to refuse to implement the targets set by the Ministry of Education for the development of a culture of peaceful coexistence with the Turkish Cypriots, and especially the proposed measure of organising visits by Turkish Cypriot teachers and pupils. The circular had been criticised by the Equality Body. Following this, the teachers issued another circular reiterating their position against the exchange of visits with Turkish Cypriots.

CHAPTER 11. CYPRUS

Debates on nation and citizenship

A crucial development was the opening of the checkpoints which allowed many thousands of Turkish-Cypriots to visit the south, generally greeted by both Turkish-Cypriots and Roma residing in the south with relief and optimism. However, there was a tense atmosphere generated in the run-up to and aftermath of the referendum on the Annan plan to reunite the island on 24 April 2004, the rejection of which by the Greek-Cypriots has given rise to nationalist sentiment in the south (see Hadjidemetriou, 2006). The political atmosphere has drastically changed since the presidential election in February 2008 and the new negotiations to resolve the problem. Nevertheless, as long as the there is no settlement, unease about the legal, political, socio-economic and everyday consequences of the de facto partition will remain.

The grant of RoC citizenship to children of settlers from Turkey who are married to Turkish-Cypriots has become a highly controversial issue as it brings out the conflict over the nature of the Cyprus problem. There is a misguided conflation of the internationally-condemned policy of an aggressor country, with the fact that we are also dealing with some basic rights and humanitarian issues relating to the rights of children and individuals who marry, start families and continue with their lives. The granting of citizenship rights to children and spouses of Turkish-Cypriots is an important political issue which has taken up the headlines and has brought about accusations against the government for ‘legalising the Turkish settlers’. Moreover, the condemnation of a war crime (colonisation) must not be conflated with issues regarding the conditions of sojourn and living of poor undocumented workers, exploited as cheap foreign labour (see Faiz, 2008). Finally, gender has become an important issue as regards citizenship. The position of women in the processes of nation-building and nationalism raises the crucial question of a gendered Cypriot citizenship, which one scholar referred to as ‘the one remaining bastion of male superiority in the present territorially divided state’ (Anthias, 1989: 150). This last ‘bastion’ was formally abolished with an amendment of the citizenship law in 1999 (No. 65/99), which introduced entitlement to citizenship for descendants of a Cypriot mother and a non-Cypriot father. The reluctance of Cypriot policymakers to amend the citizenship law, allegedly due to the concern about upsetting the state of affairs as it existed prior to 1974, cannot withstand close examination. After all, there have been seven amendments to the citizenship law prior to the amendment No. 65/99. It is apparent that the issue of gender equality had not been a particularly high political priority. Besides, in the patriarchal order of things, the role of Cypriot women as ‘symbolic reproducers of the nation’, particularly in the context of ‘national liberation’, as transmitters of ‘the cultural stuff’, required that potential association and reproduction of women with men outside the ethnic group must be strictly controlled (Anthias, 1989: 151).

From the research conducted over the last ten years, we can locate three types of relevant findings highlighting the problem with racial and well as other types of intolerance, including hate crimes which inform the context: (a) opinion surveys from quantitative research and opinion polls; (b) qualitative research (interviews, focus groups and ethnographic/participant observation) and (c) research papers based on policy and institutional analysis. The absence of comparable reliable data covering the period under examination makes it difficult to comment on trends. Nonetheless, relying...
on various indicators and proxy data some conclusions are possible, even if they are preliminary and subject to further investigation.

**Colour as signifier of racism**

Colour remains an important signifier of racism, although not exclusively or necessarily. Research conducted in 2010 confirms that colour racism and racial abuse against blacks persists. During focus groups with asylum seekers (see Trimikliniotis and Demetriou, 2010), Africans reported having received the worst treatment of all asylum seekers, facing more overt and acute forms of discrimination, particularly from immigration officers who have no hesitation in demonstrating racist behaviour towards them. Other asylum seekers interviewed also reported having been subjected to racial abuse but the degree of regularity, humiliation and intensity does not match the stories told by the Africans. Colour and ‘race’ are not the only signifiers of racial hatred in Cyprus. There is an increasingly loud and frequent public discourse, which often avoids explicit references to ‘race’ but utilises other signifiers such as essential or inherent or hereditary characteristics which derive not from the blood or DNA but culture, language and religion, in what scholars refer to as neo-racism (Balibar and Wallerstein, 1991).

**Rise of far right violence and hatred discourse**

There is a neo-racism connected to the rise of the Far Right and discourses of hatred. Even though traditionally in Cyprus there was no typical far right / xenophobic populist or Neo-Nazi party, focusing for instance on anti-immigration populism or anti-Semitic politics, this is now beginning to change as these signifiers are regularly being articulated in the mainstream press and media. In the 2009 European Parliamentary elections, a neo-Nazi type of party called ELAM ‘Ethniko Laiko Metopo’ which translates into National Popular Front contested the elections and received 663 votes (0.22 percent); at the time it received no media coverage. The main discussion lines of ELAM produced the usual racist slogans contained in the Greek neo-Nazi and extreme Right papers and magazines, claiming that it is the only party that speaks for the “liberation of our enslaved lands, the ending of the privileges of the ‘greedy’ Turkish-Cypriots and for a Europe of Nations and traditions which belongs to the real Europeans and not to the ‘third-worldly’ [backward] illegal immigrants”. In the national parliamentary elections of 2011 ELAM received 4,354 votes, scoring 1.08% of the votes, the largest percentage amongst the parties that did not elect an MP. This, in spite the general admission that ELAM is behind several racist attacks against unsuspecting migrants and Turkish Cypriots taking place in public space under broad daylight.

The recently emerging organised racist lobby, with an anti-immigration and xenophobic agenda, has found affiliates in many mainstream political parties and in media outlets. There is a number of publications and regular media discourses about the imminent and grave ‘dangers’ from ‘Afro-asiatic’, ‘Muslim-Asiatic’ and ‘Turko-asiatic’ hordes that are ready to invade Cyprus as part of a plan orchestrated by Turkey to change the demographic character of Cyprus through illegal immigration; a leaflet was also widely circulated to this effect. Studies have shown that there are regular media discourses employing the usual racist frames comparable to those of other EU countries such as ethno-nationalistic, conflict-
criminality, welfare-chaupinist, job-stealing, ‘threat to liberal norms’, bi-
logical racism and national specific frames (Trimikliniotis, 1999; 2005a;
Trimikliniotis and Demetriou, 2007). Particular individuals within various
political parties, including centre-right mainstream parties, various newly-
formed committees for the ‘salvation of Cyprus’ involving various public
figures such as a former ECHR judge, a former military officer and politi-
cians, as well as neo-Nazi groups argue that asylum-seekers, migrants
and Turkish-Cypriots are abusing the Cypriot welfare benefit system rip-
ing the “golden benefits” of “the Cypriot paradise” and making Cypri-
ots “second class citizens”. They criticise the Minister of Interior for his
‘liberal’ migration policy, sometimes even going as far as labelling him
as an agent who conspires to distort the population make-up and de-
Hellenize Cyprus. Asylum-seekers, refugees and migrants are described
as “invaders”, “a fifth column against the Greek element of free
Cyprus”, claiming that “Hellenism is threatened from asylum-seekers as
it is threatened by colonists/settlers in the Turkish occupied territories.”
Such discourses aired regularly by the media are creating a climate which
is conducive to racial hatred. Such is the influence and power of the
media that when the Equality Body embarked upon the drafting of a
Code of Conduct on how ethnic communities and immigrants should be
portrayed in the media, the result was a watered-down non-binding set
of guidelines and an extensive explanation of why ‘freedom of the press’
should not be ‘interfered with’.

Racist predispositions and opinion surveys: Racial intolerance
uncovered

The findings of a research conducted by Charakis (2005) on the anti-
social behaviour of the Cypriot youth and racist tendencies provide some
interesting data (Charakis and Sitas, 2004). Methodologically the research
covers a large and representative sample of teachers, school heads and
deputy heads, media persons and youth. The aim of the research was
to investigate racist predispositions amongst the Greek-Cypriot youth,
referred to as habitus by the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. The
research team constructed what they refer to as an ‘emotional map’
of the respondents’ dispositions of Greek-Cypriot youth between ‘two
intractable extremes’. The study revealed that, in depicting the parameters
of racist and anti-racist dispositions, 20 per cent belong to an intractable
group which dismisses all forms of discrimination and who espouse a cul-
ture of equality and human rights; ten per cent “articulated deeply racist
dispositions of a primordial sense based on the reduction of phenotype
to genotype and dismissed all forms of ‘otherness’”. The scholars deduce
from their empirical research that “whatever correlation is undertaken or
frequencies studied, the two cohorts present an intractable boundary[,] all
their responses emanate from an unwavering system of beliefs” (Charakis
and Sitas, 2004: 152). However, what is crucial in terms of tendencies is
what happens to the remaining 70 percent in the middle and how they
shift from one position to the other, depending on the issue. Charakis and
Sitas argue that “if we correlate respondents with ideas that were dis-
criminatory in the broadest sense possible, the concentration of responses
would move from the intractable racist [group] … to spread all the way
up to a 79 percent but stop short of the boundary [of the other group].
If we were to correlate respondents with active derogation of the cultural
‘other’ we would find that it also corresponds with ‘xenophobic’ feelings
and shrink back to 30 percent …”
Definitions of tolerance/acceptance/recognition-respect in Cyprus

Sources and manifestations of tolerance/intolerance in Cyprus

To speak of tolerance/acceptance/recognition-respect in Cyprus is to locate the three levels of analysis on the question of tolerance in their specific historical context. In Cyprus, tolerance as a value is marked by the political, ideological, institutional/constitutional and socio-cultural environment of a war-torn society.

It is difficult to disentangle the sources from the manifestations of tolerance/intolerance in Cypriot society. Yet, we can certainly speak of historical structures in society which have generated logics of postcolonial (in)tolerance: The historical legacy of the “dialectic of intolerance” (Kitromilides, 1979) is partly a legacy of colonialism. Structured around the institutional framework of Cypriot political life, today it also finds expression in ‘ethnic’ intolerance. This intolerance undermined the development a strong ‘public opinion’ and debate in a ‘small society’, where education is more concerned with technical or professional qualifications, rather than the development of critical faculties. This intolerance has informed the social and political relation within and between the two communities; in fact it was the major characteristic of the political life in Cyprus. It did not enable Cypriots to debate and see the potential alternatives of confrontation, to the “predetermined route to disaster” as Kitromilides called it, such as the creation of a Cypriot consciousness, over and above their narrow racial or ethno-religious and linguistic-cultural identities/consciousness. As the most insightful analyses of nationalism in Cyprus point out, the central element in Greek Cypriot nationalism is that of ignoring the Turkish Cypriots (Loizos, 1974; Attalides, 1979; Papadakis, 1993). All are in line majoritarian thinking and the pattern of intolerance.

The postcolonial frame has produced a somewhat inchoate nationhood, which (re)produces a strange duality: on the one hand it maintains “surplus ethnicities” (i.e. recognised minorities such as the Armenians, Maronites and Latins) attached to the “main communities”, i.e. Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots (see Constantinou 2009). On the other hand these very same frames and social apparatuses reproduce different kinds of residues of ethnicities and social, cultural and political identities (Panayiotou, 1996, 1999, 2006; Constantinou, 2007) as contradictions to the hegemonic national homogenisation of society, as Balibar (1991) shows. Social and historical residues are reproduced in everydayness and often in direct or indirect or subtle challenge to the ‘official’ or hegemonic line or practice. Hence local forms and instances of tolerance, co-existence, social solidarity and self-sacrifice are constantly thrown in, in parallel or as subaltern response to the abundance of the intolerance and rigidities of officialdom. We return to this later.

We are dealing here with a very ambivalent state of being. Anthias (2007: 177) aptly refers to how “postcolonial frames leave subject positionalities where indentity politics is overstressed as a compensatory mechanism for the uncertainties and fissures in society...Cypriots are ambivalent about their value, and this produces and reflected in imagining about belonging to the Greek and Turkish nation. The concept Cypriot is divested of value, and of itself; it is an apology for not being
complete, and a form of self-hatred and denial is sometimes witnessed. “Like many other peoples in the region, the identity of the Cypriots has been fluid. ‘Greekness’, ‘Turkishness’, ‘Cypriotness’ and ‘Other-ness’ in history remain hosted contested issues (see Papadakis, 1993; Philippou and Makriyanni, 2004; Constantinou, 2007).

Migrant workers interviewed for research purposes detect the very ambivalence within Cypriotness: a contested Cypriotness, a mixed and hybrid experience that contains both solidarity-based, more open and universalistic almost set of values, in a contradictory and transient symbiosis with exclusionary, narrow-minded and blatantly xenophobic and racist elements. It is the former elements that reach out, as a kind of solidarity that migrants identify as ‘basic goodness’. Migrant workers seem to identify with what they perceive as ‘basic goodness’ of ordinary Cypriots, which may be explained as a dimension of a collective trait that generously reaches out as a sociability, collective generosity and hospitality. It may well be a manifestation of survival of a collective memory of a community of a historically oppressed and discriminated subalternity, or it may genuinely be a kind of good nature’, an ethics of a “common humanity”.

On the other hand, there exists a class-ridden shame, that many Cypriots would much rather forget: the fact that not many decades ago a lot of Cypriot women had to work as domestic workers in wealthy houses, hence the contradictory attitude towards domestic workers- a total dependence to do the ‘mothering’-and-cleaning entangled with a resentment and rejection of their descent, role and position in society. This is where certain version of Cypriotness may turn into an intolerant, exclusionary, xenophobic and racist ideology and practice.

Are the ‘Cypriot states of exception’ breading intolerance?

Constantinou (2008: 145-164) aptly refers to ‘the Cypriot states of exception’ to exemplify the multiple exceptionalism that defines the political-legal order of Cyprus, where one exception generates another. This brings us to the heart of ‘the Cyprus problem’, which naturally intersects with the operation of the acquis in a de facto divided country (Trimikliniotis, 2000, 2010). The invocation of exception blurs the distinctions between legality and illegality, normality and abnormality and opens up ‘opportunities’ for those in power to extend their discretion in what Poulantzas referred to as authoritarian statism. In line with the doctrine of Carl Schmitt (2005), the regimes of exception allow ‘the sovereign’ to decide when and how to invoke the emergency situation. In this sense, Cyprus is a bizarre case particularly where the distinction between the ‘exception’ and the ‘norm’ is not easy to decipher. When ‘norm’ and ‘exception’ are so intertwined and interdependent, the edges of the ‘grey zones’, or what is assumed to be the edge, becomes the core. Agamben (2005: 1) advocates that if current global reality is characterised by a generalised state of exception, then we ought to examine the intersection between norm and exception in the specific EU context: ‘the question of borders becomes all the more urgent’. The reference here is to the ‘edges’ of the law and politics where there is an ‘ambiguous, uncertain, borderline fringe, at the intersection between the legal and the political’: Agamben here quotes Fontana (1999: 16). The analytical insight into the ambiguity and uncertainty of the no-man’s land between
the public law and political fact and between the judicial order and life, must move beyond the philosophical and the abstract to the specific legal and political context if it is to have a bearing on the socio-legal and political reality that is currently reshaping the EU.

The turbulent political history inevitably shaped the social life of Cyprus and as such the question of ethnic/racial intolerance and discrimination during the period of independence up until 1974 is best viewed in this light. It is not surprising that the political question and widespread ethnic violence has overwhelmed the research agenda leaving little research interest for issues such as intolerance. In the case of Cyprus, the questions of tolerance, racism, racial discrimination, structural or ideological, must be linked to the long-drawn ethnic conflict, what Azar (1986) termed as “protracted social conflict”. The ‘Cyprus problem’ must be connected to the attitudes, practices and discourses in the daily life of ordinary persons, not just today, but also viewed in a historical perspective.

It is essential to view racial intolerance in Cyprus within the nationalist/ethnic conflict in a historical perspective in order to examine: (a) the links in the discourse of intolerance, racism and nationalism, and particularly to view how these are articulated in the political arena; (b) the way in which the discourses and ideologies of exclusionary nationalism develop over time, particularly how continuities and ruptures of belonging and exclusion materialise in specific contexts; and (c) whether there is process of ‘transformation’ of nationalism into racism and vice-a-versa.

If one is to understand ethno-racial and social intolerance in Cyprus, one must appreciate the fine linguistic and cultural issues relating to the meaning of the key terms and the extent to which they are considered to be morally, politically and socially deplorable or repugnant. The concept of φυλή (Greek for “race”) is not redundant in public discourses not even in the so-called ‘politically correct’ media world. In Cyprus there is little sense of political correctness in the media language and society at large. The term “race” can be and is being used without the inverted commas in spite of the fact that Cyprus has signed and ratified all the UN and other international instruments which reject the theories of race and consider the term discredited (see National Report of the RoC on the Conclusions of the European and World Conference against Racism, 2002).

The issue of ethno-racial intolerance towards migrant workers was up until very recently dismissed as ‘isolated incidents’ by the authorities, a matter that attracted serious criticisms of institutional racism or at least government inaction. The racism debate with migrants at the receiving end and Greek-Cypriots as the perpetrators did not ‘fit in’ the national story of victimisation of Greek-Cypriots. Of course not all Greek-Cypriots are perpetrators and not all migrants are victims, but the power structure puts migrants at the receiving end.

A careful reading of the successive ECRI reports on Cyprus may lead to the conclusion that what we have is institutional racism, underlying the whole legal and administrative system. The Reports fall short of using the term ‘institutional racism’, but a careful reading reveals a resemblance with the kind of structural practices associated with the what Lord Macpherson called ‘institutional racism’ (Macpherson, 1999).
Alternatives to the intolerant nation: the potential for reconciliation

Following the Greek-Cypriot ‘No’ and the Turkish-Cypriot ‘Yes’ in the 2004 referenda, and their aftermath, it is possible but not necessarily certain that Cypriots will be able to shake off their ‘idealised’ view of the self and the demonised view of the ‘other’ (See Trimikliniotis, 2006 2007). Some have begun to get rid of the distorted view of each other allowing viewing each other beyond the ‘ethnic lenses’. The opening of the crossings contributed to the replacement of totalising discourses about the ‘other’ by individualising discourses. Moreover, the discovery of mass graves on both sides have opened up crucial questions in the public domain about the violence and intolerance of the past. Many publications and media stories about past mistakes, crimes and atrocities committed by both sides, as well as stories of self-sacrifice, cross-ethnic solidarity and support are challenging the dominant historical narrative about the barbaric and demonised ‘other’.

No community can claim to have ‘clean hands’, opening up the potential for de-communalising and ‘disaggregating collective victimhood’.

This is not an easy process as social subjects often organise their collective existence and justify their political perceptions precisely ‘around loss and sorrow’, which are powerful conservative forces. There is an effort ‘to energetically retain the reasons which perpetuate these or even reinvent new ones as they fantasise that only in this way they can justify their existence’ (Gavriilides, 2006). In Cyprus, ‘memory’ is organised and subordinated to the ‘national cause’ of the two opposing dominant nationalisms. Even the tragic issue of the missing persons has been used and abused by the two sides in a praxis of political ‘mnisikanein’, as Paul Sant Cassia (2005) has brilliantly shown: ‘mnisikakein’ is the Greek word for the practice of not letting go of the past evil one has suffered and is associated with a craving for revenge breeding intolerance. It is well-documented that memory is politically organised.

A study directed by Sitas on the prospects of reconciliation, co-existence and forgiveness in Cyprus (see Sitas et al, 2007) revealed that the only ‘hard variables’ that were found to be significant were: class/stratification; ethnicity; gender; age; religion and refugee-status. In terms of the ‘softer’ and ‘experiential variables’ – what seemed very significant were consumptions of cultural, media-linked and symbolic goods; educational experiences; civic involvement; contact with and exposure to cultural ‘others’ and traumatic experiences of war and violence. The study argues that the distinction between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ variables is important in sociological work. The ‘hard’ variables denote those situations that people can do very little about, i.e. they are born in or are defined by them. The ‘soft’ variables are experiential and involve degrees of choice, personality and social character. Most G/C and T/C especially those who have been affected directly by the conflict, think that there are “openings” and that there are cracks in the cement of the current status quo:

- “that substantive dialogue is possible between members and institutions and associations of civil society;
- there is an open-ness to some form of co-existence;
- there is an open-ness towards forgiving;
- there is a convergence about social norms;
- there is an open-ness to more economic co-operation;
- there is an open-ness towards a solution.”
The point is to realise this potential, but this is a subject to counteracting the dialectic of intolerance, racism and the various states of exception operating in this small troubled country.

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CHAPTER 12. BULGARIA

Antonina Zhelyazkova, Maya Kosseva and Marko Hajdinjak

International Center for Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations (IMIR)

Introduction

From the very moment of the formation of the modern Bulgarian state in 1878, the Bulgarian society and the state institutions had to face the problem of balancing between the accommodation of ethnic, religious and cultural diversity in the country and the aspiration for building a unitary nation-state. For more than a century (until 1989), Bulgarian legislation practically ignored the existence of different minority groups in the country and did not explicitly protect their rights. The process of changing the legislation to recognize the diversity and multiculturalism in the Bulgarian society and to protect the rights of minorities has started only after 1989, as an inseparable part of the democratisation of Bulgaria and its aspiration to join the EU.

In addition to the legal recognition, different ethnic and religious groups were also “discovered” by the scholars from various fields in social sciences. The avalanche of studies dedicated to the ethno-cultural situation in Bulgaria followed soon, including the first sociological studies about the levels of tolerance and mechanisms for coexistence of different communities. The interdisciplinary research “Relations of Compatibility and Incompatibility between Christians and Muslims in Bulgaria” (1993-2000), conducted by historians, ethnologists, sociologists, political scientists, has brought forward the thesis that during the centuries of coexistence, the Bulgarian society has set up a sustainable mechanism for accepting otherness under the strictly observed unwritten rules. Both the majority Bulgarians and the minority groups accept otherness and are tolerant towards it on the level of everyday life, but the psychological division line is preserved and the boundaries of the formal parallel existence are seldom crossed. It was also noted that Bulgarians often have negative stereotypes about the “others” on the group level, but disregard them on the personal level and have no problem in accepting their neighbour, colleague or friend from a different ethnic or religious community.

Gradually the debates have centred on the question whether tolerance in Bulgaria truly exists or is the notion about tolerant Bulgarians basically a well-entrenched myth. Studies from the 1990s and the last decade show that Bulgarians predominantly perceive themselves as tolerant. This stereotype has been actively promoted by the media and the leading Bulgarian politicians.

1. The first published result of the research was the book Relations of Compatibility and Incompatibility between Christians and Muslims (Zhelyazkova, Nielson, Kepel, 1995).
2. The survey of the Open Society Institute Sofia conducted in June 2008 gave the following answers to the question “Are Bulgarians tolerant towards those who are different”: fully tolerant - 15.1%, rather tolerant - 37.7%, rather intolerant – 23.6%, not tolerant at all – 10.1%, cannot say – 13.4% (OSI, 2008).
Examples of tolerant Bulgarian attitude towards the others are usually brought forward from history. One such case is the shelter provided to the Armenian refugees, fleeing the genocide in 1910s. Russians, Ukrainians and Byelorussians who emigrated from the Russian lands after the October Revolution in 1917 were similarly accepted in an organised manner by the state and have quickly integrated into the Bulgarian society. The crucial evidence, however, is the saving of the Bulgarian Jews during the WWII. Bulgarians defied the German demands for the deportation of Jews and the Bulgarian Jewish community survived the Second World War unharmed.

An interesting case in which discourses of tolerance and acceptance, or indeed intolerance and rejection, developed in Bulgaria concerns the repressive assimilation campaigns undertaken by the Communist government against Pomaks and Turks in the 1980s and the reaction of ethnic Bulgarians. In the 1980s, the Bulgarian Muslim communities were forced to change their names and to accept “Bulgarian” ones. In addition, all other distinctive signs defining them as a group like wearing of traditional clothes, customs and religion were also prohibited. A small but active group of Bulgarian intellectuals has condemned this act, but under the strict control of the Communist regime and bombardment of the media propaganda, there was no popular reaction on the larger scale. The mass protests of the Turkish community and especially their exodus in the summer of 1989 have been recognized as being among the most important events leading to the fall of the Communist regime. The protests, initiated by the Turkish community, soon acquired a national character and among the demands put forward to the authorities were the protection of minority rights and the return of the original names to Turks and Pomaks (Stoyanov, 1998; Yalamov, 2002).

Although these protests and especially the restoration of the names are often considered as additional examples of the Bulgarian tolerance, it is much more difficult to evaluate how involved the Bulgarian society really was in trying to protect the rights of the Bulgarian Muslims. On one side, the society at the time was sharply divided over the issue and there were also counter protests, where demands that the Muslims should remain with the Bulgarian names were voiced. On the other, it is an indisputable fact that Bulgaria has avoided the ethnic conflicts of the Yugoslav type and that the political class and the media intentionally imposed the notion of the Bulgarian ethnic model, which was widely accepted by the society (Erdinç, 2002; Zhelyazkova, 2001a: 295-300).

In recent years, debates on ethnic diversity and tolerance have focused on the thesis that coexistence with others over the centuries was not a result of conscious tolerance towards diversity and otherness, but merely a manifestation of putting up with it. In other words, what can be observed in Bulgaria is above all the liberal tolerance. While allowing for the free expression of ethnic, religious and cultural identity of minorities, the majority society is not really prepared to respect and accept the minorities in the country.

To a large extent, this is a consequence of the fact that for decades, the minorities have been strongly marginalised in the public spaces, which were strictly controlled by the state. This is especially the case with the Roma, who were practically invisible for the wider society under the Communism. They lived in clusters in segregated settlements and worked only
in certain professions. In the democratic period, they have become visible to the society, while at the same time their social problems have become ever more intense. As a consequence, the level of dissatisfaction and rejection of the Roma among Bulgarians has been steadily rising (Tomova, 1995; Mizov, 2003; Pamporov, 2006; Grekova, 2008).

The same is true about an increasing anti-Turkish sentiment in the country, fuelled above all by several nationalist and extreme right political parties, which gained popularity in the second half of the 2000-2010 decade. The increased intolerance towards the Turkish community has also come as a consequence of the widespread dissatisfaction over the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), the main political party representing the Bulgarian Muslims. The influence and importance of the MRF has been steadily increasing over the years and the party has been a virtual kingmaker from 2001 to 2009. The distrust and dissatisfaction of the majority population over what is perceived as “Turkish” party has quickly transformed into the ever strengthening perception that Turks in Bulgaria yield too much political and economic power.

**Cultural diversity challenges during the last 30 years**

Since the liberation from the Ottoman Empire in 1878, the population of Bulgaria has always been ethnically and religiously diverse. The first Bulgarian constitution (Tarnovo Constitution) included articles safeguarding the rights of the Bulgarian citizens belonging to ethnic and religious minorities. For example, Article 40 guaranteed the right to free practice of religion to those subjects of the Bulgarian Principality who were “Christians of non-Orthodox denomination or other believers.” The Constitution guaranteed the autonomy of minority religious communities and wide cultural rights for minority groups (the right to have their places of worship, schools, newspapers and journals). In Turkish schools, which were financially supported by the state, the language of instruction was Turkish. Turks also had their political representatives in the Bulgarian National Assembly, but had no right to form a political party on ethnic grounds (Tarnovo Constitution, 1879; Nazarska, 1999).

Despite that, Bulgarians have not been able to accept the minorities (especially the Turkish one) as an equal and inseparable part of the nation before 1989. The national minorities have thus felt insecure and marginalised, although at the same time they viewed themselves as part of the Bulgarian nation.

There are over 15 ethnic communities in Bulgaria. The largest group are Bulgarians (84.8% according to 2011 census), followed by Turks (8.8%) and Roma (4.9%).

The religious division of the population is the following (according to the 2011 census – see NSI, 2011): 76% are Eastern Orthodox Christians; 10% are Muslims (546,004 are Sunni, 27,407 are Alevi; 3,727 just declared “Muslims”); 0.8% are Catholics; and 1.10% are Protestants.

The three largest minorities in the country are Turks, Roma and Pomaks (or Muslim Bulgarians). Pomaks have not been included as a special ethnic group in the census as they are considered a religious and not an ethnic minority. These are also the three groups with the most significant
tolerance-related problems – each in a different way and for different reasons. Turks are well integrated, politically organised and with a very clear and well-expressed self-awareness, but are faced with the increasingly intolerant attitude of the majority population, which perceives that Turks control too much political power in the country. Roma are almost completely excluded from the society. They are rejected not just by the majority population but other minorities as well. The widespread perception is that the state institutions “tolerate” Roma too much and that instead of tolerating, the state should control them. Pomaks are tolerated as a religious minority, but any attempt to assert their different ethnic or national identity is met by a furiously intolerant rejection of such claims. Pomak self-identification is often presented as a threat to the national interests and an attack on the national unity.

Table 1. Division of the population according to ethnic group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic group</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>1992</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgarians</td>
<td>5,664,624</td>
<td>6,655,210</td>
<td>7,271,185</td>
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<td>Turks</td>
<td>588,318</td>
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<td>Roma*</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Roma*</td>
<td>325,343</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vlachs</td>
<td>3,684</td>
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<td>62,108</td>
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<td>24,807</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7,364,570</td>
<td>7,928,901</td>
<td>8,487,317</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Most experts consider that the real number of Roma in Bulgaria is almost double the official number – between 600,000 and 700,000.

Turks

Turks are the largest minority in the country and are among the most homogeneous ethnic groups. They have started to settle in the Bulgarian lands after Bulgaria was conquered by the Ottoman Empire in the end of the 14th century. During the five centuries of the Ottoman rule, Turks became the majority population in the urban centres, while Bulgarians remained the majority in rural areas. After the Bulgarian independence, numerous Turks have retreated from northern and central Bulgaria towards the eastern parts of the country. In the following century, huge numbers of Turks left the country in several emigration waves, although their share of the Bulgarian population always remained close to 10% (Eminov, 1997: 76-78; Zhelyazkova, 1990).
The minority rights of the Bulgarian Turks have been defined in several international and bilateral agreements (the Berlin Treaty of 1878, the Istanbul Protocol of 1909, the Peace Treaty of 1913, the Bulgarian-Turkish Government Treaty of 1925 and others). These agreements offered the Turkish community the judicial guarantees for establishing their cultural and religious institutions in Bulgaria. On the other hand, very often Bulgarian state failed to live up to the obligations it has signed up to in the agreements. Quite the contrary, the state periodically tried to limit the rights of the Turkish minority. The situation worsened after the coup of 1934. Under Tsar Boris’ authoritarian rule, Turks suffered social, political and cultural discrimination (Yalamov, 2002: 142-164).

The Communist regime, which took power in Bulgaria after the WWII, initially endorsed a liberal and tolerant policy towards the Turkish community. The authorities allowed the existence of Turkish elementary schools and print media in Turkish language, and introduced preferential quotas for acceptance of Turkish students in the universities. The main goal of these policies was the integration of the Turkish minority into the society and their active involvement in the processes of modernisation and construction of a Socialist state. At the same time, significant emigration to Turkey was also permitted, as this was a way for the state to “get rid of” those Turks, who did not accept the Communist regime and its anti-religious policies (Stoyanov, 1998; Büchsenschütz, 2000; Gruev, 2003; Gruev, Kalionski, 2008). It can be said that the actions of the state in this period were an example of policies, which seemed liberal and appeared to be designed to stimulate the identity of the minorities, but were in fact used for the purpose of assimilation. Above all, the education and cultural policy of the state towards Turks aimed at weakening one exceptionally important segment of their identity – Islam (Büchsenschütz, 2000: 131).

Yet, seemingly liberal policies did not last long and in the early 1960, a drastic change occurred. Under the pretext of “integration” all specific features of Turkish identity (language, religions, customs and ultimately even their names) were first restricted and later prohibited. The process of complete assimilation of the Turkish minority reached its peak in the mid-1980s, when the names of the Bulgarian Turks were administratively substituted with Bulgarian-sounding names. The so-called “regeneration process” has caused an immense rift between the Bulgarian majority and Turkish minority, which has still not been completely overcome (Yalamov, 2002: 365-388).

The aim of this exceptionally repressive assimilation campaign was the complete annihilation of a separate Turkish ethnic and religious identity in the country. As a result, the Turkish community reacted by withdrawal and self-isolation. Despite the obligatory change of the names and their use in the public space, Turks continued to use their original, Muslim names within their families and communities. The efforts to preserve identity were manifested through many everyday practices. For example, most of the rituals connected with the life cycle like births, weddings and funerals were conducted in secrecy. The newborn children received a traditional name, alongside the official Bulgarian-sounding name under which they were listed in the documents. This widespread resistance on numerous levels made it possible to quickly return to the traditional public manifestation of ethnic, religious and cultural identity after the fall of the Communist regime in 1989. Furthermore, the return to tradition in some cases exceeded the restoration of practices banned by the Communists. Various
religious and cultural practices, which have naturally withered away as a result of modernisation, were brought back to life (Zhelyazkova, 1998: 381-382).

The restoration of minority and human rights of the Turkish and other minority communities after 1989 did not occur smoothly. A significant opposition to the reversal of the assimilation policies has appeared, especially among the Bulgarians living in the ethnically mixed areas and among the members of the security sector (the Ministry of Interior, secret services, army), who were directly involved in the implementation of “the regeneration process.” In their opinion, the process has achieved certain results and brought Bulgaria into a position from which there should be no retreat – otherwise the national interests of the country could be threatened. On the other hand, the Turkish community, encouraged by the restoration of their names, raised other demands: study of Turkish language and Islamic religion in schools in regions with predominantly Turkish population, proclamation of Islamic holidays Kurban Bayram and Sheker Bayram as official state holidays, and recognition of the Turkish community as a “national minority” (Baeva, Kalinova, 2009: 36-39).

The first democratic Constitution, adopted in 1991, included no reference to the term “minority.” The Constitution only mentioned the “citizens whose mother tongue is not Bulgarian” (article 36) and added that everyone had the right to “develop their own culture in accordance with their ethnic affiliation, which is endorsed and guaranteed by the law” (article 54).

Although the post-1989 period saw numerous positive developments regarding the change of legislation and the general consensus among the main political parties regarding the protection of minority rights, there was also a notable opposition to these trends and above all to the political participation of minorities (especially Turks) in the central and local government. The article 11 (4) of the Bulgarian Constitution states: “There shall be no political parties on ethnic, racial or religious lines, nor parties which seek the violent seizure of state power.”

Despite this, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), the first political party representing Turks and other Muslim communities in Bulgaria, was formed in 1990. Since then, the MRF has always been represented in the parliament, and has been a member of three government coalitions. The reaction of the majority population to the appearance of the MRF on the political scene was predominantly negative. The public disapproval was reflected by the negative response of the main political parties – both from the right and from the left. Despite the persistent efforts of the MRF leaders to present the party as a national civic party and not as a representative of a single ethnic group, its political opponents time and again insisted on using “ethnic” terminology in the political debate, referring to the MRF as “the Turkish party.” On several occasions, most notably prior to the 1992 elections, efforts were made to ban the MRF on the grounds that it was unconstitutional (Article 11). In 1992, the Constitutional Court declared that the MRF was not unconstitutional and could operate as any other political party as its statute made no restrictions to membership in the party on ethnic grounds, nor it included any other provisions defining it as “ethnic party” (Constitutional Court, 1992).

Political attacks on the MRF have continued until today. While most of the criticism towards the party deals with its alleged high level of corruption,
black funds and links with the grey economy, some accuse the MRF’s leaders of trying to isolate the Turkish minority in order to preserve full control over its votes, thus obstructing its integration into the Bulgarian society. The anti-MRF rhetoric (which often spilled over into anti-Turkish hate speech) characterised the 2009 parliamentary election campaign, bringing substantial gains to the GERB (Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria) party (the winner of the elections) and the extreme nationalist Ataka (Attack) party. President Parvanov’s comment on the election campaign was that “this was not anti-MRF talk, it was openly anti-Turkish and anti-Roma talk” (BTV News, 2009). The widespread dissatisfaction over the political party generally considered to be Turkish has in recent years thus grown into a widespread intolerant attitude towards the Turkish minority.

Since 1989, the Bulgarian Turks have succeeded to fully integrate into all spheres of public life. As far as the official state policy is concerned, Turkish minority has been recognised and accepted by the Bulgarian state. The education in Turkish language is provided on all levels of education, they can freely practice their religion, they have newspapers and electronic media in their language and are actively involved in the political life in Bulgaria. Unfortunately, the full integration into the political and public space did not lead to genuine coexistence based on respect and acceptance on the side of the Bulgarian majority population and for the larger part of the last 20 years, their attitude towards the Turkish minority can best be described as a case of liberal tolerance. Furthermore, in recent years the anti-Turkish sentiments and intolerant attitude have been on the rise. The majority believes that the Turkish community has too much political and economic power and finds such situation to be intolerable. Turks are a minority and should therefore know their place – they are tolerated as long as they keep a low profile in public space. On the other hand, Turks do not want to be simply tolerated – they want to be included and actively participate in all spheres of public, political, cultural and economic life in the country.

Roma

Roma are the third largest ethnic community in the country. The real number of Roma in Bulgaria is highly disputed and ranges from the official 325,343 (Census 2011) to 700,000 (expert estimates). The reason for the difference is that a large number of Roma self-identifies as Bulgarians or Turks, while some also choose Vlach identity. An additional reason for inaccurate numbers is the high mobility – many Roma do not live on addresses where they are officially registered, but have migrated to other towns or villages in search of temporary or seasonal employment and are therefore hard to track during the census.

According to the 2011 census data, 37% of Roma are Orthodox Christians, 18% are Muslims, while 10% are Protestants (it is interesting to note that out of 64,476 Protestants in Bulgaria, more than one third – 23,289 – are Roma). 24.6% of Roma did not declare their religion (NSI, 2011).

Roma are the most heterogeneous community in the country. In addition to professing different religions and identifying themselves as belonging to different ethnic groups, they speak a number of languages – Bulgarian, Turkish, and Romany (numerous forms and dialects). Some differ according to their lifestyle – they can be either “settled” or “nomads.” Roma
are further divided into numerous sub-groups. For example, the Bulgarian speaking Roma are divided into 21 subgroups. For all these reasons, Roma are perceived as a “community” above all by the non-Roma population. They rarely perceive themselves as a united and unified “Roma community” and the differences, distances and conflicts among various Roma sub-groups are often larger than between Roma and other ethnic groups (Tomova, 1995; Pamporov, 2006; Grekova, 2008).

An expected consequence of this situation is that the Roma community never managed to unify behind one Roma political party and elect its representatives into the National Assembly, despite potentially having more than enough voters to do so. There are over 20 registered Roma parties in the country, which fragments the Roma votes, keeping their electoral results well below the 4% parliamentary threshold. Only a few Roma parties (especially the Party “Roma” and Euorroma) had some modest success on the local level (Hajdinjak, 2008: 119-120.).

To say that Roma in Bulgaria are not integrated into the society and that they are not tolerated by the other communities (not just the Bulgarian majority but by other minorities as well) is an understatement. The majority of Roma live in segregated city ghettos or village settlements, separated from the rest of the population. In the 1945-1989 period, the Communist regime employed various measures (often repressive) to force the Roma minority to abandon their traditional nomadic lifestyle. After being made to settle, Roma were included (if not really integrated) into the country’s social-economic system. They received access to health care and education, and were included into the labour market.

However, the situation has dramatically changed during the transition period. Today Roma are largely excluded from the legal labour market and work predominantly in grey and black sectors. Their access to proper health care is very limited, while the children drop-out from schools has dramatically increased. The prejudices and stereotypes about Roma are exceptionally negative – they are described as “dirty,” “lazy,” “thieves,” “liars,” “cheaters,” “irresponsible” and “hopeless.” As a consequence, Roma are rejected and according to recent sociological studies, only a third of Bulgarians are content with living in the same town with Roma (Tomova, 1995: 58-61; Pamporov, 2006: 37-38; Grekova, 2008: 20-28).

The first genuine and purposeful attempt to deal with the problem of Roma exclusion was the Framework Programme for Equal Integration of Roma in Bulgarian Society, which the Bulgarian government passed in 1999. The Framework Programme was an attempt to set up a comprehensive state strategy for accomplishment of real equality of the Roma people in Bulgaria. It served as a base for various strategies, plans and programmes prepared and implemented by consecutive governments and individual ministries.

The National Action Plan – Decade of Roma Inclusion, passed in 2005, was the most ambitious attempt to address the multifaceted problem of Roma exclusion. Despite much optimism and hope that accompanied its launch, the Plan has not achieved much in terms of tangible results over the following years.

The programmes, action plans and other measures implemented by the government and various state institutions demonstrate that on the
institutional level, the state policies towards Roma can be rated as tolerance but with a reservation that it is tolerance with the clear goal of social-economic integration. Despite these measures (many of which suffered from poor implementation, insufficient funding and lack of commitment), the situation of the Bulgarian Roma has not changed substantially yet. If anything, the situation changed for worse. The general public still perceives them in overwhelmingly negative terms and continues to reject and exclude them (Grekov et al., 2010: 16). This is perhaps most visible in the institutional efforts to integrate Roma children into the system of education as quite regularly, attempts to desegregate Roma schools and transfer the Roma children to normal, or “integrated,” schools result in the resistance of Bulgarian parents (and quite often also teachers) against such moves. On numerous occasions, Bulgarian parents begun withdrawing their children from integrated schools and transferring them to other schools with little or no Roma children. Acceptance and toleration of Roma are a precondition for their successful inclusion into the society, but at the same time only their participation in all spheres of public life can reduce the distances and rejection. For now, the Bulgarian Roma are entangled in a web of rejection, exclusion and intolerance and the prospects for this to change in the near future are not very bright.

Pomaks

The fourth significantly large ethno-religious group is the Muslim Bulgarians or Pomaks. The issue of Pomak identity has been a controversial one ever since the establishment of independent Bulgaria in 1878 and has yet to be resolved. The widespread belief is that Pomaks are not a separate ethnic group as the only difference between Pomaks and other Bulgarians is religion. Very often, Pomaks are seen as the “lesser” Bulgarians – inseparable part of the Bulgarian family-nation, but blemished by the “wrong,” Muslim religion. The majority of Pomaks live in the area of the Rhodopa mountain. According to the Census data, there were around 160,000 Muslim Bulgarians in 1992, and 131,531 in 2001 (NSI, 2001). According to various expert data, their number could be between 180,000 and 250,000 (Kostova, 2001: 26; Troeva, 2011: 14). The main reason for this conflicting and inaccurate data is the lack of internal homogeneity. Many Pomaks have problems with self-identification (Troeva, 2011: 14-19) Some identify themselves as Turks, some consider themselves as Bulgarians’ (there has been a strong tendency towards converting to Christianity among some of them), while others believe their origin is entirely different from both dominant groups (some believe they have Arabic origin). Many identify simply as Muslims, equalising the religious identity with the ethnic one.

Many times in history, the academic discourse about Pomaks as “brothers who have lost their way” transformed into violent campaigns of forced assimilation during which Pomaks were forced to abandon their religion, customs and even their names. As a result, even today, the Pomak community is still very divided and uncertain regarding their identity. There is a very strong sense of isolation among them, especially those residing in the geographically remote and inaccessible Rhodopa mountain villages. A growing distrust towards the Bulgarian population and the state of Bulgaria, which has virtually abandoned them during the painful years of transition, has also been observed among Pomaks (Tomova, 2000: 131).

6. One of the best such examples is the book “On the Past of the Bulgarian Mohammedans in the Rhodopes,” published in 1958 by the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences.
7. It is interesting to note that those Pomaks who live among Christian Bulgarians, more often identify themselves as Turks, while those who live in the regions with a compact Turkish population prefer to identify as Bulgarians.
All attempts to assert a separate and unique Pomak identity (especially if they came from within the community) have provoked a very strong negative reaction among the majority population, including the political and intellectual circles. The most recent example was the case of the pilot internet census, which started in September 2010. The questionnaire prepared by the National Statistics Institute offered as possible answers for respondent’s ethnic group also ethnicities such as Bulgarian-Muslim and Macedonian. This triggered a wave of criticism. The NSI Head stated that NSI has no authority or goal to determine what ethnic groups live in Bulgaria, but just wanted to give every Bulgarian citizen an opportunity to self-determine his or her ethnic background. The nationalist political parties demanded the categories to be removed from the questionnaire over fears they would divide the nation. In response, two Deputy Directors of the NSI resigned, while the resignation of the Head of the NSI was rejected by the Prime Minister (Novinite.com, 2010b).

The state policy towards Pomaks is a combination of tolerance and exceptional intolerance. On the one side, Pomaks are free to practice their religion and manifest their cultural identity without hindrance both in the private and public sphere. On the other side, the state and the majority population strictly refuse to acknowledge their right to genuine self-identification and the attempts from within the Pomak community to assert their identity as different from the Bulgarian majority usually lead to an overly negative and aggressive reaction from the state institutions, media and the public. The overall attitude towards Pomaks can thus be rated as intolerance. Without recognising its existence, there can be no discussion about tolerance and acceptance of a particular community.

All other minority communities in the country are relatively small. Only Russians, Armenians and Vlachs number more than 10,000 people, while all other are smaller than 5,000. Most (with the exception of Macedonians, who have problems similar to those faced by the Pomaks) are well integrated into the Bulgarian society and have no acceptance-tolerance related difficulties. Two of these communities (Armenians and Jews) deserve to be mentioned here because of their special place in the Bulgarian social and cultural life. Their presence and practically complete integration into the society is perhaps the only indicator giving ground to the claim that the Bulgarian society is not a complete stranger to mechanisms of acceptance of otherness.

**Jews**

Jews have settled in Bulgaria in 14th and early 15th centuries, when they were expelled from Spain. The community has integrated exceptionally well into the Bulgarian society and played an important role in the development of the Bulgarian state. Their level of integration was such that Bulgaria was the only country in Europe, where the number of Jews increased during the WWII. Despite being the ally of the Nazi Germany, in 1943 the entire Bulgarian society rose up in defence of the Bulgarian Jews, when the order came from Berlin that they should be sent to the concentration camps. As a result, none of the 50,000 Bulgarian Jews ended up in death camps. Despite that, in 1948-1949 over 30,000 Jews emigrated from Bulgaria to Israel to avoid living under the Communist regime and today, only a fraction of the once large Jewish community still resides in the country. The census data give the following numbers: 1,162 for 2011 and 1,363
for 2001. The representatives of the Jewish community believe there are around 10,000 Jews in Bulgaria, which are difficult to trace because they are so well integrated into the Bulgarian society, have intermarried with ethnic Bulgarians, and have in numerous cases abandoned their mother tongue for Bulgarian language (Barouh, 2001).

Armenians

The majority came to Bulgaria during the period of the Armenian Genocide in the 1910s. They were well received and acquired refuge in Bulgaria, which provided them with good conditions for adaptation and integration. Their numbers were significantly reduced as a result of two large emigration waves to the Soviet Armenia (in 1935 and 1946).* The majority of Armenians live in the city of Plovdiv. The community is well organised and there are numerous Armenian organisations all over the country involved with educational and cultural activities. Armenians have been disproportionately active and prominent in the cultural life of the country (Miceva, 2001).

Both Jews and Armenians can be seen as examples of minority groups that have been treated with respect and recognition. They have always enjoyed full freedom to express their ethnic, religious and cultural identity. One pragmatic explanation for this is the small number of members of both communities. For this reason, the majority has never perceived them even as a potential threat to the national unity. Most Jews and Armenians also live dispersed in the larger cities and towns of Bulgaria, and are integrated into the majority population to the extent that the only visible marker distinguishing them from the rest of the population are their names. Both communities have been fully accepted and are respected both on the state level and by the society, as is manifested by numerous highly respected individuals from both communities who have left their mark in the Bulgarian politics, culture, science and sport.

Immigrants

Bulgaria has only recently become a country attracting a more significant flow of immigrants. Neither the society nor the state institutions are truly prepared for this process. The state structures respond slowly and chaotically to the increasing numbers of refugees, asylum-seekers and economic immigrants, and the state has no clear policy on how to accommodate them and integrate them into the country. The society is only partially aware of the issue, as the immigrant communities are still small in number and relatively invisible for the average citizen. Having in mind the problematic attitude towards the traditional minorities, it can hardly be concluded that the increase in immigration will be met with understanding and benevolence.

Definitions of tolerance in Bulgaria

Traditionally the debates about how tolerant the Bulgarian society was were based on the entrenched auto-stereotype among the Bulgarians as an exceptionally tolerant nation. This belief has its roots in the period of the National Revival, when the spiritual leaders of the nation advocated
the equality of all ethnic and religious communities in the country. The belief was further strengthened at the turn of the 20th century, when Bulgaria accepted and accommodated thousands of Jews fleeing from anti-Semitic pogroms in Russia (1895) and Romania (1904). A decade later Bulgaria welcomed Armenians who had escaped from the genocide in Turkey. Finally, Bulgarians stood up and saved their Jewish co-citizens in 1943, when they prevented their deportation to the Nazi concentration camps. Even the fall of the Communist regime and the transition to democracy occurred under the sign of protection of minority rights and equality of all religions. All this made it possible for the Bulgarian political elites to talk about the existence of a unique “Bulgarian ethnic model,” based on tolerance and respect for the others (Zhelyazkova, 2001b: 62-66).

Yet, when the general self-perception is juxtaposed to a concrete manifestation of tolerance, the results are less encouraging. Thus for example a survey from 2000 shows that the overwhelming majority of respondents believe that Bulgarian Christian majority is tolerant (the belief shared by 89% of respondents who defined themselves as Christians and by 87% of those who said they were not religious). However, only 25% of Christian and 17% of non-religious respondents support the construction of temples of other (non-Christian) religions (Fotev, 2000: 34-35). Several sociological and anthropological studies conducted in recent years have shown that the ethnic Bulgarian majority is in general very distrustful and distant from the various minorities in the country. Bulgarians have incomparably more stereotypes and prejudices regarding the minorities than it is the other way around (Pamporov, 2009; Kanev, Cohen, Simeonova, 2005; Fotev, 2009). The minorities are in general much better disposed towards the majority, and more open to various kinds of contacts and cohabitation. One of the more recent studies on social distances and ethnic stereotypes in Bulgaria has shown that even after 130 years, the majority of ethnic Bulgarians still associate the Turkish minority with the Ottoman rule and the term “Turkish yoke” (Pamporov, 2009: 113). This is a clear sign that the education and integration policies in Bulgaria are still very far away from becoming multi-cultural.

Before 1989, in the regions where ethnic Bulgarians were a minority population, while Turks were a local majority, almost all prestigious political, intellectual and business positions were occupied by ethnic Bulgarians. The logic behind this was that Bulgaria is a country of Bulgarians, while the others were “intruders” and a heritage of unfavourable historical circumstances (Zhelyazkova, 2010: 9-11). This made it possible for the Bulgarian political elites to talk about the existence of a unique “Bulgarian ethnic model,” based on tolerance and尊重 for the others (Zhelyazkova, 2001b: 62-66).

Post-1989 democratic transition has reversed this trend and now Turks are well represented in regional and municipal administration, local economy and other spheres of social life in regions where they represent majority population. This reversal has caused many Bulgarians residing in the mixed regions to believe that Turks pushed them out of the public space and are (again) dominating them. A research conducted in 2006 in one such municipality (Ardino; population: 68.2% Turks, 16.9% Bulgarians and 14.9% others – mostly Pomaks) showed that many Bulgarians do not regard the local administration as theirs. They feel marginalized and believe it is not in their power to influence the social processes in the municipality. Frustrated by the lack of perspectives, the young Bulgarians “are escaping” to bigger towns in search of professional realization and very few are still living in Ardino (Troeva-Gigorova, Grigorov, 2006).
Tolerance is a quite under-represented notion in the Bulgarian education system. The education is still quite unreformed and the curriculum is based on the Bulgarian ethnocentric national viewpoint. Roma children are predominantly segregated in separate schools and all the efforts to integrate them into mixed schools usually encountered active resistance of (Bulgarian) teachers and parents. Even if they do not protest openly, the Bulgarian parents remove their children from classes or schools where larger groups of Roma children are studying. The studies on ethnic discrimination in Bulgaria show that Roma are victims of institutional discrimination on daily bases. In most cases, however, this discrimination remains largely hidden and is not officially registered because Roma rarely use legal and institutional resources available for protection of their rights. This is not a result only of the lack of information, but above all of their isolation from the Bulgarian society and the lasting distrust and fear of the Bulgarian institutions (Grekova et al., 2010).

Another important criteria for tolerance in the society are the political parties. One of the first political parties founded in 1989 was the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), a party widely considered as a political party of the Muslim communities (especially the Turkish one). Its appearance and activities were met with very mixed reception. On one side, its representatives have been promoting themselves as the protectors of the ethnic model in the country and have on numerous occasions (especially in the beginning of the transition) contributed to the multi-ethnic and multi-religious coexistence and tolerance in the country. On the other side, the MRF has caused also a considerable negative backlash among the Bulgarians. The long years of its participation in the political games in the country and above all the increasingly authoritarian structure of its political apparatus have significantly contributed to the predominantly negative attitude towards the party in Bulgaria today.

The increasing popularity of nationalistic and xenophobic political parties says much about the levels of tolerance in the country. Two most popular such parties are VMRO – Bulgarian National Movement, and Ataka (Attack). VMRO (which stands for Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization) focuses on the national dignity and integrity and is less radical in its public statements and activities. It was established in 1989, but never gained significant popularity and usually participated in the Bulgarian parliamentary life as a member of various coalitions. Ataka relies on extremely aggressive nationalistic, racist and xenophobic rhetoric. It appeared on the political stage shortly before the 2005 elections and achieved an unexpectedly high result with 8.14% of the votes. Contrary to the predictions that this would remain its best achievement, Ataka performed even better on the 2009 elections (9.36%). On the 2006 Presidential elections, Ataka leader Volen Siderov received 21.49% in the first and 24.05% in the second round of voting.

A very good test of how tolerant is the society is its reaction to various political initiatives regarding the Turkish minority. On numerous occasions and especially during the election campaigns, Ataka has raised the issue of the Turkish language news programme on the national TV channel “Kanal 1.” After the parliamentary elections in 2009, the party demanded the referendum on the issue, provoking a heated public discussion for and against the news. After a significant number of aggressive and intolerant statements were made in the media and public space, in the end the position prevailed that the Turkish language news should be preserved.

11. This was especially the case from its establishment in 2005 to 2009. After the change of the government in 2009, the party made a visible effort to soften its rhetoric and move closer to the mainstream. Although officially not a coalition member, Ataka has been the most loyal and unquestionable supporter of the government, formed by the GERB (Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria) party in 2009.

12. A 15-minute long summary of the main news in Turkish language (with Bulgarian subtitles) has been broadcast on the national TV channel since 2004.
Another test for the Bulgarians is the increasing anti-Islamic sentiments in the world. On the one hand, there is the opinion that “our” Muslims are well integrated and are “not like the others.” On the other hand, the suspicions and allegations about the spread of the radical Islam in the Turkish and Pomak villages have become quite common in the recent years. Even the traditional and well established norms from everyday life (like head-scarves) are used by certain political circles as evidence that “radicalism” has entered Bulgaria. On several occasions, the special police investigators were called in to investigate the “manifestations of radical Islam” in various Bulgarian villages, but so far they have only confirmed that there was no such phenomenon in the country. Despite that, the media usually exploits these issues in a very sensationalistic manner, intensifying the public feelings of distrust and tension.

Media are in general a very import factor forming the public opinion and an indicator of the existing tendencies. Unfortunately, some media have in the recent years contributed to the spread of intolerance instead of trying to achieve the opposite. One of the TV channels, quite popular on the national scale, is SKAT. Its programme orientation is openly nationalistic, and anti-Islamic and racist messages are a common feature in many of its shows. The Council for Electronic Media, the state regulatory institution, rarely intervenes against the hate speech featured on SKAT and in other media, which regularly use negative and offensive terms for various minorities.

The situation has somewhat improved in the recent years with the passing of the new Law on Protection against Discrimination (in force since January 1, 2004) and the establishment of the Commission for Protection against Discrimination. The increasing number of NGOs has been engaged with the protection of human and minority rights and protection against discrimination. They have sent a number of signals to the Commission and started procedures with the goal of creating legal precedence and bring public attention to the issues of anti-discrimination and tolerance. The NGOs are also the most active in the research of tolerance in Bulgaria and in efforts to build a truly tolerant society.

The issues of tolerance, equality of citizens and fight against discrimination have been included in the relevant Bulgarian legislation: the Constitution, Law on Religion (or Confessions Act) of 2002, Law on Political Parties (2005), Law on Protection against Discrimination (2004), and Penal Code (from 1968 and amended many times since then). Special state institutions in charge of these issues have also been formed: the National Council for Cooperation on Ethnic and demographic Issues (1997), Ombudsman (2003), and the Commission for Protection against Discrimination (2005).

Monitoring of tolerance and anti-discrimination practices in Bulgaria has been conducted since 1998 by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI). ECRI has issued four reports on Bulgaria until now.13 Despite certain remarks, ECRI believes that the Bulgarian Constitution safeguards the equality of all Bulgarian citizens. Regarding the Confessions Act, ECRI recommends that the Bulgarian authorities continue the process of amending the law in order to ensure the full freedom of religion in accordance with Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

ECRI’s most categorical recommendations deal with the prevention and punishment of racist crimes and offences based on discrimination on grounds of ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation and other indicators. ECRI
Article 13 (3) of the current Constitution states: “Eastern Orthodox Christianity shall be considered the traditional religion in the Republic of Bulgaria.”

Concluding remarks

Bulgarians have been used to living in a multi-cultural environment since the times of the Ottoman Empire. At the same time, this experience of cohabitation has led to the construction of models of parallel existence — the otherness is tolerated without being actually accepted. From the very formation of the modern Bulgarian state in 1878, the Bulgarian society and the governing circles viewed Bulgaria as a mono-national Orthodox-Christian state. All Bulgarian Constitutions and principal laws noted the existence of various ethnic and religious communities and upheld the principle of equal rights and obligations, but at the same time all these legal documents (all Constitutions and the Law on Religion) placed the Bulgarian Orthodox Church in the privileged position compared to other religions.14

The perception of a mono-national state has resulted in corresponding policies towards the minorities. They were accepted as a part of the Bulgarian society, but at the same time were in practice highly marginalised — Roma live mostly in segregated settlements at the edges of cities and towns, while majority of Turks and Pomaks reside in peripheral rural regions. In this way, they remain largely “invisible” in the everyday life of the majority population. The public attitudes towards them is directed and regulated mostly by the media and certain political parties with nationalist orientation. Most often, the minorities fall into the media and political spotlight in election periods, or in times of political, economic or other crises, when they are most often presented as being responsible for a given problem, or as a problem itself.

At the same time, the mere fact of practical cohabitation in a multi-cultural environment is often enough for Bulgarians to perceive themselves as tolerant. However, the “tolerance” in this case can be understood only as “putting up with someone different,” without accepting and understanding them. A similar attitude can be observed even in the academic circles. The humanities in Bulgaria have failed to conceptualise the issue of tolerance. The thesis that the Bulgarian society is tolerant because of the traditional coexistence of various ethnoses and religions is accepted as an

axiom. An Orthodox and a Catholic church, a mosque and a synagogue, which stand almost side by side in the centre of the capital Sofia, are frequently pointed out as a symbol of tolerance in the country.

And yet, the term “tolerance” remains above all a synonym of bearable and parallel cohabitation. The situation could be classified as liberal tolerance – the right of the minorities to express their ethnic, religious and cultural characteristics is respected, but only as long as it is considered (by the state institutions, political actors and even the majority population) that this is not in contradiction with the national interests. The Bulgarian intellectuals have only recently (through import of the European discourse) begun to understand the tolerance in a broader way – as acceptance of the different groups. Such discourse for now exists predominantly in the projects and work of the non-governmental organisations. The particular studies actually show that the attitude of the majority of Bulgarians towards otherness is still based on deeply entrenched disregard, apprehension and prejudice.

The legislation and the state policies follow the European norms and are largely in line with the EU legal practices, but this is above all a result of the EU accession process as the Bulgarian legislation had to be changed so that the accession criteria could be fulfilled. The practical implementation of these legal texts often leaves much to hope for, and the comprehensive policy on equal treatment of all citizens belonging to various minority groups has yet to be developed. The traditional distrust towards the state institutions is another reason why many representatives of the minority communities remain very reserved regarding the possibility to turn to the state for protection of their rights.

Many minority communities feel that they are not equally treated and that the majority society and the state institutions are neglecting them. They have set up various NGOs and political parties in an effort to protect their interests. Roma are the most active in the NGO sector. They have not succeeded in uniting around a single political party, but have their representatives in many municipal councils. Turks and Pomaks have a political representation on the central level, and the political majority in many municipalities where they live. The Chief Mufti office is also actively involved in the protection of religious freedoms on the national and local level.

In conclusion, several recommendations can be made on how to increase the sensitivity and ability to accept the otherness in the Bulgarian society. In the first place, the state should more actively support the work of the Commission for Protection against Discrimination, which has until now shown the best concrete results in the fight against discriminative treatment. The Commission itself should intensify and widen its media campaigns and its activities aimed at encouraging citizens to protect their rights through legal means. The media control institutions should be much stricter towards the cases of hate-speech and intolerance in the media.

The state needs to develop a comprehensive and purposeful policy on acceptance of otherness in the Bulgarian society. To make this possible, a centralised system for collecting information on actual existence/lack of tolerance in the society, media and institutions is needed. The cases of discriminative practices, registered by various NGOs, the Commission for Protection against Discrimination, courts and other institutions should be structured in a common database.
At the beginning of the 21st century, Bulgaria is still searching for the proper balance in accommodating its ethnic, religious and cultural diversity. To a large extent, the Bulgarian political circles and the society have declared their support for the process of recognition and acceptance of “otherness” in the country. However, only a few concrete measures have produced effective and genuine results to date.

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The 2010 Hungarian Parliamentary elections made it onto the front page of many international newspapers. Although most papers reported on the electoral success of the radical right-wing political party, Jobbik, at the same time another, arguably more important, development had occurred in Hungarian electoral politics that led to the restructuring of the entire Hungarian political landscape. The previously governing Hungarian Socialist Party was unseated (capturing only a couple more percentage points of the vote than Jobbik), while the Fidesz-KDNP coalition (the centre-right Hungarian Civic Union-Christian Democratic People’s Party, hereinafter simply ‘Fidesz’) received enough votes to secure a two-thirds majority in parliament, making it possible for them to pass legislation (or even change the constitution) without support from the opposition. The new government made it clear that they saw their victory as a “two-thirds revolution” reflecting the will of the “Hungarian nation”. Thus, as the new Prime Minister Viktor Orbán declared, Fidesz formed a “Government of National Causes” which would not shy away from using its constitutional majority “to demolish taboos”. They intended to push their own legislation through parliament and to rewrite the Hungarian Constitution to reflect “the moral system of the new Framework for National Cooperation” (ibid).

The ‘nation’ played a central role in Fidesz’s vision of legislative and constitutional reform for Hungary. Through its national discourse and policies, Fidesz implicitly and explicitly identified who belonged, and who, by extension did not, to the nation. Ethnic Hungarians living outside of Hungary in the neighbouring countries were included (and not only symbolically) in Fidesz’s conception of the ‘Hungarian Nation’. This was reflected in the institution of dual citizenship for transborder Hungarians, one of the first laws passed by the new parliament. The new law removed residency requirements for those speaking Hungarian and claiming Hungarian ancestry. In effect, this meant that the approximately 2.5 million ethnic Hungarians in the neighbouring countries were now eligible for Hungarian citizenship. In his ‘one-hundred day’ speech Orbán made it clear that these transborder Hungarians were now ‘reunited’ with the ‘Nation’.

1. The KDNP is a small party that would not have obtained enough votes in 2010 to enter parliament without the support of Fidesz. The last time the KDNP won seats on its own was in 1994. After the party fell apart in 1997, many of the party’s MPs joined the Fidesz fraction in the parliament. Former KDNP members joined Fidesz lists in 1998 in elections that saw Fidesz ultimately form a government. KDNP subsequently reformed and the two parties formed an official alliance in 2005, a year before the 2006 parliamentary elections (in which they lost out to the Socialists).

2. Prime Minister Orbán, evaluating the first 100 days of his government’s work, in a speech at the ‘Professzorok Batthyány Köre’ on September 4, 2010: http://www.miniszterelnok.hu/beszed/100_nap_amely_megvaltoztatta_magyarorszagot (last accessed: August 31, 2011)

3. The New Constitution of Hungary, designed and voted into force by Fidesz, which came into effect on January 1, 2012 starts as follows: “God bless Hungarians! National Creed: We, members of the Hungarian Nation, at the beginning of the new millennia, and responsible for all Hungarians, declare the following…” (In Magyar Közlöny 43, April 25, 2011: http://www.kormany.hu/download/0/49/30000/Alap1%C3%B6v%C3%A9%20helyi.pdf; last accessed: January 16, 2012)

4. Prime Minister Orbán, evaluating the first 100 days of his government’s work.
At the same time, boundaries of exclusion from the ‘Nation’ were also being redrawn at the level of discourse and in some cases policies as well. The Roma minority, which had featured prominently in the 2010 elections as the primary ‘Other’ against which the ‘Nation’ was constructed, clearly did not fit in Fidesz’s conception of the ‘Nation’. A series of laws were passed that directly or indirectly targeted the Roma ‘problem’: tougher measures on petty crime were introduced; school behaviour of children deemed violent was to be more strictly punished; it again became possible to fail students, thus forcing them to repeat the school year even if they were only in the first grade; and actions seen as ‘welfare delinquencies’ were criminalized. Although none of these changes named the Roma explicitly (to the contrary, Fidesz repeatedly invoked an anti-discrimination discourse citing ‘dignity for all’), it is clear that the Roma were disproportionately affected by these measures.

Orbán thus clearly demarcated the boundaries of the ‘Nation’. Transborder Hungarians were referred to as ‘co-nationals’ (nemzettársak) or ‘Hungarian people’ (magyar emberek), and Roma were ‘our fellow citizens’ (állampolgárok) or ‘our compatriots’ (polgártársak). Other ‘markers’ also conveyed and constructed difference: ‘Gypsy ethnic origin’ (cigányszármazás), ‘skin colour’ (bőrszín), ‘citizens belonging to the Roma minority’ (Roma kisebbséghez tartozó állampolgárok) were often used in relation to criminality, social welfare delinquencies, or school violence. Government officials emphasized the fact that they had to take action against such crimes in order to protect Hungarians, whose interests had been neglected by the previous government. The irony of this situation is that while the boundaries of national inclusion were extended beyond the political borders of the country, the boundaries of national difference were constructed within those same political boundaries. This was an ethnic (or ethnicised) vision of the nation: it included transborder Hungarians but excluded Roma.

These inclusionary and exclusionary discourses were diluted versions of similar discourses preferred and proffered by the right-wing party Jobbik. Indeed, the governing party, Fidesz, operated in a symbiotic if ultimately silent relationship with Jobbik. When it suited them, Fidesz, could draw clear boundaries to distinguish them and Jobbik, identifying in the process what was unacceptable and what was not. On other occasions, Jobbik became the unofficial spokesperson for Fidesz, saying explicitly what Fidesz dare not say even implicitly, thus blurring the lines between politically correct and stigmatizing discourses.

The dramatic electoral changes taking place in the spring of 2010 reflect only the latest chapter in Hungary’s political history of national inclusion and exclusion. Indeed, the discourses circulating now enjoy political legitimacy in large part due to their lineage through previous generations of Hungarian politics. The status of Hungarians living in the neighboring countries has been a perennial topic of public debate on the nation on and off for the last century. All post-communist governments of varying political stripes have made the transborder Hungarian question central to their political agenda. The question of Hungary’s internal minorities has taken a backseat to the question of the transborder Hungarians. In many ways, Hungary’s policies on internal minorities can even be said to have been driven by the political elite’s preoccupation with the transborder Hungarians: Hungary has used its domestic policies to set the example for minority politics which the neighboring countries have been meant to follow in their treatment of Hungarians. But the policies they have devised for Hungary’s minorities in general and the Roma in particular have provided administrative structures that do
not always meet their needs. Legislative changes that were introduced in education, the welfare system, and economic structures have had the effect of further marginalizing the Roma. The key difference now with the rise of Fidesz has been the party’s ability to implement policies unencumbered by political opposition.

Our study on tolerance will focus its attention on these two groups: the transborder Hungarians and the Roma. We will sketch out the position of other groups in Hungary in both historical and demographic context, but our main focus will be on these two groups that have also received historically the main focus in Hungarian political, cultural, and social life.

National identity and state formation in Hungary

The ‘Nation’ has figured prominently in Hungarian political and social life over the last century and a half as an all-encompassing framework to explain all sorts of social and economic phenomena. The ‘nation’ has even overshadowed to a certain extent traditional left-right political cleavages in various east European contexts (Fox and Vermeersch, 2010; Palonen, 2009). In order to better appreciate this resurgence of the ‘Nation’ in Hungarian political and public thought, as well as its effects on the public’s perceptions of what ‘being Hungarian’ means, we will look at, first, how Hungarian national identity has been historically constituted, and, second, changing popular understanding of Hungarian national identity. In both cases our interest is in how both political and public space has been ‘nationalized’ and the implications of these developments for both inclusion and exclusion.

Understandings of the ‘Nation’ in Hungary

Political debates on questions related to definitions of the ‘Hungarian nation’ began in Hungary in the 19th century and have continued with varying degrees of intensity and with periodically shifting ‘Other-figures’ to the present day. The debates wavered between ethno-cultural and civic-political conceptions of Hungarian nationhood. These competing conceptions were applied differently to Hungary’s changing landscape of minority politics. Until 1918 the minority question concerned those non-ethnic Hungarians living within the borders of the Hungarian portion of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. After World War I and the loss of territory it entailed, the situation of the Hungarian minorities living in the newly constituted or transformed neighbouring countries became the main national minority issue. Then as now, the relationship between internal (non-Hungarian) and external (Hungarian) minorities was viewed as two sides of the same coin: how can Hungary adequately address the issue of its internal minorities without harming the interests of ethnic Hungarians living outside the national borders.

Different solutions to this problem have been proposed at different historical junctures. Following Hungary’s political reconfiguration at the conclusion of WWI, the ruling classes “perceived the main danger as the threat to the existence of what remained of the state of Hungary”, overshadowing their concerns for the Hungarian minority abroad (Kis, 2002: 234). During the years of the Cold War stability “Hungarian statehood – even if not independence – seemed fairly secure. Thus, the anxiety for the Hungarians outside of Hungary, for their capacity to resist oppression and forced assimilation, became the main preoccupation of the new populists” (ibid: 234). This
distinction led to different policy strategies and outcomes: while the ruling classes sought out alliances in the interwar period to help bolster Hungarian statehood and regain the lost territories, by the 1960s and 1970s, when the Hungarian minorities of the neighboring countries were ‘rediscovered’ and their existence raised political questions for Hungary, the new populists had to depart from the old nationalism and form alliances with western powers embracing the discourse of human rights and minority rights.

Things changed again following the collapse of communism when Europe emerged as a key political actor, “offer[ing] a set of international standards, including provisions on minority rights, in terms of which conflict resolution could be sought” (ibid: 236). This new generation of Hungarian nationalists thus had to ‘learn’ this new rights-discourse if they wanted to be accepted in European politics. The ensuing debate has “reveal[ed] a deeper disagreement between the nationalist and non-nationalist understandings of the policy of minority rights. For non-nationalists, the commitment for such a policy is a matter of principle, a consequence of their more general commitment to freedom, equality, and individual dignity. Nationalists, on the other hand, adopt the rights-discourse as a matter of tactical accommodation to a status quo, not as a framework for principled settlement” (Kis, 2002: 238).

Nationalists thus, argues Kis, fail both the universalization test (anti-Semitism and indifference for the plight of the Roma are common in these groups) and the human-rights test (they treat individual human rights with neglect and contempt).

**Hungarian national identity and some of its external “Others”**

Hungary has defined itself not only vis-à-vis internal minorities (the Roma) and external neighbours, but also vis-à-vis Europe. After World War II, when leading public figures were expected to legitimize the “sovietization” of Hungary and the neighbouring countries, there was little room for open debate on questions of national identity. In this new context, the ‘reactionary forces of the ancient regime’ constituted the ‘inner Other’; at the same time the “people of the East” became part of the ‘self’ in a new homogeneous and homogenising version of Eastern Europe. This was an attempt to ideologically and historically justify the geo-political division of Europe, a political reality that emerged after Yalta. Similarities among the nations of Eastern-Europe were frequently stressed, and common roots in their history, literature, and culture were highlighted by literary critics, musicologists, ethnographers, and historians.

These state-driven, top-down identity construction programs ultimately contributed to the appearance of a counter-debate, led by historians, about the characteristics of Hungarian national identity and Hungary’s position in Europe. Starting in the 1960s a new generation of Hungarian historians began to reframe the “Europe debate”, many of them with the aim of differentiating Hungary and its neighboring countries – “Central Europe” – from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, thus repositioning the region on the mental and geographical map of the continent (Pach 1963, 1968; Berend and Ránki, 1976; Szűcs 1981; Berend 1982, 1985; Hanák 1984). Beginning in the early 1970s, more and more academics argued that a sharp line cut through Eastern Europe where the western parts of this region – especially Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary–
were more developed and thus more similar to Western Europe. However, it was not until the early 1980s that a Hungarian historian, Jenő Szűcs, openly claimed that Europe was divided into three parts – the West, the East, and the in-between region of Central-Eastern-Europe. He argued that each of these three regions had a different path of development (Szűcs, 1981).

By the 1980s this debate evolved into a more general dispute about the existence and essence of a “Central” Europe, with well known intellectuals from all around Europe chiming in (Milan Kundera, Czeslaw Milosz, Eugene Ionesco, Danilo Kis, György Konrád, Timothy Garton Ash and others). This debate centred on the degree to which a shared Central-European culture and mentality could be said to exist. These debates carried into the 1990s, trickling down ever more into public consciousness and public opinion, leading ultimately to the rediscovery of the Hungarians that lived as minorities in the neighbouring countries. Csepeli (1989) argues that at the start of late 1970s Hungarian national identity began a process of reinventing itself. Part of this can be explained by an emergence in a “world-wide demand for a reformulation of national identity”, but the more particular reasons were the worsening condition of Hungarians living outside Hungary: “consequently, beginning in the second half of the 1970s, an outwardly directed aspect of the national question emerged in Hungary” – argues Csepeli. In surveys conducted in the 1980s a significant number of Hungary’s population (57%) said that “there were countries in Hungary’s vicinity which discriminate against Hungarians who live there” and they thought that the Hungarian state should support and help these transborder Hungarians. However, it was only a minority of the respondents which said that, if it became necessary, Hungary should not avoid clashes with its neighbours (23%), while an even smaller proportion (7%) thought that there was nothing objectionable “to the Hungarian government’s extortion of its neighbours through the limitation of domestic minority group’s rights.” (Csepeli, 1989).

This shift in focus by the early 1990s led to the re-emergence of some of the neighbouring states and nationalities as Hungary’s dominant ‘external Others’, thus undoing notions of ‘relatedness’ among ‘the people of the East’ that had been constructed and legitimated during Communism.

**Attitude surveys on Hungarian national identity**

Surveys from recent decades reveal ambiguity over popular understandings of Hungarianness. Research from the 1980s showed that political vacillation between ethno-cultural and civic-political understandings of nationhood was reflected in popular confusion over Hungarian national identity (Csepeli, 1989). On the one hand, the communist state promoted a civic-political understanding of identity where all individuals, irrespective of their background, were equal citizens. On the other hand, in its everyday practices the same state placed pressure on minority groups to assimilate into a ‘homogenous nation’. This was further complicated by the fact that the majority population resisted the assimilation of certain minority groups, especially that of the Roma. Attempts at ‘integration’ were thus viewed as imposed cultural and lifestyle practices that were deemed desirable for the Roma by members of the majority society (e.g. the forced washing and haircutting campaigns to ‘civilize’ the Roma in the 1960s, as described by Stewart 1997; Bernáth and Polyák, 2001).
In the 1990s there was a greater ambivalence in relation to these civic-political and ethno-cultural understandings of national identity. On the one hand, human rights, tolerance, and rational discourse were seen as dominant components of the national character; on the other hand, ethnocentrism and intolerance towards foreigners were part of the same national identity. These latter components were remnants of the long history of the ‘culture-nation’ rhetoric of Hungary and could be best understood by using Habermas’ concept of ‘welfare chauvinism’: people living in developed welfare states were aware of the set of privileges they benefited from, and, fearing the loss of those privileges, they developed feelings of ethnocentrism and intolerance towards foreigners (Csepeli, 1997; Csepeli et al., 1999).

More recently culture-nation conceptions of Hungarianness have been resurgent. This is manifest in the lately declining negative attitudes towards foreigners (xenophobia) and the increasing prejudice, rejection, and negative attitudes towards internal minorities (mainly the Roma). This is accompanied by claims of cultural supremacy and the rejection of ‘difference’. These trends have been attributed to alarmist discourses about the ‘shrinking of the nation’ (nemzetfogyás) which anticipate a rapid aging of Hungary’s population. Against this backdrop, foreigners are increasingly expected to undergo complete assimilation. This was made easier (at least in theory) by the fact that the largest group of immigrants in Hungary are ethnic Hungarians from neighbouring countries. These groups speak Hungarian as mother tongue and share more or less the same cultural codes; as such they are not perceived as threatening the ‘Nation’. In contrast, assimilation of internal minorities and especially the Roma is viewed as much more problematic: a separate ethnicised and sometimes racialized identity is ascribed to the group, based mainly on origin and outward appearance, which makes assimilation unimaginable.

As seen from the above, nationalism and ethnocentrism has been consistently high among Hungary’s population since the 1990s. During this same time significant changes have occurred not so much in the degree of nationalism but in its content and in the socio-economic background of those who support it (Csepeli et al., 2004; Örkény, 2006). In the mid 1990s, the demographic profile of nationalists was older and low social status; ten years later this demographic profile dissipated and only value preferences correlate with nationalist attitudes (Csepeli et al., 2004).

**Cultural diversity challenges during the last 30 years**

In this section we identify minority groups in Hungary and account for their ‘difference’. We summarize the most important demographic features of these groups and briefly outline their histories with a focus on questions of toleration and/or exclusion. We also explore how well ‘toleration’ captures the circumstances of these groups in the larger political and social contexts in which they are embedded. Whilst we provide a general overview of all major minority groups in Hungary, our focus in this report will be on the Roma (as an ‘indigenous’ minority) and transborder Hungarians (as an ‘immigrant’ group).

The most significant tolerance issues in Hungary today are related to the situation of the Roma. Their ‘otherness’ has been constructed differently from other groups for a variety of complex historical and social reasons. At present, Roma are the target of the most intense xenophobia, prejudice,
and racism in Hungary. Historically, it was Jews who were seen as the primary internal other against which the national ‘self’ was understood; now it’s the Roma who fill this role. This is due in part to the rise of the extreme right who have turned new (and negative) attention on the Roma, further legitimating the radicalization of more mainstream discourses in the process. But the extreme right is both cause and consequence of this: anti-Roma prejudices can and also should be viewed more generally as a ‘cultural code’ shared to varying degrees and with different interpretation in all political discourse and indeed at a societal level more generally as well. In different ways, a wide range of political processes contribute to the ethnicization of Hungary’s social, political, and economic problems by making a scapegoat of the Roma.

Immigrants in Hungary, although comparatively small in number, are also typically viewed as a fearful ‘other’. This is even the case, somewhat paradoxically, when the ‘other’ in certain contexts (namely nationalist political discourse) simultaneously constitutes part of the national ‘self’. Thus ethnic Hungarians arriving in large numbers primarily as labour migrants from the neighbouring countries since the early 1990s have suffered the humiliations and degradations (often ethnicised) of labour migrants elsewhere in the world, in spite of their nominally shared ethnicity. Other immigrant groups in contrast have basically remained invisible due to their small numbers. But when these other immigrant groups do appear in the media, they too are often presented as either threatening (e.g. the Chinese mafia) or at the very least exotic.

Main minority groups in Hungary

We will discuss both indigenous groups and immigrant groups in Hungary.

The **indigenous groups** include:
1. National minorities: Germans, Slovaks, Croats, Serbs, Slovenes, Ukrainians, Ruthenians, Greek, Armenians, Poles, Bulgarians, Romanians
2. Religious minority: Jews
3. Ethnic minority: Roma

The **immigrants** include:
4. Ethnic Hungarian immigrants from the neighbouring countries
5. Other (mostly non-European) immigrants

**Indigenous groups - demographic picture**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>German</th>
<th>Slovak</th>
<th>Serb</th>
<th>Croat</th>
<th>Slovene</th>
<th>Romanian</th>
<th>Roma</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>22,455</td>
<td>25,988</td>
<td>5,185</td>
<td>20,123</td>
<td>4,473</td>
<td>14,713</td>
<td>325,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>50,765</td>
<td>30,690</td>
<td>4,583</td>
<td>33,014</td>
<td>10,502</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>35,594</td>
<td>21,176</td>
<td>12,235</td>
<td>14,609</td>
<td>4,205</td>
<td>8,640</td>
<td>325,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>31,231</td>
<td>16,054</td>
<td>20,030</td>
<td>7,139</td>
<td>380,000</td>
<td>7,139</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>30,824</td>
<td>13,570</td>
<td>2,905</td>
<td>13,570</td>
<td>1,930</td>
<td>10,740</td>
<td>142,683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>62,233</td>
<td>17,692</td>
<td>3,816</td>
<td>15,620</td>
<td>3,040</td>
<td>7,995</td>
<td>190,046</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sociological estimations\(^8\) 200,000-220,000 100,000-110,000 5,000 80,000-90,000 5,000 25,000 400,000-800,000

Source: National census

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8. The data are from the national census.
9. Estimations – as opposed to census data – began in the late 1980s and are done regularly by organizations and researchers. Source: Tilkovszky 1998. As to the data on the Roma population, the most important sources are: Kemény-Janky-Lengyel, 2004; Kemény-Janky, 2003; Ladányi-Szelényi, 2002.
According to the 2001 census, about 4% of Hungary’s population belongs to a national minority group. The Roma minority population has at least doubled over the last forty years from an estimated 200,000 (1967) to 400,000-800,000 (2008). Censuses in Hungary notoriously undercount Roma who are reluctant to self-identify as Roma for fear of persecution.

National minorities

Hungary is home to a number of officially recognized national minorities that together make up about 8-12% of the population including both the Roma and the national minority groups. Most officially recognized minorities in Hungary are the result of the post World War I efforts to fashion (ethnically homogenous) nation states out of previously multinational empires in the region. Whilst minorities constituted nearly half of the population of the Hungarian half of the Habsburg Monarchy, the post World War I truncated version of Hungary (with two-thirds less territory and half the population) largely achieved its aims of national homogeneity, thus accounting for the modest figures for national minorities that we see echoed generations later in contemporary Hungary. After World War II, the expatriation of a large part of the German minority and the population exchange of ethnic Slovaks in Hungary for ethnic Hungarians in Czechoslovakia, as well as the assimilationist politics of the communist regime resulted in even further population decrease of national minorities in Hungary (Ács, 1984; Arday and Hlavik, 1988; Balogh, 2002).

• Germans/Swabs
Germans have lived in Hungary since the 17th century when they came as settlers. More waves arrived throughout the centuries to follow. At the end of World War I, 500,000 Germans lived in Hungary. After WWII, in the name of collective guilt, thousands of Germans were either deported to the Soviet Union for forced labour (35,000-60,000) or expatriated back to Germany. During this period, in total about 185,000 Germans were deprived of their citizenship and of property and had to leave the country for Germany. About 230,000 Germans remained in Hungary.

During the communist regime, the cultural activities of the German minority were very limited. In this politically (and ethnically) constrained environment, however, the Alliance of Germans was established and officially recognised (1955), thus providing the German intelligencia with an opportunity to develop certain literary and fine art activities as well as to engage in research projects on the history, linguistic and ethnographic characteristics of the German minority in Hungary. From the early 1980s, the Alliance established its first bilingual primary schools. These schools were popular with German families, including those who had otherwise been on the path to assimilation. This contributed to a revival of German culture in Hungary, which included the fostering of cultural and economic links with various organizations in Western Germany. Today, the German minority (benefitting from the 1993 Minorities Law) is very active and enjoys a vibrant cultural life in villages and towns where there are significant numbers of ethnic Germans (Tilkovszky, 1989, 1997).

• Slovaks
As in case of the Germans, Slovaks also settled in the historic territory of Hungary in the middle ages to fill various gaps in the labour market. And like the Germans, Hungary’s Slovak population was also subjected to population transfers following the conclusion of World War II. At this time nearly half a million Slovaks lived in Hungary. The population
Jews are neither a national, ethnic nor a religious minority from an official point of view; rather Jewish is (officially) a religious denomination on the one hand, and a cultural community (unofficially, sociologically) on the other hand.

Other national minorities: Greeks / Bulgarians / Croats / Serbs / Slovenes / Ruthenians / Ukrainians / Poles / Armenians / Romanians

The number of ‘other national minorities’ in Hungary (including Greeks, Bulgarians, Croats, Serbs, Ruthenians, Ukrainians, Poles, Armenians, and Romanians) totals altogether around 40,000 (with nearly three-quarters of those being either Croatian, Romanian, or Ukrainian).

Hungary’s Law on Minorities granted all of these groups a degree of cultural autonomy that has contributed to their revival (though this especially true for the biggest of these groups, the Germans and Slovaks). This cultural autonomy, however, is in large part symbolic. Given the relatively small number of these groups together with the degree of their assimilation, none are viewed as a challenge to the hegemony of the Hungarian nation or as groups that present problems related to toleration today.

Jews

The Jewish population is estimated to be around 80,000-200,000 in today’s Hungary. At the beginning of the 19th century this population was rather small, consisting of mainly wealthy families living in urban areas. From the 1830s onwards, new migrants (mostly from poor rural backgrounds and Yiddish speaking) started to arrive from Galicia and Russia. By the turn of the century Jews made up 4% of Hungary’s population. The liberal and open political atmosphere of the time, however, contributed to a significant degree of assimilation among these Jews. The political emancipation of Jews took place in 1867 and in 1895 the Jewish religion was given the same legal status as other religions, thus effectively legalizing mixed marriages between Jews and Christians. Hungarian Jews turned increasingly to Hungarian culture and Hungarian even became the language of religious practices.

Intermarriage and conversion provided further paths of assimilation. These trends continued relatively unabated until 1882 when the ‘Tiszaeszlár trial’ took place, in which members of a Jewish community were accused of killing a Christian girl for her blood to drink at Pesach. Whilst the accusations were ultimately dropped, the trial indicated a rise of anti-Semitism in Hungary.

A new era in anti-Semitism began following the end of World War I. The political shock owing to the loss of territories and population led to the dominance of an irredentist political ideology that went hand-in-hand with (and indeed fuelled) the rise of anti-Semitism. In 1920 the Hungarian government passed the first ‘numerus clauses’ law, placing caps on the number of Jews who could be admitted to university. Further laws followed culminating in the late 1930s with severe restrictions placed on the Jews’ basic rights of citizenship. With the outbreak of World War II, Jews were moved to ghettos before they were eventually deported with the German occupation in 1944. In the span of a couple of months about 600,000 people (70% of Hungary’s Jewish population exchanged affected a much smaller proportion (but nevertheless very significant) of the two groups: 76,000 Hungarians moved to Hungary from Slovakia, and 60,000 Slovaks moved from Hungary to Slovakia. Today, there are still villages and towns in Hungary where half of the population declares himself Slovak. Like the Germans, the Slovaks have also been beneficiaries of the 1993 Law on Minorities. Slovaks thus have been bouncing back from the post World War II population transfers with Czechoslovakia which had attempted (unsuccessfully) to tidy up a messy national minority picture (Gyivicsán and Krupa, 1997).

10. Jews are neither a national, ethnic nor a religious minority from an official point of view, rather Jewish is (officially) a religious denomination on the one hand, and a cultural community (unofficially, sociologically) on the other hand.
at the time, most of them from the countryside) were deported to the death camps and killed. The majority of the Budapest Jews (in the ghettos), however, survived.

After the end of the war a segment of the surviving Jewish population left the country for the US and Israel. Many of those who stayed behind in Hungary joined the Communist Party. Jews also participated in the 1956 revolution, but because Rákosi, the previous dictator, whose Jewish origin was well-known, anti-Semitism rose during the revolutionary period. The revolution was oppressed and thirty years of ‘soft communism’ followed (the Kádár-regime, 1956-1989). In the meanwhile the National Church Office controlled all churches and let them function only under surveillance.

The regime change in 1989/1990 brought about a Jewish revival. Zionist organizations, cultural and civil organizations, and Jewish educational institutions were all established and many Jews, especially the younger generations, discovered a new interest in their previously lost cultural and religious traditions. Second and third generation Jews, often from mixed marriages, began to organize themselves. Today, there is a vivid Jewish cultural life in Budapest. Despite some debate on the matter, most Jewish leaders did not make demands for official recognition in the 1993 Minorities Law. During this same time, however, anti-Semitism has also been on the rise. Surveys reveal that about 10% of the population holds radical anti-Semitic views (Kovács, 2005). Political anti-Semitism has recently surged ahead where it has been finding renewed expression amongst the next generation of radical right extremist groups (Karády, 1997, 2002; Gyurgyák, 2001).

Over the years anti-Semitism has been an essential and formative element of Hungarian national self-understandings, with the Jew filling the role of ‘internal other’ for centuries. Two hundred years of Jewish assimilation in Hungary, sometimes interpreted as a success story, sometimes as a failure, has now seem to arrive at a new phase.

The Roma

• History of toleration and exclusion

Today, the ‘Roma question’ is the most serious diversity challenge facing Hungary. One of the reasons the Roma question is distinctive is because the state always treated them as a distinct group, developing specific policies exclusively targeting the Roma. These policies were also consistently assimilatory, with the aim of eliminating ‘differences/otherness’ of the Roma (Liégeois, 1983). The 1993 Minorities Law signalled a new ‘multicultural turn’ in Hungary’s relations with its minorities. The Law officially recognized cultural and ethnic difference, but it did little to resolve the ‘Roma problem’. The recognition and emancipation of the Roma as a minority group did not and could not lead to sustained ethnic political mobilization or the fight for reversing the assimilatory trends of the past. Cultural difference continues to operate as a disadvantage rather than a source of pride. Prejudiced discourses have indeed become even more dominant and discrimination and segregation of the Roma is arguably greater now than during the communist regime.

The Gypsy/Roma population first arrived in Hungary during the 15th century. Another important wave of Gypsy/Roma migration, this time from Romania, occurred following the Turkish occupation of Hungary in the 16th century. In the 18th century, the Empress Maria Theresa, followed later by her son Joseph II, introduced a series of policies intended to sedentarize this otherwise nomadic Gypsy/Roma population. This was partly
successful. Part of the Gypsy/Roma population, was, however, settled (mainly by force) in villages where they could fill the niche of some missing trades (Gypsies/Roma thus became blacksmiths, brick makers, etc.). Linguistic assimilation gradually began around this time and by the 19th century the sedentarized communities had all lost their original languages.

From the beginning of the 19th century new waves of Gypsy/Roma migration began from Romania. These Roma became known as the Vlach Gypsies and spoke the Romany language. They were tradesmen who travelled around the country selling goods and providing services. Another important group arriving from the east were the ‘Beas’ Gypsies who were not nomadic and settled in villages in the south of Hungary. They spoke an archaic Romanian dialect.

According to the 1910 census, 0.6% of the population of 18 million was Gypsy/Roma. From the beginning of the 20th century, the living conditions for many Gypsy/Roma communities began to deteriorate as the demand for traditional trades waned. During World War II, a number of Roma were persecuted and ultimately deported, with tens of thousands murdered (on debates over figures, see Karsai, 1992; Purcsi, 2004; Bársny and Daróczi, 2005).

The roma population in Hungary was politically emancipated at the end of World War II with the onset of communism. This emancipation, however, promoted the assimilation of all sub-national groups; it did not, therefore, translate into the recognition of the Roma as a cultural/ethnic/linguistic group. New policies were instituted in 1961 that amounted to forced assimilation. The Roma were viewed as a socially disadvantaged group with distinct cultural traits. Their social integration was to be achieved by suppressing all signs of cultural difference, which, in communist parlance, included somewhat vaguely the ‘Roma way of life’. Integration was interpreted as acceptance of and adoption to the ‘Hungarian way of life’ and norms (Mezey, 1986; Kemény, 2005).

The communists thus regarded and dealt with the ‘Roma question’ as a social problem. At the same time the Roma were viewed as a reserve of manpower to fulfil the regime’s industrial ambitions. Due to this (and alongside more generic communist goals of full employment), the majority of the Roma were indeed employed as unskilled workers in these communist years. The state also had plans to resettle the majority of Roma. This resettlement program, which began in the 1960s, however, resulted in numerous local conflicts. This ultimately led to the next problem: the increasing concentration of Roma in poor urban areas and the emergence of new urban ghettos. The relatively high employment rates of Roma during the communist years ensured that rates of absolute poverty remained relatively low. The social distance separating the Roma from the majority population, however, did not decrease during this period. Nonetheless, linguistic assimilation continued to take place: in 1971, 71% of the Roma claimed Hungarian as their mother-tongue; this figure has more recently increased to 90% (Kemény, Janky, and Lengyel, 2004; Kemény, 2005).

It was claimed during Communism that the Roma were fully tolerated and accepted into society. In reality, however, the Roma experienced very real and specific problems in housing, healthcare, education, and employment that were systematically ignored by a ‘colour blind’ state committed to a policy of assimilation.

With the regime change in 1989/1990 one million jobs were lost as a consequence of the economic transition and the restructuring of major industries. Unskilled manpower was made largely redundant resulting in the long-term unemployment of large numbers of Roma. The transition thus led to mass unemployment among the Roma: while in
In 1989, 67% of the Roma were still employed, by 2003 this number had dropped to 21% (Janky, 2004; Kertesi, 2004). Since the changes, a second and now a third generation have grown up without ever entering the labour market. The poverty rate is five to ten times higher for Roma than it is for the majority population, and it has doubled in the last ten years. (It is important to note, however, that 60% of households living in deep poverty are not Roma [Ladányi-Szelényi, 2002]).

Neighbourhood and school segregation further exacerbates this marginalization of Roma. Discriminatory practices against them in employment, healthcare, and law enforcement have worsened, and segregation in schools and places of residence have also increased. The extent of Roma isolation in some of the poorest areas of Hungary has been so great that so-called “Roma Villages” have come into being without access to public transport or public services. Nearly three quarters of the Roma live in segregated areas (Kemény, 2005), with most of them trapped in the most deprived and unemployment stricken areas of the country. Steady rates of school segregation also contribute to the low educational level of the Roma population (Kertesi and Kézdi, 2009). Despite policy measures aimed at curbing segregation, the situation is not improving. Life expectancy for Roma is seven years below the national average (Kemény and Janky, 2003, 2004).

**Political representation and mobilization**

The most important political institution guaranteeing political representation for minorities is the self-government system, created by the 1993 Minorities Law. In 1994 there were 477 local Roma self-governments; by 2006, the number had increased to 1100. There are several Roma political parties representing different interests and political views in local self-government, but none have won representation at the national level. Roma politicians lack a significant power base in Hungary, not because they are not politically united (as some critics claim), but because the political system, like Hungarian society at large, continues to discriminate against Roma. In 2006 and 2010, only four candidates of Roma origin were elected as MPs of different mainstream parties. Critics say, however, that the political representation of the Roma minority is still inadequate because the self-government system was tailored to meet the needs first of the national minorities and only then the Roma. The minority self-government system was designed to provide minorities with a degree of cultural autonomy, which is what national minorities were demanding. For the Roma, however, the greatest challenge they face is not whether they can nurture their cultural heritage or develop their particular ethnic identity, but rather whether and how they can integrate into the majority society, becoming equal, tolerated, non-discriminated members with the same opportunities as others in society. The minority self-government system is therefore more of symbolic importance than any real politically practical consequence.

**Toleration/exclusion today**

No other group suffers from lower rates of acceptance and tolerance than the Roma. In spite of a few blips in the early 2000s, “it is noticeable that attitudes towards the Roma remain essentially negative and, in comparison with other ethnic groups, the rejection of the Roma is at a very high level” (Enyedi, Fábián and Sik, 2005). Since then, increasingly open and hostile political discourse directed at the Roma has translated in part to declining rates of acceptance (Gimes, Juhász, Kiss, Krekó, and Somogyi, 2008).
Table 2. Attitudes towards ethnic/national/migrant groups in Hungary (scale of 100: 1 – the least accepted; 100: the most accepted)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Roma</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabs</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanians</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacks</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germans/Swabs</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kovacs, n.d.

‘Non-acceptance’ is constructed by well-known stereotypes such as: ‘They do not want to integrate’, ‘They do not deserve to be helped’, ‘They are thieves because it is in their blood’, etc.

Table 3. Anti-Roma attitude scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Number of respondents</th>
<th>Agreed among those who responded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Roma are mature enough to make decisions concerning their life</td>
<td>959</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma should be given more assistance than the non-Roma</td>
<td>973</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The country should provide the opportunity to Roma to study in their mother tongue</td>
<td>976</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All problems of Roma would resolve if they finally started to work</td>
<td>976</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Roma should completely be separated from the rest of the society since they are incapable to cohabitate.</td>
<td>976</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma should not hide their origin</td>
<td>937</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Roma should be taught to live in the same way as the Hungarians</td>
<td>979</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is good that there are still bars/discos where Roma are prohibited to enter</td>
<td>926</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The increase of the number of the Roma population</td>
<td>943</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Everyone has the right to take their children to schools where there are no Roma children</td>
<td>956</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma have criminality in their blood</td>
<td>947</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fábián-Sik, 1996, 2006

The intensity of these stereotypes has also grown over time: more negative stereotypes are shared by a higher proportion of the population now than twenty years ago.

Table 4. Rate of those who agree with the following statements on Roma (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>1992</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>There are respectable Roma but most of them are not</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma do not make any efforts to integrate into the society</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma should be forced to live as the rest of the society</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma do not deserve assistance</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma have criminality in their blood</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma should be separated from the rest of the society</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma cannot integrate because of discrimination</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Hungarian government should do more for Roma</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Median
The negative tendencies characterizing this picture of intolerance can partly be explained by the rise of the radical right in the last several years. However, as the data indicate, the non-acceptance of Roma is more widespread than this: along different dimensions 50-80% of the population display negative attitudes towards the Roma. Moreover, surveys also reveal that prejudiced attitudes are held from people on both sides of the political spectrum.

The recent rise of Jobbik as part of a more general shift to an increasingly radical and racist political discourse emerged following the ‘legitimacy crisis’ political scandal of 2006 (precipitated by the leaking of the prime minister Ferenc Gyurcsány admitting to lying in the build up to the elections earlier that year). This culminated with a series of on again, off again riots orchestrated and attended by an assortment of radical right groupings. Jobbik, although not the main organizer, benefited from this backlash and witnessed an increase in its support. Their first big electoral victory came in 2009 when they sent three MPs to the European Parliament. Their next big success came in the Hungarian 2010 elections when they came in third, only slightly behind the previously governing socialists. The Magyar Gárda (Hungarian Guard), which established itself in 2007 as a ‘cultural NGO’, also has links to Jobbik. Its main activities involve organizing uniformed marches through villages and towns with large Roma populations. The association was outlawed in 2008 but similar paramilitary groups still continue to operate (e.g. Szebb Jöv ért, Betyársereg, Véderő, etc.).

This is all evidence of a general shift to a more radical political discourse (frequently echoed in the media). Jobbik has put the Roma back on the political and public agenda with their talk about ‘Gypsy criminality’, ‘parasites of the society’, and so forth. These and similar themes have found their way into the mainstream media, reproducing and in a sense legitimating them in the process.

**Immigration trends**

The proportion of immigrants in Hungary is one of the lowest in Europe (less than 2%, with the majority being ethnic Hungarians from the neighbouring countries). These numbers are nevertheless on the rise (with non-EU nationals now making up 35-40% of all immigrants) (Kováts, 2010).

The first important wave of migration to Hungary started in the late 1980s still during the communist years across the tightly controlled borders of Romania. Most of these immigrants were ethnic Hungarians fleeing economic hardships and political persecution in Ceauşescu’s Romania. The early 1990s witnessed a second upsurge in ethnic Hungarian migration from Romania in response to continued economic stagnation but also following the outbreak of ethnic tensions in Romania (Sik, 1990, 1996). The third wave of migration took place during the Yugoslav war, with ethnic Hungarians accompanied by many other nationalities from the former republics of the dissolving Yugoslavia. (Most of them, however, continued on to other EU countries).

The number of naturalized citizens between 1990 and 2005 can be seen in the graph below. The 1992 spike presumably reflects the upsurge in migration from Romania following the ethnic violence there (Kováts, 2005).
Given that the question of migration in general and transborder Hungarian migration in particular had been politically taboo in the communist years, it is not surprising there was a corresponding void in the area of migration policy. The 1993 Law on Minorities did not address immigrants, only national minority groups. Another 1993 law, however, “The Act on Hungarian Citizenship”, was the first law to address immigration matters. The law decreed fairly restrictive paths to naturalization (with some benefits for ethnic Hungarians).

Because of the ambiguities surrounding the problems of immigration, civic participation of immigrants was not a relevant issue in contemporary Hungary, and so its direct legal regulation has been practically non-existent. Currently, NGOs are tasked with matters of immigrant and refugee inclusion (Sik and Tóth, 2000). This hands-off approach to immigrant incorporation is evidenced by Hungary’s failure to sign the European Council’s Convention on the role of foreign nationalities in local politics (ETS. 144). Since their participation was not forbidden, however, migrants have in some cases participated in local elections. One of the main reasons the state has not concentrated its efforts on immigrant integration is because it has been assumed that most migrants are ethnic Hungarians from the neighbouring countries, for whom questions of integration are viewed as unproblematic. Research on the topic has nevertheless shown a sharp discrepancy between the political elite’s discourses on national unity and the discriminatory practices experienced by migrants on the ground (Fox, 2007; Pulay, 2006).

A marked shift in policy towards immigration occurred in 2002 when the then Fidesz government introduced its ‘Status Law’, a package of entitlements for transborder Hungarians which included the legal right to work in Hungary for three months per calendar year. Although the law did little to facilitate immigration and settlement for ethnic Hungarians, it did open the door to legalized labour migration (which had previously been mostly undocumented). A far more significant breakthrough in immigration issues, however, came in 2007, when Romania joined the EU and Hungary decided to open up its employment market to workforce coming from Romania. Against all expectations and forecasts, studies show that these
administrative changes did not lead to mass migration to Hungary (Hárs, 2003; Sik and Orkény, 2003; Sik and Simonovits, 2003). Within the above context, the new Dual Citizenship Law passed by the Fidesz government in May 2010 can be perceived as more of a symbolic gesture than a law with immediate practical implications for the Hungarian economy (at least not in the case of ethnic Hungarians that live in countries that already joined the European Union.)

**Attitudes towards immigrants**

Attitude surveys (Dencső and Sik, 2007) show that general levels of xenophobia are very high in Hungary (only Greece, Portugal and Estonia exhibit higher levels), despite low levels of immigration.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5. The rate of those refusing to receive the different ethnic groups arriving to Hungary (%) June 2006 and February 2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Hungarians from the neighboring countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pirez (a non-existent group)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: TARKI 2006, 2007

According to another survey (TARKI, 2009) 71% of the Hungarian population supports issuing residence permits to ethnic Hungarians, whereas only 15-19% support residency for other immigrants (Arabs, Israeli, Africans, Ukrainians, Serbs, Chinese, Roma from neighbouring countries).

It is worth pointing out that the acceptance of ethnic Hungarians today at the expense of other immigrant groups was very different in the early 1990s. Survey data have shown that more than half of the ethnic Hungarians coming to Hungary felt that the receiving society was unfriendly towards them (Sik, 1990). The most common complaints were verbal insults and occasional discrimination (Fox, 2007; Pulay, 2006). These findings are in sharp contrast with survey data on attitudes toward co-ethnic Hungarians. More ethnographic research has shown that ethnic Hungarian migrants have been frequently blamed for the worsening labour market situation: ‘they take our jobs’. In the early and mid-1990s only 25% of the Hungarians agreed that ‘they should unconditionally be admitted into the country’. Research on attitudes toward foreigners shows that Hungarians in Hungary consistently regard Transylvanian Hungarians favourably and Romanians unfavourably (Tóth and Turai, 2004). Such findings, however, do not account for the way in which category membership shifts in sending and receiving contexts. It is not enough to say that Hungarians in Hungary like Transylvanian Hungarians and dislike Romanians. Data show that Hungarians in Hungary like Transylvanian Hungarians as long as they stay in Transylvania, Romania; the moment Transylvanian Hungarians cross the border as migrant workers they become ‘Romanian’ in the eyes of their hosts (Tóth and Turai, 2004).

The root of tolerance towards ethnic Hungarians comes from the traditional understanding of national identity and nationhood which claims ethnic/cultural kinship among all Hungarians who are scattered in different states of
Definitions of tolerance and acceptance/accommodation in Hungary

The concept of ‘tolerance’ as such is not explicitly defined or used in Hungary’s legislative frameworks. However, from an analytical point of view, it can be said that in Hungary different aspects of the notion can be captured by the term “liberal tolerance” (ACCEPT, 2009). Thus the 1989 Hungarian Constitution codified and guaranteed freedom of speech, media, and religion, the right to respect and dignity; equal treatment before the law; the right to equal education; and the protection of children and ethnic minorities. Many of the laws and policies that have been implemented in Hungary over the past two decades have contributed to the development of a framework of “egalitarian tolerance”. These laws and initiatives have collectively aimed to create “institutional arrangements and public policies that fight negative stereotyping, promote positive inclusive identities and re-organize the public space in ways that accommodate diversity” (ACCEPT, 2009). While in principle these frameworks of ‘tolerance’ were developed in order to address the problems of all groups and individuals living in Hungary, in practice questions of ‘toleration’ most often came into focus in relation to the Roma and their integration into mainstream society. Thus, throughout this section of the report we will focus on the Roma. We will discuss how values of accommodation are understood and articulated in Hungary and how these values are codified into laws and policies. We will also consider how tolerance is reflected in institutional and everyday practices.

Values of the Hungarian regime of accommodation: legislative and policy frameworks

By the late 1990s, two main and divergent approaches had taken shape to accommodate Roma in mainstream society: the first approach focused on legislative solutions whilst the second concentrated on educational and welfare policies. The two approaches saw the root of the ‘Roma problem’ very differently and offered remedies that were therefore based on different assumptions of the cause of the problem. But as many experts have pointed out, the legislative and socio-economic solutions need not be seen as mutually exclusive, but rather as complementary (Szalai, 2005).

Legislative frameworks

It was suggested by lawyers, NGOs, and human rights activists who pursued legislative solutions for the Roma that the problems the Roma experienced existed because intolerance and informal discriminatory practices against them were deeply embedded in Hungarian society. As a result, the Roma, both as individuals but also as members of a minority group, had little or no protection under the law. Two parallel legislative frameworks were thereby developed, both of which attempted to codify norms of respect and recognition into Hungarian law:

13. The analysis and literature review for this study was closed in the fall of 2010. Since then the legislative framework of Hungary changed considerably, and the Hungarian Constitution was also rewritten. It is not possible to include an analysis of these changes in this present report, however, below are a few links to reports that tackle some of the legislative changes:

Hungarian Helsinki Committee:

14. Liberal tolerance was defined in the ACCEPT Project Grant Agreement, Annex I – “Description of work” (p. 7) as follows: “not interfering with practices or forms of life of a person even if one disapproves of them”.


16. ACCEPT Project Grant Agreement, Annex I – “Description of work” (p. 7)
a) **Minority rights approach**: This approach resulted in the Minorities Law of 1993, which was conceived, drafted, and implemented to protect the cultural rights of all ethnic and national minorities living in Hungary. The law explicitly named thirteen indigenous minority groups to benefit from the law by being given the right to form local and national minority self-governments. Minority self-governments in turn could administer their own cultural institutions as well as offer their opinions on bills concerning minorities, including sending them back to parliament in cases where there were objections of a substantive nature. The law was modified in 2005 to create electoral lists, meaning that only those who registered as a member of a minority group before an election were able to vote for their respective minority self-government. This was welcomed by minorities given earlier perceived abuses of the system where non-minorities were able to vote for minority representatives, resulting in minority self-governments without any minority members. Despite these modifications and improvements, the law has remained very controversial in Hungary. Many of its critics claim that the law is burdened by an inherent contradiction: while it protects cultures of numerically small and assimilated national minority groups, the less assimilated, numerically larger minority Roma are the least protected. Legislative efforts in this regard have thus been aimed primarily at addressing the needs of Hungary’s national minorities, not the Roma. This is due in part to the Hungarian state’s desire to use the law to showcase its progressive minority treatment to the neighbouring countries and the EU and its institutions. The hope was that the Hungarians in the neighbouring countries would eventually benefit through the implementation of copycat laws in their own countries.

b) **Human rights approach**: This approach resulted in the *Equal Treatment and Equal Opportunities Law* of 2003, more commonly referred to as the ‘anti-discrimination law’. It was designed to sanction established discriminatory practices in everyday life (e.g. workplace, housing) and institutions (e.g. education, police, healthcare). This approach, by its very nature, focused on individuals, and claimed that all people, irrespective of their ethnic, racial, religious, sexual differences should be given equal opportunities and be treated with equal respect before the law. Since the law was passed, several human rights NGOs have successfully brought cases against schools, hospitals, and companies that discriminated against the Roma (data on such cases can be found in the archives of the Roma Press Agency and the Equal Treatment Authority). During this same time period, the media became more cautious and nuanced in its reporting on Roma matters and avoided routinely linking the Roma with criminality. However, as pointed out in the previous sections, some of these gains have recently been lost: “Roma criminality” has once again become a catchphrase both in the media and political discourse. These successful cases were thus both few in number and often only of symbolic importance: the law failed to bring about significant improvement in the lives of the Roma. Discrimination against the Roma in state institutions, the labour market, and everyday interactions is still widespread; some analysts even claim that in the past few years the tendency has been toward a worsening of the situation (see for example studies by Havas-Liskó, 2006 and Kertesi-Kézdi, 2009 on increase in school segregation). And even at the time the legislation was passed critics argued that its basic framework, although important, did


and could not adequately remedy the situation of the Roma in Hungary since their problems were not caused by discriminatory legislation but by informal and non-codified discriminatory practices which laws in themselves cannot eradicate (Stewart 2002). Lately, though, others have begun to argue that more recent legislation does at least implicitly discriminate against the Roma, or at the very least has discriminatory consequences for the Roma (Szira, 2010; Hungarian Helsinki Committee reports 2010, 2011; Hungarian Civil Liberties Union reports, 2010, 2011).

Policy frameworks

Many researchers have argued that an ethnicized (Roma) underclass (e.g. Ladányi, 2001; Szelényi and Ladányi, 2002, 2004) has been taking shape in recent years and have thus urged the state to speed up its efforts for the ‘inclusion’ of this group. Proponents of this perspective acknowledge the importance of anti-discrimination and minority rights legislation, but at the same time argue that the problems facing the Roma minority have to be addressed not only through the ‘politics of recognition’ but also through the implementation of various measures and policies of social inclusion. Some social policy experts (e.g. Ferge, 2000, 2003) support the idea of universal social rights, claiming that without a universal system of such rights, the chance for increasing social inequalities is much higher. On the other hand, there have been sociologists (Szalai, 1992, 2005) who have been fiercely critical of the existing system for supporting not only the needy but the more privileged classes as well. Moreover, research on social policies shows that consecutive Hungarian governments have often promoted policies that benefit the middle and upper-middle classes while simultaneously contributing to the emergence of an ‘aid industry’ which socially excludes the poor (Ferge 2000, 2003; Ferge, Tausz and Darvas, 2002; Szalai, 2005). Data shows that the lack of well-targeted social policies usually correlates with inequalities, poverty, and increasing social exclusion.

Besides debates over how comprehensive a system of social inclusion should be (whom to include, how, and for how long), there is also considerable confusion among policy makers, the general public, and politicians concerning whether colour-blind or colour-conscious approaches are preferable. In theory, social integration policies are (or ought to be) colour-blind; they target the poor regardless of their skin colour or cultural background. Many people belonging to the Roma minority are poor, and since the poor are targeted, they would automatically benefit from these policies. At the same time, successive governments in Hungary have liked to remind everyone of the efforts they have made to facilitate the integration of the Roma. This has meant that certain policy measures and the budgets attached to them were specifically labelled ‘Roma integration policies’ without the benefit of clear goals or budgetary allocations (as the State Audit Office wrote in its report in 2008). Therefore, it has never been entirely clear how much money has actually been spent on the Roma, or how many of them have actually benefited from these funds.

At the time pre-accession EU funds became available to promote integration in the labour market and educational institutions, policy making took a different tack. A clear requirement of these funds was that they had to explicitly target the Roma (thereby endorsing a colour-conscious
approach). This approach was also carried over to the post-accession period when the National Development Plans required recipients of public money to specify how their programs would specifically affect the Roma. The state funded ‘Széchenyi Plan for small and medium sized enterprises’, for example, was a colour conscious economic policy that targeted the Roma to address EU directives regarding equality in labour markets. The plan offered financial incentives for businesses that employed Roma in disadvantaged regions of Hungary and gave financial support to small and medium size businesses that were started and run by Roma. An analysis of the program once in place, however, suggested that a significant portion of the plan’s budget was spent on non-Roma businesses that employed Roma only for the shortest period required, and only in low paying, marginal positions.

It is important to highlight, though, that a colour conscious approach has not been adopted wholesale in Hungarian policy making. To the contrary: certain integration measures continue to be formulated as colour-blind. One of the most crucial issues in this regard is school segregation. The most important steps that have been taken to reverse the processes that have led to segregation have all used social and not ethnic terminology to define the target group (their preferred terminology is the ‘socially disadvantaged’). The system today is thus a mixed one, containing both colour-conscious and colour-blind elements.

Twenty years of ‘state efforts’ to integrate the Roma have therefore not achieved the expected results as increasing poverty, inequality, and segregation tendencies reveal. Until pre-accession funds became available, successive governments developed more holistic integration strategies that attempted to simultaneously address all policy areas (labour market, education, housing, health care, social assistance) in a collective effort to foster integration. Later, when EU funds became available, new programs were developed specifically targeting the Roma. Nevertheless, it has been argued that the Roma have benefitted less from these projects than the majority society (Kadét and Varró, 2010). At the same time, there is continued social and political opposition to a number of integration and desegregation strategies and policies (e.g. school desegregation is typically hindered by resistance from local populations). This also contributes to the socio-economic degradation of the Roma in Hungary.

(In)Tolerance as institutional and everyday practice: the Roma

The complex processes that have contributed to the ongoing exclusion of the Roma are so deeply embedded both in institutional and everyday practices that it is almost impossible to disentangle them and discuss them individually. Most studies that describe labour market discrimination (Ladanyi and Szelenyi, 2002, 2004), school discrimination (Kertesi and Kézdi 2009), law enforcement discrimination (Helsinki, 2008), and discrimination in the social security system (Ferge, 2000, 2003; Ferge, Tausz and Darvas, 2002; Szalai, 1992, 2005) emphasize that the reasons for the failure of these policies are to be found at both macro and micro levels, and that institutional and individual discriminatory practices are strongly intertwined. Although there are many studies of these issues, two by Julia Szalai (1992, 2005) particularly exemplify the (in)tolerance of the present structures, demonstrating why the social security system is ill-suited to help Roma families in breaking the poverty cycle.
Szalai (1992) argues that the long-term impoverishment of the unemployed, pensioners, families with young children, and the Roma after 1989 was not the inevitable consequence of the transition from a planned to a market economy, but rather resulted from the ways in which the social security system was structured and organized during communism and immediately thereafter. In 1990 this system suddenly lost 27-28% of its operating budget since two deficit running departments (the health care system and the pharmaceutical industry) were included in its budget. As a consequence, a conflict of interest arose between the long-term and the temporarily poor, while the two big ‘players’ (the healthcare system and the drug industry) succeeded in representing their interests against the interests of the ‘small and powerless consumers’ of the social security system. A second major change occurred also during the early 1990s: The social security system was decentralized and many of its functions were given over to local self-governments, where minority self-governments were thus put in charge of many issues related to ‘Roma poverty’. New funds to tackle these issues, however, were not allocated to these minority self-governments; the allocation of social aid remained the responsibility of municipalities. These contradictions provided few opportunities to redress problems of social exclusion. Szalai (2005) also shows through interviews with key social security stakeholders how many policies were subject to different local interpretations. Thus even well intentioned policies not infrequently resulted in practices that were discriminatory and even racist, with the Roma, the long-term unemployed, and families with many children benefitting little if at all. These bureaucrats were always able to find some law or policy to support their exclusionary decisions. Szalai (2005) concluded her study by placing the burden of responsibility for these abuses not only on the state bureaucrats directly involved, but more widely on society as a whole for the overly broad scope of this power.

Concluding remarks

An overview of the history of Hungarian nation building and of the policy and legislative frameworks that resulted from different approaches of the state to this issue has highlighted several important points. First, it is clear that ethnic/cultural and civic/political interpretations of nationhood in Hungary have existed concomitantly throughout the past 150 years of state building, and political elites have alternated between both to define the nation and formulate policies to protect or assimilate minorities.

Second, Hungarian political elites in the past three decades have made significant efforts to adopt minority and human rights frameworks laid out by the European Union and other international organisations. These obstacles to nationalism were strong enough so that even the radical and extremist political forces attempted to conform to them.

Third, accession to the European Union has brought about many significant changes in Hungarian legislation and has been accompanied by the availability of new financial resources, part of which have reached the targeted minorities. This has led, on the one hand, to the rise of a policy discourse of toleration/acceptance and, on the other hand, to the improvement of certain aspects of the life of these minorities and immigrants (e.g. lessening of segregation in some school districts at least, and improved
treatment of immigrants and refugees). But while EU has undoubtedly produced successes in these and other regards, Hungary at the same time has experienced an alarming rise in the activities and popularity of the radical right. These tendencies paint a rather bleak picture of intolerance towards the Roma.

The question of the Roma is the most pressing question of tolerance in Hungary today. Immigration to Hungary has not generated the same sort of problems with respect to tolerance that the Roma experience. This is in part because of the small scale of immigration to Hungary but also because the majority of these immigrants are ethnic Hungarians from the neighbouring countries. Immigration thus does not present the same sorts of diversity challenges that the Roma question presents.

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CHAPTER 14. POLAND

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Introduction

Poland is one of the less diversified societies on the globe. Walter Connor reported that in 1971 that among 138 countries taken into account only 12, i.e. 9.1% could be considered ‘national’, Poland included (1994: 96). The historical Commonwealth of Poland and Lithuania (14th to 18th centuries) was in itself diverse linguistically, ethnically and religiously, and it also welcomed various ethnic and religious minorities. In this respect, it was a very tolerant regime in a sea of mostly intolerant European countries (e.g., already in the 13th century Polish kings allowed Jews, who were expelled from western countries, to settle and practice their faith). One could say that at that time it represented a case of an ‘imperial regime of tolerance’ (Walzer, 1999), in which various self-governed collectives were allowed to observe their religious practices, provided they did not proselytise (similarly to millets in the Ottoman Empire). Still, when the republic was reborn after WWI, religious and ethnic minorities comprised almost one third of the population. Only after WWII, due to the Holocaust, border changes, and ‘population exchanges’ with the defeated Germany and victorious Soviet Union, the country was made practically homogenous ethnically (Poles) and religiously (Roman-Catholics). Actually, having a homogenous population was an official aim of the communist authorities and it was exercised throughout their reign.

The last thirty years may be divided into three periods: the continuation of the systematically liberalised communist rule, democratic change after 1989 till the EU accession in May 2004, and the last five years, as soon after Poland’s accession to the EU a new law on national, ethnic and linguistic minorities was accepted and put into practice. Although the 1952 Communist constitution granted non-discrimination, ‘nationalities’ (not ‘ethnic minorities’) were barely mentioned in it (Łodziński, 2010: 21). In practice, minorities could barely cultivate their traditions through the channels of state-controlled ‘cultural associations’. Ethnic issues perceived as threatening to the state interest were downplayed and hidden from the public. ‘Solidarity’ was concerned with economic and political problems and the issues of minorities were raised only incidentally. In the process of post-1989 democratic changes minorities were allowed to form associations and express their opinions. Besides the internal will to democratis
the political order, integration with the EU and its institutions also pushed policy makers to accept liberal laws concerning religious freedoms as well as ethnic and national minorities.

Polish *multiculturalism* is different from that of multiethnic or immigrant societies, such as Switzerland or the UK. Although lip service is paid to multicultural traditions, it is seen as a historical phenomenon. For instance, ‘multicultural’ festivals are organised in big cities, small towns and in borderland regions (cf. Bieniecki, 2004), but virtually all of them refer to past ‘multiethnic’ or religiously diversified life. Multiculturalism is also mentioned in the media and some official statements. *Tolerance* is evoked as an old Polish historical tradition. Today, ‘tolerance and multiculturalism’ serve rather as a myth that legitimises current politics than actual administrative and political practice. But this ethnic homogenisation of the society makes issues of the acceptance of, and tolerance toward ‘others’ even more urgent, e.g. with respect to how, in such an ethnically uniform society, ethnic and religious minorities perceived as marginal are treated. Simultaneously, the growing standard of living and membership in the EU makes Poland more attractive for immigrants from the so called third countries. This gives an opportunity to observe reactions to these ‘growing social problems’, as they are often bluntly described, and to interpret them in terms of ‘a culture of tolerance’.

This report on the one hand gives basic data about the national, ethnic and religious minorities in Poland in a historical perspective, as well as basic information about increasing migration. On the other hand, it describes some legal regulations regarding ethnic and religious minorities. These rules meet European Union and other international standards, but also bear traces of a local political thought which reflects the state of mind of the political elites, usually legitimised by historical and cultural circumstances.

**National identity and State formation**

The Commonwealth of Poland and Lithuania (15th-18th centuries) was a noble’s democracy. The nobility (szlachta) had many privileges similar to modern democracies. The political system entailed, among others, free election of the king by all nobles wishing to participate; sessions of the parliament, Sejm, held at least every other year; pacta conventa, agreements bargained with the king-elect; the right of insurrection against a king who violated liberties; *liberum veto*, a right of the local councils’, sejmik’s’ representatives to oppose any new law accepted; and *confederation* – the right to organise rebellion through a collective political purpose.

The nobility described itself as a ‘nation’ that was ‘racially’ different from burghers, Jews and peasants (cf. Hertz, 1988). Nevertheless, this noble’s notion of nation gave rise to its more modern concept. According to Andrzej Walicki (1994), before the three consequent partitions of the country in 1772, 1793 and 1795, the Commonwealth’s society was on the way to a civic form of nationalism, similar to the French model. Enlightenment intellectuals explicitly advocated Polish citizenship, regardless of language, religion or class origin. The ‘polonisation’ of elites was also a spontaneous process that lasted for centuries. It is best illustrated by the first words of the national Polish epos from the beginning of the 19th century, *Pan Thaddeus*, written in Polish by Adam Mickiewicz (himself born to a petite noble family, but whose mother came from a
converted Jewish family, in Nowogródek, then Lithuania, now Belarus): “Lithuania, my homeland…”

The interruption of state existence, the rise of ethnic nationalism in (Central) Europe, and the nationalising policies of Prussia and Russia all caused the transformation of Polish nationalism from civic to ethnic. In the second part of the 19th century the issue of class composition of a nation understood in terms of ethnicity became urgent, especially that peasants did not always sympathise with the subsequent noble’s uprisings. The task of intellectuals was to get the peasantry involved in the national cause (cf. Stauter-Halstead, 2001), nation being defined ethnically.

After regaining independence in 1918 the country was designed as a democratic republic in which all citizens were equal under law, independently of religious, class or ethnic affiliation. The Wilsonian plan of building a nation state securing minority rights was accepted, but not really implemented. In the interwar nationalist milieu, Polish authorities carried out a nationalising policy. The Nazi Germany invasion on 1 September 1939, motivated by racial-nationalist concepts, exacerbated chauvinistic feelings also in the oppressed populations. Post-WWII communist authorities embraced nationalist ideology and opted for an ethnically homogenous state-model. In the former German territories, which were a partial compensation for the territorial loss to the Soviet Union, Germans were expelled and Poles replaced them. After the Potsdam agreement, 3.2 million Germans were driven out of the new Polish territories (Sakson, 2010: 11).

The model of a monolithic ethnic state was supported by Poles who experienced German persecutions and were convinced that ethno-religious uniformity secures peace. In the 1947 referendum (even though carried out in the atmosphere of fear), virtually all political forces, (Kersten, 1989: 462) opted for the acquisition of German lands. As Krystyna Kersten summarises: “War, by sharpening and drawing out national divisions, shaped a specifically Polish national consciousness. In a situation of danger, the nation emerged as a dominant category and major subject of actions… [N] ational divisions and distinctions that partly resulted from self-identification, but mostly imposed from the outside, above all by Germans, instead of disappearing after the war, had been strengthened” (1993: 11).

The consolidation of power by the communists enabled them to launch a formally tolerant policy towards nearly non-existent national minorities; this course of action, despite fluctuating periods of tightening and loosening of the policy¹, was exercised for the next four decades. Ethnic and religious minorities were recognised and had their cultural associations. However, the state presented itself as an ideological, social and cultural monolith. Individual freedoms were granted in the constitution passed in 1952, but minorities could barely cultivate their traditions through the channels of cultural associations controlled by the state.

In 1968, the communists launched an anti-Semitic campaign. 300,000 Jews had survived the Holocaust, and many of them left Poland later, especially frightened by the pogrom in Kielce in 1946 (Nowak-Małolepsza, 2010: 215). Internal Party struggles, anti-Israeli politics of the Soviet Union and students’ protests incited the anti-Zionist campaign and the cleansing of Jews from top ranks in the state apparatus and higher education. This operation was based on anti-Semitic sentiments and it received partial sup-

1. Sławomir Łodziński distinguishes five such periods: 1) verification of nationalities (1945-47); 2) gradual recognition of some minorities (1948-55); 3) emigration of Germans and improvement of relations between the State and minorities (1956-1968); 4) anti-Semitic campaign in 1968 followed by the policy of ‘moral-political unity of the Polish nation’ (1968-1980); 5) period of intensified minorities’ activity initiated by ‘Solidarity’ and relaxation of the authorities’ attitude towards them (2010: 18-20).
port of the population. It drove ca. fifteen thousand Polish Jews and their in-laws out of the country, many of them top intellectuals (cf. Eisler, 2006). Today, no more than 10 000 Jews live in Poland.

The ‘Solidarity’ movement of 1980-81 was concerned above all with the liberalisation of the system and economic issues (the first goal was partly fulfilled by the radio broadcasting of a Catholic Sunday Mass was in fact the only promise in the agreement between the protesting workers and the authorities from August 1980 that the communist kept after crushing the movement till the end of their rule in 1989) and the question of minority rights was not really raised by it (Szczepański, 2008). Poland entered the 1990s as a country homogenised ethnically and religiously with minority issues barely existent due to their size and the communists’ tactics of sweeping most problems under the carpet and playing the ethnic card only in order to stir hatred that served their own political purposes. Minorities were hardly perceptible in everyday life.

In the process of democratic change they were allowed to form associations and express their opinions. The 1991 Treaty with Germany gave political rights to Germans who have self-organised in various associations, membership in which had risen to hundreds of thousands (it is estimated between one to three hundred thousand). Moreover, this minority, thanks to a special election law, has since then had representatives in the parliament. Besides, the will to democratis the political order after decades of authoritarianism as well as the integration of the country with EU institutions has encouraged the acceptance of liberal laws concerning the freedoms of religious and ethnic minorities.

Integration with the EU has intensified two contradictory discourses: 1) Europe as a chance for modernisation and pluralisation of the nation, and 2) European integration as a threat to the national and moral integrity of the nation.

All discussions about tolerance in contemporary Poland seem to revolve around the issue of who is the real host and who is the tolerated minority or migrant in the country of the Polish nation, and the slogan Poland for Poles, used by extremist nationalists is not that unpopular.

**Main cultural diversity challenges in Poland**

**Minorities in the post-1989 period**

As mentioned above, interwar Poland was a multiethnic state. According to the 1931 census, in a total population of 32.107 million people, 69% were ethnic Poles, 14% were Ukrainians, 9% were Jews, 5% were Belarussians, 2% were Germans, and 1% were other ethnic minorities – Tartars, Karaims, Russians, etc. (Tomaszewski, 1985: 50). The country was also divided religiously: Roman Catholics – 64.8%, Greek-Catholics (Uniates) – 10.5%, Orthodox – 11.8%, Protestants – 2.6%, Jews – 9.8% and others – 0.5%. In result of the processes described above, the dominant majority embraced the policy of a national state exercised by the communist authority. In result, in the 2002 census, out of 38 230 88 people, 36 983 720 declared Polish nationality (96.74%).
After 1989, the Polish democratic government recognised the distinct ethnic and cultural groups. The state protects individual citizens independently of their national identification which is a matter of personal choice (Kodzinski, 2005: 160-168). Political liberalisation has not prompted the spectacular ‘coming out’ of minorities. Before the National Census of 2002, experts estimated the total number of indigenous ethnic minorities in Poland between 800 000 and 1 600 000, i.e. between 2 and 4% of the total population. To the bewilderment of the scholars and minority activists, the Census showed that only 471 500 (1.23%) of respondents declared an ethnicity other than Polish (2.03% remained undetermined). The low numbers are interpreted as a heritage of the reluctance of people to show their ethnic identity in the mono-ethnic state (cf. Cordell & Dybczyński, 2005: 80-82) or as manipulations of interviewers who refused listing nationalities other than Polish (cf. Dolińska, 2010: 350-52).

The Act on Minorities which was accepted in 2005 makes a distinction between ethnic minorities and national minorities. A national minority is a group: a) less numerous than the rest of the state’s inhabitants; b) differentiated by language, culture or tradition and aiming to maintain the differentiation; c) possessing consciousness of historical national community; d) inhabiting Polish territory for at least 100 years; e) identifying with the nation organised in a state. An ethnic minority shares with the national minority all of its features, except for the identification with a nation different than Polish and possessing its own state. This division raises disgruntlement and the Polish Tatar Association and Federation of Roma in Poland perceive it as deprivation.

According to this definition, there are nine national minorities recognised in Poland (numbers in brackets show population declared in the 2002 Census): Belarussians (48,000), Czechs (386), Lithuanians (5,846), Germans (152,897), Armenians (1,082), Russians (6,103), Slovaks (2,001), Ukrainians (30,957) and Jews (1,133). Polish law, therefore, acknowledges four ethnic minorities substantiated historically: Roma (12,855), Tatars (495), Lemkos (5,863) and Karaims (43) (GUS 2002). It should be added that according to the law regulating these issues, a special category of ‘regional languages’ was added and two such linguistic minorities are recognised, i.e. Kashubians (5,063) and Silesians (173,153).

In scholarly works the last two are sometimes treated as ‘postulated’ or ‘claimed’ minorities. In the 1990s, a group of activists declared the existence of a ‘Silesian nation’. It has not been recognised by Polish authorities and the Polish Supreme court as well as the European Court in Strasbourg denied the group the right to ‘existence’, the lack of a national historical tradition being the main objection. One has to admit that it denies the principle of self-identification as a decisive factor in questions of national or ethnic belonging. The public was shocked when, despite official denial, over 170 thousand persons declared that they are Silesians, more than any other minority. It creates a conundrum for scholars on how to explain such phenomenon of a ‘nation without history’, and various historically grounded interpretations have been given (cf. Dolińska, 2010: 343-44). However, it also creates a schizophrenic situation in which the biggest subjectively chosen national identity is not objectively recognised by the state.
Altogether, people have declared 72 various national or ethnic identities. Besides the ones listed above, let us mention only those comprising more than one thousand members: Vietnamese (1,808), French (1,633), American (1,541), Greek (1,404), Italian (1,367), and Bulgarian (1,112) (GUS, 2002).

This is ‘merely’ statistical data from 2002 and since then the situation has changed. The difference in status between citizens and ‘not-citizens’ may be confusing, especially the differentiation between residents and migrants. Some ‘historical’ groups, such as the post-1948 expellees from the domestic-war-torn Greece are not considered a national minority. Armenians are classified as a national minority while they perceive themselves as an ethnic one (łodziński, 2006: 305) The numbers for minorities and minority activists given by some scholars can be two to ten times bigger than those found in the Census.

**Immigrants**

Officially there are relatively few migrants coming to Poland each year:

International migration for permanent residence (GUS, 2010: 129):

- 2001-2005 .......... 39,119
- 2005..................... 9,364
- 2008..................... 15,275
- 2009..................... 17,424

However, both immigration to Poland and the emigration of Poles abroad have become common phenomena. The Central Statistical Office estimates that immigrants in Poland constitute less than one percent of the total population of inhabitants of Poland (i.e., approximately 380,000 people). In a country report on Poland in the electronic journal “Focus Migration” one can read the following: ‘It is extremely difficult to quantify Poland’s foreign population as there is hardly any official data concerning the “stocks”, in other words, the total number of foreigners in Poland”. One of the few sources is the 2002 census, which estimates the number of foreigners living in Poland at just 49,221 people. This would correspond to just 0.1% of the total population. According to the census, the most widely represented nationalities in 2002 were Ukrainians (9,881; 20%), Russians (4,325; 8.8%), Germans (3,711; 7.5%), Belarusians (2,852; 5.8%), and Vietnamese (2,093; 4.3%). In general, however, independent experts consider the census numbers, as well as the government population statistics for foreigners, to be too low.

By contrast, the International Migration Report 2006 produced by the UN Population Division estimates the number of foreigners living in Poland to be 703,000 (2005), corresponding to 1.8% of the total population. Despite the low numbers, the issue of immigrants is relatively new and complex problem in Poland. Since the early nineties of the twentieth century Poland which has been a traditional ‘migrant sending’ country for few generations, became a destination and transit country. The presence of foreigners, majority of whom come from the former Soviet
In view of the relative homogeneity of the Polish society, new migration poses a challenge. Besides the settling of newcomers from the ‘East’ and transit migrants (Iglicka, 2001), Poland is undergoing an inflow of refugees from Chechnya, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. Also, an increasing number of EU citizens are settling in Poland. However, the percentage of permanent immigrants is still low. Foreigners mostly choose big cities for their place of residence, especially the capital. Illegal migrants have problems with their integration in many spheres of life, including the job market, education and health (cf. Bloch and Goździak, 2010).

Religious minorities

Statistics show that almost 37 million people in Poland have been baptised in the Roman-Catholic Church. Other denominations are small and barely visible in the public space. A Treaty (Concordate) with the Vatican was quickly signed after the fall of communism and the Catholic Church enjoys many privileges. Already in 1989, the parliament ‘accepted a bill thanks to which the Church was granted back confiscated rural lands’ (Buchowski, 2009: 71). A reprivatisation bill for individuals has not been passed.

Next to the State, the Catholic Church is the largest property owner in the country, with up to 200 thousand hectares in its hands. Public discourses are permeated with religious authorities’ opinions. The presence of crosses in public places like hospitals, schools and Parliament is rarely questioned. Abortion law is one of the strictest in Europe. Disputes over moral issues (e.g. in vitro) and the presence of religion in the public sphere have no end. Smaller ‘brothers in faith’ are treated paternalistically. A conflict between Catholics and Greco-Catholics over the issue of who should own the major basilica, a former cathedral of the Uniates, in Przemyśl, in south-eastern Poland illustrates the case in point. Despite the appeal of Pope John Paul II, it was taken over by the Catholics who changed its style from ‘eastern’, with a cupola, to ‘western-like’, with a spiral tower (Hann, 1998; 2001; 2006: 184-187). Religious classes in public schools are treated as given, but are secured basically only for Catholic students; alternative classes in ethics, granted by law are taught only in 2.5% of schools. Meanwhile, the society shows many characteristics of western-like secularisation – concubines are common, the proportion of children born out of wedlock is systematically increasing (ca. 15%), and the divorce rate is high (30%) (cf. Buchowski, 2010).

Case studies

In order to show the challenges of multiculturalism in Poland over the past 30 years, we have to choose from several cases that illustrate the point. Anti-Semitism, which is present in Polish folk culture (cf. Cała, 2005), in daily life and politics (Krzemiński, 2001) could be the case in point, but today ‘in Poland, there is no ‘Jewish question.’ There is a problem of anti-Semitism, the persistence of which bears out accepted wisdom: anti-Semitism is a problem of anti-Semites’ (Borodziej, 2001: 67).
Ambiguous attitudes towards the German minority have its roots in 19th century nationalism and the politics of Germanisation that took a genocide form during WWII. It was constantly utilised by communist authorities in raising fears and animosities (Madajczyk, 1998). Post-1989 politics can also, from time to time, evoke ghosts (Kurcz, 1997), as is expressed in the access negotiations with the EU, the possibility of purchasing land in the Polish western territories (cf. Buchowski, 2010a: 334). However, these topics are exploited in the literature and are currently not hotly discussed public issues. We have decided to study two groups – the Roma and Muslims. The first has been perceived as stereotypical social outcasts and discriminated for ages; the second has re-appeared in social consciousness under a new guise of an Islamic threat, which is abstract in the Polish context. We think that these cases will allow us to identify the key features of the discourse on cultural diversity and the practices designed to cope with the diversity that has re-appeared in Poland after fifty years of absence.

Selecting these groups was, on the one hand motivated by their dissimilarity, which might be perceived as more radical than in the case of less culturally and/or religiously detached groups. Also, Poles show strong attitudes towards these groups. In the research on social distance and hostility of Poles towards foreign ethnic groups, Roma and Muslims are disliked most (CBOS 2007: 2-3; Nowicka, 1997: 60-63). In a number of polls carried out in the last fifteen years, Roma, and since 2001 Arabs, have been the least accepted minorities. More than fifty per-cent of the people asked dislike them.

Recently, reluctance towards Roma has decreased to 15% – a significant change from the three quarters in the mid-1990s. Aversion to Arabs is unchangeably high, and increases in the periods of media debates on terrorist attacks (CBOS, 2007: 5; CBOS, 2010: 4).

Roma in Poland

The estimates provided in 2002 by the local authorities, based on information submitted by local government units, imply that there are 20,000 Roma in Poland. Roma NGOs give numbers ranging between 20 and 30 thousand. Roma are divided along caste-like lines as well as territorial lines, which today can be related to the competition in running projects realised by Roma activists. They are also divided according to socio-economic distinctions, e.g. between town and countryside dwellers and ones related to tribe/caste/class (cf. Mirga, 1998: 116-117). This heterogeneity impedes attempts at establishing a strategy for life improvement and cooperation in this community. As mentioned above, in the 2005 Act on National and Ethnic Minorities and Regional Language, Roma are recognised as an ethnic minority, as they have resided in Poland for more than a century (Talewicz-Kwiatkowska, 2010: 114).

Changes in the course of history

Roma started arriving on Polish lands in the 14th century; by the 16th century, concerns with their isolation, nomadic life and economic activity began to grow and the first legislations restricting their freedom of movement and expelling them had been issued. The policy of ‘oppressive tolerance’ lasted for centuries. During WWII, Roma became victims of drastic Nazi exterminations, being placed in ghettos and sent to
concentration camps. For instance, there existed a special Zigeunerlager in Auschwitz-Birkenau. Altogether, about 500,000 Roma lost their lives in Porrajmos, the Roma Holocaust in Europe. Its memory has not been cultivated for decades, and only in recent years, the Romani elites have started to try to restore it and use it in building a common identity.

After WWII, Roma's status was extremely low. The majority were illiterate, and they did not receive state benefits and allowances. They were forcefully assimilated. A State Council resolution from 1960 forced nomadic groups (in the 1950s still half of Roma led a nomadic life) to settle and work in the industry or agriculture. The lack of understanding of cultural otherness by the patronising authorities motivated by assimilationist ideology, permeated by ingrained prejudices against Gypsies, was striking (Puckett 2005: 622). Ideas of multiculturalism and tolerance were alien to communists. This resulted in various repressions and police surveillance, as well as the exacerbation of social stereotypes concerning Roma (Mirga 1998). Simultaneously, forced settlement resulted in a gradual shift from traditional activities, which was not accompanied by replacing them with new forms of earning the living. This contributed to a significant deterioration in the economic situation of the Roma community, which in many cases remains unchanged until today (Talewicz-Kwiatkowska, 2010: 118).

Since 1989, improvements in the social status of Roma have been more a result of international pressure having its origin in the need for alignment with European standards, than the efforts of successive Polish governments (Puckett, 2005: 625). It began changing at the end of the 1990s, when a growing number of violent incidents against Roma together with the high costs of post-socialist transition led the Romani people to establish their own representation. This enabled the formation of non-governmental organisations which struggle for the preservation of Roma cultural identity and the use of governmental funding, and participation in European and state programs supporting the minority.

One of the reasons for the ‘othering’ of Roma in Poland is their racial (darker skin) and cultural difference. They form a basis for creating stereotypes about ‘Gypsies’: laziness, isolationism, unpleasant smell, untidiness, disorder, demanding attitude, hooliganism, etc. (Nowicka, 1997: 207-212). These images are combined with differences in customs and group endogamy, both in terms of kinship and socialising. Together these perceptions ensue in the lack of acceptance (Nowicka, 1999: 9). Difficulties in cooperation between Roma and the authorities are based on a poor understanding of group specificity and cultural distinctiveness (language taboo, compliance with group rules, and absolute loyalty to the family) on the one hand, and the reluctance of the Roma to meet requirements of the dominant society, on the other.

Education of Romani children – a means of overcoming isolation?

The situation of Roma in the era of political and economic transformation in the early 1990’s made it clear to leaders that education is a prerequisite for full participation in the socio-economic world. The slowly developing Roma elites realised that poor education is the major reason for the low status of Roma. In the mid-1990’s efforts were made to eliminate illiteracy among Roma and to create opportunities for the younger generations. However, the cultural specificity of Roma was not
properly diagnosed, which resulted in inefficiencies in the educational programs introduced.

According to some estimations (the 2002 Census did not provide adequate data on Roma; experts hope that the National Census of 2011 will provide more reliable data), only 70% of Roma children participate in formal education, and there is widespread illiteracy among the elders. In some local communities hardly any children attend schools regularly, because they are engaged in their families’ economic activities, including periods of travelling, which mean school absence. The fact is that ‘truancy from school by Gypsy children, which was an ongoing problem for decades, was not only tolerated but often encouraged, and was eventually accepted by the authorities: the resistance to attendance was on the part of both children and their parents’ (Majewicz, 1999: 128).

The above problems are secondary in relation to the main obstacle, i.e. cultural rules underlying the use of non-Roma language. This calls into question the effectiveness of education regarding the Roma in general, since there are at least two reasons for Roma to reject the educational offer: 1) Polish is a foreign language to most of Romani children which causes learning difficulties at the very beginning of school, and 2) integrational classes are unattractive or even deterrent to some Roma parents because of the high expectations with respect to the integration of children coming from various cultural backgrounds. Thus, the solution would be to create a motivational program for the Roma communities, which would raise awareness in the field of the educational needs of children, which permanently alter the deep resentment to social inclusion (Różycka, 2009: 29). So far, government agents responsible for the preparation of educational programs for Roma are unable to cope with this task.

The situation in Romani education in Poland outlined above results in constant EU recommendations, published repeatedly since the end of 1990’s. Their main points focus on: 1) the abolition of separate Roma classes in schools; 2) making efforts to persuade Roma parents about the advantages of education for their children; 3) preparing the possibilities of pre-schooling for Roma children in order to overcome the difficulties related to the lack of the knowledge of the Polish language which permanently alter the deep resentment to social inclusion (ECRI, 2010: 18-20). Although some improvements have been made, there is still an unsatisfactory level of Roma children’s engagement in school education and the state’s attention to ensuring basic minority rights.

In addition to educational issues which require a strong reaction of the state in dialogue with the Roma community, there is the problem of Roma unemployment, and, in fact, an increasingly widening gap between the demands of the labour market and the opportunities for Roma to actively participate in it. Data from Romani NGOs indicate that they are unable to keep jobs for extended periods of time and face discrimination based on their ethnic distinctions from both employers and co-workers. These two issues are strongly co-related and must be addressed simultaneously if any improvement in Roma’s situation is to be made (Puckett, 2005: 628).

Violent incidents

In the early 1990s, Roma were often the target of attacks carried out by racist groups (individuals or groups of individuals and households were
raided by young sympathisers of neo-Nazism). In addition, a recurrent problem was the slowness of the police and the courts in solving matters of this type of violence and the denial of justice for Romani victims of crimes motivated racially, as well as cases of police abuse (ERRC, 2002: 6-8). Including numerous cases of discrimination related to access to housing, medical care and social welfare, the situation of Roma in Poland has raised many concerns, as Roma started receiving greater attention because of ‘the notion that the treatment of minorities is an extremely important indicator of democracy’ (Puckett, 2005: 622).

Minor attacks occur spontaneously, bigger *pogroms* are usually sparked by some acts of Roma which are perceived as unacceptable. Such a situation occurred in Mława in 1991, when 200 people had been attacking Roma buildings for two days, inflicting destruction in their possessions, and destroying twenty houses. Authorities introduced a curfew. Most Roma managed to escape the city before the riots erupted (ERRC, 2002: 1931-1932; Majewicz, 1999: 132). Fortunately there were no fatalities. *Ex post facto* analysis has shown the importance of both ethnic and non-ethnic factors in this event (Giza-Poleszczuk and Poleszczuk, 2001: 234-44). The court classified the perpetrators’ acts as crimes committed on ethnic grounds. Similar incidents, although of a smaller scale, occur from time to time in some Romani settlements.

The most recent event occurred in Limanowa in July 2010. A mob of over a hundred people armed with stones and bottles of petrol attacked a Roma family living in a block of flats, shouting ‘let us finish with Roma’. Authorities responded by calling special police units from Cracow; after a few hours, the crowd scattered causing no damage. The issue was addressed by the ombudsman and local mediators brokered the talks between the parties.

Instances of violence against members of Romani communities, anti-Roma graffiti, and newspaper articles, all confirm the presence of a negative stereotype of Roma in Poland. Despite educational and developmental programs and a growing scholarly interest in Roma, they remain the group with the lowest status among the cultural and ethnic minorities in Poland.

**Polish Muslims and Muslims in Poland**

In a Catholic and homogeneous country like Poland, significant cultural distinction comparable to the one represented by Roma, which might be classified as ‘racial-cum-cultural’, is relatively rare. Muslims who live in Poland, and whose distinctiveness is based, first of all, on religious difference, comprise another group. The followers of Islam in Poland may be divided into three, not entirely congruent groups:

1) Tatar Poles who have been living in Poland for several centuries; 2) immigrants from Arab countries who came to Poland in the 1970’s mainly as students – they often contracted mixed marriages with Poles and have permanent residence permissions; and 3) new Muslim immigrants, such as a) refugees from Bosnia (Marciniak, 2004), b) political asylum seekers from Chechnya and some other Muslim countries like Pakistan or Afghanistan. In our analysis, we have divided them simply into ‘historical’ Muslim community and ‘newcomers.’

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14. [http://wyborcza.pl/1,75478,8176184,Pozwolcie_nam_skonczyc_z_Romami.htm](http://wyborcza.pl/1,75478,8176184,Pozwolcie_nam_skonczyc_z_Romami.htm)
Polish Tatars are Muslims, but are at the same time treated as a familiar component of the Polish cultural landscape and, in some ways, a legacy of Poland’s multicultural past. New Muslim immigrants have started coming to Poland in the 1970’s – they are relatively few, although more numerous than Tartars. This group is constantly growing, especially because of incoming students and professionals from Arab countries. The number of all Muslims living in Poland does not exceed 30 000 people (Włoch, 2009: 60).

The situation of these two groups is totally different and the analysis of their status and perception serves as an indicator of accepted patterns for assimilation and forbearance towards strangers and otherness in Polish society. It should enable us to assess the potential of tolerance for immigrants coming to Poland.

Tatars

Polish Tatars, called the Lipka Tatars (the Turkish name of Lithuania, which they originally inhabited), are descendants of Muslim settlers in the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania from the 14th century. From the battle of Grunwald (1410) onwards, the Tatar light cavalry regiments took part in military campaigns of the Commonwealth of Poland and Lithuania and benefited from their military service by receiving titles and land. Their rights to personal and religious freedom had practically never been questioned. Many integrated into Polish gentry or local communities in the north-eastern part of the Commonwealth by intergroup marriages. Tatars assimilated as they gradually lost their language and began to use Polish and Belarusian instead. They accepted local habits and cultural features of the surrounding Christian and Slavic population. Polygamy became a virtually banned practice, vodka, which is prohibited by the Koran has become an acceptable product; and religious manuscripts started to be written in a mixed idiom of Polish, Belarusian and Russian.

Religion was an integral part of their identity and many clung to it inantly. Over time, modified Islam was preserved as the only real distinctive factor of Tatars and the core of their ethnic and/or cultural identity. At the turn of the 16th and 17th centuries, anti-Islamic expressions were virtually non-existent in Poland (Włoch, 2009: 59) and Tatars had generally not experienced major forms of discrimination because of their religious difference (Warminśka, 1997: 233). Their presence has been accepted for the last six centuries.

In the interwar period, Tatar culture was thriving, they had a right to pastoral care in the army, religious education was developed, they were fully recognised by the authorities and perceived as faithful and devoted members of the new Republic. Tatars even redirected money collected by the community for the initial purpose of building a mosque in Warsaw to the National Defence Fund before WWII (Włoch, 2009: 59).

WWII profoundly changed their situation. Numerous settlements and mosques are now located beyond the eastern Polish border. In 1945, returnee-Tatars settled in the newly acquired Polish western territories. It led to several local conflicts over their religious (and ethnic) distinction. The socialist nation’s ideology excluded difference. In result, part of the community returned to its places of origin in the 1960’s. Many moved
closer to the old Tatar settlements near Białystok, in the north-east of Poland, i.e. the Podlaskie region, where they live to this day.

Cultural and religious life did not flourish as vigorously as before WWI. Tatar intellectuals were killed or they migrated to the West. Contact with the outside Muslim world was almost impossible. Assimilation, which lasted for ages, made the community almost invisible. Today, Tatars live mostly in big cities, and they have merged with the Polish society (cf. Chazibijewicz, 2010). They continue contracting marriages with Christians, and some have stopped practicing Islam (Warmińska, 1997: 234).

Current status

Between the 14th and 18th centuries there were ap. 4,000 Tatars living in the Commonwealth. In the interwar period 5,500 Tatars inhabited the new Republic. After WWII, the estimated Tatar population oscillated around 3,000 people. Thus, they constitute a very small proportion of a country with more than 38 million citizens.

Tatars participate in Polish culture, but at the same time reproduce their ethnic distinctiveness on the basis of religion. As mentioned, they are recognised as an ethnic minority. Polish Tatars speak Polish, have a deep sense of belonging to their Polish homeland, and do not identify themselves with any other country. This differentiates them from some other minorities in Poland, which often identify themselves with neighbouring or distant states, which is interpreted by some Poles as an anti-Polish attitude (Warmińska, 1997: 243). One can say that the Tatar identity in Poland is engendered by their religious identity, a mythical attachment to the historical community of origin and multiple elements shared with Polish culture. Despite apparent contradictions between Islam and the image of Polish culture, as impregnated by Catholic Christianity, the identity of the Polish Tatars combines these two threads (ibid: 244).

After 1989, in the upsurge of ethnic movements and the re-emerging of minority communities of all kinds, Tatars began efforts to rebuild and revive their ethnic identity. The revival resulted in the creation of periodic cultural and educational events (festivals, workshops and summer schools), the establishment of Tatar press and other media that are meant to reinforce awareness of Tatar presence in the Polish cultural landscape, the dissemination of knowledge about the community’s distinctiveness, and help in rebuilding inter-group identity, which was partly lost in the course of history (Warmińska, 2009: 37).

Non-Tatar Muslims

Apart from Tatars, the population of Polish Muslims comprises people of Arab extraction who arrived in Poland in the 1970’s and 1980’s as students, and later as professionals, such as businessmen, engineers or diplomats, as well as refugees and asylum seekers from the Caucasus and Central Asia. Recently, more Muslims have arrived in Poland, some of them entrepreneurs or well-paid employees. Nonetheless, these new Muslims do not comprise a significant minority. As the estimates show, their population may reach 30,000 people, which is 0.1% of the Polish society.
The latest protest was organised by a group of 200 Chechen and Georgian refugees who were trying to get to Strasbourg to file a complaint against Polish authorities because of the negligence in the process of refugee status application, see: http://wiadomosci.wp.pl/kat,1342,title,Uchodzcy-opuscili-juz-pociag-zatrzymany-w-zgorzelcu,wid,11780551,wiadomosc.html?ticaid=1af02

Recently, Chechens have become one of the most important Muslim groups in Poland. Many from the about 5,000 refugees who came to Poland after the first war in Chechnya have lived for a long time in twenty refugee camps, comprising a majority of refugee status applicants nationwide. However, the status is granted unwillingly, (which raises the applicants’ protests17), even though most of them treat Poland as a transit country to the old EU states (Włoch, 2009: 61).

Muslims are not an object of any particular attention of the public, authorities or the media, with some rare exceptions (see below). One can call the attitude towards them an ‘indifferent tolerance.’ Their religious associations are recognised by the state18, and other Muslim organisations function as other NGOs. Muslim schools are non-existent, but educational authorities permit the use of classrooms in public schools during the weekend for religious education. So far, there have been no conflicts related to the dress of Muslim women in schools or in any other context (Włoch, 2009: 60).

Warsaw mosque19

Today there are five Muslim mosques in Poland. Two of them, situated in Kruszyńiany and Bohoniki, are small wooden buildings of historic value, built between the 17th and 18th centuries in north-eastern Poland for Tatars inhabiting nearby villages. They do not raise any controversy and have become tourist attractions on the Tatar Trail20 in the Podlasie region. There is also a brick mosque in Gdansk, built in 1989, and a meeting place and prayer room in Poznań, which since 2006 also houses the Association of Muslim Students.

The fifth object is the meeting place of the Warsaw Muslims, located – as is the case of Poznań – in a private villa, adapted for this purpose in 1993. However, it is too small for the growing Warsaw community, which is now larger than 10,000 people. The election of a new mufti, Tomasz Miśkiewicz, educated in Saudi Arabia, lent a new impetus to the issue of the construction of a mosque in Warsaw. The Muslim Religious Association is negotiating the return of a parcel confiscated by the communist government21, where they want to build a larger mosque. The Warsaw municipal architect objected the mosque's project, proposing a building that would commemorate the long tradition of Muslim, i.e. Tatar presence in Poland. Since then, no progress has been made in this respect (Włoch, 2009: 60).

In 2001, the Muslim League in Poland, led by Samira Ismail, was formed; it also attracts mostly immigrants from Arab countries (Stefaniuk, 2010: 180). One of the organisation’s main aims is to build a Muslim Community Centre in Warsaw. It will comprise a mosque, library and meeting space.
The centre will serve not only religious, but also educational purposes, as well the purpose of popularising Islamic culture among Poles. Moreover, it will be used by Muslim charities, women and children, and other Muslim groups. It will also serve as a place for holding exhibitions Contacts with the media should help build bridges between the Arab-Muslims and Poles. Now, the construction is underway and it is expected to be completed in late autumn of 2010. The project is feasible thanks to the financial support from a Saudi sponsor. It became known because of the protests accompanying its completion.

The protest against the building of the mosque was organised by the Association of the Future of Europe. In March 2010, a demonstration was held at the mosque building site. Protesters claimed that the Muslim League in Poland represents a radical wing of Islam. Referring to the fact that the Saudi Arabian project sponsor is a follower of Wahhabi Islam (in Poland Sunni Islam is dominant), the association fears it may create a centre of radicalism and terrorism. The protest\(^{22}\), attended by less than fifty people, was accompanied by a counter manifestation of an association protesting against intolerance towards religious, ethnic and cultural diversity.

In the spirit of constitutional provisions\(^{23}\), the Common Council of Catholics and Muslims supports the mosque initiative in Warsaw. Since the protest, press comments and opinions of both the opponents and supporters of the mosque in Warsaw, the brunt of public discussion moved to the Internet. A website ‘Mosque-ochota.pl’\(^{24}\), where citizens express their opinions, has been established by a right-wing Warsaw councillor. What dominates in the comments, are concerns about the presence of followers of radical Islam in Poland, associated primarily with the terrorist attacks, and indiscriminate, superficial opinions on the values promoted by Islam.

**Islamophobia without Muslims**

The arrival of Muslims from Arab countries raised concerns about ‘our Muslims’, i.e. Polish Tatars that are in danger of being influenced by radical Islamists or, at best, will deviate from their traditions facilitating coexistence with Poles. These comments indicate a generalised reluctance of most Poles to aliens and to ‘incomprehensible’ cultural practices, which are, in fact, known only through stereotypical images co-created by the sensation-greedy media. No special desire to learn more about ‘otherness’ and no sincere need for dialogue with ‘the Others’ can be observed. Beyond academic circles, debates about multiculturalism are practically absent. However, increasing migration and claims of Muslims in the country, together with foreign news about the ‘war on terror’, the involvement of Polish troops in military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as cultural conflicts in Europe (e.g. over dress codes and minarets), cause this issue to be occasionally discussed – see both the Warsaw and Poznań cases (Weinar, 2008: 14).

A comparison of the situation of the different groups of Muslims living in Poland and of the different attitudes towards them shows that the Polish discourse on diversity and tolerance focuses on racial and cultural differences, and, in this particular context, on religious matters only as a secondary issue. The example of the Tatars shows that their confession does not make them ‘alien’ and they are fully accepted, even boasted\(^{25}\). The negative attitude towards Muslims, mostly Arabs, of those questioned in opinion polls, (CBOS, 2010: 4), ensues from cultural and racial difference. Cultural

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\(^{22}\) http://warszawa.gazeta.pl/warszawa/1,34882,7708462,Protestowali_przeciw_budowie_meczetu_na_Ochocie.html

\(^{23}\) See: http://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/polski/2.htm

\(^{24}\) http://meczet-ochota.pl

\(^{25}\) During celebrations of the year of immigration and multiculturalism, Polish authorities proposed to show miniscule Polish Tartar communities living on the border with Belarus as an example of harmonious cohabitation (Weinar, 2008: 14).
Polish Muslims do not engage in spectacular political activities and avoid comments on current political events. Their distinction is above all demonstrated on religious grounds. Only exceptionally do Muslim leaders make statements addressing heated issues, such as terrorist attacks or the kidnapping of Polish citizens in the Middle East. Despite this low key presence, they have faced xenophobic reactions. In these apex moments, Poles seem to implicitly share Huntington’s media-propagated thesis on the clash of civilisations and they present Islam as a religion of terrorists (Stefaniuk, 2010: 183-185).

Muslims face discrimination on the grounds of xenophobia, which may be called ‘phantom Islamophobia’ (Włoch, 2009: 65) - a negative attitude towards the community, which, unlike in Western Europe, is not based on conflicts resulting from eye-striking and ‘unacceptable’ dissimilarities in cultural practices. This Islamophobia probably derives from the same source in which anti-Semitism is rooted. In Poland, both Jews and Muslims/Arabs barely exist and function as ‘imagined communities’ that threaten national and religious interests (Zgliszczynski, 2008: 7; Robotycki, 2010: 103).

### Tolerance/acceptance in Poland

First, the basic assumptions of discourse on tolerance should be explained, especially that it tends to be departed from cultural reality and everyday practice.

There is a deep-rooted conviction of the Polish public, instilled in peoples’ minds already in elementary schools, and partly shared by academic experts, that the Nobles Republic, up until the partitions took place, was a multicultural, tolerant country, allowing for a peaceful coexistence of many diverse cultural groups (see part 3). This argument justifies the claim, repeated by politicians and journalists, that contemporary Poles are tolerant and keen on multiculturalism in their very nature, and that the Polish nation welcomes diversity (Tokarczyk, 1979: 10). No serious study critically analysing the possible intellectual links between the concept of a multi-ethnic historical Polish state and today’s state of mind and practices of Poles can be found. Moreover, demands to restore and nurture the traditional Mythical Polish tolerance, which were advanced after 1989, ignore a huge change in collective consciousness that occurred during the years of the partitions (e.g. the emergence of competing nationalisms), interwar nationalist politics, war radicalisation of nationalist re-sentiments, and more than 50 years of Realpolitik of the Communist authorities that skilfully utilised ethnic stereotypes (Robotycki, 2010: 80).

### Tolerance as public policy

Reluctance towards minorities demonstrated under communism, also influenced the attitudes of Poles, who constitute a decisive majority in the society, in the redefinition of mutual relations during the process of accession to European structures. The National Census of 2002 indicates a huge gap between the estimated size of minorities and the actual...
declaration in the polls. These results raised questions about census methodology and quality. Minority leaders complained that people did not understand the questions about their identity. Besides, we are dealing here with social mimicry, which occurs when members of minority groups hide their distinct identity fearing intolerance (Robotycki, 2010: 82). This is interpreted as a direct consequence of the homogenising and assimilationist policy of the authoritarian regime before 1989 (Warmińska, 2009: 37).

The census of 2002 has facilitated the acceptance of the Law on National and Ethnic Minorities and the Regional Language, finally adopted only in 2005, partly due to the EU accession (Robotycki, 2010: 82). Its main drawback is that the definition of minorities refers to the historical terminology from the period of the Commonwealth (see part 2). It prioritises historical roots and traditions of minorities and discriminates groups with a relatively short history of settlement in Poland. Thus Greeks, for instance, who came to Poland as political refugees after 1948 and still comprise a group larger than several other officially recognised national groups, do not have minority status (Pudło, 1995; 1997). State legislation is not always efficiently implemented at the local level, and raises conflicts over the allocation of public funds. Apparently, official statements clash with popular images and social awareness of minorities’ presence and rights.

Minority activists criticise the Law on National and Ethnic Minorities and Regional Language because during the fifteen years of the process of negotiations, they did not feel they were treated like partners in a dialogue, but paternalistically (Lodziński, 2005). They accuse authorities of merely fulfilling legal requirements of the EU and not meeting the actual need of minorities (Robotycki, 2010: 83). Minority leaders pragmatically accept this law, but are pessimistic about its daily functioning, also in terms of obtaining financial support. All indicate a discrepancy between public discourse and social practices as well as between the legal set up and law implementation.

Tolerance as a value

In most cases, tolerance as a value is addressed in terms of the above-mentioned assumption of a historically shaped Polish propensity to peaceful coexistence with culturally distinct groups. References to the ‘golden age of tolerance’ of the Nobles’ Republic (see part 2; also: Berenger, 2002; Tazbir, 1973) are not accompanied by studies on a contemporary understanding of tolerance. Quite often, tolerance is discussed in general terms, and as being applicable elsewhere (cf. Posern-Zielinski, 2004; Borowiak and Szarota, 2004). It can be also presented as a postulate, a desired value necessary for changing social life. Political and media discourses are rather simplistic, probably due to the numeric insignificance of minorities in this homogenised population. Everyday interactions with minorities are not common and the policy of the (post-)communist state has also affected the perception of the issue as socially unimportant.

Discourse on tolerance as a value focuses on the theoretical aspects of tolerance and its significance in the history in Europe since antiquity. These speculative considerations refer chiefly to the Enlightenment thinkers. They focus on philosophical writings and their possible applications
Discourse on tolerance seems to be the most lively in the area of sexual minorities and non-believers rights. Focus on ethnic and religious minorities in the project excludes discussion on issues most pertinent to tolerance in Poland.

Particularly before 2005, debates on multiculturalism barely existed. They reproduced the myth of peaceful coexistence and were mainly descriptive, as there was no particular need for debating multicultural policies: 1) national minorities were seen as miniscule and generally assimilated; 2) new minorities were not numerous and migrants treated Poland as a transit country; 3) the questions of belonging and citizenship were unjustified for those convinced of a national homogeneity. Neither the authorities nor the general public showed interest in problems related to increasing levels of cultural diversity (Weinar, 2008: 3-5).

In the 1990s, cultural diversity was again presented by nationally minded scholars as a threat to the coherent Polish identity. Multicultural ideas were seen as alien concepts, trendy but unnecessary and inapplicable locally (Lenik, 1994: 48). Similar fears can be found in right-wing discourses. They also ridicule ‘political correctness’ and resist ‘indiscriminate tolerance’ to any type of cultural distinction. Right-wing discourses are criticised by leftist and liberal intellectuals. Thus, public discourses on tolerance often take a bipolar shape: on the one hand, minority activists, young left-wing activists and liberal intellectuals speak and work for a secular, multicultural and diverse society, and on the other hand, right-wing thinkers, nationalist activists and conservative clerical circles fight for national and religious integrity and warn against alien cultural imports.

Minority rights in the fields of education and the cultivation of culture, for instance the organising of cultural events or preserving traditional crafts, do not raise objections. In this respect attitudes are fully tolerant and can probably be connected to the long-lasting ‘folklorisation’ of diversity present already in the Peoples Republic, and congruent, at least at the surface, with multiculturalist ideas. Actual problems appear when: a) state or EU funding for cultural activities is considered; b) appropriate legislation granting provisions for property confiscated by the state after WWII is considered; c) issues of bilingualism in regions populated by minorities (e.g. street names), political representation and commemorations of historical events in the public are considered. Tensions arise between policy makers at all administrative levels and minority members and representatives (Łodziński, 2005: 221-223). Poles eagerly accept ‘strangeness’ and ‘otherness’, provided that it is practiced in the private sphere or as an exotic custom, i.e. it implies activities that do not interfere with their image of the world and do not jeopardise the idea of a homogenous community and a sense of security based on cultural familiarity.

**Tolerance as a practice**

Reports of international organisations monitoring the level of respect for the rights of minorities show that the situation of minority groups in Poland is improving, and that racial or ethnic offences are rather ‘soft’. Legal standards are increasingly congruent with both the social reality and international instruments for equality and anti-discrimination. Despite these improvements, data on insufficient state action in many areas concerning support granted to culturally distinct groups appear repeatedly,
particularly in relation to immigrants (the education of children belonging to minority groups; prolonged periods of document issuance, difficulties in conducting business and acquiring rights to social assistance).

Poland still lacks in-depth studies on the problem of racial discrimination and ethnically or culturally motivated crimes. It is difficult even to define the scale of the phenomenon and to specify its manifestations, which is crucial in creating programs and strategies to combat them. There is also a visible lack of organisations providing support for victims of such practices. This is an area to which attention has not been paid until recently, but it will be increasingly present in Poland, if only because of the increased inflow of foreigners to the country (Klaus and Wencel, 2009: 43).

Polish law is now better adapted to the EU requirements, but there are still many unregulated issues. The only exception is the Labour Code, in which appropriate regulations can be found. However, there are many practical problems with its enforcement. In some spheres there are no government regulations established, such as the protection of health, or the very question of the lack of access to assets and services offered publicly (Bloch and Goździak, 2010).

Concluding this part one can say that there is no visible discrimination against culturally/ethnically and religiously different communities in Poland, but there are certainly instances of behaviour and opinions conducted in public which require a proper response, taking into account respect for the civic rights of all people.

**Concluding remarks**

Public opinion polls indicate that the reluctance of Poles towards people of different nationalities and ethnic backgrounds residing in Poland is slowly decreasing, which can be treated as one of the premises indicating that the tolerance of cultural diversity in Poland is growing (CBOS 2010: 9). This is of great importance in the face of the influx of immigrants, from Asia to Eastern Europe, among others.

There is an interconnection between openness to ‘others’ and the financial status in the Polish socio-cultural conditions – along with the improvement in material status, decreases the tendency to intolerant and xenophobic attitudes, and, therefore, there is a good chance that Poland will increase the level of acceptance of difference, if economic performance of the country will prosper and thus contribute to a decline in the rates of poverty and unemployment (Jasińska-Kania, 2009: 56).

Polish rationale of the cultural diversity debate, residual as it is, has many nationalist, xenophobic, and homogenising features (Trapani, 2009: 93). However, thanks to liberal, anarchist, feminist and non-governmental circles, new elements and forces appear, which predicts constant improvements in the situation of minority groups in Poland, in spite of the slow development of the process.

The contemporary debate on tolerance in Poland refers constantly to the mythical tolerance of the Nobles’ Republic, resulting in little social conscience on the real problems of minority groups and in a reluctance to revise traditional views. This situation is reinforced by the relatively low
numbers of minority and immigrant populations, together with a still 
overriding importance of the ethnic and cultural component in the com-
mon representation of the nation/community.

Increasing pluralisation of the Polish society, including increasing visibility of 
the so-called social minority groups (people with disabilities, sexual minori-
ties, etc.) and their struggle to gain equal access to universal rights and a 
place in the public space, is increasingly influential in the revival of the de-
bate around the acceptance of diversity and the redefining of notions of the 
homogeneity of the Polish state. Significant achievements in this process are 
initiated by non-governmental organisations representing minority groups 
because the authorities have no special interest in intensifying the dialogue 
with minority groups, focusing on the introduction and implementation of 
European directives and trying to align with international standards, rather 
than recognising the minorities’ actual problems and situation. Nascent de-
bate about tolerance and acceptance should be a grassroots attempt to 
involve minority groups in a dialogue with the state.

As the number of culturally distinct citizens within the Polish society increas-
es, it can be expected that changes in attitudes towards every-day contact 
with different cultural practices will evolve, thus changes in educational pro-
grams and public education campaigns are necessary in order to alter the 
social disposition towards cultural diversity of the majority of Poles.

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Abbreviations

CBOS – Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej

GUS – Główny Urząd Statystyczny

ECRI – European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance

ERRC – European Roma Rights Centre
Alina Mungiu-Pippidi and Sinziana-Elena Poiana

Romanian Academic Society

CHAPTER 15. ROMANIA

Introduction

To understand the Romanian discourse on identity one needs to take a step back. As the whole Romanian culture after communism returned to the inter-war ideology and debate, any review will have to survey the twentieth century as well. Political culture was and is still conceived to a great extent as identity. American anthropologist Aaron Wildavsky (1987: 3-22) labeled Romania a “fatalistic” culture on the basis of the Romanian folk ballad, Mioritza.

*Mioritza* is the story of a shepherd who reacts to the news that his envious fellows plan to kill him in order to steal his herd with perfect indifference, preparing for death and a cosmic wedding with the Universe. Wildavsky cross-tabulates the strength of group boundaries with the nature of prescripts binding the groups. Whether prescriptions are strong and groups are weak – so that decisions get frequently made for them by external factors – the result is what he calls a “fatalistic” political culture (Shafir, 1985: 133-134), dominated by distrust on all levels. The individual citizen sees no point in neither exercising his free will”, nor trusting his fellow citizens to try engaging some collective action. The others are perceived as envious and distrustful, the self as victim. It is true that Romania belongs to the part of the world where foreign influence is the most important agent of political change. In 1940 the constitutional monarchy was reversed by domestic fascism due less to the strength of the Iron Guard than to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. The pact deprived Romania of important territories, which dealt a mortal blow to the legitimacy of the monarch. The subsequent communist regime was entirely Soviet sponsored; the fall of Ceau escu, who was betrayed by the Army and the Securitate in front of a yet manageable popular uprising in late 1989, has also been attributed to a plot led by Moscow.

In the context of this article, ‘culture’ or ‘discourse’ refers to the prevalent elite social representations of identity, the political order and the norms derived from them. By social representations I understand “not simply widespread beliefs, but theories or branches of knowledge in their own right that are used for the discovery and organization of reality”, organizing principles that provide common reference points for
individuals and communities at a given point in time, thus enabling communication among members of a community by providing a code for naming and classifying the various aspects of their world and their individual and group history (Moscovici, 1993). Most of the social representations of the Romanian intelligentsia in the twentieth century were defined in connection with, and more often than not, in opposition to these modernization endeavors imposed from top down by an enlightened, Western oriented oligarchy grouped around the constitutional monarchy.

For most of modern Romania’s history until the advent of the Second World War, except for brief moments; and despite many setbacks, the ruling elite has incessantly pursued a modernization project mainly inspired by the French model. The remarkable continuity of this project, despite the controversy surrounding it, may be attributed to the uneven distribution of power, which allowed this group enjoying the consent of the monarch to carry on with little investment in building some societal consensus over the target pursued. Whenever Romanian Liberals pushed ahead with democratization as a natural consequence of their overall modernization project, they discovered that widespread participation was very likely to endanger the modernization project itself. On several occasions, this prompted the Liberals to make a full stop and go back on their commitments in an attempt to regain control of the process, which in turn generated strong anti-Liberal resentments leading up to a confrontation with, at times an outright rejection of, the modern political system that had emerged after the adoption of the franchise.¹

Most of the interwar discourse that we will present in this paper has therefore never become part of the official discourse;² but its radical taint is at least partly due to its development in contrast to, or dissent from, an ever-patronizing liberal bourgeois oligarchy running the country. Many radical voices in this discourse also had roots in Western Europe, where radical rightwing ideology in various forms and shapes had been growing constantly since the end of the First World War. Romanians were part of the European intellectual environment; Romanian doctoral students were generally enrolled in West European institutions of higher learning, most notably in Paris, Berlin and Vienna, and translations from en vogue authors such as Oswald Spengler or Georges Sorel flourished in Bucharest.³

Along the lines of the interwar national discourse, what is and is not Romanian today? Further more, what were the political solutions that the postcommunist Romanian government found for accommodating ethnic minorities’ demands? Was the consociationist governance solution a lasting one in the case of the Hungarian minority? What are the challenges posed by the large Roma minority in Romania and what was the evolution of the tolerance discourse towards them? To answer all these questions, the paper will first go through the main national identity components, as determined by Romania’s geographical location, its institutional heritage, its cultural identification and its new status of EU member state. Further on, we will look at the main challenges posed by the discourse towards the largest ethnic minorities in Romania – Hungarian and Roma – and review the current status of tolerance in public discourse and government policy towards them, in terms of individual and collective rights, cultural differences and access to public resources.

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¹ The Iron Guard, an Orthodox nationalist movement with grass root support, was the very embodiment of this kind of anti-system opposition.
² Except for the short-lived government of the Iron Guard between September 1939 and November 1940.
³ Equally influential were the French Catholic right with authors like Charles Maurras and Hermann Keyserling, the White Russian radical right (A. Soloviov, Léon Chestov [Lev Shestov], Nikolai A. Berdiaev) and Italian fascists like Benito Mussolini. Edmund Husserl’s and Martin Heidegger’s classes were also frequent-ed by students in philosophy. Carl Schmitt seems to have been largely unknown. Romanian Political Culture in the 20th Century.
National identity: Romania is…

Balkan

Along with other neighboring countries, Romania has long disputed its placement in South Eastern Europe, as the Balkan Mountains are not even close to its territory and its language is Latin-based. In studies of nineteenth and twentieth-century nationalism and nation-building, the custom has indeed spread to use the term “Balkan” as a negative, albeit poorly defined, attribute, in relation to ethnic diversity, mass violence and intricate wars. The legitimacy of such definitions came recently under attack as they clearly reflected less geographical or socio-economic realities and more cultural stereotypes (Todorova, 1997; Wolf, 1994), but they are still prevailing in journalism and best-selling travel books. What remains uncertain is if, East to Trieste or South to the Dniestr, there was (and still is) a community of some coherence, to which Romania draws on. If yes, then what are the legacies that being part of this community leaves to Romania as a modern nation state and the Romanian identity?

There is a common historical background to South-Eastern Europe, which can stand to justify the ranging of Romania alongside the rest of the Balkans. The Ottoman Empire not only granted religious autonomy to the Balkan peoples, but it also adopted many of the Byzantine political practices making them its own. This means that Balkan societies were left behind on two accounts. On one hand, they followed passively the Ottomans in their stagnation and decline, being both politically and economically subordinated; on the other hand, institutions such as the Church remained suspended to the late Byzantine Empire, an abstraction passed beyond time, therefore beyond evolution. The legacies with a lasting impact for the Balkans present political institutions and culture can therefore be summarized as follows:

1. **Social.** Due mostly to sharing the Ottoman pattern, which was at the heart of the Empire’s organization, the Balkans emerged from pre-modern times with small peasant holdings as main form of property in rural areas and no autonomous cities, the Ottoman city being state-centered and state-managed. Unlike Bulgaria and Serbia, the Romanian principalities enjoyed limited autonomy, so they used to have large estates, but they adopted the small holdings property model at the end of the First World War due to populism and pressure of the model existing in neighboring countries. The scarcity of political and professional elites is the third central element of the model.

2. **Political. Byzantine tradition.** The Byzantine model was indeed followed, in its grandeur and ambition, by rulers from the Balkan Peninsula to Muscovy, but as historians showed, more in the conception of monarchy and its exterior appearance than in anything else (Pippidi, 2001: 23-77, 151-164). Some essential features were enough salient, however, to matter for pre-modern and modern political culture of the Balkans. Those were, in brief, three. The first is the historical inferiority of the Church to the ruler, missing the historical tension among the two which created the first source of power polarity in Western Europe. The second feature of the model, the autocracy of Byzantine despots, to some extent dependent of the first, was inherited by the flock of would-be followers in the Balkans. Finally, the third Byzantine inheritance is the absence of the Germanic, later continental, model of one son inheriting all.
3. Political. Ottoman tradition. The absence of autonomous cities meant the absence of civil society and balance of the power of the landowners in the principalities. The absence of a domestic aristocracy throughout the Balkans meant the absence of equilibrium between the central government power and the periphery, which further allowed for arbitrariness of appointments and dismissals, and consequently central interventionism and developed informal devices to keep them and their families afloat. The overwhelming presence of a hyper-regulatory state in the life of these provinces led therefore to a generalized behavior of rules avoidance. The need to act evasively, if not dishonestly, became a necessity when the well organized and governed Ottoman state was transformed into a chaotic and corrupt polity.

4. Demographic. Ottoman legacy. Historians agree that the most resilient Ottoman legacy, and the one causing most problems presently is demography. The Ottoman rule induced intentionally, on one hand, and prevented unknowingly, on the other hand, that natural process of ethnic homogenization which took place in most of Western Europe, leaving, as Ernest Gellner (1983) keenly observed, the burden-some task of ethnic cleansing for the modern times to carry out.

Not Western: Modernization as rape

The social representation of modernization as a violation of the traditional self has a history stretching far beyond the First World War, and beginning in the late 19th century with conservative group of “Junimea” [Youth], who opposed imported Western institutions and considered them “forms without content”. Later on, both Nicolae Iorga, the most influential intellectual of the generation of founding fathers, and his disciple Nae Ionescu, who was to become a professor and intellectual advisor of Mircea Eliade and Emil Cioran, resented the import of modern political institutions and were skeptical not only of the compatibility of Romanian traditional society with these novelties but also, and more importantly, about their suitability in the Romanian setting. Ionescu was completely against any form of Westernization. Iorga, a historian, was more moderate, and confined himself to warning that domestic institutions must not be overlooked. He was very critical towards the two modern Romanian constitutions, that of 1866 and of 1923, and to the idea of importing ready-made constitutions altogether. Iorga warned that such imitations made in total disregard for unwritten laws embedded in Romanian society would remain confined to paper.

While specific policies should have helped the institutions defined by the 1866 Constitution become engrained in Romanian soil, Iorga hit a sensitive nerve when drawing attention to the distance between formal and informal rules. His point was that establishing formal rules in ignorance of or disregard for unwritten traditional rules would compromise the Romanian project of political modernization from the very onset. The traditional ideas that he considered part of the unwritten Romanian “Constitution” over a variety of past regimes were the national character of the state, the limits to and defense of a “traditional” territory and above all the state as an expression of the peasant society, whereby the oligarchy did not serve as an intermediary between the ruler and the ruled.

The Liberals believed that the difference between the East and West was simply one of development and was due to different historical evolution.
It would have been difficult for the leading liberals—the Brătianu family—to think otherwise, considering they had ruled the country for two generations—through the war of independence with the Ottoman Empire, to the creation of the nation state and through the adoption of the first two modern constitutions. These steps had taken almost 50 years, in which literacy levels and urban development skyrocketed. However, the Brătianu family’s opponents, whether left or right, believed that structural differences separated the West from the East. Nae Ionescu would reduce the antinomy to the opposition between Catholicism and Orthodoxy. Nationalists and pro-Westerners alike identified Orthodox Christianity as the heart of the matter.

**But European…**

As in Central Europe, the first vote against communist parties in free elections signified also and mostly ‘a return to Europe’. The prospect of joining the European Union has, from the very beginning, been the engine of democratization and transformation which has taken place in our countries. A “Return to Europe” was what our citizens voted for in the first free elections’ (Havel et al., 2002). After the fall of Slobodan Milosevic, no significant political leader in the region dares to be openly anti-European: former nationalists convert overnight under the pressure of popular enthusiasm for European accession and lure of European funds. While millions of Balkan inhabitants cross daily the Western border legally or illegally to work in the European Union, technocrats, experts and selected politicians in Western as well as Southeastern Europe struggle to bring Europe to the battered Balkans. There is no alternative project, neither on the table, nor in the social imagination.

A return to Europe, but whose? When comparing Eastern and Western European histories the temptation is to explain individual countries’ poor performance in the region by what Emil Cioran’s bon mot would summarized as: ‘Nous sommes mal placés!’ And indeed local elites indulge frequently in blaming geopolitics for the present state of their societies. Historical facts, such as the resistance of local princes to the Ottoman advance in Europe are turned into full explanatory and justifying myths: the Balkans are backward compared to Western Europe because they defended Western Europe at the cost of their own Europeanness. Only exceptionally the opposite argument is found, that the Byzantine tradition is not European, and its legacy of autocracy and synthesis of powers in the person of the monarch is completely different from the Western story of competition among various powers (Iorga in Todorova, 1996). The story of Southeastern Europe as told by its inhabitants is one of nostalgia for the brief time when the Balkans were nearly European—between the two world wars.

A return to Europe, but to what Europe? While ordinary people started to have some grasp of current EU due to cheap cable TV and temporary labor migration, which had exploded in Romania and Bulgaria since 2003, intellectuals are the ones left behind. They are slow to understand that Europe is now EU. If the new Europe is to be uniquely the product of economy and Brussels’ bureaucracy, will its labyrinths created at the beginning of the new century put into practice Kafka’s labyrinths from the beginnings of the last century?’ (Michnik, 2001: 6). What made EU’s strong initial attraction, the identification with Europe, was later revealed as an important source of misunderstandings and reciprocal disillusionment (see Rupnik, 2003).
Political elites, those who keep winning elections on the count of their openness towards European values, have quite a different stance. While fully unaware of cultural affairs, and truly committed to Europe as a development dream, most of them remain fairly ignorant in European affairs. A TV crew scorned Romanian MPs after the publishing of the European Commission highly publicized Progress Report on Romania and Bulgaria in 2003 because few were able to name the organization which produced such reports or even place it in Brussels. Prior to 2007, party position papers on European accession produced by individual parties in Romania and Bulgaria remained the exception rather than the norm. The discourse on Europe was fairly general and nonspecific. The few technocrats who had some knowledge on Europe were all involved in negotiations on both sides, either the domestic government or the local EU delegations that represent the European Commission. Most of the local expertise, which was both quantitatively and qualitatively limited was mobilized by EU-funded agencies like the European Institutes. The purpose of such agencies was to inform policy by producing impact accession studies, but actually the few good studies that were occasionally produced originate from independent think-tanks.

Cultural diversity challenges in the past 30 years in Romania

There are three main cultural diversity challenges in Romania. Two of them are related to the rights and situation of the Hungarian and Roma minorities, while one has to do with the religious identification of the Romanian majority. In this section we will discuss each of these three main challenges. According to the results of the latest Romanian Census (2002), the distribution of recognized ethnical minorities in Romania is synthesized in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1. Main ethnic minorities in Romania, 2002</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Population total</strong></td>
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<td>Romanian</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hungarian</td>
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<td>Roma</td>
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<td>Germans</td>
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<td>Ukrainians</td>
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<td>Russian</td>
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<td>Tatar</td>
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<td>Serbian</td>
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<td>Bulgarians</td>
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<td>Croats</td>
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<td>Greek</td>
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<td>Macedonian</td>
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<td>Slovenian</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
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<tr>
<td>Undeclared</td>
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Source: Romanian census 2002
As opposed to Western European countries, immigration does not yet impose cultural challenges in Romania. According to the data provided by the National Immigration Bureau, around 1% of the Romanian population is represented by immigrants. Most of them come from neighboring countries – Moldova, Ukraine and Turkey – while a very small percentage is represented by non-European immigrants. Immigration of Asian workers (China, North Korea) reached its peak in 2007 and 2008, in response to a labor market deficit in the sectors of the economy booming at the time – constructions and textiles. In 2009 and 2010 the number of work permits decreased significantly. The short period of increased Asian immigration led to the creation of small ethnic enclaves in Bucharest and few other major Romanian cities. Due to their small numbers, immigrants in Romania still do not have enough visibility and even though reports of rights’ violations have been made by various non-governmental organizations, their issues have not yet reached the agenda. For this reason, we do not consider immigration to raise major diversity challenges in Romania yet, and we focus the report on the challenges faced by historical minorities.

Challenges post-2000: Orthodoxy as identity standard

Orthodoxy as the fundament of Romanian identity, deeply embedded in the nationalist thought, was associated to a high extent with the fight against communism, being thus prone to resurface again and again after 1989, when a sort of religious revival indeed took over the Romanian intellectual life. The communist regime was tolerant, and to some extent even supportive of the Orthodox Church, but the fundamentalist Orthodox laic tradition was censored due both to its doctrine of prevalence of spiritual over material life, and its historical association with the Iron Guard. Despite this, after 1989 intellectuals rediscovered Orthodox fundamentalism through the works of Nae Ionescu and Mircea Vulcănescu, which were reprinted in mass editions together with translations from the White Russian tradition by A. Soloviov, L. Chestov, V. Volkoff and N. Berdiaev. The main Romanian publisher, Humanitas, came under attack from the French intellectual Left for these reprints, but the publishing house was merely adapting to the market trend. Fundamentalist civil society groups, such as Anastasia, founded their own publishing houses, which became extremely successful putting out this type of literature.

The influence of the interwar fundamentalist Right made itself felt well beyond the overt political discourse during the first post-communist decade. The Museum of the Romanian Peasant [Muzeul Țăranului Român], initiated and designed by painter Horia Bernea, who himself was the son of a leading Iron Guard intellectual, retrospectively fulfilled Eliade’s programmatic vision of “a people living entirely under the sign of the Cross”. Bernea returned the former museum of the Communist Party to its original destination as a folk art museum, blowing it up into a glorification of peasant Christian metaphysics very much along the lines of Blaga. Thanks to his artistic vision and dedicated team, the museum eventually became a faithful image of traditional orthodoxy as pictured by interwar intellectuals, although a not-so-true, idealistic, representation of peasant imagery and life. Bernea’s personal qualities – he was a charismatic figure and among the few intellectuals not tainted by collaboration with the communist regime – helped to make the museum of folk art into a success story. This museum completely eclipsed the Museum of the Romanian Village [Muzeul National al Satului “Dimitrie Gusti”], designed by the old Romanian Social

4. The debate included also some Jewish non-French authors, such as Michael Schafir, but it revolved around the polemic between Gabriel Liiceanu, director of Humanitas and his defenders and a few French journalists from Le Monde and L’Esprit Moderne. Michael Shafir, “The Man They Love to Hate”, in: East European Jewish Affairs, 31 (2000) 1. P. 60–81, provides a summary of the debate.
Institute, even though the latter features the most extraordinary collection of old houses, mills and churches brought from all over Romania to Bucharest on the occasion of an interwar exhibition. This testifies to the infatuation with tradition, Orthodoxy and peasant life among Romanian post-communist intellectuals.

According to the latest Romanian Census (2002), 86.7% of the Romanian population defines itself as Orthodox. This percentage is followed at great distance by other Christian confessions, among which Catholic (4.7%) and Reformed (3.2%). The Romanian Orthodox Church has currently under its supervision a total number of 15,218 churches, which makes for an average of one church per 1,500 inhabitants who declared themselves orthodox. To get a sense of this number, we will take the example of the Catholic Church, the largest in the world. For its registered 1,163 million members, the Catholic Church administers worldwide 408,637 local churches and missions, counting for an average of one church per approx. 2,800 registered Catholics. That is almost less than double the concentration of Romanian Orthodox Churches per registered member. The argument of larger number of churches in Romania due to lower density of Orthodox Church members is not valid, as the countries that were considered when assessing the concentration of Catholic Churches are also mostly Catholic, ranging from 76% (Spain) to 91% (Italy) of population registered as Catholic, with an average similar or even lower population density.

The issue of separation between State and Church has reached the Romanian public agenda on various occasions in the past decade. One of the biggest issues, still in debate, was building the National Redemption Cathedral, a project that would have been financed out of public money, the construction of which would have lasted for 20 years and destroyed one of Bucharest's parks on the way. The Romanian Orthodox Church still claims its request for public funds is legitimate, since the issues related to restitution of church property seized under Communism has not been solved yet. Due to strong public opposition, the project is currently postponed. The economic crisis has raised the issue of Church financing once again. Since financing religious activities out of public money is equivalent to sponsoring the Romanian Orthodox Church, more and more voices are asking not only for financial self-sustainability for Churches, but taxing their activity. How does that play into the notion of the Romanian traditional self as being inseparable of the Orthodox values, it is yet to be seen.

**Hungarian minority**

Beyond any doubt, Romanian nationalism of the 1990s was targeting the Hungarian population. However, that does not mean that the nationalist outburst has a unique form of manifestation. The data collected in a previous study (Mungiu – Pippidi, 1999) revealed at least three types of nationalist elite manifestations.

1. **Professional nationalists.** It is always difficult to discern between the real problem of the national or ethnic group, mirrored by leaders or elite, and the problems the leaders help subsist in order to take advantage on them and consolidate their position. Some politicians can be described as professional nationalists as they are directly interested not to solve an ethnic conflict on whose behalf their career is made.
2. **Crusaders.** Other persons with political ambitions denied by their position in society—such as priests and journalists—also discover nationalism as a ‘cause’ they pretend to embrace in a non-political and non-partisan manner, in order to gain primarily political influence. These are the voluntary soldiers of nationalist causes, the **crusader nationalists**. Their cause is most of the times a language—but they can also focus on a minority religion or denomination, even on the genetic heritage threatened by mixed marriages.

3. The third and the largest category of nationalists are, however, the **conformists**. Many influential people in a community would never have nationalist initiatives or would support personally such a movement, but since they are dependent of the group/community they are willing to pay to have their identity as good group members confirmed by nationalists who speak in the name of the group. This leads to the subordination of elites which otherwise have both the money and the wit to do their own politics to the nationalist leaders. Many middle-class and business characters find themselves passive supporters of nationalism due to this mechanism, although they are disinterested by the nature of their occupation in linguistic battles and prestige wars, favoring communication over extreme differentiation.

Each of these three categories could be found among the elites of both ethnic groups—Romanian and Hungarian. The situation was obscured even further by the absence in Romania of a class of professional politicians. The people serving as politicians in those times of ‘transition’ were either lawyers, or, quite often, intellectuals and priests, so exactly from categories aspiring to reach political influence by nonpolitical means. It is a well known fact that writers tend to be nationalist leaders in the first stages of a nationalist movement: in the former USSR Republics Popular and National Fronts were mostly lead by writers in the late 80s and early 90s, and so was DAHR (the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians Romanian).

The 2002 census recorded approximately 1.5 million Hungarians and around 550,000 Roma (although other estimations suggest 1,000,000 may be closer to truth), relatively close to the numbers in the 1991 census. Despite this fact, fantastic exaggerations like this one are necessary in order to make the point. The nationalist argument for self-govern ment relies on the numbers when stating we cannot treat Hungarians as a minority, but as a nation. The Romanian political system is however a democratic one. Allowing Hungarian representation in Parliament and bringing them in a close alliance with Romanian parties was worth, since at all times, when DAHR was dominated by nationalists as since it was dominated by moderates the national problem remained in the framework of the law. Only once in ten years did DAHR asked for civil disobedience, when requesting parents to boycott schools to protest against the 1995 Education Law. It was the opportunity for them to measure the ethnic mobilization. Passive mobilization had been a success: 400,000 Hungarians signed for modifications to be made in the Education law. However, very few followed the appeal to civil disobedience. The Law allowed for teaching in maternal language and more recently it has been amended to allow for curriculum development specific to minority education. The implementation of the legal provisions is still far from perfect. While the privatization of manuals’ development and distribution was supposed to lead to supply diversification, after a few trials, it turned out to be more profitable for editorial houses not
to print manuals in minority languages. Thus, for schools that chose to teach in Hungarian, structuring the curriculum depended on the availability of imported teaching materials. Most of the times, this means access only to Mathematics and Hungarian Language manuals for primary school children.

Was there an inter-ethnic conflict in Transylvania? Since the 1990s and up until now, both political parties and ordinary citizens in Romania dismissed the idea of an ethnic conflict in Transylvania. Foreigners, ranging from organizations to citizens pointed out usually that at least during the 1990s there was a serious amount of ethnic competition going on, but refrained themselves from qualifying it as ‘conflict’. In mid 1990s the connection with a country neighboring Yugoslavia the use of this term risked being politically explosive. Ordinary people showed even more restraint. In a research conducted in Transylvania in the end of the 1990s, the first reaction in all the focus groups was similar to this line of a Hungarian peasant in Covasna: ‘It’s only the bosses, they make the trouble, the bosses and the television, we ordinary people get along fine’.

But the ‘bosses’ are there and so is the media, always ready not only to show nationalist speeches, but to amplify all kinds of incidents, real or fictitious, bringing the national problem daily in the house of every Romanian or Hungarian and therefore prompting a further need of security. People who discarded easily the idea of an ‘ethnic conflict’ imagine a conflict is necessarily and always violent. In fact it is not: many ethnic conflicts, from Quebec to Belgium, from South Tyrol to Slovakia are not violent. But they are nevertheless conflicts, that is, fights to attain objectives and simultaneously to neutralize, affect or eliminate rivals (Horowitz, 1985). Ordinary people feel that you can have a conflict without violence: 75% Hungarians and 45% Romanians (absolute and relative majorities) consider a conflict exists between Hungarians and Romanians (UBB poll, 1997). Why then in every group people were reluctant to admit it? Because the logic of the group discussion was centered on one’s community. To admit an ethnic conflict exists would have been to accept it exists in the close vicinity, therefore to assume some kind of personal involvement. Asked for a global evaluation Transylvanians admit the conflict, asked for a personal one they reject it and attribute the responsibility to elites. This is a national conflict, centered on national symbols at the scale of the two communities as whole, and not a daily communitarian conflict for small rewards or resources. From this point of view it is indeed an elite-engineered conflict. Romanians and Hungarians did not fight in Saturday night discos and pubs: instead they were reminded via media by their leaders that they belong to a group and should act as such. Youths who should be the most susceptible to engage in daily aggressive conduct were in fact the most disinterested.

Why did more Hungarians feel a conflict exists than Romanians do? We can think of two complementary answers here. One answer is the minority status of Hungarians; being in minority Hungarians feel more easily threatened by nationalist and xenophobic speeches constantly made in the Romanian Parliament. The other is that Hungarians are dissatisfied with the status-quo and want more rights than the Romanian state is willing to grant them so it is natural they feel more than Romanians a conflict exists. Romanians being satisfied with the situation at the time they tended to react only at the excessive publicity of nationalist statements by some DAHR leaders. For the rest they considered there
would be no problem at all if DAHR does not make one. It is clear, however, that the public debate around the problem feeds the problem. This is why people considered in polls that the relations between Hungarians and Romanians degraded after 1989, although the problems of the Hungarian community were greater before: but before it was clear Ceausescu was the cause and any public discussion of the matter was impossible. According to IMAS only half of the Hungarians, compared to a large majority of Romanians shared this view. This only strengthened the idea that Romanians were in fact ignorant of the problems of the Hungarians so they considered there was no problem at all. However, a majority of both Hungarians and Romanians considered that improving the relationship between the two groups is an emergency (IMAS poll, 1996). The relationship between the groups is only the tip of the iceberg in the equation of the conflict. The relationship would be good if Hungarians ceased to ask for more rights, Romanians believed. The relationship would be good only if Romanians grant the rights the Hungarians desired, Hungarians thought. And it was not easy for an observer to say who was right. Was bilinguism and self-government going to solve problems, or create others? Was it going to bring together the two communities or was it only going to estrange them further?

The Roma: The ignored challenge

Having escaped the wave of nationalistic backlashes that most of the other new EU member states had experienced in 2005/2006, with a nationalistic party that did not make it to the Parliament in 2008, Romania found its new national enemy in the Roma as the shame inflicting non-Romanian ethnic group that jeopardizes the legitimacy of its newly gained European status. In fact, increased freedom of movement seems to have placed Romanian authorities in the uncomfortable position of not being able to shove the garbage under the mat anymore. The old news of poor access to services of Roma children and segregated communities is finally coming out, creating a spur of reactions, limited for the time being to better advice from the Western democracies that are currently expulsing ethnically Roma Romanian citizens back to their home country.5

It was just in late September 2010, in the midst of the European wide scandal related to Roma expulsions from France, that a Romanian MEP announced his intention to push for a piece of European legislation meant to change the politically correct term of “Roma” into “Gypsy”, as Roma can be confused to the capital city of Italy, while Romani – the name of the spoken language of a part of the Roma groups – can too easily be mistaken for Romanian. The idea of regulating the right of the ethnically Roma European citizens to potentially make a claim on Romanian identity has at least three interpretations. The first one is straightforward: “Romanians are not Roma”, wherefrom the absolute denial of Gypsy heritage as part of the Romanian national identity. Secondly, the Roma are not one people, therefore their entitlement to collective rights within the EU should be kept within national borders, judged case by case, and not in terms of a broader participation to European decision making. Thirdly, the Romanian state has no responsibility in solving the Roma issue, no more than it does towards the rest of its 19 legally recognized and politically represented national minorities. Each of these reveals a different set of challenges, which will be discussed in the following section.

Romanians are not Roma. The lack of a written history is not to be underestimated. The few historical records scattered from modern Northern India, through Central Asia and Northern Africa, all the way to Western Europe and to some extent the Americas, have allowed for politically half-inexistent Romanian nationalists, such as Corneliu Vadim Tudor, to mockingly respond to the issue of expulsions with “Why not consider sending them to their real home country: India!”, in reference to the Sinti branch of the Roma. The “they are not Romanian, nor Roma, but Gypsies” debate cannot be more straightforward when it comes to national identity claims: Romanians are not Roma. Therefore, no association, cultural or otherwise should be made between the two groups. But how legitimate is that claim? We analyze it further on.

The rejection of Roma culture as part of the Romanian one might be even more deeply rooted than one might think. Making a claim on Roma culture identification would mean identifying with a transnational group which would once again prove the non-European Romanian inheritance. What is more, it would strengthen the ties between Romanian identity and the Balkan one. Upon Dayton (1995), the internationally broadcasted Bosnian war drama reached the movie industry. With it, movies that were portraying the bitter sweet tragedy of war adjustment of this jolly transnational ethnic group – the Gypsies – started gaining ground all throughout Europe. Their Serbian born Bosnian director, Emir Kusturica, and soundtrack composer, Goran Bregovic, teamed up to create a series of internationally awarded movies the comic of which was almost entirely relying on Gypsy fetishes as ironical war survival techniques, with the underlying message of peace promoting residing in the international character of this ethnic group, that has no state allegiance, and in fact, no allegiance towards anything or anyone besides its own community. While the Balkans had already been ravished by ethnic conflicts, the Roma were left between battling camps. However, Kusturica’s 1995 “Underground” or 1998 “Black Cat, White Cat”, made it almost unavoidable for the Eastern European public not to relate to the heritage that the Gypsy travel across Europe had created. Despite the fictional nature of these movies, in the particular case of Romanian national identity, the fear was and still is that “Gypsy meaning Balkan” would eventually translate into “Romanian not being European”.

Truth is there was no need for romantic reveries from Serbian directors in order to acknowledge the impact that the transnational cultural link of the Roma had on Romanian culture. The proof of anthropological claim on Roma culture as our own can be found in the most hidden places, carrying with them the charge of the inter-ethnic relation and most of all of the majority – minority power relation. For example, a small “anthropologically sauvage” territory in Eastern Romania, in the middle of the historical province of Moldova, takes pride on having conserved an unique New Years masque ritual, otherwise conceptually encountered all across Romania: at midnight the ritual of taming bears is performed by men dressed in real bear skins on the sounds of drums and lyrics which are meant to help the tamer enslave the bears. Playing out the “Bear’s Dance” requires intense planning and the effort of the entire community. Those performing it today will be the first to offer a foreigner the front seat to the show, as this New Years’ ritual will help him understand Romanian culture and identity. However, what they have seem to have forgotten, if they ever knew, is that this is a ritual performed by Gypsy slaves. The initial ritual was performed using bear cubs that were placed
on a heated metal platter or burning pieces of charcoal while the tamer would play the drum. The moves currently in the ritual are just an imitation of the squabbling moves of the tortured bear cubs, and what is actually preserved in this particular region better than in others, is that real bear skins are used. This particular case stands only as a mere example of a heritage that was realistically unavoidable given the interaction between these two cultures.

‘Roma should not be called Roma’ is a violation of collective rights. The denial of the right of this group to identify itself as “Roma” carries an even greater symbolic value and is far more aggressive than it might seem. As social anthropologists argue (Mcgarry, 2008), this ethnonyme was institutionalized as a politically correct reference to an Eastern and Central European minority that identified itself as being “Roma”. Thus, it is an ethno-cultural identity ascription that marks the common traits, ethnic or otherwise, that different minority groups in different countries have in common, despite their well known but fully embraced internal heterogeneity. According to Mcgarry (2008) and Klimova-Alexander (2005), the institutionalization of one term “Roma” to describe all that belong to this group regardless of national territory, allowed for the Roma social movement to occur, as the emergence of transnational organizations that would defend the minority’s rights and promote its cultural heritage in Europe. The existence of an organized Roma civil society would fundamentally change the status of this minority into one that is entitled and able to make a claim on public space, internationally, regionally and nationally. If this thesis is indeed true, denying self-ascription as “Roma” is equivalent to denying the right of this minority to representation and participation in public decision making, as it has happened before in history.

The thought of striping this group of their right to choose their own name, especially one that refers to a trans-border group, has mainly two targets. On one hand, it shifts the responsibility from international/regional level to nation states, while, on the other, it secures the power of the nation state and eases the pressure that a transnational movement would put on it for access to more rights. If as Mcgarry and Klimova-Alexander argued, a Roma social movement does exist, and it is crucial for the defining the Roma ethno-cultural identity and placing Roma issues on national and international policy agenda, then its success would depend to a large extent on the quality and effort of its elites. However, the internal divisions, which in Romania generally overlap with clan belonging, stay strong. Sides have their own political and civil society representation that it is neither able nor willing to coordinate in order to put in effect coherent action.

They are Gypsy not Roma, as government responsibility waver. “The Romanian Gypsies are a minority the problems of which need to be addressed just as those of the rest of the minorities”, the Romanian government would argue. Moreover, “they need to obey rules if they want to be respected”, as a recently interviewed mayor answered. The latest census data (2002) indicate that currently in Romania live 550,000 ethically self-identified Roma people. Independent estimates placed them at around 1.5–2 million people, which would mean approximately 7.5% to 10% of the total Romanian population. Since a part of the Roma do not carry official documents, it is extremely difficult to know their exact number. A recent report issued by the Open Society Foundation
(McDonald and Negrin, 2010a) as a mid-term evaluation for its Decade of Roma Inclusion program shows that independent estimates tend to indicate a number of Roma that is 45% to 99% higher than the official figures in Eastern European countries (ibid: 29). In fact, the lack of data is a real obstacle in formulating coherent and viable policy responses to the Roma issue. However, what the Romanian government – as others in the region – does not take into account is that lacking data is not the same thing as not knowing what the issues are. Those are well known, but for some reason they still do not make it very high on the policy agenda.

The discrimination against the Roma in Romania is the highest out of all other possible vulnerable groups. A survey issued by the Romanian National Council for Combating Discrimination (CNCD) as early as 2004 showed that out of all vulnerable categories, the Roma and the poor are perceived to be the most discriminated. In fact, a study conducted by the National Agency for the Roma in 2008 indicated that higher discrimination towards poor people leads to even a greater degree of discrimination against the Roma who are poor and live in ethnically mixed communities. According to the same study, the only other Roma category that encounters the same high level of discrimination is that of average-wealth Roma living in segregated communities.

The overlap between ethnic based discrimination and the economic one is not a coincidence. In 2007 41.9% of Roma declared that in the past month their family had not had any source of income (Fleck and Rughinis, 2008: 131), as compared to 20.2% of the non-Roma control sample. Segregation is a crucial factor, as the chances of a Roma family to have access to at least one source of income increase by 20% in mixed communities as compared to segregated ones. The distribution of the primary source of income for the rest of 58% who declare to have at least one is presented in Chart 1.

![Figure 1. Main source of income for the Roma minority in Romania (%)](image)

Source: Fleck and Rughinis (2008:133), based on 2007 survey data on the Roma community in Romania.
As it can be seen in Chart 1, the main source of income is social support, including minimum guaranteed income, child support, disabled pensions and social support, unemployment benefits and other types of social benefits. This disproportionate structure of income reflects how deep in the “poverty trap” the Roma are caught. Most of those who take some form of paid work have low skill jobs, in agriculture (32.4%), constructions (18.8%) or services (29.6%).

The lack of skills is the direct consequence of the low access to education. Even though the number of Roma children of school age who are not in school is not known, previous research has identified communities in which the percentage of Roma children who attend school is as low as 10% (Fleck and Rughinis, 2008: 148). After all, it comes down to an economic choice. A report issued by the National Statistics Institute (2010: 5) based on 2002 census data showed that the fertility rate of Roma women is 2.5 times higher than those of non-Roma women, which accounts for a lower average age within the Roma group as compared to non-Roma. Currently, the costs incurred by the parents to send their children to school, especially when child support might be the family’s only source of income, are much higher than the short term benefits they can account for. Child labor, most encountered in Roma families, can be an additional source of income, meaning an additional set of disincentives for parents to send their children to school. A significant amount of factors contribute to the perpetuation of this situation. Poor access to education is probably one of the most relevant, as it affects the long term chances of this community to escape poverty, but spatial segregation and imposed habitation pattern, cultural differences and few and incoherent mediation initiatives fuel the current policy challenges related to the Roma community.

Romanian Roma are Romanian, or at least the statistics seems to prove that. The Roma Inclusion Barometer (2006) showed that the majority of Roma (80%) define themselves as having two ethnicities; 45% declare themselves as Romanian Roma, 32% that they belong to Roma subgroups, while only 23% say they are Roma alone (Fleck and Rughinis, 2008: 58). As such, the costs of Roma exclusion are felt at national level. A World Bank analysis estimates that the losses of Roma exclusion from the labor market rise up 887 million Euros in terms of annual productivity, and 202 million Euros in terms of fiscal productivity (de Laat, 2010). According to the same World Bank report, investment in the education of Roma children is the most profitable investment that governments can make in order to alleviate the situation of the Roma minority. It is estimated that ensuring transition of Roma children from primary to secondary education alone can lead to a 144% increase in earnings.

The discourse and definitions of tolerance in Romania

Individual versus collective rights: The language battles

Despite several discussions on the topic, Romania has not yet adopted a minorities’ law. The life of the ethnic minorities and their entitlement to a public sphere of their own is regulated by the 2003 Constitution, the Law of Public Administration, and the Law on Education. The Ciorbea government coalition, of which DAHR was a member, proposed in 1997 amendments to the public administration law (Ordinance 22/1997) and
the Education Law (Ordinance 36/1997). Amendments to the administra-
tion law legalized for the first time the use of minorities’ language in
the state administration, although its practice, especially in Hungarian
dominated regions, was widespread. The law also specifically required all
mayors in regions where minorities make more than 20% of the popula-
tion to display signs carrying denominations of towns or other important
notices in the Hungarian language also.

The debates on education exposed the deep cleavage in the battle for
bilingualism. Romanians were not prepared to accept Hungarian as a sec-
ond official language. Hungarians did not present their claim as such,
being aware of this fact. The language battles were the toughest of the
1990s. The diabolization of the Education Law 84/1995 as an instrument
of ‘cultural genocide’ for introducing a test of Romanian at the admis-
sion exams in the University was however an exaggeration. It was a poor
law, making steps back, which could only lead to revolt. The Hungarian
political elite decided at the time to make it an example. People were
instigated to civil disobedience, white flags hanged above Hungarian
schools and 420,000 signatures gathered to support DAHR amend-
ments to the law. However, a referendum of the boycott of schools was
dropped because DAHR had clear signals there would be no mass fol-
lowing on this issue. Hungarian leaders went so far as to ask Hungarians
to go on hunger strike in order to obtain the amendments debated.
Although few registered as required as strikers the protest form is no less
radical. The protest also showed the deep alliance between Hungarian
educators, politicians and Church –the Church lead the Crusade against
the education law recording people who decided to strike and encourag-
ing people to take part in the protest. A group of youngsters marched
on foot across Europe to protest in front of the Council of Europe at
Strasbourg. The Education law was a mistake of the Vacaroiu govern-
ment. But the debate and the unrest surrounding it only worsened the
daily, usual relations between Hungarians and Romanians. Romanians
mention always with fear this exceptional mobilization of the Hungarian
community.

Political representation back in discussion

When most had already proclaimed victory of the consociationist gov-
ernance model, the issue of collective rights and the way they play
out in minority – majority relations is suddenly back on the agenda. In
early October 2010 a massive toxic spill in Western Hungary, near the
Romanian border, caused 7 casualties and destroyed 40 sq km of land.
The wave of toxic waste is estimated to reach the Danube and affect
flora and fauna on the course of the Danube all throughout Romanian
territory. It so happens to be that the Romanian Minister of Environment
–Laszlo Borbely– is a representative of the DAHR. The Minister is assuring
the Romanian public that the wave of toxic wave will not jeopardize the
health of Romanian citizens, as the debit of the Danube is high enough
on Romanian territory. Since news of the toxic spill broke out, the pub-
lic opinion has been fueling suspicions on the true intentions of the
Minister of Environment, which would not go within Romanian interests,
but the Hungarian ones. The media remind a similar case of a spill taking
place on Romanian territory at the end of the 1990s, which had affected
Hungarian waters and that had led to a sentence for Romania to pay
Hungary 100,000 million EUR in damages. The Minister defends himself,
saying that he only wants to present things as they are and not scare people without any use, since regular tests are made on the water of the Danube when it enters the country and no dangerous concentrations of toxin was encountered. The situation is in full development, and its outcome is yet to be seen.

**The policy of tolerance**

Negotiating the accession of minority groups to public space and the way in which it would be regulated was never an easy task. The National Minorities’ Bill spurred intense debates each time it reached the government’s agenda. Since the mid 1990s when it was first drawn up and forwarded for debate by the DAHR, up until 2005 when it was blocked in the Parliament again, the adoption of a legal statute for national minorities in Romania seems to be more difficult than it looks. As mentioned earlier in the report, significant developments on the rights granted to minority groups were made since the beginning of the 1990s. Most of them had to do either with the ratification of UN Conventions into national legislation, EU accession negotiations and, later, transposition of EU Directives.

A lot has changed in the past 10 years alone, however not enough to put into question the very need for an official minority statute. Romania is the only country in Eastern Europe to give the constitutional right to organized and recognized ethnic minorities. Now there are 18 of them, besides Roma and Hungarian, and they occupy one seat each in the lower chamber of the Parliament, regardless of the vote turnout, as stipulated by Art 62 (2) of the Romanian Constitution of 2003. An UN - CERD official report issued in August 2010 as a response to a request coming from the still active Hungarian nationalist branch of the DAHR to grant territorial autonomy to the Hungarians in Transylvania, recognized the progresses made by the Romanian government for the past 20 years. Decentralization of public service provision and financing (e.g. social services, health, or education management) was seen as a form of autonomy and recognition of the right to self determination. Moreover, it is argued that the right granted to local administration in general through the Public Administration Law covers the collective rights that should be granted to any national minority as imposed by the ratification of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination. CERD recommends the Romanian Government for the rights to cultural self identification to be indeed supervised by a National Council for Cultural Autonomy and that an official national minorities’ statute be adopted.

Despite considerable developments, institutionally, the protection of ethnic minorities tends to remain rather obscure. The National Council for Combating Discrimination (CNCD), setup in 2000, is in charge with overseeing regulation on discrimination against minorities, including ethnic ones. CNCD can mediate discrimination cases or can recommend the case for a judicial settling. In case it takes its own resolutions it can apply fines of up to approximately 2,000 EUR, as it did in mid-October 2010 with the case of the Romanian Sports’ Ambassador –the tennis player Ilie Nastase—after stating that Romania needs to take its Roma back from France and needs to relocate them in Harghita, one of the three majoritarian Hungarian counties in Romania. The remark was taken as discriminatory and offensive to both Roma and Hungarians.
In charge with promoting ethnic diversity, is another state institution which only few people have heard of – the Department for Interethnic Relations of the Romanian Government. Its main task is to coordinate the Council for National Minorities, which brings together representatives of all ethnic minority groups in Romania. Judging by the information posted on the institution’s website, nothing much seems to have happened since 2008. However, in 2009 and 2010 the Department sponsored small outreach projects on cultural diversity. There is no way of knowing who got them and how they were used.

In recognition to the challenges posed by the large size of the Roma community in Romania, the Government setup in 2004 the National Roma Agency (ANR). The Agency’s mandate is stated to be that of “representation of the Roma minority in Romania”. Nonetheless, ANR is part of the Center of Government, being directly subordinated to the General Secretariat of the Government (GSG), as most sector regulatory agencies in Romania. The financial information available on their website is a good indicator for the well known problem of Roma organizations – low capacity of spending. For 2007, 2008 and 2009, the ANR was able to spend up to 85% of the total amount of funds allocated. Thus, even though theoretically funds for Roma integration are available, the low capacity of spending is preventing them for reaching their purpose.

The ANR is also responsible with overseeing the implementation of the governmental “Strategy for improving the conditions of the Roma”. From 2000 to 2005 UNDP and the GSG financed 17 programs that targeted infrastructure development – roads, energy supply infrastructure and school network rehabilitation in specific Roma communities. Each project was worth in average 750,000 EUR. Another 200 million USD were made available by the World Bank and the Open Society Institute in order to include Romania in their Decade for Roma Inclusion Program (2005-2015), which mainly aimed at increasing access to education and health for Roma, labor market integration and discrimination combating. The recently released mid-term evaluation (McDonald and Negrin, 2010a: 61-66) points out the obvious: the data collection problem that prevented governments in elaborating policies targeted to Roma to begin with persisted, thus preventing the efficient impact evaluation of the Decade for Roma Inclusion.

The war of political symbols: Catholic versus Orthodox

The East-West cultural divide is real and seems to be here to stay. Thus, the limits of tolerance to which non-Romanian identity can be culturally tolerated and to which it cannot, go back as far as the mid 19\textsuperscript{th} century. The argument of “modernization as rape” was reshuffled to be radically transformed by Nae Ionescu and his students Mircea Vulcănescu and Emil Cioran, who portrayed modernization as the annihilation of the Romanian “essence” independently on whether this was good or evil. The father of this argument is Ionescu, the most charismatic intellectual leader of 20\textsuperscript{th} century Romania. For him, the rejection of modernization is only a part of an overall refusal of the West identified with “Catholicism”; it is an active and transforming orientation towards the outside world that he identified as alien to the Orthodox spirit.
Young Emil Cioran, who considered populism “a shame”, denounced it in violent terms. Had Romania followed the path of anti-modernism preached by populists, he wrote, “Romania would have been today like Asia, a land to be visited by ethnographic expeditions” (Petreu, 1999: 141 and 227). Unlike the rest of the “New Generation”, Cioran saw modernization as a necessary rape and considered that the regime must “squeeze” the Romanian nation to cut its “unhistorical sleep” and force it into transformation and history. He was also quite unique in his generation, which embraced a sort of fundamentalist Christian Orthodoxy, in looking for a shortcut to modernity through a massive conversion to Catholicism, a belief that was influenced by his professor Naïe Ionescu, who taught that Orthodoxy and modernization were incompatible.

The economics of ethnic diversity

Resource distribution is one of the core issues in minorities’ politics, and hence the construction of the public discourse on tolerance towards ethnical minorities’ issues. When discussing the spectrum of ethnic diversity tolerance there are three main issues that need to be addressed: 1) the minority dimension of the property restitution issue, 2) local self-government and unequal distribution of resources across geographical areas with clear cut and compact ethnic majorities and 3) the special case of the ethnically Roma Romanian. This section will address each one of these dimensions in relation to the tolerance discourse in recent Romanian history.

First, it is no secret that Romania has an outstanding number of ECtHR complaints on property restitution issues. In fact, there are so many that in the beginning of October 2010 the Court gave Romania an 18 months deadline to solve its issues before it addresses the property restitution complaints against the country. When expropriations began, in 1945, the Jewish, German and Hungarian minorities were severely affected. Even before the official nationalization of property had started (1948), once declared enemies of the state (1945), property belonging to these three minorities was seized, on and off the record (EP, 2010: 99-100).

In the beginning of the 1990s, the adopted property restitution laws restricted the eligibility of claimants to Romanian citizens, disregarding the equal right to property of the Romanian national minorities that had been unlawfully expropriated, who had their properties confiscated in return of unjust compensations, or were simply forced to donate their properties to the State. Foreign plaintiffs became eligible only in 2003, following a revision of the Romanian Constitution that allowed foreign citizens and stateless persons to own property in Romania.

Second, the ethics of redistribution under the centralized administration was one of the core issues of the public discourse on the Statute of Autonomy in the case of the Hungarian and Szekely minorities. The argument of higher productivity of the administrative units that had a local Hungarian or Szekely majority, which would have turned illegitimate the redistribution of revenues collected in this region to poorer regions of Romania, seems now to be a false one. Various factors can account for the differences of development between counties in Transylvania and the ones in the rest of the country (except for Bucharest and Constanta). However, what data tends to suggest (ADR Center, 6. Property was seized from national minorities in three waves: 1) immediately after the the 2nd World War, when they were declared “enemies of the state” and stripped of their right to own property in Romania, 2) along with the nationalization of property during communism and 3) when they would leave the country, representatives of the German and Jewish minorities would be forced to donate their property to the state. The property restitution laws adopted in the past 20 years address only the mainstream nationalization, while cases 1) and 3) that had minorities as a direct target were not not addressed in any way.
2007) is that while prior to the start of decentralization reforms this might have been partially true, with Harghita having one of the highest GDPs in the country in 1999, by 2004 it had become far from reality. Covasna, Harghita and Mures, the counties with the highest proportion of Hungarians in the country (see map below), had a GDP below their macroregion’s average, while Alba and Sibiu, counties with very diverse ethnic composition, were 30 and respectively 10 percentage points above the regional average (ADR Center, 2007: 21).

Figure 2. Distribution of the percentage of Hungarian population out of total county population, across Romanian counties and regions.

The “area of benefit” financial allocation argument did not work one way alone. The results of the Ethnic Relations Barometer (2002: 26) showed that a large percentage of Romanians in Transylvania (67%) and outside (61%) considered that the rights minorities enjoyed at the time of the survey sufficed. Similar percentages were registered for Hungarians (64%) and Roma (61%) who thought that minorities in Romania enjoy too few rights. One thing was certain: granting further rights to the Hungarian minority without further decentralization would have not come in too cheap for the central government. With decentralization (or de-concentration, for some services) the financial costs of minority rights remained unobvious. Some were completely externalized, as was the case of manuals in maternal language for primary education. The failure to provide manuals in Hungarian, or German for all school subjects (except maybe for mathematics and literature) is entirely placed on the market, and not on the government for not being able to intervene and correct this natural effect of competition among manual editors. The situation persists.

Third, there are major discrepancies in terms of access to resources between the Roma and the other ethnic groups in Romania. For the Romanians, Hungarians and Roma the 2002 Barometer of Ethnic Relations (MMT, 2003) identified the distribution of intra-ethnic rates of poverty and extreme poverty (see Chart 2).
The question is what proportion of this discrepancy can be structurally explained and how much can be placed on discriminatory policies or attitudes. In a previous section we briefly touched upon the vicious cycle that the Roma are caught in: low access to education has made labor market integration difficult for Roma ethnics, which accounts for high differences between employment rates within the Roma and non-Roma populations. Not being able to access the labor market, means finding other sources of income. For a large percentage of the Roma (55.9%) this means some form of social support, while for others is staying on the black market. The problem is as real as it gets, and even though enrollment rates for Roma children were slightly increasing since 2000, the enrollment rate for Roma in primary school still remained significantly lower (by 25%) than that of non-Roma children (UNICEF, 2006).

Discriminatory practices, especially in relation to the Roma, aggravate the situation. A survey run in 2005 (CURS, 2005: 9) showed that the Roma population perceives itself as being the most discriminated as compared to the main ethnic groups (Romanian and Hungarian), as much as in comparison to other marginalized groups – HIV positive people, gay people or the elderly. Out of the situations when discrimination can be more pervasive the one at hiring stands out, with 68% of Roma considering themselves discriminated when they tried to get a job. Once hired, 63% of them feel discriminated at the workplace. The other two situations that come close are in school (60% of Roma children considering themselves discriminated) and in public places (50%).

On the other hand, in the Eurobarometer on Perception and Experience of Discrimination (2008), only 40% of the Romanian population declared that they believe that discrimination on ethnic origin is fairly or very widespread, as compared to the 62% EU average. The same survey showed that Romanians are generally favorable towards ensuring equal opportunities at employment through affirmative action measures targeting minorities. However, they are the least favorable towards granting them to ethnic and sexual minorities.
Conclusions

Today it is still fashionable to search for grand explanations for Romanian exceptionalism rather than try to make comparative analyses and deconstruct it. Why would post-1989 intellectuals continue a tradition shared equally by the far right and the far left? One answer is obvious: because most intellectuals, after Stahl’s death, are those who attacked him two decades ago. Another answer is scarier: because young intellectuals seem to follow more in the steps of Cioran and Eliade than those of Stahl and Gusti, mostly for reasons of cognitive convenience. Why? Well, since it is still easier to bolster one’s self-esteem by easy rather than by hard means. The problem remains the lack of self-esteem one seems to get from being a part of a “minor culture” and the great ambition to surpass it fast and with little investment. The golden trio not only managed to achieve some fame for themselves, but they wrote hundreds of pages that may be seen as prescriptions of how to get cured from being a “cultural minor”.

One of the challenges that need to be surpassed in order to set the premises for a truly plural Romanian society is the equivalence between Romanian and Orthodox. Is there anything wrong with Orthodox spirituality, one could ask, besides its failure to contribute properly to the much-needed modernization? The sad answer is yes. The link between Orthodoxy and non-democratic attitudes is neither random, nor spurious. When left alone by intellectuals, Orthodoxy is far removed from practical life: it does not teach individualism or promote quests for justice and morality like Protestantism (Radulescu-Motru, 1904), nor does it endorse any political action of the kind recommended by Eliade or the Iron Guard. It can be accused of failing to provide the basis for democratic education, but no more. In the hands of the intelligentsia and nationalist clergy, however, more often than not it supplied the grounds and legitimacy for anti-liberalism.

The policy discourse towards the two main ethnic minorities in Romania – Hungarian and Roma – needs severe revision, which would hopefully be followed by a change in the public discourse as well. Two Romanian foreign ministers in a row, both selected from amongst these typical intellectuals (a historian and a theologian) made in recent years outrageously racist remarks concerning Roma. The whole Romanian policy towards the Romanian citizens begging and stealing in Western European capitals is to portray them as Roma, a group culturally unrelated to Romania. In contrast, Hungarians from Transylvania have always been seen as equals, despite not allowing them to call Hungarian the second official language (it is legal to use it in Courts and administration though). But there is no real communication between these groups. Nationalism, very popular in the early 1990s, has been to some extent tamed by EU entry. While the dominant discourse remains identity centered, policy is rather ambiguous. Moldovans born in Romania are granted citizenship, although in smaller numbers than they would wish. The recent decision of FIDESZ in Budapest to grant citizenship to Hungarians living in neighboring countries was received with indifference in Bucharest.
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CHAPTER 16. TURKEY

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Introduction

Having the legacy of the Ottoman Empire, modern Turkey, with more than 72 million inhabitants, is a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural country, housing approximately 50 different Muslim and/or non-Muslim ethno-cultural groups: Sunni Turks, Alevi Turks, Sunni Kurds, Alevi Kurds, Circassians, Lazis, Armenians, Georgians, Jews, Greeks, Arabs, Assyrians etc (Andrews, 1989). However, leaving aside the attempts made for democratisation of the country in the last decade, the Turkish state has been far from recognising the ethnically and culturally diverse nature of the Turkish society. Ethno-cultural and religious minorities in Turkey have been subject to homogenising state policies.

As Turkey is a republican country, one could not find official figures about the numbers of ethno-cultural and religious minorities. The article is designed to portray the ways in which ethno-cultural and religious diversity has hitherto been managed by modern Turkish state within the framework of the discourse of tolerance. Explicating the construction of the Turkish national identity and the modern Turkish state, the article will primarily delineate the constitutive elements of the state machinery as well as the technologies of citizenship. Turkey's process of Europeanization will also be scrutinized in order to pave the way to a detailed analysis of the transformation of the Turkish polity from the Cold War years to the Post-Cold War years. In doing so, major challenges against the traditional Kemalist nation-state building process will be scrutinized such as political Islam, Alevi revival, Kurdish revival and Europeanization/globalization. Subsequently, some statistical information will be given regarding the major ethno-cultural and religious minorities. The term ‘minority’ has a delicate history in Turkey, as it often has negative connotation in the popular imagery. In the text, the term ‘minority’ will be used in both legal and sociological/anthropological framework.

Ottoman multiculturalism was usually coupled with the term ‘tolerance’. The concept of tolerance has a very long history in the Turkish context tracing back to the Ottoman Empire. It also has a very popular usage in everyday life. Turks are usually proud of referring to the Millet System of the Ottoman Empire is often known to be the guarantor of tolerance,
respecting the boundaries between religious communities. The equivalents of the term tolerance in the Turkish language are tolerans, hoşgörü, tahammül, müsamaha, görmezden gelme, and göz yumma. The meaning of the term hoşgörü is depicted in the Dictionary of the Turkish Language Association (Türk Dil Kurumu) as follows: “the state of tolerating everything as much as possible.” hoşgörü literally means “seeing (the other) in a good way”. The term ‘tahammul’ is derived from the Arabic root word ‘haml’, which literally means ‘to pick’ or ‘to bear’ or ‘to carry’. For example if one picks a book, or carries a load or a burden, etc. the word ‘haml’ would generally be used; but if one patiently bears a turmoil, or an affliction, or a humiliation, or an indignity, or an oppression, etc….the term ‘tahammul’ would be used. The word musamaha literally means to forgive, and it is even claimed that the word Masih derives from this word in Arabic. Additionally, in Arabic, the word tasamuh transcends the realm of political toleration and connotes personal virtues such as patience and generosity. On the other hand, “görmezden gelme” means “pretending not to see”, and “göz yumma” literally refers to “to close one’s eyes”, or to condone, excuse.

Most of these words used in Turkish as equivalents of the term tolerance, address at a kind of burden to carry on one’s shoulders, so they all refer to a kind of endurance and forbearance. The very etymological meaning of ‘tolerance’ also has parallels with the use of its equivalents in the Turkish language. It does not seem to be accidental that in most languages in which tolerance has been historically debated, the words tolerance (or its synonym, sufferance) and suffering have the same source. The etymology of the term ‘tolerance’ is also very illustrative to understand what it contains. It does not seem to be accidental that in most languages in which tolerance has been historically debated, the words tolerance (or its synonym, sufferance) and suffering have the same source. The Latin word tolerantia comes from tolerare, to bear, and tolerate, to suffer, endure, and the same link exists in English (through the synonym, sufferance), in French (souffrir), Italian (soffrire), and even in Hebrew (sevel-sovlanut). This etymological fact happens to be philosophically significant. It indicates that there is no tolerance without suffering and its overcoming. Tolerating someone means recognizing an irreducible difference, a gap of alienness separating us, which nevertheless is accepted. This implies a concealed hatred or contest between the tolerating and the tolerated party. By this very otherness, the other represents a challenge to the self in the form of a potential competition over goods, power, moral values, and so on.

**Nation, State and citizenship in Turkey**

Since the beginning of the nation-state building process, the primary goal of the main constituents of the Turkish Republic had been the establishment of a homogenous nation and a unitary state. In order to achieve this goal, Mustafa Kemal and the military/political elite equipped the state with a superior power over the civil society. Serif Mardin (1975) puts special emphasis on the statist and centralist character of the Republic in its founding years. He underlines that the Republic was ‘diffident’ in integrating the social forces into the central political system although the local notables, who took part in the National Independence War, and formed a significant component of the first Grand National Assembly, were incorporated into the Republican People’s Party (RPP) and the bureaucracy (Mardin,
To this aim, some religious, ethnic and local claims such as Kurdish Sheik Sait rebellion (1925) and the Islamist Menemen revolt (a district of Izmir), were suppressed by the state elite on the ground that the social forces were regarded as the sources of decentralisation and political rivalry (ibid.: 23). Therefore, Mardin argues that rather than integration of the social forces into the centre through mobilisation of the masses, the Republican idea to restructure the society was confined to the bureaucratisation and regulation (ibid.). Hence, the Kemalist elite preferred achieve the goal of forming the unitary state and a homogenous nation by means of preserving the state’s raison d’être, and adopting policies to suppress, assimilate and exclude diverse societal groupings along religious, ethnic and cultural lines.

In order to maintain the dominance of the state in political and social structuring over its social rivals, Mustafa Kemal and the state elite adopted policies and programmes to homogenise linguistic, historical and cultural features of the Turkish society and to construct a ‘new national identity’. Atatürk defined the Turkish nation as “the Turkish people forming the Turkish Republic”. By this statement, he elucidated that every individual who participated in the establishment of the Republic and took a share in the future of it is a Turk (Özbudun, 1981: 18). Atatürk’s definition of the Turkish nation embraces all the people who live in the lands of Anatolia and Thrace, and feel to be a part of the past and the future of the Republic. That is why his conception of Turkish nation avoids the distinction of any social segment along with religion, ethnicity, and sectarianism. In this sense, the republican Kemalist elite were difference-blind, and did not recognise ethno-cultural diversity of the Turkish nation.

The defining distinctiveness of the early Republic was Turkification policies, which sought the dominance of Turkishness and Sunni Islam as the defining elements in every walk of life, from the language spoken in the public space to citizenship, national education, trade regime, personnel regime in public enterprises, industrial life and even settlement laws. Having an imperial legacy, many such new regulations and laws referred to a set of attempts to homogenise the entire nation without any tolerance for difference. It is highly probable that the underestimation of ethno-cultural diversity among the Muslim population of the Republic was due to the preceding Ottoman Millet system borrowed by the republican political elite. The Millet system did not consider ethnic differences among Muslims. All Muslims, regardless of their other differences, belonged to the one and the same ‘Muslim nation’. Paradoxically, the successful nature of the Turkish revolution/rupture lays in the continuity of the Ottoman notion of millet.

In the years to come following the formation of the Republic, assimilationist and/or exclusionary policies of the state elite, which sought to erase social and cultural diversity, continued to render the national identity based on Sunni Islam and Turkishness a dominant role in social and political spheres. The social forces affiliated with diverse religious, ethnic and cultural values were frequently faced with and suppressed by the homogenising policies such as the nationalist Turkish history thesis of 1932, the Sun Language Theory of 1936, the unitarian nationalist education policies (Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu, 1924), banning the use of mother tongue and of ethnic minority names, discriminatory settlement laws put in effect on the exchange minorities and new migrants (İskan
For the Kemalist mode of secularism as a means to the project of modernist nationalism see Göle (1997), Keyman (1995), and Cizre-Sakallıoğlu (1996).

Discriminatory citizenship laws granting citizenship exclusively to Muslim origin migrants, the imposition of Wealth Tax in 1942, especially on non-Muslims, and the forced migration of Kurds in the east and southeast of Turkey (Kaya, 2007). Ethno-cultural minorities adopted different means to cope with the challenge of the state's homogenising policies. They generated their own individual identities in accordance with these assimilationist and/or exclusionary policies. Within the framework of the majority nationalism, ethnic and cultural minorities chose to be involved in the project of the construction of a homogenous Turkish nation, disguised their ethnic identities in the public, and identified themselves as a constitutive element of the Turkish nation.

Subsequent to the primary goal of the formation of a homogenous nation and a unitary state, the state elite pointed at the modern and secular character of the state. Without a macro socio-economic transformation, a total cultural change through the adoption of the Kemalist version of Westernisation and secularism required the state elite to construct ‘an imagined Turkish nation’ in line with the interests of the unitary and bureaucratic state (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, 1996). In its configuration of secularism, the Kemalist elite did not only accommodate the Islamist identity of the individual but also dispersed the individual identity under the banner of the modern and secular Turkish nation (ibid.). In doing so, they ensured that the individual will was secondary to national will, and also precluded that Islam as a social power could be organised as a challenge to the unitary and bureaucratic state (ibid.). Relying on the ‘bureaucratic code’, the state elite instrumentalised secularism, which was conceptualised as the separation of politics and religion both in public and private spheres, in order to consolidate the central state power against the potential threat of social forces affiliated with Islamic values and aims.

It should be noted that there is a debate over the definition of Turkish citizenship, for instance “while some argue that the formal definition of Turkish citizenship is based on territoriality rather than ethnicity (Kirişçi, 2000), for some, Turkish citizenship oscillates between political and ethnicists logic (Kadıoğlu, 2007). The historical evidence shows that citizenship policies of Turkey were civic republican in rhetoric. The first citizenship law of 1928 gave citizenship to all those residing within the boundaries of the republic on the basis of jus soli principle. However, it has gradually become ethno-cultural in nature embraced by jus sanguinis principle. Retrospectively speaking, ethnic groups in Turkey such as Kurds, Circassians, Alevis, Armenians, Lazis and Arabs have developed various political participation strategies vis-à-vis the legal and political structure and delimitations.

**Cultural diversity challenges**

In the aftermath of the 1980 military coup, Kemalist ideology encountered various challenges originating from ethno-cultural and religious groups. This was the time when the Kemalist rhetoric of nationalism, which was based on a retrospective narrative holding the Muslim origin nation together against the syndrome of common enemy of imperialist European powers, was challenged by its major taboos: Islam, Kurds, Alevis, globalization and liberalization. In what follows, these challenges will be scrutinized.

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1. For the Kemalist mode of secularism as a means to the project of modernist nationalism see Göle (1997), Keyman (1995), and Cizre-Sakallıoğlu (1996).
Rise of political Islam in the 1980s: Islamist forces as integral parts of the regime

State-centric Kemalist regime was confronted with the challenge of ethno-cultural and religious groups in the aftermath of the 1980 military coup (Keyman and Öniş, 2007: 16). The military coup and the policies undertaken by the military government until 1983 revealed that the military elite made a profound attempt to eradicate the sources of social strife emerging from the conflict between the rightists and leftists, and between diverse ethno-cultural communities in the 1970s, and to rebuild the social-political cohesion (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, 1996: 245-246). For this purpose, the military elite began to pursue a project of restructuring the society in a way that the conservative and Islamist sources of culture were accommodated into the homogenous modern Turkish national identity (ibid.).

In parallel with the invocation of the Islamist aspects in the national culture, the policy of economic liberalisation was regarded as a necessary means to structure a new social and economic order. Both the accommodation of the Islamist forces and the economic liberalisation were expected to avoid the polarisation and fragmentation among the political parties supported by the diverse social forces contesting to obtain resources and to shape the social order. It is in this political context after the 1980 coup that it became possible to see the Islamist forces, values and themes more pervasively involved in various areas of formal political and social spheres. For instance, the Islamist orders and communities (Sufi tarikats) infiltrated into the political parties, government, civil service, and the business and banking sectors. Moreover, the Prime Minister Turgut Özal, who was backed up by the military in the formation of the new conservative and economically liberal order, met the leaders of some Sufi tarikats for the Friday prayer. Mandatory religious instruction in primary and secondary schools was introduced by the military regime led by Kenan Evren (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, 1996: 244).

However, the state’s project of restructuring the political society was embedded in an implicit ‘double discourse’. One aim of the military government in the project of reorganising the society was the integration of social forces into the political system, and the other was the enhancement of the state’s role in politics. To put it differently, the military government undertook a macro socio-economic transformation, whereby it attempted to create a homogenous and cohesive society unified in Islamic and nationalist identity under the circumstances of liberal economy, on the one hand. On the other, it was committed to strengthen the state’s control over the political and social realms. That is to say that although the introduction of free market economy both in economic and social spheres such as the privatisation of mass media stimulated the mobilisation of social forces and the proliferation of civil society, it also impeded the democratic consolidation by containing the political activity of the civil society within the channels of political participation (Toprak, 1988: 126-127).

In order to enhance the state’s role in politics, the military government initiated the enactment of an electoral law, by which it adopted the 10 % national threshold in order to preclude the participation of the ideologically oppositional parties in the competitive politics (Özbudun, 2000: 75). The military government also enacted some articles of the 1982 constitution and other laws, whereby it outlawed cooperation between political
parties and other civil society institutions aiming at demobilising the working class and depoliticising the civil society (ibid.: 27). Therefore, it can be argued that the enhanced state’s control over the political and social spheres eliminated a civil society autonomous from the state, in which social forces could be mobilised into major oppositional groups organised along ethno-cultural lines as a challenge to the unitary state and the republican regime.

The Islamist forces incorporated into the new socio-economic order in which the big business circles in the centre and in the peripheral Anatolian petite bourgeoisie circles integrated and coexisted within the structure of liberal economy. Hence, they were used by the new state elite to counterbalance the leftists and highly mobilised urban working class (ibid: 26-27). The Islamist forces did not emerge as a challenge to the secular and republican regime, they rather became an integral part constituting and maintaining the status quo of the liberal and capitalist order, which enabled the military and state elite to sustain the political regime.

New challenges in the 1990s: Ethno-religious claims

The political context of the 1990s showed a different character from the 1980s, whereby the enhancement of the state’s role in politics proved to be counter-productive. While the state’s control over the political and social realms prevailed, ethno-cultural and religious minorities mobilised a politics of identity in reaction to the state’s restriction of political participation. Ethno-cultural and religious communities, which were already integrated into the regime in the 1980s, could not participate in the political process to the extent that they could manifest their dissidence against the inequality and injustice in the distribution of resources within the restricted liberal system.

Due to the lack of the political will and capacity of the coalition governments of the 1990s in management of the economic liberalisation in technological and organisational terms, the opportunities of the open and free market economy did not assure sustained economic growth and were not equally allocated to every segment of the society (Keyman and Öniş, 2007: 136). Both the rapid integration to the world economy and the poor management of the economic liberalisation gave rise to economic crises and problems of inequality and poverty. Social segments which were marginalised and deprived by the unjust features of the liberal economy protested against the deteriorating effects of the socio-economic structure such as poverty, unemployment, corruption, social injustice and ‘the moral decay’.

Another factor which played a significant role in the rise of the politics of identity by which political mobilisation was stimulated and formed along ethno-cultural and religious lines was the process of globalisation. The transformation to the free market economy and broader interaction with the world societies also created an impetus for the proliferation of liberal, democratic and pluralistic ideas in the political realm as well as to the cultivation of social mobilisation in civil society.

However, the Turkish political regime based on the priority of state and the restricted political participation was not able to respond to the demands for fostering a political system promoting democracy, pluralism and civil
society required by the liberalisation process. Fragmentation embedded in the globalisation process provided the marginalised and oppressed social groups with an informal social-economic structure by which they were able to mobilise in the political context of restricted participation and devalued left-right axis and to fight against the inequalities of the liberal economy and the complexities of the urban life (Hale and Özbudun, 2009:35). Hence, it is crucial to present that his period has witnessed three major social movements challenging the authority of the traditional political centre: political Islam, Alevi revivalism, and Kurdish nationalism.

**Political Islam as a challenge to the Kemalist regime**

The emergence of the Welfare Party with an Islamic social base and political agenda posed a profound challenge to the state-centric, republican and secular regime in both political and cultural terms. The Welfare Party (WP, Refah Partisi) and the broader social network of the Islamist movement sought to respond to the inequalities of the global and liberal system by transcending the state and mobilising the marginalised and underprivileged social groups within an expanding Islamic civil society (umma) and the framing structure of identity politics. The WP tried to generate its electoral support from a broad Islamist social network both by supporting the socio-economic opportunity structures for the social integration of the Islamist forces into the growing liberal economy and the competitive urban life and by channelling their interests and demands to the national politics through political parties. Like the Islamist movements in the other Middle Eastern countries, Islamist communities, Sufi orders (tarikats) and Islamic welfare associations provided a network for the marginalised classes, in which they were provided with sources of social services including employment, religious and secular education, health services, food, cloth and coal supplies which the nation-state failed to provide to a large extent thanks to the unmanaged transition to the liberal economy (Hale and Özbudun, 2009: 16-18).

It should be noticed that the Islamist political mobilisation appealed both to the winners and losers of the global and liberal economy in the sense that the newly emerging Islamic bourgeoisie, which underwent a continuous integration into the liberal system since the 1980s, distributed to the poor the wealth raised from the publishing houses, private media channels, university preparation courses, Islamic banks and financial institutions and holding companies (ibid: 13). Through its connections with these Islamist communities, the WP attracted the votes of the Islamic bourgeoisie, the upper middle class and the marginalised lower class and also stimulated political mobilisation of the conservative and Islamist social forces, which dramatically challenged the republican and secular segments.

In regard with the unacceptability and intolerance of the dominant regime towards the Islamist forces, the military elite and the coalition government led by the WP in 1997 confronted some crises. The WP posed some challenges to the secular regime with its demands articulating Islamic values and purposes in the political life involving the exercise of the Islamic law, the segregation of sexes in social life, religious education and the headscarf issue. Analysing the demands of the WP for the incorporation of Islam into formal politics, it should be underlined that what the WP was seeking was the acquisition of state power and the formation
of an Islamic social order from above rather than mere toleration for the recognition of freedom of religion and conscience and the protection of religious rights such as the wearing of headscarf and religious cloths in public places (ibid: 7-9).

Within the legal and institutional framework, the military/bureaucratic state elite made it explicit that the WP’s Islamist demands cannot be tolerated as the military gave a harsh ultimatum to the party in the meeting of the National Security Council (NSC) on the February 28, 1997 and the party was closed down on the January 16, 1998 by a Constitutional Court decision in the following year (ibid: 4). The WP and the Islamist forces constituted a religious and cultural challenge to the republican and secular dominant regime and segments of the society. Their challenge was manifested in the legal and institutional frameworks in that the WP suggested the introduction of a new legal implementation, whereby each legal community would be governed in accordance with its own religious rules. In doing so, it asserted a return to the Medina Covenant of the Prophet Muhammad’s time, the age of happiness (asr-i saadet), whereby a kind of multiculturalism based on religious differences was experienced (ibid: 7-8).

In the social and economic spheres as an everyday practice, the WP also attempted to undermine the secular and Western order and to alter it in a way that it could also embrace the social forces, which had a religious and Islamic way of living. Therefore, the WP and Islamist forces posed a religious and cultural diversity challenge both in their attempt to stimulate social integration and political participation of the Islamist segments into the republican and secular establishment and to Islamize the society and culture in the legal and institutional framework and everyday practices. However, the state elite and dominant secular segments reacted to this challenge of the WP immediately, and showed their intolerance towards the Islamist forces by purging them from the formal political sphere.

**Alevi Revivalism**

The other challenge to the republican state and the myth of homogeneous nation rose from the Alevi community. After the adoption of the caliphate institution by the Sublime Port in the 16th century, the Ottoman Sultan, Yavuz Sultan Selim, imposed the dominance of the Sunni Islamic tradition over various religious groups in Anatolia (Erman and Erdemir, 2008). As a consequence of these assimilationist and suppressive policies, Alevis were compelled to develop a protective attitude towards their own community and identity by living in small social enclosures in rural areas (ibid.). In the Millet system of the Ottoman Empire, Islam was the main constitutive element (Yildiz, 2001). In the Millet system did not distinguish between the Muslim subjects of the Ottoman with regard to ethno-cultural differences. All Muslims, regardless of their differences, belonged to the one and the same ‘Muslim nation’. Thereby, Alevis were also imagined as the integral subjects of the ‘Sunni Muslim nation’ (Kaya, 2004).

Throughout the nation-state building process, the state elite also followed the Ottoman heritage of the ‘Millet system’ imposing the dominance of the Sunni Islam. In order to achieve the goal of the Kemalist
mode of modernisation, the republican political elite implemented policies for the secularisation of the political and social life (Göle, 1997). One of these policies was the abolishment of any kind of place for religious communion and practice other than mosques without taking into consideration the Cemevis, dervish lodges and special places for Alevi communion (Erman and Erdemir, 2008). For this reason, Alevi communities were deprived of the places where they could be organised into a religious community as an alternative to the Sunni communities.

Moreover, by the entitlement of all the religious affairs to the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) accountable to the Prime Minister’s Office, the Alevi were subject to the decisions made by this institution on all matters of religious life (Erman and Erdemir, 2008). It is also worth noting that the Directorate of Religious Affairs gradually turned into a state institution instrumentalised to impose and diffuse the values and practices of the dominant Sunni Islam. The transition to the multi-party politics did not bring about a radical challenge to the dominant republican and secular regime based on the homogenous Sunni-Turkish nation. Rather, the Democrat Party which emerged as the opposition to the Kemalist Republican People Party, had embraced the dominant Sunni Islamic discourse, mobilised the Sunni conservatism, made connections with Sunni sufi sheikhs and returned to the Arabic prayer’s call in the 1950s. Thus, we can draw the argument that throughout the Republican history, both the state and the society regarded Alevis as intolerable or difficult to tolerate or accept as they posed a challenge to the dominant Sunni Muslim order.

Despite the state discourse for the re-alignment with the Alevis and the common initiatives of the Sunnis secularists and Alevis to accommodate cultural and religious diversity, in this decade, one could also find obvious examples illustrating the cases of intolerance and conflict. As an ethno-class group, the Alevi community living in the squatters of the shanty town Gazi at the periphery of Istanbul emerged as a resistance grouping, which considered their Alevi identity superior to the Turkish national identity as opposed to the moderate Alevis seeking a democratic, pluralistic and peaceful movement. The Alevi community of Gazi neighbourhood identified themselves with aspects such as distrustful and sceptic of the bureaucracy, the state authorities, the politicians and the municipal governments, which ignored the grievances and the lack of social services there as a result of their ‘Othering’ the ‘poor and different’ Alevis.

This conflict between the dominant classes and the culturally and religiously different underclass Alevis of the urban life took place in an armed clash in Gazi neighbourhood. In March 1995, an unknown person fired at the people in three coffee houses and one of them died and 20 of them were seriously injured. The neighbourhood people were involved in an armed conflict with the police forces, which were late to intervene and thus seen as responsible for the attack. At the end of the clash between the Alevis and the police in the neighbourhood, 15 people were killed by the policemen. This case of armed conflict between the security forces and the marginalised Alevis revealed that the level of social intolerance, suspicion and hatred increases when the dichotomy between Sunni-Muslim-Turkish majority and the ethno-religious groups and minorities such as the Alevis was re-emphasised, and the gap between the rich and the poor was widened.
Kurdish Revivalism

At the end of 1980s, political parties which represented the Kurdish identity and defended the Kurdish cultural and political rights began to enter the formal political sphere. Under the Özal government, the abolition of the articles of the law 765 of the Turkish Penal Code, which restricted the freedom of expression, laid the ground for the formation of legal ethnic and religious parties (Sahin, 2008: 134). In addition, departing from their alliances with the leftists parties of the 1970s, the Kurdish political and intellectual elite abandoned the old communist slogans, the socialist economic programmes, and the aim of forming an independent Kurdistan, and replaced them with the seizure of the cultural rights for the Kurdish people and the democratic consolidation of the democratic republic (ibid). During the 1990s, the attempts of the Kurdish political elite to represent the Kurdish cultural and political rights by participating in the national politics through political parties were undermined by closure cases of the Constitutional Court and the public debates on the legitimacy of a party, which was founded on the basis of the recognition of ethnic identity.

Ever since the establishment of the Turkish Republic, the state has never been tolerant to the expression of Kurdish identity in the public space. The Kurdish population was considered by the Kemalist elite as the most formidable threat against the formation of nation-state based on the republican, secular, modern and bureaucratic principles as well as on the homogenous Turkish national identity. First, as it was evidently revealed in the Sheikh Sait Rebellion (1925), the Kurdish tribal leaders and religious leaders, sheikhs, who maintained control over the local community, constituted a potential source of rivalry to the central political authority. Second, the Kurdish people were also perceived as a rigorous impediment to the project of the Kemalist mode of modernisation and Westernisation due to their ‘backward, pre-modern and inprogressive’ communal and pramordial life style based on Sufi order (tarikats), tribes, sheikhs, landlords, warlords and rebels (ibid). Consequently, the increasing affiliation of the Kurds with the PKK, the Kurdish Workers Party (Partia Kerkeran Kurdistan) is even making them more intolerable for the majority Turkish nation and the state.

Since 1984, the PKK has been leading an armed struggle against the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) in the southeastern region. In order to defend the Turkish territorial integrity and the national security, an urgent implementation of excessive military and authoritarian control over the governance of some cities (Martial Law) in the eastern and South Eastern regions was introduced in 1987, and was extended for 57 times until its abolition in 2002. Moreover, since 1985 the military adopted another strategy, whereby they supported and armed the village guards of some Kurdish tribes allying with them to counterattack the tribes involved in armed attacks.

The rise of the Kurdish ethnic nationalism, which involved the attempts of the Kurdish representation in the national politics, on the one hand, and the armed struggle, on the other was perceived as ‘a low-intensity war’ between the Kurdish minority and the Turkish state. The armed conflict has resulted with an increasing tension between the Turks and the Kurds in a way that leads to the mental division among the Kurds. Kurds are now willing to stay in their home cities despite the difficulties in getting jobs. Racism and institutional discrimination towards the Kurds in the big
cities and in western Anatolia is growing day by day. Since the mid-1980s, the Kurds have been coupled by the majority Turkish public with separation, division, disintegration, terror, violence, drug trafficking, informal economics, and gun industry.

2000s: European Integration and Euroscepticism

As stated earlier, Turkey was granted the right to candidacy in the Helsinki Summit of the European Union in December 1999. Later in 2002, the Copenhagen Summit introduced new concerns and discussions regarding the nature of European identity, the notion of Europeanization and the borders of Europe, which led to identity-based concerns regarding Turkey’s place in Europe and the situation of Islamic identity in European societies. According to Keyman and Öniş (2007), the main concern was whether the EU aspired to become a global actor or rather preferred inward-oriented integration. Subsequently, while the former aspiration was accommodating towards Turkish membership, the latter perceived Turkey as a liability due to the social, political and economic disparities between the EU member states and Turkey (ibid: 48-50). For the first time the Copenhagen Summit and the subsequent discussions linked the question of culture with European enlargement and the EU’s capacity to embrace cultural differences. “The discussions over Turkish accession reveal yet another dimension of ‘absorption capacity’, that of ‘cultural’ and ‘social’ absorption, which are directly related to the ‘identity’ of the Union. Jean-Louis Bourlanges, an MEP from a French centre-right party vocal on Turkish accession, has argued that the accession of Turkey will not only have a huge economic impact on the EU, but will also introduce a great deal of cultural and social heterogeneity that will endanger the formation of a solid and democratically organised political community” (Emerson et al., 2006: 3)

In the course of European integration, the JDP adopted a conservative democratic ideology with an emphasis on secularism, social peace, social justice, the preservation of moral values and norms, pluralism, democracy, free market economy, civil society and good governance. By using such a pragmatist discourse, the JDP aimed to mobilise socially and economically marginalised classes, which reacted to the inequalities deriving from the processes of globalization and urban life (Kaya, 2004: 16-17). Moreover, the JDP also became attractive for the liberal and secular bourgeoisie, upper middle and middle classes, who were disenchanted with the political system because of the political and economic instability (Hale and Özbudun, 2009: 37). The JDP immediately took an initiative to raise toleration and respect for the freedom of religion and conscience, and for the protection of religious rights such as the right to practice religion in public and private space.

Whether the JDP’s discourse on conservative democracy and Islamic liberalism achieved to transform the society into a more tolerant society with respect to the recognition of religious freedom and rights is not certain. However, it is clear that the JDP government made profound attempts to force the state and the society to recognise cultural and religious differences. The protection of religious freedoms and rights became a heated debate between the Islamist and secular segments of society. One of the cases, where the JDP sought to increase the tolerance vis-a-vis the social integration of Islamist forces and to foster the respect for religious free-
dom is that the JDP government proposed a draft-law, which enabled the Imam Hatip (clergy high-school) graduates to study not only in the faculty of Islamic theology but also in other faculties (ibid: 86). By doing so, it made an attempt to eradicate the constraints, which gave rise to the social and economic segregation of religious and conservative segments.

Moreover, between 2002 and 2008 the JDP made several attempts to initiate the amendments and decisions in the legal and institutional framework for the lift of the ban on headscarf. The JDP government proposed to the Constitutional Court an amendment on the articles of the Constitution concerning the ban on wearing headscarf in universities with the expectation that this amendment would lead to the lift of the ban in 2008. Following the constitutional amendments, the newly elected head of the Board of the Higher Education (BHE), Yusuf Ziya Özcan made an announcement to the universities and stated that according to the constitutional change, the ban on wearing a headscarf in the Turkish universities was lifted. However, the Court repudiated the lift of the ban ultimately. As a consequence, the appearance/existence of conservative and Islamist segments in the socio-economic sphere was recognised/accepted as an everyday reality although (in)tolerance/(dis)respect for the expression of faith and wearing religious clothes still remained as a highly debated topic in the public.

On the other hand, it should be thoroughly questioned whether the quest of the JDP for the recognition of religious freedom and rights through the adoption of the discourses on conservative democracy was equally carried out in every social cleavage, and particularly, in the case of religious minorities. Before the 2007 elections, even though the JDP took an initiative to accommodate the Alevi in the Sunni-dominant order, the party was primarily concerned with gaining more votes from the Alevi. The Alevi were not equally treated in the JDP’s policy to transform the society to become more tolerant for the expression of faith and religious rights. The JDP failed to accommodate the Alevi into the social sphere and continued to retain the Sunni-dominant social order since it did not recognise the Cemevis (Alevi communion houses) as places of worship in addition to mosques, and insisted on the inclusion of the Alevi children in the assignment of the compulsory courses of religion in the secondary school education. Therefore, one should contend that the JDP’s policies to stimulate the social sensitivities for the toleration and recognition of the religious minorities and the protection of religious rights were confined to the Sunni conservative and Islamist segments.

In the legal and institutional framework, since February 2002, it is also possible to find various reform policies for the recognition and protection of ethnic minority rights, which manifested a great shift in the discursive position taken by the political elite. Since the Accession Partnership Programme and the National Programme (March 2001) addressed at the recognition of ethno-cultural diversity, the former coalition government and the JDP government enacted and enforced reform packages and policies to accommodate ethno-cultural diversity, and in a broader sense, to secure the individual rights, liberties and human rights within the framework of the consolidation of democracy and the rule of law. With the initial reform packages put into force between 2002 and 2004, first, they reduced the role of the military in politics by removing the military origin judges from the State Security Courts, and eventually abolishing these courts, removing the military members from the High Audio Visual Board (RTÜK) and

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the Board of Higher Education (BHE), weakening the military impact on the judiciary, civilianising the National Security Council (NSC) and restricting its role to a consultative body, and by bringing the extra-budgetary funds of the military under the general budget of the Defence Ministry.

Secondly, they reinforced the individual rights, liberties and human rights versus the authoritarian and unitary state by loosening the law on the freedom of association and demonstration, abolishing the death penalty and all means and practices of tortures by the security forces, revising the Penal Code, abolishing the term of ‘forbidden language’ from the Press law, permitting limited broadcast in Kurdish in the private radio and TV channels, introducing limited broadcast in Arabic, Circassian, and various dialects of the Kurdish such as Kurmançî and Zaza on the national radio and TV channels, and by allowing the ethnic languages and dialects to be taught in private courses. Consequently, the reform packages, which were adopted to raise the social awareness of tolerance and acceptance of ethno-cultural minorities, encouraged ethno-cultural groups to vocalise their claims through legitimate political channels.

Since 2001, the governments took initiatives to remedy the civil and cultural rights of non-Muslim minorities through legal amendments. In accordance with the Copenhagen Political Criteria, the constitutional amendments expanded the individual rights and liberties to every citizen and provided the structural arrangements for democratic consolidation and the enhancement of the rule of law and human rights (Oran, 2004). The EU Reform Packages partially and gradually restored civil and cultural rights conceded to the non-Muslim minorities with the Lausanne Agreement.

In the nation-state formation process, the state elite of the Republic inherited from the Ottoman the discourse and practices of the homogenous nation based on the Sunni Islam and the exclusion of the non-Muslim minorities. The Kemalist definition of nationalism was also discriminative against the non-Muslim minorities since it incorporated the element of Islam into the so-called modern secular national identity. The configuration of the majority and minority elements of the Turkish nation were also inscribed in the (1923) during the foundation of the Turkish Republic. According to LA, the non-Muslim minorities (Greek, Jewish, Armenian and Assyrian) were officially categorised and recognised as ‘minorities’ resting upon their ethnic and religious differences whereas Kurds, Alevi, Circassians and other Muslim elements belonged to the Turkish nation (Türk Uyruklu) constituting the majority (Oran, 2004).

With the EU Reform packages, the ban on establishing associations for the preservation and diffusion of languages and cultures other than Turkish and traditional to minorities was abolished; the use of the ‘forbidden language’ was re-legalised in the law of associations; the restrictions on learning and publishing in different languages and dialects other than Turkish were abandoned; the right to acquire intangible property of the foundations belonging to the non-Muslim minorities was restored by a change in the law on foundations and was initially subjected to the decisions of the cabinet and later to the General Secretary of Foundations (Vakıflar Genel Mudurluğu), and the limitation on the names other than Turkish was abolished by a change in the law on population. Furthermore, recently the European Union General Secretariat in Ankara has decided to drop the use of the term ‘non-Muslims’ in identifying officially recognized
minorities in Turkey. Seeking to update the government’s terminology for the 21st century, Turkey’s chief negotiator for European Union affairs has announced a decision to use the term “different belief groups” instead of “gayrimüslim” (non-Muslim) in official EU correspondence. The decision was taken after the Chief Negotiator Egemen Bagis received a letter from the vice patriarch of the Ancient Syriac Orthodox Church, Yusuf Çetin, who pointed out that “Muslim” means “believer” in Aramaic, a northwest Semitic language used in ancient times as the everyday speech of Syria. As such, the term “gayrimüslim,” which has been the preferred term for non-Muslims in Turkey, implied “nonbelievers”.

Furthermore, the discursive shift from ‘majority nationalism’ to ‘diversity as an ideology’ fostered by the governing party created an incentive for a change in the every-day life for the social motivation toward toleration of ethno-religious rights of non-Muslim minorities. The political elite, the Turkish and Armenian intellectuals and civil society organisations were induced to open public discussion on the taboo issues involving the Armenian ‘genocide’, the Armenian ethnic minority rights, the Armenian-Turkish diplomatic relations and the impact of the Armenian Diaspora on the problems related to the Armenians.

Strikingly, the debates on the Armenian ‘genocide’ both at the state and society levels have been good examples of the rising aspiration of toleration for the Armenian ethnic and cultural rights. One of these cases of the rising tolerance was the highly debated and polemical conference on ‘Ottoman Armenians during the Demise of the Empire’ held at Istanbul Bilgi University in 2005. Although some ultranationalists brought a lawsuit on the organisers of the conference and the court partly considered their claims rightful and lawful, this conference became a good indicator of eradicating the biased views on the Armenian issue.

On the other hand, it should be also pointed out that the EU Reforms on civil and cultural rights of non-Muslim minorities could not be brought into practice in an immediate and effective way because its application was obscured and delayed by bureaucratic obstacles and the interference of National Security Council, the intelligence agencies and the Security Forces. Since 2004, none of the applications for the approval of non-Muslim foundations has been approved, and 18.66% of the applications for the acquisition of intangible properties belonging to the existing foundations have been approved (Oran, 2004: 133-134). By looking at the constraints in bringing the EU reforms on non-Muslim minorities into practice, one could maintain that the dominant discourse of ‘non-Turkish’ and ‘foreign’ non-Muslim minorities is still prevalent, and therefore, the Turkish state is still reluctant to accommodate tolerance, recognition or acceptance in everyday life.

Discourses and practices of (in)tolerance in the age of euroscepticism

From 17 December 2004 to 3 October 2005, when EU state and national government leaders decided to start negotiations with Turkey, tensions began to rise between nationalist, patriotic, statist, pro-status-quo groups on the one hand and pro-EU groups on the other hand. This was the time when the virtuous cycle of the period between 1999 and 2005 was replaced with the vicious cycle starting from the late 2005. A new nationalist
5. Sévres Syndrome derives from the Sévres Peace Treaty signed by the Allied powers and the Ottoman Empire in 1920 in the aftermath of the World War I, leading to the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire.
be difficult to see how its judgment could have an impact on the support for the EU membership. The only way, then, could be that Euroscepticism is understood as a general perception and attitude towards Europe, not only towards the EU and the prospect of membership. This is actually a remarkable phenomenon indicating that Europe and European Union are often interchangeably used in Turkey.

The Eurosceptic attitude towards the EU-accession could be found not only in the JDP government and among Turkish nationalists and pro-status quo groups. Rather, after 2005, the Kurdish people also became ardently critical of the EU reforms with a growing sentiment of Euroscepticism. In parallel with the suspicion of the sufficiency and the efficiency of the JDP attempts to recognise the Kurdish identity, the revocation of the concept ‘minority’ in the Progress Report in 2004 provoked some of the Kurdish nationalists to reemphasize their position against the Turkish majority nationalism. A considerable fraction among the Kurds claimed that they denounced the concept ‘minority’ because it rendered them a ‘degrading’, ‘inferior’ and ‘unequal’ status versus the Turkish people (Saĥın, 2008: 144). Rather, this fraction defended their claim that the Kurdish people were one of ‘the constitutive elements’ of the Turkish Republic, and therefore, had a status equal to that of the Turks. Considering themselves as the ‘constitutive element’ rather than a minority, the Kurds fervently alleged that their characteristics which distinguish them from other minorities should be recognised, and the equality to the Turkish majority in living conditions should be secured (ibid). In other words, even though this demand gives the Kurds a distinctive status in comparison to the other ethnic and religious minorities, it is sound in the sense that it remarkably denotes to the right of ‘equal citizenship’.

It has also been suggested that although the EU reforms on the protection of ethnic minorities culminated in an open public debate, they did not achieve to take a concrete and significant step towards the settlement of the Kurdish problem (Somer and Liaras, 2010). The Kurdish Democratic Society Movement (DTH) declared in 2004 that the objectives of the movement involved the support for the EU accession, the resolution of the Kurdish problem by peaceful and democratic means and with respect to territorial integrity, and the adoption of a new democratic and universal constitution (hurriyetim.com.tr, 22.10.2004). The DTH, which abandoned the secessionist and federalist claims, put forth its demands for the adoption of ‘constitutional citizenship’, the abolition of the 10% national threshold in the electoral law, the liberalisation of equal participation for all political parties, and social and economic development in the Kurdish populated regions (Radikal, 26.05.2004). Thus, considering the definition of ‘minority’ in the Turkish political context and on the Kurdish political party, one should carry on debating whether the EU reforms adopted by the JDP government aim to merely tolerate cultural and individual rights of the Kurdish minority, or are designed as an initial stage drifting towards a national project for the resolution of the Kurdish issue and the recognition/acceptance/respect of the difference of the Kurds.

It was possible to find the examples of intolerance influenced by the upsurge of radical nationalism in the practices of everyday life. In March 2005, two Kurdish children allegedly burnt the Turkish flag during the Newroz celebrations (hurriyet.com.tr, 21.03.2005). Six month after the Prime Minister Erdogan’s visit to Diyarbakir in 2005 where he declared his full support of the solution of the Kurdish problem with respect to

6. For more information about the declaration of the DTH see “Eski DEP’lilerden Demokratik Toplum Hareketi (The Democratic Society Movement from the former members of the DEP) http://hurriyetim.com.tr, 22 October 2004 accessed on 13 June 2010
7. Y. Alataş, “AB Üyülükü Kürt Sorunun Yan Dışı” (The Series on the Kurdish Question on the Verge of the EU Accession), Radikal (27 May 2004).
democracy, the Kurdish people in this city rioted in the funerals of four PKK members (Somer and Liaras, 2010). In the following months, the casualties caused by the PKK attacks increased.

It should also be underlined that the Turkish majority nationalism increased as a response to the rising Kurdish nationalism as well as to Euroscepticism. In retaliation to the issue of flag burning in Mersin (21 March 2005), some public figures started flag campaigns in the name of ‘responsible statesmanship’ (Hurriyet.com.tr, 21.03.2005). The ‘waved and unwaved flags’ (Billig, 1995:10) obviously indicated the cases of the rise of intolerance where the nationalist and sceptic attitudes of both Kurdish and Turkish people were provoked in regard to the national and ethnic conflict. Hence, the intolerance, ethnic conflict and violence increased at the time when the Kurdish people became increasingly critical of the suitability and the sufficiency of the JDP government’s EU reforms for the recognition of ethno-cultural identity and the resolution of identity-related issues, and the sceptical and nationalist attitude towards the ‘Other’ was strengthened by the Turks and the Kurds.

Finally, it is also possible to find striking cases where social intolerance, unacceptability, non-recognition and even hatred towards the Armenians reached its peak and even involved violent conflict. The most conspicuous of these cases was the assassination of the prominent Armenian journalist, Hrant Dink in January 2007. It was claimed by some journalists in the media that the assassination of Hrant Dink could be linked to a reaction of ultranationalists, who were agitated by the verdict of guilty for Hrant Dink on the denigration of Turkishness in one of his articles. In 2005, Hrant Dink was sentenced to six months’ conditional imprisonment on account of ‘insulting Turkish national identity’ according to the article 301 of the Penal Code. The article 301 of the Penal Code considers a criminal somebody who publicly denigrates Turkishness, the republic or the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and sentences him/her to imprisonment between six months and three years.

Moreover, the rise of Euroscepticism and the reinvigoration of national identity as a response to the upsurge of identity politics based on ethnic and religious difference after the articulation of the concept of ‘minority’ in the 2005 Progress Report also aggravated intolerance and conflict between the Turkish nationalists and the Armenian minorities. For example, in March 2005 the 80th anniversary of the Gallipoli Victory was celebrated in an exaggerated manner in retaliation to the 90th anniversary activities of the Armenian exodus (hurriyet.com.tr, 17.03.2005). Hence, it is argued that the shift in the discourse from ‘majority nationalism’ to ‘diversity as an ideology’ through the EU reforms and the attempts of the JDP did not result in a substantial change in the attitude of the Sunni-Turkish majority towards the toleration and acceptance of ethno-cultural and religious diversity for non-Turks and non-Muslim minorities such as Armenians.

Conclusion: The myth of tolerance in Turkey

The concept of tolerance has a very long history in the Turkish context tracing back to the Ottoman Empire. It also has a very popular usage in everyday life. Turks are usually proud of referring to the Millet System of the Ottoman Empire is often known to be the guarantor of tolerance, respecting the boundaries between religious communities. Such an official
discourse is still carried out in contemporary Turkey, although it is evident that it is just a myth. The myth of tolerance was functional to conceal the mistreatment of ethno-cultural and religious minorities other than the majority of Sunni-Muslim-Turks in Turkey. The term tolerance has become more viable in the aftermath of the Helsinki Summit of the European Union in 1999. Whether a cultural diversity challenge is tackled in relation to the concept ‘tolerance’ or other concepts such as ‘recognition’/‘acceptance’ or assimilation, expulsion and persecution, depends on the historical form of a particular state.

The definition of tolerance is confined to the acceptance of Sunni Muslims and their secular counterparts under the banner of the Sunni-Muslim-Turkish nation. However, it does not mean to embrace all different kinds of ethno-cultural and religious minorities. As Karen Barkey (2008: 110), a famous Ottoman historian, stated earlier, toleration in the Ottoman context as well as in other imperial contexts refers to the “absence of persecution of people but not their acceptance into society as full and welcomed members of community”. Toleration is actually nothing but a form of governmentality, designed to maintain peace and order in multi-ethnic and multi-nominational contexts. The Ottoman imperial experience and the Turkish national experience approve that the Turkish nation tolerate those non-Muslims, non-Sunni-Muslims and non-Turks as long as they did not disturb or go against the Sunni-Islam-Turkish order. If ethno-cultural and religious minorities did transgress, their recognition could easily turn into suppression and persecution.

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